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## Studies on Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti* Part II: What is Memory?<sup>1</sup>

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The present paper is the second of a series of papers in which I have been presenting the critical edition and English translation of the fragmentary codex unicus of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti*, the long commentary that Utpaladeva composed on his own *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā* (ĪPK) and *svavṛtti*, a work of outstanding importance for the philosophy of Kāśmirian Śaivādvaita, and for Indian philosophy as a whole. I need not repeat here what I have already said elsewhere on the nature of the *Vivṛti* and its relation to the other commentaries.<sup>2</sup> Suffice it to recall that Utpaladeva is said to have composed the ĪPK and the concise *Vṛtti* at the same time, and later on to have devoted an analytic commentary to the complex *Kārikā-Vṛtti*, i.e. our *Vivṛti* (or *Ṭikā*), in which he discussed possible alternative views and rejected them, also making occasionally quite long digressions on particular subjects. Of this lengthy work – corresponding to the extent of 8000 *ślokas* (hence the traditional denomination of *Aṣṭasāhasrī*) – only a comparatively small fragment has come down to us, covering the section ĪPK I.3.6 through I.5.3. A detailed exposition of my discovery of the original manuscript – after a cursory consultation, some 15 years ago, of a transcript of the same made by PROF. K. CH. PANDEY – can be found in the first study that I have devoted to this text (TORELLA forthcoming), which also contains a description of the manuscript (National Archives, Delhi, Skt. Mss. No. 30).

The present paper deals with the *Vivṛti* on ĪPK I.4.1–2. In the previous chapter Utpaladeva, referring to an enigmatic statement in the *Bhagavad-*

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<sup>1</sup> This paper that I have dedicated to PROF. MICHAEL HAHN as a token of appreciation to the scholar and of affection to the old friend is perhaps a bit far away from his preferred field of research, but I remember what once he told me during my stay at his house at Oden-dorf: that the fact that we both liked to work on unpublished sources created a stronger link between us than the mere sharing the same subject ...

<sup>2</sup> TORELLA 2002: XL–XLV.

*gītā*,<sup>3</sup> had identified three powers (*śakti*) in the Lord: Cognition, Memory and Exclusion. After making some preliminary remarks concerning them as a whole, he starts now a detailed inquiry into each of them. His aim is to show that cognition, memory and exclusion, which constitute the very basis of the knowledge process in human mind, are indirectly also a proof of the coinciding of the individual subject with universal Consciousness. None of these phenomena can be really explained and their complex functioning accounted for satisfactorily in merely 'mechanic' terms, as first of all the Buddhists do. The individual subject can cognize, remember and exclude only if it is conceived of as inscribed within an eternal and, at the same time, dynamic universal I-ness, i.e. Śiva.

If Utpaladeva's investigation starts with memory, by infringing the above stated order, it is "because in a very clear manner (*suspaṣṭam*) memory can serve as a logical reason for the establishment of the identity of the self with the Lord".<sup>4</sup> The starting point is the classical definition of memory given in *Yogasūtra* I.11: "Memory is the non-extinction of the object formerly perceived" (*anubhūtavaiṣayāsampramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ*). The sustained analysis of Utpaladeva singles out a few crucial points contained in such an apparently simple process: How is it possible to attribute temporal differentiation to a cognizer that is permanent in his essential nature? What is the relationship between the cognitive act of the original perception and the cognitive act of the subsequent memory? How can the latter bring the former to light again without objectifying it? On this point, in fact, the Śaiva and his principal opponent, the Buddhist epistemologist, are in full agreement: a cognition is self-luminous and cannot be the object of another cognition. The standard Buddhist explanation is far from being satisfactory: saying that the perception produces a *saṃskāra*, which in turn will produce the phenomenon of memory, only accounts for the fact that memory has a certain objective content but leaves out the 'subjective' component represented by the fact that the object has been 'coloured' by the previous perception, or, to be more precise, by its having been 'already' perceived in a certain past moment. Memory, in fact, is indeed the memory of the past object but also of the past perception of it. Instead, as Abhinavagupta says,<sup>5</sup> what the *saṃskāra* is able to convey (or resurrect) is neither the original

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<sup>3</sup> *Bhagavadgītā* XV.15b *mattaḥ smṛtir jñānam apohanam ca* "From Me derive memory, knowledge and exclusion."

<sup>4</sup> So we read at the very beginning of the *Vivṛti* on I.4.1; see below, p. 535.

<sup>5</sup> See below, fn. 83.

perception nor the object insofar as it was cognized by such past perception. This presupposes a living organism at work, a dynamic and unitary consciousness able to freely move between different moments of time.<sup>6</sup> Having this in mind, Utpaladeva deliberately introduces an apparently little but in fact quite significant change in the *Yogasūtra* definition, by reading *asampramoṣaṇam* in the place of *asampramoṣaḥ*.<sup>7</sup> Due to the very nature of the phenomenon of memory, consciousness is expected to work at the level of individual subject, fully within the world of *māyā*. As Utpaladeva puts it:<sup>8</sup> “For this function belongs to the Lord alone, identical with consciousness, and takes place due to His freedom, in these terms: it is the Lord that, having assumed the form of the [limited] knower, identified with the *puryaṣṭaka* and other planes onto which freedom is superimposed, cognizes, remembers or ascertains.”

But how, analytically, does the process of memory work? Both the act of ascertainment (*niścaya*, *adhyavasāya*) and memory belong to the category of *vikalpa*, being the *māyic* form of *vimarśa*. The main difference between *adhyavasāya*, immediately following the original manifestation (or ‘shining’) of the object — that is, its perception —, and *smṛti*, which is instead more or less distant from it, is that in the former case we have the reflective awareness (*parāmarśa*) ‘this’, while in the latter we have the reflective awareness ‘that’. However, according to the Pratyabhijñā philosophy, only a *parāmarśa* of a presently ‘shining’ object is possible. So memory cannot have as its object something which only ‘shone’ in the past (*Vṛtti: prakāśitasya parāmarśo na kṛtaḥ syāt*).<sup>9</sup> Once the matter has been put in these

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<sup>6</sup> The point has been explicitly touched, in a different context, by Utpaladeva in *ĪPK* I.3.2cd [...] *saṃskārajaṭvaṃ tu tattulyatvaṃ na tadgaṭiḥ* “The fact that [memory] arises from latent impressions implies its similarity to the former perception, but not its cognition of that.” The *saṃskāra* of the former perception is awakened by a present perception — similar to the other — which gives rise to the memory. The *saṃskāra*, therefore, ensures this ‘similarity’ in the memory, but the memory itself has no direct access to (cannot ‘know’) the former perception, nor can it, strictly speaking, establish the similarity between the latter and the present perception which has been reawakened by the *saṃskāra* (TORELLA 2002: 99 f., fn. 4). *Vṛtti* thereon: “Since memory arises from the latent impression left by the former perception, it only bears a similarity to that perception but does not have direct cognition of the latter; and, moreover, as there is no cognition of the former perception not even the similarity to it can be maintained.”

<sup>7</sup> A *lyūḍanta* word like *asampramoṣaṇam* is more inclined to express a process than the *ghaṇanta* word *asampramoṣaḥ*. See below, fn. 78.

<sup>8</sup> See below, p. 539.

<sup>9</sup> See below, p. 542.

terms (the possibility that memory might have as its 'object' the former perception had been discarded at the outset), Utpaladeva is able to point to the centrality of a dynamic I as the only way to get out of the impasse. It is the I that ensures the possibility of unifying the various cognitions occurring at different times, thus resolving the apparent inconsistency between a (present) *vimarśa* and a (past) *anubhava*. The one and same *svasaṃvedana* of both cognitions creates that necessary bridge between them which the Buddhist epistemologist fails to account for.<sup>10</sup> A further clarification is provided by Abhinavagupta in the *ĪPVV* (II, p. 32, ll. 10–13): the *prakāśa* concerning the part-object (*arthāmśe*) belongs to the past; but the *prakāśa* as grasped by the *vimarśa*, concerning the part-self (*svātmāmśe*), is not limited by time. Thus the *vimarśa* in the memory can connect itself with the *vimarśa* in the perception and, through it, with the former light of the object — in this way meeting both requirements: taking place in the present and not being divorced from *prakāśa* (TORELLA 2002: 106f., fn. 12).

In the course of the exploration of the mechanism of memory, Utpaladeva has to explain his position with regard to the object of memory. The object of memory is, in principle, the same as the object of perception: the unique particular, the *svalakṣaṇa* of the Buddhists, belonging to a specific time and space and having a specific form. But just as the original perception had caught with definiteness only some aspects of the *svalakṣaṇa*, so the memory usually resurrects only some aspects of it, and not necessarily the same. The starting point of this long digression, which will turn into an investigation into the nature of the universal, the particular and their relationship, is the degree of vividness of the remembered object. Vividness (*sphuṭatva*) depends on how many aspects or components of the thing are manifested in memory. In fact, the apparently unitary *svalakṣaṇa* is composed of a number of 'manifestations' (*ābhāsa*), each of them having the nature of universal.<sup>11</sup> But if it is true that the more numerous *sāmānyas*

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *ĪPVV* II, p. 17, ll. 22f. *anubhavasmrtyor ekaṃ svasaṃvedanarūpam ekaviśayato-palambhāt*.

<sup>11</sup> Utpaladeva's concept of *svalakṣaṇa* seems (and, in a sense, indeed is) just the opposite of the Buddhist's (for a detailed discussion see TORELLA 1992: 332–336). For the Buddhist epistemologist the starting point is the particular; perception grasps it in its entirety but is also inexpressible and uncommunicable; many different *niscayas* may stem from this single perceptual content, each of them captures a part of it and connects it with a word, which therefore denotes a certain *sāmānya* (or rather the negation of what is other than that feature). For Utpaladeva, each *pramāṇa* grasps an individual *ābhāsa* (which is a *sāmānya*), expressed by a determinate word, depending on a determinate reflective awareness, or grasps

unite, the more individualized is the object, and the more vivid is its manifestation in memory, it is also true that *sāmānyas* are not on the same plane. Even a single *sāmānya* can as well be manifested vividly, when it comprises a multiplicity of broader universals (this is the case, Utpaladeva says, of the universal 'dhava' [*Grislea tomentosa*] with respect, e.g., to the universal 'treeness'). In referring to a hierarchy of *sāmānyas*, Utpaladeva is likely to have in mind Bhartṛhari's conception, as expressed in *Jāṭisamuddeśa*, v. 33 *sambandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu | jātir ity ucyate [...]* (cf. Helarāja's commentary, p. 41 *bhidyamānā upacaritabhedā gavāśvādiṣu sattaiva mahāsāmānyam eva jātiḥ gotvāśvatvādikā, aparasāmānyam*). Bhartṛhari, in his turn, seems to derive this conception from the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (I.21 ff.),<sup>12</sup> where the term *sāmānyaviśeṣa* appears for the first time. *sāmānyaviśeṣa* can be taken in a double meaning: "specific *sāmānya*" (versus the highest *sāmānya*: *bhāva*) and "being at the same time *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*". Praśastapāda calls them *para* and *apara sāmānya*: the former causes the notion of continuity, the latter that of distinction.<sup>13</sup>

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— in the perception itself and not in a later cognitive act — a group of *ābhāsas* coordinated by the Lord's power of necessity around a dominant *ābhāsa*, which allows the perception to remain unitary. The group of *ābhāsas* taken in its totality ultimately corresponds to the Buddhist *svalakṣaṇa*. The two conceptions are after all not so opposed to each other: Utpaladeva's *svalakṣaṇa* clearly derives from the *svalakṣaṇa* of the Buddhists, only with a significantly inverted perspective.

<sup>12</sup> See in particular I.2.3 (Candrānanda) *sāmānyam viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam*, I.2.4 *bhāvaḥ sāmānyam eva*, I.2.5 *dravyatvaṃ guṇatvaṃ karmatvaṃ ca sāmānyani viśeṣāś ca*, etc.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. p. 741 *sāmānyam dvividhaṃ — param aparaṃ ca*; p. 743 *tatra sattāsāmānyam param anuvṛttikāraṇam eva*; p. 746 *aparaṃ [...] anuvṛttivyāvṛttihetutvāt sāmānyam viśeṣaś ca bhavati*. See also Bhartṛhari, *Jāṭisamuddeśa*, v. 14 *anupravṛttidharmo vā jātis syāt sarva-jātiṣu | vyāvṛttidharmasāmānyam viśeṣe jātir iṣyate*.

Text<sup>14</sup>

[9v13] <sup>15</sup> vivṛtau<sup>16</sup> smṛtyādīnām idāniṃ jñānaprakaraṇenānena svarūpaṃ nirūpa-  
yiṣyann aśeṣakālānugatasvatantrāva bodha<sup>17</sup> lakṣaṇātmataṭṭvasvabhāveśvaraśaktirūpa-  
 tāṃ pratipipādayiṣuḥ smṛter eva tāvat suspaṣṭam īśvarātmāsiddhihetuta[10r]jyā  
 prathamam sambhavam āha ||

sa hi pūrvānubhūtārthopalabdḥā parato 'pi san |  
 vimṛśan sa iti svairī smaratīty apadiśyate || <1.4.1>

[...] <sup>17</sup> || [11r10] vṛtṭiḥ || paścād api pūrvānubhūtārthānubhavitṭvāt pūrvānubhū-  
 tārthaprakāśāsampramoṣaṇam tasyaikaśya vibhoḥ kartuḥ sa ity atra pūrvānubhūta-  
 tvena pratyavamarśaḥ smṛtir nāma vyāpāraḥ

|| vṛtṭiḥ || bodhātmāno nityatvenaitadavibhaktāyāḥ boddhṛtāyāḥ nityatve 'pi <sup>18</sup> tat-  
 tattathānirmitavibhinnadeśakāloparajanārthoparāgeṇa bodhaikarūpasyā[11v]rthā-  
nubhavyāpi ca bhinnakālatvena pūrvapaścādvavahāraḥ | tad āha "paścād api"  
 iti | ata eva prakāśamānārthādhīnatvād asya kāvyaavahārasya sūtre vṛttau cārtha-  
 śabdopādānaḥ<sup>19</sup> | viśayopalabdḥṛtāpy arthasya prthagbhāve nopapannety anta-  
 rarthānupraveśadarśanārtham arthākāro 'nubhavitety evamarthatātparyeṇa sūtra-

<sup>14</sup> The words underlined in the text are those literally cited in the ĪPVV. Punctuation is mine (that found in the MS is often misleading). In the edition, <...> means 'addition with respect to the transmitted text'; [...], means 'elimination of portions of the transmitted text' (also the indications 'folio' and 'line' are between square brackets). The *sandhi* has been 'normalized'. The establishing of the text has resulted from the delicate balance of sometimes divergent factors: the text as transmitted by the codex unicus, internal coherence, literal citations in the ĪPVV, paraphrases in the ĪPVV, parallel texts. A few literal citations from the *Vivṛti* can be found in the footnotes of the KSTS ed. of the ĪPV, which have been derived from the marginal notes of an important ms. of ĪPV, that sigled Gh in the edition of the ĪPV (the ms. is now at the National Archives, Delhi, where I have consulted it). When the transmitted text has been modified, this has been pointed out by using three different expressions: correction, conjectural emendation and tentative restoration. The first is felt as virtually certain, the second as highly probable, the third as a mere attempt.

<sup>15</sup> The MS regularly reads *vivṛtti-* instead of *vivṛti-*.

<sup>16</sup> The *avatarāṇikā* of the *Vivṛti* is cited in ĪPV I, pp. 115 f., fn. 17.

<sup>17</sup> The *Kārikā* is followed by the text of the ĪPV thereon.

<sup>18</sup> Abhinavagupta seems to have a partly different text: ĪPVV II, p. 5, ll. 10 f. '*tena*' iti *bodhena* | '*te*' iti *anubhūyamānāḥ* [...]. But neither *tena* nor *te* fit the context of the transmitted text, which on the other hand is confirmed by the paraphrase found in ĪPVV immediately after the above passage: p. 5, ll. 11–14 '*tathā*' iti *svarūpād avibhaktā api bodhasvā-* *tantryaprakāreṇa nirmitavibhaktatām iva āpāditāḥ, ata eva vicitraṃ kṛtvā bhinnā bodhā* *ca anyonyaṃ ca, tata eva deśakālaviśeṣaṇā ye arthāḥ, taiḥ prakāśamāṇair yaḥ uparāgaḥ,* *tena hetunā* [...]. The reading °*viśeṣaṇa*° would seem preferable to °*upasarjana*° MS, but cf. p. 8, ll. 24 f. *kevalam apradhānatayā tasya prathanam iti viśeṣaṇatvam upasarjanatvāt*.

<sup>19</sup> °*upādānaḥ*, my conjectural emendation, °*upādānāt* MS (cf. *ibid.* p. 5, ll. 21 f. '*ata eva*' *śaṅkitam pūrvapakṣam arthaśabdopādāne hetutvena upajīvati*).



vṛttyor arthaśabdaśaṣṭhyās tṛcāpi kṛtaḥ samāsaḥ, sa ca jñāpakāt kvacid iṣṭaḥ, trnnantena vā sādhanam kṛteti dvitīyāsamāsaḥ | pany arthasyānubhavamukhenaiva kālāsamparśo vakṣyate viśeṣato 'nubhūtātānubhūyamānatādirūpeṇa | satyam etat, kintv anādinidhanasyaivāsya sarvaśakteḥ cittattvasya māyā yat<sup>20</sup> kālakramāvabhāsanavyāpārā kartṛśaktiḥ saiva ca<sup>21</sup> tadānīm kālāśaktisaṃjñā tattadavidhāvabhāsanīyādikakarmavastusaṃlagnatayā kālakramopasarjanavicitrāvabhāsanādikriyārūpatayā prathate |<sup>22</sup> eṣaiva hi sā<sup>23</sup> parameśvarasyāvabhāsanākhyā kriyāntastattatpadārthāvavibhāyīśātmakecchā[12r]prārambhā bahistadavabhāsanaparyantā nānyat kiñcid iti vakṣyate | smṛtikriyā<sup>24</sup> py<sup>25</sup> asyaivaiśaivāntaḥsthitānubhūtapūrvārthavimarśecchopakramā bahiḥ sa iti tatpūrvakāloparaktānubhūtabhāvāvamārśanāvāsānā | tad āha “anubhūtārthaprakāśa” iti | sampramoṣaṇam iti lyuḍantena kartrvyāpārataḥsphuṭikaraṇāya nirdeśaḥ ghaṭādivailakṣaṇyena sādhyamānatāprādhānyasya rūḍheḥ | cinmayasyeśvarasyaiva hi svātantryād vyāpāro 'yam yad eṣa samāropita-svātantrya<sup>26</sup> puryaṣṭakādiḥpramāṭrūpo jānāti smaraty avasyati<sup>27</sup> vā na tu svasāmārthyena pṛthagbhūtānām jñānasmrtyādivastūnām kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ svatantrāṇām yena viśayabhedas codyate | ata eva “svairī” ity upātṭam vivṛtaṃ ca “kartur” iti, anubhavasmarāṇakālavyāpītvam “sa parato 'pi sann” iti sūtre nirdiṣṭam vivṛtaṃ ca “pāścād api pūrvānubhūtārthānubhavitṛtvād” iti | tathā “ekasya” iti kartrtaiva ca aīśvaryaṃ uktam “vibhor” iti | kevalam<sup>28</sup> anubhavo 'rthasya pravṛttatadarthāva-bhā[12v]saprāmātrantaraiḥbhāvanirmāṇamukhena tadānīm tadanubhavitṛpratyagātmani vakṣyamāṇanayenānupraveṣo nirmāṇam ivāsyābhāsanād | avabhāty api tasminn<sup>29</sup> atatsamāropāpohanātmanā niścayena vinā vyavahāro na pravartate, sa ca niścayo 'nubhava-kāla eva vā bhāvyate 'yam iti, anyadā vā sa iti, ubhayathāpi vā | kālāntare tu sa niścayaḥ pratyavamarśātmā smṛtir ity ucyate | tad uktam “prakāśa-sampramoṣaṇam pratyavamarśa” iti | anugatadeśakālānnavacchinna-tattadābhāsa-mātrapratyavamarśe tu vikalpamātram etac cottaratra vakṣyate <|| I.4.1 ||><sup>30</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *kāla*°, my correction for *akāla*° MS (cf. p. 8, l. 9 *karṭṛśakteḥ kālakramāvabhāsanam nāma vyāpārāḥ*).

<sup>21</sup> Apparently in the text that Abhinavagupta had before him there was *tatra* in the place of *tadānīm* (p. 8, l. 8 '*tatra*' iti *māyāviśaye*).

<sup>22</sup> *eṣaiva*, my correction for *eṣava* MS.

<sup>23</sup> *parameśvarasyā*°, my correction for *parameśvarā*° MS.

<sup>24</sup> *yā* added above the line.

<sup>25</sup> *asyaivaiśaivāntaḥ*°, my conjectural emendation for *asyaivaiśavāntaḥ*° MS.

<sup>26</sup> °*svātantrya*° cit. p. 11, l. 14, incorrectly, as °*svātantrye*.

<sup>27</sup> *vā na tu*, my correction for *vā 'nanta*° MS (*na tu*, strictly required by meaning, is cit. p. 11, l. 25).

<sup>28</sup> *anubhavo 'rthasya pravṛtta*°, my conjectural emendation for *anubhavam arthasya pravṛttam* MS. In emending the transmitted text, I have taken into account the long and complex explanation of the passage given by Abhinavagupta *ibid.* p. 14, l. 23 – p. 15, l. 17.

<sup>29</sup> *ataḥ*°, my correction for *ataḥ* MS.

<sup>30</sup> MS has: || 25 || 1 ||

<Vivṛti> smṛtīvikalparūpaparāmarśasamaye deśakālādyavacchedāt tathāntaḥsthitasya bahir api tad idam ityādisarvanāma<sup>31</sup> nirdeśasyārthasya<sup>32</sup> sāmārthyād eva prakāśo bhavatiṭy āha ||<sup>33</sup> [...]

[13r6] **bhāsaye ca svakāle 'rthāt pūrvābhāsitam āmr̥ṣan |**  
**svalakṣaṇaṃ ghaṭṭābhāsamātreṇāthākḥilātmanā || <I.4.2>**

[...] <sup>34</sup> [14r8] **Vṛttiḥ** || smṛtiśaktyā sa iti pūrvānubhūtaṃ svalakṣaṇaṃ parāmr̥ṣan<sup>35</sup> bhāsayaty evānyathā prakāśitasya parāmarśo na kṛtaḥ syāt svasattākāla eva<sup>36</sup> ca | tena smaraṇakāle naṣṭasyāpy ābhāso na duṣyati | kadācit tv arthitāvaśād ghaṭṭakāñcanadravyasattādyanyatamaikābhāsarūpeṇaivāsyāspṛuṭa<sup>37</sup> vabhāsaḥ, anyadā tu sarvātmanārthitvena<sup>38</sup> spṛuṭa eva, atīṣayanirantarāvahitacetasas tu dṛṣṭārthapratyākṣikāra eva ||

**Vivṛtiḥ** || smṛtau deśakālādyavacchedena pūrvatayānubhūtaṃ parāmr̥ṣan niyata-rūpatayā svalakṣaṇātmānam arthaṃ parāmr̥ṣati | tad āha “smṛtiśaktyā” iti “svalakṣaṇam” iti ca | prakāśasvabhā[14v]vaś ca parāmarśo yathāsau<sup>39</sup> tasyāvaśyaṃ prakāśanena tathā bhāvyam, anyathā parāmarśanam eva nopapadyeta<sup>40</sup>, ato 'tra nāsti vivādaḥ | ata eva “bhāsayaty eva” ity avadhāraṇaṃ tena ca sūtre līnartho niyoga-karaṇalakṣaṇe vivṛtaḥ | kevalaṃ yad yathā parāmr̥ṣyate tat tathaivāvabhāsyate smṛtau ca pūrvaprakāśitasya parāmarśāt pūrvaprakāśita<sup>41</sup> tvenaivāvabhāsaḥ<sup>42</sup> | tad āha “anyathā prakāśitasya parāmarśo na kṛtaḥ syād” iti | eṣa eva ca anubhūtavaiṣayā-

<sup>31</sup> °nirdeśasya, my correction for °nirdeśasya MS.

<sup>32</sup> Here MS adds *syād eva*, then deleted.

<sup>33</sup> The *avataraṇikā* of the *ĪPV* follows.

<sup>34</sup> The text of *ĪPV* follows.

<sup>35</sup> All the mss. of the *Vṛtti* (and, accordingly, my edition) have *ābhāsayati*.

<sup>36</sup> I add *ca*, omitted in MS (and also in one of the mss. I used for my edition of the *Vṛtti*) but explicitly cited by Abhinavagupta (p. 12, ll. 19–21 [...]) “*svasattākāla eva ca*” ity anena vṛttau sphuṭikṛtaḥ | tena smṛtikāle eva ca ābhāsayatiṭi vṛttiyojanā).

<sup>37</sup> The evidence of the *Vivṛti* induces me to accept the reading *asphuṭāvabhāsaḥ* instead of *sphuṭāvabhāsaḥ*, as found in my edition of the *Vṛtti* (both readings had been transmitted by the mss.). I read °*avabhāsaḥ* instead of °*ābhāsaḥ* MS (all the mss. of the *Vṛtti* read °*āvabhāsaḥ*, which is also confirmed p. 25, l. 19 *yā vṛttiḥ* “*avabhāsa*” ity antā).

<sup>38</sup> MS reads *tathaiva sphuṭa eva*; the same reading can be found in three mss. of the *Vṛtti* (J, T; Ch; in Ch *sphuṭa eva* is added in the margin), while the rest of the mss. read *tathaiva* only. In my edition of the *Vṛtti* I had accepted *tathaiva* and considered *sphuṭa eva* an old gloss interpolated into the text. Now, if, as I believe after taking into consideration the arguments of the *Vivṛti*, in the previous line we must read *asphuṭāvabhāsaḥ*, it is instead *tathaiva* to be deleted and only *sphuṭa eva* to be left.

<sup>39</sup> See below fn. 42.

<sup>40</sup> MS has °*dyate* then corrected to °*dyeta*.

<sup>41</sup> °*ta*° added above the line.

<sup>42</sup> What may appear p. 22, ll. 12–14 as a quotation is in fact a paraphrase: ‘*anubhūtasyaivaśyaṃ prakāśaḥ*’ ity ‘*pūrvābhāsitatvenaiva prakāśaḥ*’ ity *ca* vyākhyātam [...].

sampramoṣaḥ | pūrvaprakāśitatvaṃ ca pūrvātīdadeśakālapramātrākāra viśeṣā vacchedenaiva prakāśanād bhavati | tad āha “svasattakāla eva ca” iti | tad evam anyathā parāmarśanābhāvaprasaṅgāt paurvakālikasyārthābhāsasya samarthanāt smaraṇa-kālayogānupayogāt pūrvāvabhāsasya smaraṇakāle nāśānāśavicāro niṣphala eva | tad āha “smaraṇakāle naṣṭasyāpi” iti | etāvata ca smṛtitvam upapadyate 'nyathā pūrvārthāvabhāsānūmeṣe tad abhinavam eva jñānāntaram syāt pūrvārthamātra-viśayaṃ yogina iva | yogino hi yasya prathamah kālābhedaḥ sarvathā na vikalito māyāmāye [15r] puryaṣṭakādaḥ pramāṭary avasthānāparityāgāt tasya smaryamāṇair aparair atītaiḥ saha cārī kaścīd artho 'bhiyogavaśād adṛṣṭapūrvō 'pi tāvaty aṃśe labdhasvarūponmeṣasya sāksātkāreṇāvabhāti, pūrvānubhavasam sparśenaiva vā pramātur vikalpa eva kaścīd atīta viśayaḥ svecchayā kiṃ notpadyate rājā mama pitābhavad ityādiḥ | atrātīte 'py arthe 'tīdadeśādisahacārīṇi jñānābhāsaś tadānīnta-nas tadānīntanapramāṭṛsaṃlagnatvāt, smaraṇe tu pūrvapramāṭṛmayah<sup>43</sup> | tasmāt pūrvāvabhāsonmeṣaḥ smṛtāv avāśyābhyupagamaniyaḥ |<sup>44</sup> arthitvāc ca<sup>45</sup> ābhogava-śena smṛtāv upajātāyāṃ ghaṭādyābhāsasyaiva kāñcanādyābhāśa<sup>46</sup> sambhinnasyāpi yathopayogaṃ pūrvadeśakālābhāsādyavacchedoparāgāt svalakṣaṇarūpasya smaraṇād asphuṭo 'sāv avabhāso bhavati | tad āha “kadācit tu” iti | pūrvadeśakālādyavacchedavirahe tu svatantravikalpeṣu sāmānyākārasyaivaśyāsphuṭasyāvabhāsaḥ | sāmānyāny eva hi prabhūṭāni sambhūyānyonyāvaccchedena vyavasthitāni sphuṭābhāsātām āśādy deśādisāmānyābhāsāvacchedena svalakṣaṇatām bhajante |<sup>47</sup> e-ka[15v]m api ca sāmānyarūpaṃ śākhādīmattvamātraṃ vṛkṣatvaṃ dhavakhadirādi-varṇasamsthānasāmānyavaicitryābhāsasaṃmīśraṃ deśakālābhāsasāmānyasahasra-sambhedabheditaṃ cānekātmatām āpadyate | svayam adeśakālābhedaṭve 'pi paras-paraṃ bhedaḥ parasparaṃ paryāyāvaccchedaś ca sāmānyānām anekasvalakṣaṇatā-pattihetuḥ, teṣāṃ cānugunyaenaivānyonyāvaccchedo bhavati śītasāmānyāgnisāmān-

<sup>43</sup> I would be tempted to add here something like *idānīntaḥ* making contrast with the previous *tadānīntanaḥ*; *idānīntaḥ* is in any case to be implicitly understood, if we want to obtain the expected meaning.

<sup>44</sup> Fn. 62 of ĪPV I, p. 124 reads as follows: *yathoktaṃ madhyapratyabhijñāyāṃ — arthitā-vaśāt smṛtāv upajāyamānāyāṃ ghaṭādyābhāsasyaiva kāñcanādyābhāsasaṃbhinnasyāpi yathopayogaṃ pūrvadeśakālābhāsādyavacchedoparāgāt svalakṣaṇarūpasya smaraṇād asāv avabhāso bhavati iti*. The quotation shows some significant divergence from the text I have established, also confirmed by Abhinavagupta's comments. Some substantial doubt remains only with regard to *upajātāyāṃ/upajāyamānāyāṃ*, the latter fitting the context better.

<sup>45</sup> *ābhoga*°, my correction for *bhoga*° MS. The detailed comments of Abhinavagupta refer to the reading *ābhoga*° (ĪPVV II, p. 25, ll. 20–23 *ā samantāt bhogaḥ saṃvedanāntarbrūḍī-tānantabhāvasaṃskāramadhyanimagnasya cidbhāvasya unmeṣaṇātmakapālanacarvaṇavyā-pāro 'nveṣaṇātmā*, *ābhogaś cintāsantatilaḥ saṃprāṇaṃ prā*[read: *prā*]nidhānam).

<sup>46</sup> With some hesitation I correct °*sambhinnasyāpi* MS to °*asambhinnasyāpi*. The latter is the reading that Abhinavagupta's remarks (p. 25, l. 23 – p. 24, l. 4) seem to presuppose.

<sup>47</sup> *ekam api ca*, my conjectural emendation for *ekam api tat* MS (the *pratika* p. 26, l. 25 reads *evam api ca*, but see the objection which immediately precedes it: [...] *tatra vṛkṣa iti ekabuddhiḥ katham*).

yayos tathātvābhāvāt | <sup>48</sup>kiṃcic ca sāmānyam <sup>49</sup>anyasāmānyānavacchede 'pi svata evānekasāmānyamayaikasāmānyātmatayā svalakṣaṇatām anāpannam api sphuṭam bhavati yathā vṛkṣatvāpekṣayā dhavatvādi | svabhāvatvena <sup>50</sup>hy aviśeṣitam api tadantapraviṣṭavṛkṣatvādi sāmānyatām na tu jāhāty eva, deśakālābhedāvacchede naiva hi svalakṣaṇibhāvaḥ | yadā punar arthitāvaśenaiva sadghaṭakāñcanalohita-tvādyābhāsasamvedanenaiva pūrvadikkālābhāsasamabhedina evārthasya smarāṇam tadā sphuṭa evābhāsaḥ | tad āha “anyadā tu” iti | <sup>51</sup>kadācit punar atyantaikarasā <sup>52</sup>vadhānodyuktasya niravaśeṣaviśeṣaṇāvabhāsaśāmānādhikaraṇyāpattiviśadīkṛtaḥ <sup>53</sup>smāryamā[16r]ṇo 'rthaḥ sākṣātkāramaya eva sphuṭam puraḥ sphurati | tad āha “atīśayanirantara” iti | nairantaryam avadhānasya <sup>54</sup>vijātiyacittavyavahārābhāvo nairmalyam | <sup>55</sup>tadā ca pratyakṣibhāve 'pi pūrvadr̥ṣṭatayaiva pratyakṣibhāvād anubhūta viśayāsampramoṣaḥ sutarām iti smṛtibhedamadhyagaṇanāyām na kṣatiḥ | <sup>56</sup>svatanthro 'pi vikalpas tattatpramāṇapariśuddhānekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭāvabhāson-mukho yadā bhavati, tadā sphuṭibhavaty eva so 'rthaḥ | tad uktam brahmādibhāsa-ṇākaraṇanunmukhyād iti | <sup>57</sup>tadā ca <sup>58</sup>vikalpatā syān nirvikalpatā <sup>59</sup>veti nāsmākaṇ grahaḥ | parāmarśasūnyatā tu na kvācid api vidyate tādātmyāt sarvaprakāśānām | sarvatrānusmaranādau ca cittattvasyaiva svātantryam, na tu svakāraṇasāmārthyād

<sup>48</sup> I have accepted the reading *kiṃcic ca*, quoted by Abhinavagupta, which better fits the context; *kiñca* MS.

<sup>49</sup> *anyasāmānyānavacchede*, my correction for *atyasāmānyāvacchede* MS. *anyasāmānyānavacchede* is what the sense requires and is also confirmed by Abhinavagupta's paraphrase (p. 28, ll. 5 f.): *anyena vyatiriktatayā parāmṛṣṭena ābhāsāntareṇa aviśeṣitatve 'pi*.

<sup>50</sup> The original reading of MS was *hi*, then corrected to *hy a°*.

<sup>51</sup> The passage *kadācit punar [...] na kṣatiḥ* is quoted in IPV I, p. 125, fn. 67: *yathoktam aṣṭasahasrīyam — kadācit punar atyantaikarasādhānodyuktasya niravaśeṣaviśeṣaṇāvabhāsaśāmānādhikaraṇyāpattiviśadīkṛtaḥ smāryamāṇo 'rthaḥ sākṣātkāramaya eva sphuṭam puraḥ sphurati, tathā ca pratyakṣibhāve 'pi pūrvadr̥ṣṭatayaiva pratyakṣibhāvād anubhūta viśayāsampramoṣaḥ sutarām iti smṛtibhedamadhyagaṇanāyām na kṣatiḥ*. The text is the same as in MS, apart from *tathā* instead of *tadā* MS and the omission of the passage *tad āha [...] nairmalyam*.

<sup>52</sup> *°avadhāna°*, my conjectural emendation for *°ādhāna°* MS. Cf. the following *avadhānasya*.

<sup>53</sup> *°kṛtāḥ* MS, then corrected to *°kṛtaḥ*.

<sup>54</sup> *vijātiyacittavyavahārābhāvo nairmalyam*, my tentative restoration for *vijātiyacittayavyavahārābhāvānairmalyam* MS, evidently corrupt.

<sup>55</sup> IPV II, p. 30, l. 2 quotes, incorrectly, *tadā na*.

<sup>56</sup> p. 30, ll. 14 f. quotes, incorrectly, *svatanthro 'pi*.

<sup>57</sup> *tadā hi* MS, for which I substitute the more congruous *tadā ca*, quoted *ibid.* l. 23.

<sup>58</sup> *vikalpatā*, my correction for *vikalpaḥ* MS. The expected reading *vikalpatā*, required by the following *nirvikalpatā*, is indirectly confirmed *ibid.* l. 23 *tat katham vikalpatā ukteti*.

<sup>59</sup> p. 31, l. 1, *vāśabdo 'tra na saṃśaye, api tu sambhavavikalpe*.

udbhavatīti pratipādayitum “pūrvābhāsitam” iti “ābhāsayati” iti ca ṇicā nirdeśaḥ kṛtaḥ “prakāśitasya” iti ca <I.IV.2><sup>60</sup>

### Translation

*Vivṛti*: The author, who, with the present section on knowledge, is going now to describe the specific nature of memory etc.<sup>61</sup> — with the aim to demonstrate that memory is formed by the power of the Lord, constituting the very nature of the self as characterized by a free dynamic awareness running through all times — starts in fact his proving argument precisely with respect to memory, since in a very clear manner memory can serve as a logical reason for the establishment of the identity of the self with the Lord.<sup>62</sup>

**1. The Free One (*svairī*), the perceiver of the object formerly perceived, continuing also to exist later, has the reflective awareness: ‘that’: this is what is called ‘remembering’.**

*Vṛtti*: The light-perception of the object formerly perceived is not extinguished (*asampramoṣaṇam*) [at the moment of memory],<sup>63</sup> since he [the knowing subject, the Lord] also continues to exist later as the perceiver of the object formerly perceived. To have here a reflective awareness of an object in terms of ‘that’ — as formerly perceived — on the part of him who is one, the Lord, the agent: this is the function called ‘memory’.

*Vivṛti*: Although the cognizer is permanent in his essential nature, since permanent is the consciousness from which his nature is never divided, the notions of ‘before’ and ‘after’ can be applied [to the self and his cognitive activity] in common experience on account of the temporal differentiation of the object perceptions,<sup>64</sup> whose essence is in fact solely consciousness: this [seeming] temporal differentiation is due to the influence of the objects, which are various (*tattat*°), created [by the

<sup>60</sup> MS has: ॥ 25 ॥ 2 ॥

<sup>61</sup> See fn. 3.

<sup>62</sup> If Utpaladeva decides to start with memory (out of the three *śaktis* under consideration: the above mentioned Knowledge (in general), Memory and Exclusion), it is because the analysis of the phenomenon of memory makes immediately and easily evident that the latter presupposes a knowing subject assumed as identical to the Lord (ĪPVV II, p. 2, ll. 18–21 *tāvadgrahaṇaṃ jñānāpohanāder api anantaraṃ nirūpayiṣyate svarūpaṃ iti kramaṃ dyotayati* | *nanu kuto 'yaṃ evaṃbhūtaḥ kramaḥ* | *āha suspaṣṭaṃ kṛtvā īśvarasvabhāvasya ātmanah siddhau hetuṭā smṛter yato 'sti, tato 'yaṃ kramaḥ*).

<sup>63</sup> Utpaladeva has in mind the classical definition of memory in *Yogasūtra* I.11: *anubhū-taviśayāsampramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ*.

<sup>64</sup> It is the differentiated content of cognition to project a corresponding differentiation onto the cognizer and the cognition (p. 5, ll. 19f. *tataś ca arthoparāgād arthagatau deśakā-lau pramātāraṃ ca anubhavaṃ ca āviśantau lakṣyete*).

Lord's freedom] in such a modality (*°tathānirmita°*),<sup>65</sup> separated [from the consciousness and among themselves] (*°vibhinna°*) and qualified by time and space (*°deśakālopasarjana°*).<sup>66</sup> This is said [in the *Vṛtti*] with the phrase "also later".

Precisely because of this — i.e. the fact that the use in common experience of the notion of time depends on the objects insofar as they are manifested — the *Sūtra* and the *Vṛtti* have the word "object" (*artha°*). But also the condition of perceiver of any content of perception (*viśaya°*) would be inadmissible were the object separated [from the perceiver]. Therefore, in order to indicate that there is an inner interpenetration with the object, [both the *Sūtra* and the *Vṛtti* intend to state that:] "the perceiver has the form of the object"<sup>67</sup>. It is having this intention in mind that both in the *Sūtra* and the *Vṛtti* the author compounds '*artha*', which would have the genitive ending in the analytic sentence, with '*anubhaviṭ*' ending with the agent suffix *ṭrc*. Such a compound is to be accepted as correct in some particular cases<sup>68</sup> due to a *jñāpaka*<sup>69</sup>. Or else, we can take it as composed by the words

<sup>65</sup> That is, as if they were separated from their essential nature as consciousness.

<sup>66</sup> My translation follows Abhinavagupta's paraphrase (see fn. 18 to the edition).

<sup>67</sup> According to Abhinavagupta (*ibid.*, p. 6, ll. 5 f.), this is meant to exclude the alternative view: the object has the form of the perceiver.

<sup>68</sup> That is, in some particular cases used by cultivated persons, but it is not to be taken as generally valid as this would entail the complete non-applicability of explicitly stated general rules, like, in this case, Pāṇini II.2.15 *ṭṛjakābhyām kartari* (p. 6, l. 12 '*kvacit*' *śiṣṭa-prayukte* | '*sārvatrika*' *iti jñāpake* '*ṭṛjakābhyām kartari*' *niṣedo* '*navakāśaḥ syāt*'; apparently '*sārvatrika*' is a citation from the *Vivṛti*, but it is not found in the MS). The issue whether a *jñāpaka* can be applied to the generality of cases has often been debated among the grammarians and usually answered in the negative (cf. the well known *paribhāṣā* "*jñāpakasiddham na sarvatra*"). See e.g. Puruṣottamadeva's explanation in his *Laghuparibhāṣāvṛtti* (p. 160, ll. 8–10), which is also quite close to the wording of Utpaladeva's text: *jñāpakam hi nāma na vācakam kiṃ tarhi iṅgītena sūcakam kvacid eva iṣṭasiddhav āśrīyate na sarvatretīty yujyate jñāpakasiddham na sārvatrikam iti* | [...] *kiṃtu viśiṣṭa*[read: *śiṣṭa*?]*] prayogadarśanāt kvacid eva*). In other words, as we can read in a marginal note found in the ms. sigled Gh in the KSTS ed. of the ĪPV and included in the fn. 44 of the same edition (p. 120), this grammatical 'mistake' is not to be imputed to the carelessness of the author, disregarding the prohibition for compounding a *karṭṛ-* or *karma-śaṣṭhī* with an agent noun in *-ṭṛ* or *-aka* stated in Pāṇini II.2.15, but to his specific intention (*yatnataḥ* in the *Vimarsinī*) to point out one of the cardinal tenets of the Pratyabhijñā ('*ṭṛjakābhyām kartari*' *iti sūtreṇa hi samāśaḥ atra pratiśiddhaḥ iti parasya pramāḍakathitam etat iti vyāmohaṃ nivārayitum āha* '*yatnataḥ*' *iti samāśas tv atra vaktavyavastuśraddhayaḥ kṛtaḥ*).

<sup>69</sup> In this case the *jñāpaka* is to be found in the intention of the *sūtrakāra* himself, then restated by the *vṛttikāra*, to underline through the model of what happens in nominal composition (the *ekārthibhāva* of its components) the essential non-separateness of the three elements at issue: *artha-anubhava-anubhaviṭ* (cf. ĪPV I, p. 120, l. 7 – p. 121, l. 3). In the synthetic expression of nominal composition (*vṛtti*) the meanings of the single words merge into the overall meaning of the *vṛtti* just as dust mixes with water, so that in the end the water/*vṛtti* does not show any more the 'troubling' presence in itself of the dust/single

'*artha*' and '*anubhaviṭ*' with the latter interpreted as ending with the agent suffix *ṭṛṇ* (*ṭṛṇnāntena*). In this manner, the compound comes to be a *dvitīyāsāmāsa*, allowed on the basis of [the *vārttika*] "a factor [can be compounded] with a word ending with a primary suffix" (*sādhanaṃ kṛtā*).<sup>70</sup>

words: *ibid.* p. 6, ll. 7–9 *samāse hi vṛttipadārtho vṛttyarthe pāmsur iva udake miśrībhavan tatkalūṣyarūṣaṇaṃ tatra avabhāsayati* (read: *nāvabhāsayati*; the correct reading is also found in the above cited fn. 44 of the KSTS ed. of the ĪPV I, which is based on the ĪPVV). The above remark, which might be also taken, as I did, as referring to the close interconnection of the terms in a *samāsa* and their merging into the overall meaning of the synthetic expression (*vṛttyarthe*) is given a much more specific connotation in Abhinavagupta's discourse in the ĪPVV: in spite of the fact that such a compound goes against the grammatical rules, nonetheless it is provided with a sort of 'correctness' by the urge of the author to express what he aims to express (p. 6, ll. 6f. '*ṭṛcāpi*' *iti pratiṣiddho 'pi samāso 'tra vaktavya-vastuśraddhayaḥ kṛtaḥ*). The 'force' of the overall intended meaning of the compound has the capacity to make the imperfection or unfitness of its single components (*tatkalūṣyarūṣaṇaṃ*) unnoticeable.

<sup>70</sup> The suffix *ṭṛṇ* produces agent nouns identical to those ending with *ṭṛc* except for having a verbal regime and shifting the *udātta* onto the root; see LAZZERONI 1997. The *vigraha* form would be: *artham anubhāvitā*. The possibility for the two words to form a *dvitīyāsāmāsa* is, however, not allowed, unless (Bhāskaraṇṭha says in his *Vyākhyā*, vol. I, p. 149, ll. 2f.) we resort to the *yogavibhāga* device and divide Pāṇini II.1.24 *dvitīyā śrītatītapatitagaṭātīvastapṛāptāpānnaiḥ* into two parts. According to Bhāskaraṇṭha, *yatnataḥ* in the ĪPV refers precisely to the use of the *yogavibhāga*; this interpretation can also be found in a marginal note of the ms. Gh of the ĪPV, then reproduced in fn. 43 of the KSTS ed. of the ĪPV I, p. 120). For his part, Utpaladeva refers to *vārttika* 2 under Pāṇini II.1.33 (*Mahābhāṣya*, I, p. 386, l. 13) *sādhanaṃ kṛteti vā pādahārakādīdyartham*, which, in order to justify compounds like *pādahāraka*, states that a factor [whatsoever] can be compounded with a *kṛdanta* (we may add: in the absence of a specific Pāṇinian rule to exclude it). Through Kātyāyana's more allowing interpretation of Pāṇinian rules concerning the *kṛdanta* compounds, also the *dvitīyāsāmāsa* with a *ṭṛṇnanta* as *uttarapada* comes to be accepted. Interpreting *anubhaviṭ* as a *ṭṛṇnanta* instead of a *ṭṛjanta*, says Abhinavagupta in the ĪPVV (p. 6, l. 15), would have a further implication: a restatement of the fact that the whole discussion on memory presupposes a 'māyic' scenario (*tācchilyādinā hi māyāpadam avadyotitataraṃ syāt; tācchilā, taddharma* and *sādhukāri* are the three possible meanings of *ṭṛṇ* according to Pāṇini III.2.134f.). In conclusion, either as *ṣaṣṭhisāmāsa* (incorrect, but allowed due to *jñāpaka*) or *dvitīyāsāmāsa* (allowed, but only after applying Kātyāyana's *vārttika* or an ad hoc *yogavibhāga* operation), the compounds *pūrvānubhūtarthopalabdḥi-* in the *Sūtra* and *pūrvānubhūtarthānubhaviṭ-* in the *Vṛtti* point to a *bhedābheda* view of the object, its perception and the perceiving subject. More analytically, Abhinavagupta says (ĪPV I, p. 120, l. 6 – p. 121, l. 3), they show that perception comes to be (apparently) qualified by time through its object, that is, it 'rests' on the object, while both the perception and the object rest on the knowing subject. Grammatically, *pūrvānubhūta-* insofar as it is a *viśeṣaṇa* of *-artha* rests on it (the past participle suffix *ta* gives it a temporal qualification); in their turn, they rest on the perceiver, who is the central element, the *pradhāna* as the *uttarapada* in the *tatpuruṣa* compound (*Bhāskarī*, I, p. 155, ll. 8–10).

[Objection:] But later on<sup>71</sup> the text will put the matter in a different way, i.e. that it is instead through the perception that the contact of the object with time occurs, in the form of “[the object] has been perceived, is being perceived, and so on”. [Reply:] This is true. However, to this Consciousness-principle, which is indeed in itself without beginning or end and possesses all powers, belongs *māyā*, that is, the power of the agent subject whose activity is the manifestation of the temporal succession, and then this very power, with the denomination of ‘power of Time’, appears in the form of various and multiform activities like ‘making manifest’ and so on, qualified by temporal succession insofar as they depend on their objects, that is, the various and multiform things to be manifested, and so on. This is the action named ‘manifestation’ (*ābhāsana*<sup>o</sup>), belonging to Parameśvara; it begins with the will, consisting in the internal manifestation of the various things, and ends with their external manifestation. It is this and nothing else, as we shall see.<sup>72</sup>

Also the act of memory ultimately belongs to Him. In fact, memory starts with the wish to regain the reflective awareness of an object perceived in the past and currently stored internally (*antaḥ*)<sup>73</sup>, and ends externally<sup>74</sup> with the [present] reflective awareness [of the object] in terms of ‘that’ – i.e. the reflective awareness of the object as formerly perceived (*°anubhūtabhāva*<sup>o</sup>)<sup>75</sup>, ‘coloured’ by [the reflective awareness belonging to] that former time.<sup>76</sup> He means this when he says [in the *Vṛtti*]: “the light of the object perceived”.

<sup>71</sup> According to Abhinavagupta (p. 6, l. 19), the reference is to II.1.4ab *kramo bhedāśra-vo bhedo* ‘py *ābhāśasadasattvataḥ* “Succession is based on differentiation and this in turn derives from the existence or non-existence of a certain manifestation” (TORELLA 2002: 154).

<sup>72</sup> According to Abhinavagupta (p. 9, ll. 17f.), the reference is to II.4.21 *itthaṃ tathā ghaṭapaṭādyābhāśajagadātmanā* | *tiṣṭhāśor evam icchaiva hetutā kartṛtā kriyā* “Therefore causality, agency, action are nothing but the will of Him who wishes to appear in the form of the universe, in the various manifestations of jar, cloth and so on.” (TORELLA 2002: 187).

<sup>73</sup> In the limited subject (p. 10, l. 1).

<sup>74</sup> That is, in terms of separation from the limited subject (p. 10, ll. 5f. *bahir iti tata eva saṃkucitasamvidrūpāt vedakāt prthagbhāvena*).

<sup>75</sup> I take *anubhūtabhāva* in the sense of [*arthasya*] *anubhūtatva* (but the easier interpretation as *anubhūto bhāvaḥ* is also possible).

<sup>76</sup> The additions between brackets come from the thorough gloss and elucidation of this very concise passage furnished by Abhinavagupta (p. 10, ll. 1–9 *antar iti pratyagātmārūpe dehaprāṇapuryaṣṭakaśūnyāvacchedini saṃvittatve yaḥ sthitaḥ pūrvānubhūtaḥ prāktana-prakāśaparāmarśarūpayā idantayā upalakṣito* ‘*rthas tasya yo vimarśas tamo*’ *pasāraṇena sphuṭikaraṇam, tatra yā icchā saiva upakramāḥ prārambho yasyā bahir iti, tata eva saṃkucitasamvidrūpāt vedakāt prthagbhāvena sphuṭavedyatvena yo* ‘*dhunā vimarśaḥ, sa yataḥ prākkālabhāvinā vimarśena prakhyā*’ [read: *prācyā*] *nubhavasvabhāvaprakāśajivitenā militaḥ, sa ity evaṃrūpeṇa śabdena āviṣṭaḥ ubhayakālasparśitāyām api pūrvakālasparśapradhānaḥ prakāśate* [...]).



By using the *lyuḍanta* word [a]*sampramoṣaṇḍ*<sup>77</sup> he means to clarify the fact that memory is a function of the agent subject, since [in such words]<sup>78</sup> the aspect of 'being brought about' is conventionally deemed as predominant, whereas it not so with words like 'jar' and so on.<sup>79</sup> For this function belongs to the Lord alone, identical with consciousness, and takes place due to His freedom, in these terms: it is the Lord that, having assumed the form of the [limited] knower,<sup>80</sup> identified with the *puryaṣṭaka* and other planes to which freedom is superimposed (*samāropita-svāntarīya*), cognizes, remembers or ascertains.<sup>81</sup> And it is not that by their own power (*svasāmāthyena*) cognition, memory and so on, conceived of as entities (*°vastūnām*), separated from [any agent subject], establish among themselves a

<sup>77</sup> Instead of the *ghaṇanta* word *sampramoṣa*, as found in the classical definition of memory in *Yogasūtra* I.11.

<sup>78</sup> While the nominal stems are generally considered 'established' (*siddha*), namely frozen items with respect to verbs, whose core is an action in progress (*sādhya*), instead the action nouns belong, so-to-speak, to an intermediate sphere (cf. *Mahābhāṣya* ad Pāṇini V.4.19, vol. II, p. 432, l. 18, *kṛdabhihito bhāvo dravyavād bhavati*). Utpaladeva, and then Abhinavagupta, seem to introduce a further distinction of their own (or, at least, I have failed to find their *vaiyākaraṇa* source): the verbal action expressed by a *kṛdanta* word may have a higher 'dose' of *sādhya* when expressed by a *lyuḍanta* with respect to a *ghaṇanta*. To this topic, and more in general to the very interesting *siddha-sādhya* issue in Indian grammatical thought, I am devoting a separate study.

<sup>79</sup> Abhinavagupta in *ĪPVV* (p. 10, ll. 19–21) adds that the neuter gender of a *lyuḍanta* word is also significant with respect to the masculine gender of the *ghaṇanta* word: the word in the neuter, though possessing the qualification of being *siddha*, does not dismiss its also being *sādhya*, just like adverbs do.

<sup>80</sup> This is an implicit reply to the opponent who might object (p. 11, ll. 11–14) to the attribution to the Lord of an activity which obviously points to a state of spatio-temporal limitedness: how could the Lord, whose knowledge perpetually embraces everything (*sarvataḥ prakāśarūpaṃ sarvārthakroḍikāri*) perceive a particular thing, then keep it in a sort of dark deposit, then resurrect it.

<sup>81</sup> According to Abhinavagupta, in saying *puryaṣṭakādi* °Utpaladeva means to totally exclude the *śūnyapramāṭṛ*, who is not involved in *vyavahāra* activities, like memory (p. 11, ll. 16f. *śūnyasyāpi vyavahārātītasya smartṛtā na bhāti*); the body, though not mentioned directly, is not to be excluded, due to its close association with the *puryaṣṭaka*. The latter also includes *prāṇa* from which it cannot be separated. The mention of their autonomy as *samāropita* means that *svāntarīya* naturally belongs to the Lord only, and only through him it is, as it were, extended to other levels of subjectivity; the point is clearly stated in *ĪPK* IV.2.

cause-effect relationship independently,<sup>82</sup> so that this thesis would lend itself to the criticism that there is a different object (*viṣayabhedaḥ*).<sup>83</sup>

For this very reason, the *Kārikā* says ‘the Free One’ (*svairī*) glossed by the *Vṛtti* with ‘[of] the agent’ (*kartuḥ*). The capacity of the agent subject to embrace both the time of perception and the time of memory is stated in the *Kārikā* by the phrase “continuing also to exist later” (*sa parato ’pi san*), commented on by the *Vṛtti* with “since he also continues to exist later as the perceiver of the object formerly perceived” (*paścād api pūrvānubhūtārthānubhaviṣṭvād*). Then, ‘of Him who is one’ (*ekasya*) sovereignty, that is, his being the agent subject is indicated with the word ‘of the Lord’ (*vibhoḥ*).<sup>84</sup>

But there is a difference to specify (*kevalam*):<sup>85</sup> the object perception consists in the entrance [of the knower] — through the ‘creation’ of his unification with other knowing subjects in whom the appearance of a certain object is taking place — into the dimension of individual subject, namely, of the perceiver of that same object at that very time (how this can happen we will explain later on); this perception is in a sense also a creation, since that object is made manifest.<sup>86</sup> Even if that object

<sup>82</sup> In this case, memory as an independent ‘event’ (*vastu*) would be simply the effect of the impression left by the former perception, itself also an independent *vastu*. This is the Buddhist position, clearly summarized by Abhinavagupta (p. 11, ll. 23–25 *anubhavaḥ saṃskāraḥ smṛtir iti tu jñānamālaiva upādānopādeyabhāvena bhaviṣyati*).

<sup>83</sup> According to Abhinavagupta, this unacceptable (to the Śaivas) position has been criticized by Utpaladeva in *ĪPK* I.3.2. In this *Kārikā* it is strongly underlined that a cognition cannot be the object of another cognition: this applies also to memory. Also the Buddhists agree on this, but their alternative explanation of memory is far from being convincing. What the *saṃskāra* can cause is the mere fact that memory has a content, but this content cannot be either the original perception nor the content as having been the object of a former perception (*ĪPV* I, p. 97, ll. 5–8 *saṃskārāt paraṃ saviṣayatāmātram smṛter siddham, na tu anubhavaṣayatvam, nāpi asya viṣayasya pūrvānubhavaṣayikṛtatvam*). See above, fn. 6.

<sup>84</sup> As Abhinavagupta specifies (*ĪPVV* II, p. 13, ll. 22–24), here *vibhu* means “the One who exists in various modalities” (*vividhaṃ kṛtvā bhavati*), and is not to be taken in the usual sense of “pervader” (*vyāpaka*) because, strictly speaking, this would presupposes the existence of spatial differentiation.

<sup>85</sup> That is, the difference between fresh perception and memory. Here Utpaladeva is apparently replying to the opponent who might say that, if memory is defined as *anubhavāsampramoṣaṇa*, it is after all itself a perception, or, to be more precise, the ‘coming forth again of that very perception’ (p. 14, l. 22 *anubhavasyaiva punarunmeṣaḥ*). But, if this is how things stand, then, when we experience this coming forth again of the perception, why do we not say in common usage that we are just ‘perceiving’ (ll. 22f. *tat punarunmeṣe ’pi anubhavamīty eva na kiṃ vyavahāraḥ*)? Having this possible objection in mind, Utpaladeva proceeds to clarify what is the specific nature of *anubhava* (I follow Abhinavagupta’s understanding of the passage).

<sup>86</sup> The fresh perception is felt by the perceiver as the appearance of something totally new, as a ‘creation’. But in fact this is not a creation proper (of something that was not before), since other subjects have already experienced it previously (p. 15, ll. 15f. *nirmāṇa-*

shines in perception (*avabhāty api*), it cannot enter worldly transactions without an act of ascertainment (*niścayena*), consisting in the exclusion of different objects which might be wrongly superimposed on to it. And such ascertainment may occur at the very moment of perception, thus producing the notion 'this', or in a different moment, thus producing the notion 'that', or with a combination of the two times.<sup>87</sup> But if this ascertainment takes place subsequently (*kālāntare*), having the [former] reflective awareness as its very essence, then we call it 'memory'.<sup>88</sup> This has been said [in the *Vṛtti*, with the phrase]: "the non-extinction of the light [...] the reflective awareness". Instead, if there is a reflective awareness of this or that manifestation as not delimited by the space and time that were originally connected with them, we have a generic *vikalpa* (*vikalpamātram*).<sup>89</sup> This topic will be dealt with later on.<sup>90</sup> - 1 -

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*tayā cakāśad api na nirmāṇarūpaḥ pūrvaṃ pramātrantararūpatayā bhāvāt | iha[read: iva]śabdo 'nubhavitur abhimāno 'yam iti dyotayati).*

<sup>87</sup> Generally speaking, this act of ascertainment (*niścaya*) — or, to use a broader term, of conceptual elaboration (*vikalpa*) — operates on the content of perception, which would be destined by its very nature to remain in the reign of *nirvikalpa*, that is, over and above the sphere of ordinary reality (*vyavahāra*). To resort to the nice simile of Abhinavagupta, the *vikalpa* is just like the door keeper of the dancing hall who helps the poor villager in his desire to come out from this too lofty place where he has incidentally found himself and come back to the more modest reality, the world of *māyā*, where he is accustomed to live (p. 15, ll. 21–23 *tad ayaṃ grāmya iva lāsyamandirāt nirjigamiṣan dvārapālena vikalpena anu-grhyate māyāprāṅgaṇe nikṣipatā*); likewise, the *vikalpa* helps the human subject leave the very 'uncomfortable' plane of pure perception and come back to ordinary life where he could make use of the wealth (less shining, of course ...) of *nirvikalpa* perception. This mental act will result in the awareness 'this', when it follows immediately the perception and is closely linked to it; in the awareness 'that', when it is more or less disconnected from perception (see below); or else, in a combined awareness (this-that), which characterizes the act of recognition.

<sup>88</sup> Both the general *vikalpa* and memory take place after some time from perception and produce the awareness 'that'. But there is a significant difference between them. While the former totally disregards the time of any original perception (it can even ignore any definite perceptual content), the latter is characterized by its connecting itself, through its present reflective awareness, with the reflective awareness which immediately followed the original perception: the *smṛti* resurrects in the present the original perception, leaving intact its having occurred originally in the past. As Abhinavagupta puts it, *idānīntānāvabhāsanakālaparāmarśo 'pi na nimilati — iti etatparāmarśabhittiṣrādhānyena pūrvakālaparāmarśaḥ iti viruddhapūrvāparaparāmarśasvabhāva eva 'sa' iti parāmarśa ucyate* (ĪPV I, p. 119, ll. 8–12).

<sup>89</sup> Cf. ĪPV II, p. 17, ll. 11–15 *yadi tu sa ity etat svikṛtau pūrvau deśakālau na asya parāmrśati, api tu nīlaṃ pītam ity etāvanmātram tat niścayanasmaraṇapratyabhijñānādi-viśeṣavyapadeśanibandhanāyogād apūrvatānāvabhāśac ca śuddham eva vikalpanam ity ucyate*.

<sup>90</sup> ĪPK II.3.4, etc.

*Vivṛti*: When reflective awarenesses in the form of that particular mental construct that is memory occurs, there is, as a matter of fact (*sāmarthyād eva*), the manifestation of the object as being internal, and external as well,<sup>91</sup> with the delimitation by place, time, etc. The object may be indicated through various pronouns, like 'that', 'this' and so on. The *Kārikā* says:

2. As a matter of fact (*arthāt*), [he who remembers] must necessarily, having a reflective awareness (*āmṛśan*) of the particular entity (*svalakṣaṇam*) formerly made manifest, make it manifest at the actual moment of the memory (*svakāle*), either as a single manifestation 'jar' or as the totality of its components (*akhilātmanā*).

*Vṛtti*: Thanks to the power of memory the subject, when having a reflective awareness as 'that' of the particular entity formerly perceived, does make it manifest [in the present] (*bhāsayāty eva*). Otherwise, with regard to an object made manifest [only in the past] no reflective awareness could take place (*prakāśitasya parāmarśo na kṛtaḥ syāt*);<sup>92</sup> and this manifestation occurs at the very moment of the act of remembering. Therefore, the manifestation at the time of the memory also of an object that has disappeared does not create any shortcoming [for the explanation of the phenomenon of memory].<sup>93</sup> At certain times, then, the object appears in the form of a single manifestation, i.e. limited to one of the many manifestations that constitute it, such as — in the case of a jar — 'jar [in general]' 'golden' 'individual substance' 'existence' etc., depending on the subject's intentions. In these cases, its manifestation [in memory] is dim (*asphuṭa*).<sup>94</sup> At other times, instead, the object appears in its totality, since this is the subject's intention: its manifestation is indeed vivid. And, finally, the subject whose mind is intensely concentrated without interruption even directly visualizes the object formerly perceived.

*Vivṛti*: In memory, when the subject has a reflective awareness of the object as formerly perceived, endowed with a spatial, temporal etc. delimitation, he is aware of the object as a particular entity insofar as it has a well defined nature.<sup>95</sup> This is said [by the *Vṛtti*] with the words 'thanks to the power of memory' (*smṛtiśaktyā*)

<sup>91</sup> 'Internal' insofar as the object is no more in the range of sensorial perception; 'external' in the sense that it appears as separated from the I (p. 19, ll. 8–10 *antar iti indriya-bhūmy atikramya sthito 'pi bahir iti samvidbhāgāt vyatiriktatvena ahantāvibhaktena*).

<sup>92</sup> This obvious remark (obvious in the context of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy) is the explication of *arthāt* 'as a matter of fact' in the *Kārikā* (p. 18, l. 14 *arthāt sāmarthyāt parāmarśānyathānupatīyā*).

<sup>93</sup> See below, fn. 102.

<sup>94</sup> Having modified the text of the *Vṛtti* with respect to my edition of it (TORELLA 2002: 15, l. 9), I have modified my translation accordingly. See above fn. 37 and 38 to the text.

<sup>95</sup> My translation agrees only with the latter part of Abhinavagupta's explanation (p. 19, ll. 6–8 '*niyatarūpatayā*' *avaśyambhāvenety arthaḥ | smṛtau hi prāgdeśakālayogo 'vaśyam sphurati | anyathā vikalpamātram tat bhavet, na tu smṛtiḥ*).

and 'the particular entity' (*svalakṣaṇam*). Just as the reflective awareness is the essential nature of the light of manifestation,<sup>96</sup> so it must necessarily be accompanied by the becoming manifest of the object, without which the act of reflective awareness itself would become impossible.<sup>97</sup> Therefore, on this point there is no possible disagreement. Precisely for this reason there is [in the *Vṛtti*] the emphatic statement 'it does make it manifest' (*bhāsayaty eva*), by which the meaning of the optative form (*liṅ*) in the *Sūtra* [*ābhāsayet*] is commented on in the sense of being characterized by 'obligation' (*niyogakaraṇa*).<sup>98</sup> But we should introduce a specification (*kevalam*):<sup>99</sup> the manifestation of the object depends directly on the modality of the reflective awareness concerning it, and in memory the object appears as something made manifest in the past, since the reflective awareness of it is precisely that of something which has been made manifest in the past.<sup>100</sup> This is said

<sup>96</sup> Cf. p. 19, l. 24 – p. 20, l. 1 *sa hi parāmarśaḥ prakāśanasya svabhāvabhūto dharmah prakāśanābhāve niravalambhana eva katham syāt*.

<sup>97</sup> If the entity characterized by a certain essential property is absent, how can its essential property be present (p. 20, ll. 3 f. *svabhāvino hi abhāve asya ayam svabhāva iti katham*)?

<sup>98</sup> Utpaladeva is here probably reminiscent of the passage of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (vol. III, p. 128, l. 6 *nimantraṇam niyogakaraṇam*) on Pāṇini III.3.161 *vidhinimantraṇāmantraṇādhi-śtasampraśnaprārtaneṣu liṅ*, which lists the possible meanings of *liṅ*. The slightly ambiguous *niyogakaraṇam* by which the *Kāśikāvṛtti* explains *nimantraṇa* (vol. III, p. 128) is glossed by the *Padamañjarī* with *niyogato 'vaśyambhāvena yat karaṇam anuṣṭhānam* (cf. *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini III.3.161, vol. III, p. 327, *yan niyogataḥ kartavyaṃ tan nimantra-ṇam*); in sum, *nimantraṇam* means "inciting one to do something that has to be obligatorily done, like an obligatory ritual" (*Padamañjarī ibid. avaśyaktartavye śraddhābhōjanādau dau-htirādeḥ pravartaneti yāvat*). Abhinavagupta glosses *niyogakaraṇa* as follows: (IPVV II, p. 20, ll. 20 f. *niyogena niyamaṇa yat karaṇam sādhyamānatvaṃ, tat lakṣaṇaṃ svarūpaṃ yasya*). The possibility that the remembering subject might not make the former object manifest is to be excluded; on the contrary, it 'does' make it manifest ('*bhāsayet*' *iti vidhi-rūpeṇa niyogena niyamo lakṣyate, na bhāsayaty etat na, api tu bhāsayaty eva iti*). The above explication given by Abhinavagupta in the IPVV shows incidentally that Utpaladeva, in the long debated issue of the meaning of *liṅ*, favours the thesis of the optative expressing first of all the verbal action denoted by the verbal root, with an accessory qualification represented by *vidhi*, etc. (l. 19 *vidhyupādādhikadhātvarthaśādhyamānatodrekacanam liṅartha itī*). This corresponds to the third of the four theses examined by grammarians (e.g. *Padamañjarī*, vol. III, p. 129 *ayam vidhyādīḥ prakṛtyarthah, pratyayārtah, prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇam, pratyayārtahaviśeṣaṇam ceti catvārah pakṣāḥ*), who instead generally favour the fourth one; cf. SHARMA 1995: 577 f.

<sup>99</sup> The possible objection that Abhinavagupta has in mind is made explicit in IPVV II, p. 21, ll. 17 f.: If you say that the object shines in the memory, it means that there is no difference between memory and perception (since in both of them the object 'shines').

<sup>100</sup> Though in the absolute sense *prakāśa* has no connection with time, nonetheless in the world of *māyā* it comes to be associated to the past or the present of the experiencer (in that he identifies himself with his bodily dimension): the shining of the object in memory is associated through *vimarśa* to the shining that occurred in the 'past' experiencer.

[in the *Vṛtti*]: “Otherwise, with regard to an object made manifest [only in the past] no reflective awareness could take place”. And it is precisely in this that the “non-extinction of the object formerly perceived” consists.<sup>101</sup> And we can speak of something ‘made manifest in the past’ in the sense that the manifestation of that object was delimited by [the association with] a specific previous past place and time, a specific subject, a specific form. This is said [in the *Vṛtti*]: “and [this manifestation occurs] at the very moment of the act of remembering”. This is how the matter stands, for otherwise any discussion whether the past manifestation of the object is extinguished or not at the time of memory would turn out to be vain: it would be so since there would be no point in stating its connection with the time of memory once it has been established that the manifestation of the object has occurred in the past [only], for in this case the impossibility of the reflective awareness concerning it would necessarily ensue. This is said [in the *Vṛtti*]: “[the manifestation], at the time of the memory, also of the object that has disappeared.”<sup>102</sup> Only the above description, taken en bloc (*etāvatā*), can account correctly for the phenomenon of memory, for otherwise — i.e., in the case that the previous manifestation of the object does not come into play — we would have just yet another specific cognition, a new one, concerning the previous object in its generic form<sup>103</sup>, as in the case of the *yogin*. In fact,<sup>104</sup> in the *yogin* the original full-fledged temporal

<sup>101</sup> What has been said so far proves to be only an explication and reformulation of Paṭṅjali’s definition: the ‘non-extinction’ of the object is reached through the ‘conservation’ of its former perception within the present reflective awareness (p. 22, ll. 24 – p. 23, l. 1 *anubhavo ’tito hi atra prakāśabhāvena viśayasya uktaḥ, asampramośaś ca vārtamānikam tathāparāmarśanam*).

<sup>102</sup> In other words, if the manifestation of the (past) object does not occur in the present, also the question about the persistence or the total loss of the object becomes irrelevant, because the ‘manifestation’ of the object at the actual time of memory is the very pre-condition for the phenomenon of memory to exist. There is no ‘loss’ for the memory from the disappearance of the object, just as there is no ‘gain’ if the object continues to exist (p. 23, ll. 10f. *nāśe arthena smṛter na doṣaḥ, sadbhāve na poṣaḥ iti tātparyam vṛttīṭīkayoḥ*). This definitely being what Utpaladeva had in mind, as confirmed now by the *Vivṛti*, my previous translation of the corresponding *Vṛtti* passage (TORELLA 2002: 105, “Therefore it is not erroneous to state that there is the manifestation, at the time of the memory, of an object, which, however, is no longer present at that moment.”) has to be revised accordingly (see the translation above, p. 542).

<sup>103</sup> That is, it would be only a past object, not a past object qualified by a past experience, actualized at the time of memory (cf. p. 25, ll. 14–16 *pūrvasya arthāvabhāśasya anumēṣe, pūrvaprakāśītvēna aparāmarśe, anubhāvena atītena avacchinne* [read: *anavacchinne*] *’rthamātre yo jñānaviśeṣaḥ, so ’bhinava eva anubhava evety arthaḥ*).

<sup>104</sup> Abhinavagupta’s comments (p. 23, l. 16 – p. 24, l. 19) give us useful clues for clarifying this dense passage. A *yogin*, according to Utpaladeva, can experience an object belonging to the past independently from its having actually been the object of a past perception. This is possible because of the ‘intermediate’ nature of the *yogin* that has overcome the

differentiation has not yet totally disappeared, due to his still residing in a condition where the mayic subjectivity is identified with the *puryaṣṭaka*, etc.: to him, thanks to the power of a most intense application (*abhiyogavaśāt*), a certain [past] object, being associated with other past objects currently being remembered, though not having been itself perceived previously (*apūrvadr̥ṣṭo 'pi*), is manifested through direct perception, since the *yogin* has experienced a disclosure of his own essential nature with regard to some definite part [of the content of his cognition] (*tāvaty aṃśe*).<sup>105</sup> Or else, why not speak of a mere conceptual construct whatsoever concerning some past object, which arises at will in the subject without any contact with a previous perception, as for example "my father was a king"? In these cases, the manifestation of the cognition with respect to an object which belongs itself to the past and is associated with a past place etc. belongs to that [past] time, since it resides in subjects of that [past] time, while in the case of memory the cognition is manifested [in the present] as related to previous subjects.<sup>106</sup> Therefore, it is necessarily to be admitted that in memory the past manifestation emerges again. And once the memory has arisen thanks to an intense mental application depending on the requirements of the subject, we may have the recollection of a single manifest-

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stage in which he identified himself with the body but, being still involved with the mayic world, has not yet reached a full identification with consciousness and still identifies himself with the stages between the body and pure consciousness, namely, the *puryaṣṭaka*, the *prāṇa*, the mind or the void. This enables him still to have a notion of temporal succession: if the latter is full-fledged (*ātyantika*) only for the *deha-pramāṇ*, nonetheless it affects, more or less dimly, also the *puryaṣṭaka* etc. But, at the same time, the *yogin* also has a (still limited and sporadic) access to the identification with the supreme consciousness, "that immaculate consciousness which, though different from the presumptive identification with the thickest veil represented by the body, is however intimately present in all levels of subjectivity (body, *puryaṣṭaka*, etc.), just like the autumnal sun obscured by clouds" (p. 24, ll. 13–15). This immaculate consciousness, once occasionally freed of the veils dimming it by virtue of the intense application of the *yogin*, enables him to have direct access to past events. The events/objects are perceived as past but not through the intermediation of a past perception; this can happen because these past but essentially 'new' objects are associated with other past objects which instead are actually remembered (cf. ll. 17–19 *tam* [read: *taṁ tam*] *artham apūrvābhāsam eva tata eva smaraṇāyogyam api pūrvasmāyamaṇāśahityāt pūrvatayā anubhāty eva*). A similar case is the *yogin*'s cognition of the past lives.

<sup>105</sup> That is, if I understand well, with regard to the object, which, though not having been previously perceived, is associated with other objects which have instead been perceived in the past and are now being remembered.

<sup>106</sup> Lit.: "made of previous subjects" (*pūrvapramāṇmayah*). It is not easy to derive the expected meaning from the very laconic transmitted text (see fn. 43 to the text). Memory is in fact a combination of a past object shared by past subjects, a past perception experienced by the (presently) remembering subject and a present memory act concerning the synthesis of both. This is what also Abhinavagupta's comments would suggest: p. 25, ll. 11 f. *smaraṇe tu pūrvapramāṇīṇāṃ yo jñānābhāsaḥ tasya smartuḥ pūrvānubhāvena saha mīlito 'bhūṭ, sa eva idānīm evonmīṣatīti viśeṣaḥ*.

tation only, like 'jar [in general]' etc., even not combined with other manifestations like 'made of gold' etc., depending on what may serve [on that occasion] the subject's need; such single manifestation ('jar', etc.) has the form of unique particular (*svalakṣaṇarūpasya*) due to its being 'coloured' by the delimitation by a previous space and time, etc. As a consequence, the manifestation of the object recollected will be a dim one (*asphuṭaḥ*).<sup>107</sup> This is said [in the *Vṛtti*] with "at certain times, then [...]" Then, in autonomous mental constructs, the manifestation of the object, taken solely in its universal form, without being 'coloured' by the delimitation by a previous space, time, etc., is [also] not vivid. In fact (*hi*)<sup>108</sup>, [a group formed by] many universals, when combined among themselves and set in a relationship of mutual delimitation, become vivid, and, in the end, once delimited by the universal of space etc., they attain the status of particular realities (*svalakṣaṇatām bhajante*). Treeness (*vrkṣatvam*), which yet is one (*ekam api*) in its universal form consisting exclusively of being endowed with branches etc., once it is combined with a full variety of universals of colour and shape, such as those of the *dhava* or *khadira* trees, and differentiated by myriads of combinations with the universals of the manifestations of space and time, becomes many (*anekātmatām āpadyate*). Even if in themselves they are exempt from spatio-temporal differentiations, universals give rise to a multiplicity of particular realities by virtue of their being differentiated from one another and of their mutually delimiting one another now in one way, now in another.<sup>109</sup> This mutual delimitation must comply with a criterion of

<sup>107</sup> The content of memory is necessarily a *svalakṣaṇa* insofar as it is 'localised' in a certain time and space. Even if the object of memory is a single *ābhāsa*, i.e. a single universal, like 'jar' (in general), this is seen as a *svalakṣaṇa* in that what would make it a *sāmānya* proper, namely its embracing a multiplicity of particulars and its permanence, are 'contracted' by the very fact that it is 'remembered' (p. 29, ll. 3–6 *atra adhuneti gṛhīto ya ekaiko 'pi ābhāsaḥ, sa vyāpakatvanityatvāmasāmānyalakṣaṇatiraskarāt saṃkucitaḥ svalakṣaṇam ucyate atredaṃ sad iti*). This however is not enough to make it *sphuṭa* in cases like the one at issue, where the object is a single *ābhāsa*; its manifestation lacks 'vividness', Abhinavagupta says, because, due to its not being combined with other *ābhāsa*s, it does not possess a full efficiency (p. 26, ll. 7f. *ābhāsāntarasamparkavirahāt pūrṇārthakriyāsampādanavai-kalyena*). This apparently conflicts with what Utpaladeva will say some lines later: even a single *sāmānya* may be *sphuṭa*, when it includes a multiplicity of *sāmānyas* of a progressively broader extension. But, if I understand correctly, in memory we have a deliberate act of 'isolation' of the single *ābhāsa* depending on the subject's requirements.

<sup>108</sup> The novelty of this criterion for establishing the distinction between *sāmānya* and *svalakṣaṇa* (p. 26, l. 14 *na anyatra prasiddhaḥ*) requires an adequate explanation by Utpaladeva.

<sup>109</sup> The individual *ābhāsa*s do not possess a status of *avacchedaka* or *avacchedya* of their own, but they can assume either according to the circumstances. They are not associated — Abhinavagupta says (p. 26, ll. 15–18) — remaining on the same plane, like the members of a dvandva compound, but in a relationship of principal/secondary or qualifying/qualified. The *ābhāsa* 'cloth', in a piece of white cloth, may appear predominant to a subject who, at



compatibility, and, therefore, cannot take place, for instance, in the case of the universals 'cold' and 'fire', which do not possess such compatibility. Then there are certain universals which, even without entering into relations of delimitation with other universals, are by themselves (*svata eva*) manifested in a vivid manner without this entailing their assuming the status of particular realities, but only thanks to the multiplicity of universals that they, in their unity, encompass. For example, this is the case of the universal '*dhava*' with respect to the universal 'tree', since the former, though not being particularized as regards its own nature, contains within itself other universals such as 'tree', etc. But this does not mean that it ceases to be an universal, because to become a particular the universal must be delimited by spatio-temporal differentiation.

When, however, depending on the subject's requirement, the object is remembered as associated with the manifestation of a previous space and time along with the perception of many manifestations such as 'existent' 'golden' 'red' etc., its appearance [in memory] will be indeed vivid (*sphuṭa eva*). This is said [in the *Vṛtti*] with "at other times, instead [...]". Sometimes, then, when one is intent on remembering something with an especially intense concentration, the object being remembered, rendered clear and limpid by referring to it all its attributes — excluding none — vividly appears before him, amounting in fact to something directly perceived (*sākṣātkāramaya eva*). This is said in the *Vṛtti* with "intensely [concentrated], without interruption". The absence of interruptions in the concentration is the absence in it of the flowing of extraneous thoughts, its being pure. And in this case, although there is an immediate perception [i.e. a direct visualization] of the object, the object comes to be immediately perceived [not as present but] as having been experienced in the past. Thus, even more appropriately (*sutarām*), one is allowed to speak of non-extinction of the object perceived [in the past] (*anubhūta-viśayāsampramoṣaḥ*)<sup>110</sup>: therefore, there is no incongruity in including this type of experience among the various forms of memory.

Also when the autonomous mental construct<sup>111</sup> turns to the manifestation of something that has been proved beyond doubt by various means of right knowledge and is distinguished by many attributes, then the concerned object becomes indeed vivid (*sphuṭibhavaty eva*). This has been said:<sup>112</sup> "Due to the fact of being

that particular moment, is interested in the object as something to cover himself with; on the contrary, the *ābhāsa* 'white' will appear predominant, if he is thinking of the capacity the colour white has to confer serenity to the soul (cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* I.58 and *svavṛtti*).

<sup>110</sup> It is again the *Yogasūtra* definition of memory, which had been the starting point of Utpaladeva's discussion.

<sup>111</sup> The above considerations apply not only to the 'dependent' *vikalpas*, like ascertainment or memory, but also to those called 'autonomous' (*svatantra*), like imagination.

<sup>112</sup> The source of this quotation, according to Abhinavagupta (p. 30, ll. 19f.), are two commentaries on the *Śivasūtra*, the *Madhuvāhinī* and the *Tattvārthacintāmaṇi*, both ascribed to Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa and now lost.

intent in listening or speaking to Brahman or other deities".<sup>113</sup> We are not interested here in settling whether this experience is to be considered a mental construct or not. On the other hand, at no moment may we speak of the absence of reflective awareness, because this is the very essence of all lights [of cognition]. And in every cognitive experience, such as memory and so on, it is the freedom precisely of this Consciousness principle to be at work: it is not simply produced thanks to the power of its specific immediate cause. It is in order to show this that [in the *Sūtra* and the *Vṛtti*] causative forms are used, like "formerly made manifest" (*pūrvābhāsita*), "makes it manifest" (*ābhāsayati*), "[of an object] made manifest [only in the past]" (*prakāśitasya*).<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> The visualization of deities is a case of memory-like experience, in the sense that previous cognitions gained through various means of knowledge, like revelation or inference, enable the devotee to 'see' or evoke a chosen deity so vividly as to entertain direct relations with it, such as talking to it. But, as Abhinavagupta clarifies, this is a 'novel' manifestation (ĪPV I, p. 126, *navam eva ābhāsanam*), though depending on previous cognitive experiences.

<sup>114</sup> The use of the causative shows that the shining of the object in memory is not to be viewed as a mechanical or autonomous fact but is to be inscribed within the wider context represented by the free agency of an unitary, supreme consciousness. As Abhinavagupta puts it (p. 31, ll. 17–19), it is only to the Consciousness-principle, manifesting itself as the inner self-consciousness of all cognitive acts, that pertains the power to freely obscure one form and highlight another, to connect them or separate them. To express this in grammatical terms: the supreme I as the causal agent (*hetu*, *prayojaka*) is the ultimate responsible for the shining of the object, 'causes' it to shine. Due to its complex nature (in fact, one can induce a certain action in another only on condition that the induced subject has the intrinsic capacity to perform such action), the model of the causative form is also applied to account for the paradoxical status of limited subjects in their delicate balance between autonomy and heteronomy with respect to supreme Consciousness (TORELLA 1987: 157f.).

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