

## 1.4 RASA AS THE CHARACTER'S EMOTION, AND HOW WE KNOW IT

\**Commentary on the Treatise on Drama*, of Bhatta Lollata (c. 825)

Lamentably meager though the remaining fragments of his work may be, with Bhatta Lollata we can perceive the true commencement of the extraordinarily intense investigation into literary emotion that would make the next three centuries in India the most fertile in the history of aesthetics anywhere before European modernity. This commencement was no doubt the result of a rediscovery of, or at least reengagement with, Bharata's *Treatise on Drama* in Kashmir in the early ninth century, a work that raised, in a productive way, as many questions about rasa as it answered.

Although Bhatta Lollata is cited before Udbhata in what would appear to be a chronological listing in a verse in a fourteenth-century musicology treatise ("The commentators on the treatise of Bharata were Lollata, Udbhata, Shankuka, Abhinavagupta, and Kirtidhara"),<sup>156</sup> the selection below from Abhinavagupta's *New Dramatic Art* makes clear that Bhatta Lollata opposed some positions of "Udbhata's followers," so he is likely to be later than 800; and since he himself is the direct object of critique by Shri Shankuka, whom we can reasonably place around 850 (see next selection), putting Bhatta Lollata early in the first half of the ninth century would make sense of all our data.

Although a dozen short citations on technical questions of dramaturgy are preserved from his commentary on the *Treatise*, what we know about Bhatta Lollata's view of rasa is largely restricted to the brief passages presented below. But two verses from what appears to be another work of his on literary criticism, entitled the *Exegesis of Rasa* (*Rasavivarāṇa*), are cited by the late twelfth-century scholar Hemachandra when discussing complex figures of sound:

Such figures as this have no purpose other than displaying the poet's skill, and I will not bother with defining their subtypes. They are really an excrescence on the literary work since they do not serve the purpose of teaching any of the ends of man.

Good poets, after all, compose poetry to turn tender minds toward those ends, and a poem where the *rasa* is completely impeded by sound figures requiring special effort to make sense of is hardly a happy means to such a goal. And in actual fact, descriptions of rivers, mountains, oceans, and so on really just destroy the *rasa*; how much more so an altogether impenetrable poem. Thus Lollata [sic]: “Exertions in describing rivers, mountains, oceans, cities, horses, towns, and the like that have no purpose other than displaying a poet’s skills are not approved by serious scholars for inclusion in literary works. All the variety of sound figures, ‘twinning’ forms (*yamaka*) and the rest . . . completely impede the *rasa*, and if not simply a poet’s egotistical ostentation, are a result of his blindly following convention.”<sup>157</sup>

Even from this brief citation, Bhatta Lollata can be seen as a forerunner of Anandavardhana in holding that *rasa* must constitute the core of the literary experience, so much so that anything not contributing to *rasa*, let alone detracting from it, must be eliminated. A twelfth-century commentator preserves a historical memory of the importance of Bhatta Lollata’s views by declaring that if “Lollata, mountainlike himself, could not plumb the depths of the ocean of *rasa*,” then who else could?<sup>158</sup>

Bhatta Lollata’s interpretation of Bharata’s *Sutra on Rasa* marks the starting point of what would evolve into the standard historical narrative of the development of *rasa* theory, one that would endure basically unchanged to the end of the seventeenth century. Bhatta Lollata argues first that there is one crucial thing left unstated in the *Sutra on Rasa*, namely, the place in the whole process of the stable emotion itself. It is when the aesthetic elements are “conjoined” with the stable emotion, he asserts, that *rasa* arises, because *rasa* is in fact nothing but the stable emotion in a state of being “strengthened” or “enhanced” by these elements. Moreover, the stable emotion in question is that of the character and the character alone; it is decidedly not that of the spectator, about whom Bhatta Lollata, to judge from our fragments, is silent and apparently indifferent. The same holds for the reactions: these are responses in the main character to his own stable emotion, not those produced by his *rasa* in another character, let alone the reactions of the viewer/reader, as later thinkers would maintain.<sup>159</sup> For Bhatta Lollata, “reactions” are the sorts of physical responses discussed in the *Treatise* itself, as in the case of the erotic *rasa*: “The erotic is to be acted out by reactions such as the skillful play of the eyes, movements of the eyebrows, and sidelong glances.”<sup>160</sup> Hence, it is in the character that *rasa* exists “in the literal sense,” and in the actor only figuratively—but in no sense in the spectator, an interpretation whose reality later commentators would confirm even as they sought to refute it.<sup>161</sup> In fact, Bhatta Lollata’s understanding of the ontology of *rasa* accords fully with the position of Bharata himself, for whom *rasa* is the intensified stable emotion and simply and naturally “arises” from the conjuncture of the aesthetic elements.<sup>162</sup> This view would remain dominant for



many subsequent writers, including Kuntaka at the end of the tenth century, and even Bhanudatta as late as the early fifteenth.

## FROM \*COMMENTARY ON THE TREATISE ON DRAMA, OF BHATTA LOLLATA

### Restatements of Bhatta Lollata's doctrine

(#1a, Abhinavagupta)<sup>163</sup>

Bhatta Lollata and others, first of all, have interpreted the *Sutra on Rasa* of the *Treatise on Drama* ("Rasa arises from the conjunction of factors, reactions, and transitory emotions") to mean: rasa arises when there is a "conjunction of factors, etc.," i.e., a conjunction between these aesthetic elements *and the stable emotion*. With respect to the elements, the factors<sup>164</sup> are the cause that generates a mental state, namely, the particular stable emotion itself. The reactions meant in this analysis are not those *produced by rasa*, since they could not then be counted as *causes of rasa* as they are here;<sup>165</sup> they are rather reactions to the stable emotion.<sup>166</sup> As for the transitory emotions, although they are themselves mental states and therefore should not be able to coexist with a stable emotion,<sup>167</sup> nonetheless what is meant here by "stable emotion" is simply the dominant predisposition.<sup>168</sup> It is just as in Bharata's analogy of the mixed drink: among the various condiments,<sup>169</sup> spices, and substances a certain one acts as the dominant "perfuming" element,<sup>170</sup> and hence is like the stable emotion, whereas other ingredients appear intermittently, and hence are like transitory emotions. Therefore, it is the stable emotion alone, once strengthened by the aesthetic elements, that constitutes rasa; in the unstrengthened state it remains a stable emotion.<sup>171</sup> Rasa in the primary sense of the term<sup>172</sup> exists in the character, Rama for instance; it exists in the actor only by force of his complete identification with the part.<sup>173</sup>

(#2a, Abhinavagupta)<sup>174</sup>

Bhatta Lollata argued that, although rasas were potentially infinite in number, it was the opinion of experts that only those listed by Bharata were capable of portrayal on the stage.<sup>175</sup>

(#3a, Abhinavagupta)<sup>176</sup>

According to the followers of Udbhata . . . were the actor really to undergo the experience of rasa and emotion he would be overcome by them during a death scene, say, and utterly fail to keep the rhythm of the dance. . . . Bhatta Lollata rejects this view of Udbhata's followers. For one thing, it is perfectly possible for the actor to experience rasas and emotions as well, by way of the stimulation of his own predispositions. For another, he would be able to keep the rhythm by virtue of his complete identification<sup>177</sup> with the part.

(#4a, Ruyyaka)<sup>178</sup>

In Bhatta Lollata's view, the "conjunction" referred to in the *Sutra on Rasa* is a threefold relationship: object and means of *production*; object and means of *knowledge*; object and means of *enhancement*. These correspond, respectively, to the factors (both foundational and stimulant), the reactions, and the transitory emotions. And on this view, accordingly, the word "arises" in the *Sutra* is explained in three different ways as well. Thus, *rasa* in the primary sense of the term is the stable emotion coming into being in the character and present in him in an enhanced form. In an unenhanced state it remains the stable emotion.<sup>179</sup> In the actor *rasa* exists only in a figurative sense.

*\*Commentary on the Treatise on Drama, of Shri Shankuka (c. 850)*

Like the work of Bhatta Lollata—who inaugurates an era of not only reengagement with the *Treatise on Drama* but also regrettable textual loss—all the writings of Shri Shankuka have disappeared save for a few fragments of commentary and poems. This marks what is probably the most grievous loss in the history of *rasa* discourse after Bhatta Nayaka.

There is no reason to doubt that the literary theorist we are concerned with was the same as the poet mentioned by the twelfth-century chronicler Kalhana as the author of the court poem *Triumph of the World* (*Bhuvanābhyudaya*). According to the *River of Kings*, in 850/1 during the reign of King Ajitapida, a terrible battle took place between two royal factions, and "the poet Shankuka, a veritable moon to swell the ocean of learned minds, composed a poem about this battle called *Triumph of the World*."<sup>180</sup> A dozen or so verses of Shankuka are preserved in an important fifteenth-century anthology, though these tell us nothing specific about the poet; one verse cited in another (dated 1363) is ascribed to "Shankuka, son of Mayura," though whether this is the Mayura who composed the *Hundred Poems to the Sun* (*Sūryaśataka*), we have no way of determining.<sup>181</sup> A late twelfth- or early thirteenth-century dramaturgical work refers to Shri Shankuka as a minister who was also a dramatist and remembers at least one of his plays, a romantic comedy called *The Earring of the Many-Colored Lotus* (*Citrotpalāvalambitaka*); it also refers to a dramaturgical argument of his not known from elsewhere.<sup>182</sup> That the text of his commentary on the *Treatise on Drama* was still available then seems impossible to believe; neither Mammata (c. 1050) nor Hemachandra (d. 1172), to judge from their interpretations, knew anything more about it than what they had read in Abhinavagupta.<sup>183</sup> At all events, with a likely date of about 850, we can be sure that Shri Shankuka preceded Anandavardhana (patronized by the subsequent king, Avantivarman, whose rule commenced in 855/6), of whom he appears from the surviving materials to know nothing.



An older argument that Shri Shankuka may have been a Buddhist is worth renewed consideration.<sup>184</sup> While each individual piece of evidence may not be all that strong, aggregated they carry some force. Shri Shankuka quotes a verse from the work of Dharmakīrti, the great Buddhist philosopher of the seventh century, though other later scholars (such as Mahima Bhatta) who were not Buddhists quote him too. The honorific “Shri” might (though does not necessarily) suggest Buddhist affiliation, but he would have had to be a recent convert if he was indeed the son of the poet Mayura. The later critic Bhatta Tota is able to challenge one of Shri Shankuka’s interpretations on the (implicit) grounds that it would force him to accept the category of the universal (*sāmānya* or *jāti*) and hence to fall victim to the fallacy of defending a position at variance with his core beliefs (*apasiddhānta*)—and it was only the Buddhists who rejected universals. He accords a central place in his theory to logic in general and inference in particular—one of the only two means of valid knowledge accepted by Buddhists—so much so that when he brings the buzzsaw of inferential reasoning down on Bhatta Lollata, very little is left. But then again, other, non-Buddhist thinkers were logicians in ninth- and tenth-century Kashmir, among them two of the greatest (Bhasarvajña and Bhatta Jayanta). Last, Abhinava appears to attribute to Shri Shankuka a new understanding of the tragic *rasa*, as general compassion rather than grief for the loss of a loved one, which fits with developments in Mahayana Buddhism.<sup>185</sup>

As in the case of Bhatta Lollata, Shri Shankuka’s commentary on the *Treatise on Drama* has vanished except for the quotations preserved by Abhinavagupta, who, when he is not simply referencing his interpretations on technical questions of the theater or variant readings of the text,<sup>186</sup> opposes him at every point. But Shri Shankuka’s ideas are not easily dismissed. His important distinction between referential and expressive language, whereby he critiques Udbhata’s new doctrine of the place of the “proper terms” in the creation of *rasa*, would be picked up by Anandavardhana in his own way and restated by Abhinava even as he dismisses it.<sup>187</sup> His key argument in aesthetics, while apparently primarily an epistemological one (how *rasa* is apprehended), is actually ontological (what *rasa* is): because we cannot directly perceive emotion, we must infer it, and the content of such inferring, as in all inference, obviously cannot be the real thing itself. For precisely this reason Shri Shankuka understands *rasa* as an imitation (*anukarāṇa*, *anukṛti*, literally an “after-making”) in the actor of the stable emotion in the main character. And all the aesthetic elements—the factors, reactions, and so on—can therefore be configured as components of an inferential process whereby this emotion in the character comes to be known.

Yet the kind of knowledge involved in such aesthetic inference is unlike any other. In cognizing an entity we typically reach one of four possible conclusions: that we have cognized the real entity; that the entity we have cognized is proven to be false after we first thought it to be real; that the cognition is uncertain—it may or may not be the entity we think; or that we have only cognized something similar to what we thought we had

cognized. None of these possibilities pertains to aesthetic inference. Instead, as Shri Shankuka says, introducing an analogy that would be repeated down the ages and that tells us as much about the aesthetic objectives of Indian art as about Shri Shankuka's theory, our experience of the character in a play is like our experience of a painted figure, a horse for example, in a painting; we do not say the painting is *like* a horse, or posit any other of the three cognitive relationships; we simply acknowledge, "This is a horse." Rasa for Shri Shankuka would seem then to be a theory of perfect mimesis, where the viewer is not equating an image with a thing but simply seeing the thing itself so long as the play lasts or the painting is visible (although imperfect mimesis—absence of perspective, say—could arguably produce a reality effect as well). As the literary critic Kuntaka was to put it a century and a half after Shri Shankuka: "This is in the first place to postulate a comparability: between a poem and a painting, a poem's techniques and a painting's, and a poet and painter, because in both cases the principal objective is to reference the actual nature of a thing."<sup>188</sup>

Of course literature may be said to create what it only imitates (or is thought to imitate), and imitation, as Indian art shows, is no selfsame thing. Yet this was not the grounds on which the theory would be attacked. It was rather the notion of imitation itself, which was viewed as more a phenomenological than an aesthetic problem—whether and what precisely the actor is imitating, not whether the poet is imitating the world—and the critique of imitation on the part of Bhatta Tota in the following century would ensure for Shri Shankuka what Shri Shankuka himself had ensured for Bhatta Lollata: that his work would be consigned (almost) to oblivion.

## FROM \*COMMENTARY ON THE TREATISE ON DRAMA, OF SHRI SHANKUKA

### Restatements of Shri Shankuka's doctrine

(#1a, Abhinavagupta)<sup>189</sup>

Shri Shankuka rejects the view of Bhatta Lollata<sup>190</sup> for seven reasons: [1] Logically, we cannot have any awareness of a stable emotion *prior* to its connection with the aesthetic elements, since those elements are the inferential signs required for such an awareness. [We cannot, after all, have an awareness of fire on a mountain without first perceiving smoke, KA.]

[2] It would turn out that the stable emotions would have to have been mentioned prior to the rasa. [If in the definition of rasa as understood by Bhatta Lollata (where it is the stable emotion enhanced by the aesthetic elements that is rasa) the stable emotion were in fact the subject and rasa the predicate, the former should have been mentioned first by Bharata, KLV.]<sup>191</sup> [That is to say, if Bharata had thought it was the



stable emotion itself that turned into *rasa* as a result of a conjunction—having first been brought into being by the factors, indicated by the reactions, and enhanced by the transitory emotions—then it would have been appropriate to list and define the stable emotions first, which he has not done. The *rasas* are in fact listed and defined first, KA; and the stable emotions only later, KLV.]

[3] If *rasa* were simply the stable emotion enhanced, no purpose would be served in providing as Bharata does another explanation when the stable emotion is supposedly augmented so as to become a *rasa*. [Why, that is, does the sage first describe the factors and reactions of the *rasas*, and once again describe precisely the same factors and reactions of the stable emotions? KA; if *rasa* were simply the stable emotion enhanced, there would be no point in setting out the factors and reactions again, KLV.]<sup>192</sup> [For when defining the *rasas* one after the other, Bharata will say something like the following: “Next, the heroic *rasa*. It is embodied in a character of high status, and consists of determination. It arises from such factors as lack of confusion, intentness, leadership, discipline, strength, valor, power, fortitude, and might.” And when later on he refers again to the stable emotion he says, “The stable emotion called determination is embodied in a character of high status. It arises from such factors as power, courage, and the absence of despondency.”<sup>193</sup> These statements are identical in meaning, but when *rasa* is *defined* the factors and so on are discussed at length, and only sparsely when the stable emotions are reiterated. Moreover, it would be useless to explain the cause of a thing’s arising and to repeat it when the thing is enhanced, KA.]

[4] [If it is claimed that the stable emotion is the unenhanced state and *rasa* the enhanced state, KA], there would turn out to be an infinite number of stable emotions given the infinite degrees of enhancement to which each of them is subject, from dull to duller to dullest, and so on,<sup>194</sup> [as well as innumerable *rasas* from intense, to more intense, to most intense, KA, KLV].

[Were “*rasa*” the name reserved for the single point when the stable emotion reaches the state of full strengthening, we would have several problems, KA.] [5] It would be impossible for there to be the six types of comic *rasa* that Bharata identified.<sup>195</sup> [6] [Furthermore, Bharata states that desire has ten stages,<sup>196</sup> with each later one relatively more intense than the previous. Here too, given the possibility that each has its own relatively greater degree of intensity, KA] it would turn out that we would have innumerable erotic *rasas* and stable emotions of desire in each of the ten stages. [7] [It would also turn out that *rasas* and emotions would always progressively intensify, KLP.] [While Bhatta Lollata has argued that the stable emotion of the initial stage<sup>197</sup> gradually turns into *rasa* when it is strengthened, KA], what we find actually occurring is the opposite. Grief, for example, is powerful at first but gradually lessens rather than strengthens. This is also the case with anger, determination, and desire:

[once these stable emotions arise, each from its own cause, KA] we find them diminishing over time with the loss of indignation, resolve, and satisfaction, respectively.<sup>198</sup>

Therefore, [the *Sutra on Rasa* has to be interpreted differently, and as follows. The “conjunction” referred to there is an *inferential* relationship among the aesthetic elements, KA]. On the strength of inferential signs—the causes known as the factors; the effects consisting of the reactions; the auxiliary causes,<sup>199</sup> namely, the transitory emotions—which, though factitious, since they are acquired by human effort,<sup>200</sup> are not recognized as such, we apprehend as existing in the actor a stable emotion that is an *imitation* of the stable emotion in the main character, Rama, say, and precisely because it is an imitation it is designated by the special term “*rasa*.”<sup>201</sup>

A distinct comprehension<sup>202</sup> of the foundational and stimulant factors is gained<sup>203</sup> on the strength of the literary narrative itself; the reactions are something the actor is trained to produce; the transitory emotions [267] are gotten by inference from their own associated factitious reactions. But we have no way of apprehending the stable emotions, not even from the literary narrative. The proper terms for them, “desire,” “grief,” and so on, simply render these things referents, insofar as they denote them; they do not make us *understand* them as if they were “verbal acting,” or expression.<sup>204</sup> For *referential* language as such is not at the same time *expressive*; it is the medium whereby expression is achieved, just as the limbs of the body are not in and of themselves expressive but the medium whereby expression in acting is achieved. Accordingly, in verses such as the following,<sup>205</sup>

Although my *grief* is distended, profound, endless, and vast,  
it is siphoned off by my anger, like the ocean’s water by the submarine fire.<sup>206</sup>

or

He was so paralyzed by *grief* that his counselors raised a hue and cry,  
and fearing that his heart might burst, they begged him to try to weep.<sup>207</sup>

grief is not being “acted out” or “expressed,” but simply denoted. In the following poem, however,

As she drew my portrait a stream of teardrops came falling  
that made my body appear to perspire at the touch of her hand.<sup>208</sup>

the sentence not only denotes its proper sense, it “acts out,” or expresses, King Udayana’s stable emotion (here, pleasurable desire) and does not just speak of it. For the



“verbal register of acting,” or verbal expression, is the power enabling us to understand something, and is above and beyond the mere saying of the thing. For precisely this reason [the fact that a stable emotion cannot be understood directly from the literary narrative, KLV] the sage does not mention “stable emotion” in the *Sutra on Rasa* itself, not even in a separate case form.<sup>209</sup> [It is only when conjoined with the aesthetic elements, and by no means prior to that point, that the stable emotion can be apprehended, and only as an imitation, KLV.] Accordingly, *rasa* must be an imitation of a stable emotion,<sup>210</sup> and hence it makes sense for the sage to say later that it “arises from” the stable emotion, or “consists of” it.<sup>211</sup> We certainly have evidence<sup>212</sup> that real effects (such as *rasa*) can arise from knowledge of something unreal (like the content of an inference based on an imitation). To quote: “Two men run toward two sparkling lights, one a gem and one a lamp, both thinking the lights a gem. Although there is no difference regarding their false knowledge, there is a difference regarding their real effects.”<sup>213</sup>

In this inferential process none of the following notions arises in us: that [1] the actor is actually the happy Rama;<sup>214</sup> or that [2] the actor is not in fact Rama and not really happy when we had first thought him to be the happy Rama;<sup>215</sup> or that [3] he may or may not be Rama; or that [4] he is similar to Rama. Instead, the aesthetic apprehension we have is different from all four, [1] a true apprehension,<sup>216</sup> [2] a false one, [3] a doubt, and [4] a similitude. It is, instead, an apprehension that can be analogized to that of a painted picture of a horse, and has the form: “Here is the happy Rama.”<sup>217</sup> To quote:<sup>218</sup> “There is no appearance of doubt, or indeed of truth or falsehood—we have the thought, ‘This is him,’ and not ‘This is *actually* him.’ We encounter no antithetical ideas,<sup>219</sup> and so nothing makes us aware of the conflation.<sup>220</sup> It is an experience we actually undergo, and what logical argument can confute such empirical evidence?”

(#2a, Abhinavagupta)<sup>221</sup>

Shri Shankuka held that, in the course of a dramatic performance, while relishing the *rasa* in the actor, a viewer apprehends the stable emotion in the character, whereas in the actual world depicted in the drama<sup>222</sup> a *dramatis persona*<sup>223</sup> causes the *rasa* to come into being.<sup>224</sup> The second position, that emotion and the other aesthetic elements precede *rasa*, accords with the training intended by the teachers of drama. This is why there is in fact a third option.<sup>225</sup>

[(#2b, Hemachandra)<sup>226</sup>

Therefore, emotion does not precede *rasa*, but just the reverse. When the sage states, “Whether *rasa* precedes emotion or emotion *rasa* is a function of the nature of the case: in the course of a dramatic performance, while relishing the *rasa* in the actor, viewers apprehend the stable emotion in the character,” he is affirming

the first option. In the actual world depicted in the drama, however, it is as a result of the character's first seeing "emotion"<sup>227</sup> that its essential form, namely *rasa*, arises.] (#3a, Mammata)<sup>228</sup>

Shri Shankuka's position is as follows. The stable emotion is inferred to exist in the actor;<sup>229</sup> whom we grasp by a mode of comprehension different from all four normal forms of apprehension. . . . This inference arises from a "conjunction"—that is, an inferential relationship—of three elements: (1) a cause, which is designated by the term "foundational and stimulant factor"; (2) an effect, which is designated by the term "reaction"; (3) an auxiliary cause, which is designated by the term "transitory emotion." The first is distinctly comprehended from the literary narration itself, such as in the following verse, where we have a foundational factor for the erotic *rasa* enjoyed:

Here she comes into view, a stream of ambrosia upon my limbs,  
a salve applied to my eyes, my heart's desire incarnate, my life breath's mistress.

Or in the next verse, where we have a stimulant factor in the erotic *rasa* thwarted:

By a cruel fate I have been parted from her, that woman with large darting eyes—  
and at the same time the season has come of dense, racing clouds.<sup>230</sup>

The other two elements are manifested by the actor himself by revealing the effects of each, something he is able to accomplish thanks to training and practice.<sup>231</sup> Although these aesthetic elements are factitious, they are not recognized as such; and although the stable emotion is grasped by inference, it is different from any other thing we infer insofar as it is something tasted, thanks to the beauty of the aesthetic event [—it is like our mouth puckering on seeing someone relishing a lemon, KA]. It enters our imagination<sup>232</sup> as the stable emotion<sup>233</sup> of the character, and although it is completely nonexistent in the actor himself, it is something that can be relished by the audience members by way of their own predispositions. The inferred stable emotion thus relished is *rasa*.<sup>234</sup>

### On the Tragic *Rasa*

(#4a, Abhinavagupta)<sup>235</sup>

The term *karuṇā* (with -ā) refers in everyday life to the sense of compassion.<sup>236</sup> It receives the technical designation of *karuṇa* (with -a), or the tragic *rasa*, when the spectators apprehend the presence of grief in the actor by means of inferential signs.<sup>237</sup>



## On the Psychophysical Element

(#5a, Abhinavagupta)<sup>238</sup>

The following verses of Bharata,

Special effort must be taken in the case of psychophysical acting, since drama is founded upon it. . . . The psychophysical, which is connected with a particular emotion, is unmanifest, but it can be made known by its various properties—horripilation, tears, etc.—and so endowed with the *rasa* appropriate to the locus.<sup>239</sup>

have been interpreted by Shri Shankuka and others as follows: Why does the psychophysical require such serious “effort”? Here is the answer: The psychophysical in a particular character, Rama for example, is “connected with an emotion,” that is, engendered by an intense state of concentration, and is productive of such psychophysical responses as horripilation. This inner psychophysical element in the drama is “unmanifest,” or invisible, and can be “known” only by way of those things that are properties of it, such as horripilation, since they prompt us to infer it as their cause (there would be no causality<sup>240</sup> only if those properties were ever to come into existence in the *absence* of pleasure, pain, and so on). Moreover, it is then “endowed” with the *rasa* that happens to be the principal one in relation to the emotion under discussion, and can be known, as pleasure or pain, only with substantial effort by means of the *rasa* in the character. The horripilation and so on are the effects of this element, and in the absence of this or that outcome, how could a performance pertaining to the psychophysical element from which those effects derive ever succeed without a substantial effort? Such is the gist of the matter.<sup>241</sup>