

UPAMĀNA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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CHAPTER II

Nyāya Concept of Upamāna

The Nyāya system aims at providing path for liberation which is attained through the knowledge of the objects.¹ The knowledge is aquired through four means of knowledge- Partyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda. Upamāna, in brief, is the means of knowing denotative relation between a word and certain class of objects through the intermediary knowledge of similarity, dissimilarity or particular characteristics conveyed by the authoritative statment. There are the following factors in Upamāna: the authoritative statement, the indirect knowledge of similarity, the recollection of the sense of the authoritative statement and, the resultant knowledge. For example, a city-dweller familiar with the cow but unfamiliar with the object denoted by the word *gavaya* hears from a reliable forest-dweller that the *gavaya* is an animal resembling a cow. Then, he happens to go to the forest and comes across such an animal. He perceives its striking similarity to the cow. Then, he recollects the sense of the statement of the forest-dweller and comes to know that the object before him is denoted by the word *gavaya*.

Gautama defines Upamāna as the means of cognising some (unknown) object (*sādhyaśādhana*) through its similarity to a well known object (*prasiddhasādharmyāt*).²

From Gautama's definition of *pramāṇa* it is difficult to ascertain what he exactly considers as the nature of *pramāṇa*.

He is not strict about the differentiation into the means and the resultant knowledge while defining the *pramāṇa*. In the case of perception he takes the *pramāṇa* in the sense of resultant knowledge.³ In the case of verbal testimony he seems to take the term *pramāṇa* in the sense of the means.⁴ In the present case, however, the problem is more complicated. Here, the word *sādhyasādhana* can be interpreted in two ways: (i) the means of establishing and (ii) the result of establishing. The former meaning is accepted by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara while the latter is accepted by Vācaspati Miśra. If the earlier interpretation is accepted, Upamāna will mean a means of knowledge and the term *prasiddhasādharmyāt* becomes the basis for the words denoting means in the *sūtra* since the word *prasiddhasādharmya* also denotes the means of knowledge which is further denoted by the term *sādhana*. If the latter interpretation is accepted, the term *prasiddhasādharmyāt* serves as a means and comes nearer to the probans in inference and, hence, it will be difficult to distinguish it from inference.

To overcome such difficulties the commentators followed by Vātsyāyana interpret the *sūtra* in their own way. Again, Gautama uses the terms *sādhana* and *sādhyā* which give an impression that he considers *pramāṇa* as a means of proving an object. However, his definition of perception implies that *pramāṇa* is the means of knowing an object. Therefore, we should understand the term *sādhyā* in the sense of the object to be known and the term *sādhana* in the sense of means of knowledge. To alleviate the above-mentioned undesirable contingency of the recurrence of means in the definition, we should further consider the *sādhana* expressed in the form of assertion of the authoritative person, and similarity to a well known object as the basis of Upamāna. Perhaps, having such an idea in mind Vātsyāyana interprets the *sūtra* that Upamāna as means is the assertion of the authoritative person.

Gautama was aware of the difficulty as to which kind of similarity should be considered as well known. He realises that the opponent may criticise his view on the ground that similarity

is understood in terms of degree and the degree of similarity, i.e., perfect partial or *great* is not able to establish something.⁵ Hence, Gautama states that Upamāna does not depend upon the degrees of quantity of similarity. What is required is only the similarity of a unknown object to a well known object.⁶ Uddyotakara further explains that this kind of well known similarity may be perfect, partial or great. It will surely yield the result. We get the knowledge of the operation through perfect similarity of two operations as the battle between Rāma and Rāvaṇa is like Rāma and Rāvaṇa only. The result of Upamāna is received through great similarity as the buffalo so the cow, where one suggests the similarity between the two with respect of their power. The partial knowledge also leads to the knowledge through Upamāna. For example, when one desires to know the nature of the existence of the mountain Meru, he is told that as the existence of mustard seed, so the existence of mountain Meru.' Thus, the similarity in terms of perfect, partial or great does not present some difficulty.⁷

We find in the Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana a vague difference between Upamāna as means and the Upamiti, the knowledge resulting from it. While explaining the *sūtra* he states that the Upamāna is the definite knowledge of an object sought to be definitely known through its similarity with a well known object.⁸ But he further differentiates between Upamāna as means of knowledge and Upamiti as a resultant knowledge. The *sūtrakāra* does not state anything about the nature of resultant knowledge. It is Vātsyāyana who gives a clear cut exposition of the resultant knowledge. It is deduced from his statement that the purpose of Upamāna is the knowledge of the relation of the name with the corresponding object (*samākhyā*).⁹

Vātsyāyana makes an innovation in explaining the function of Upamāna as a means of knowledge. He considers the assertion *yathā gauḥ, tathā gavayah* (as the cow, so the

gavaya) as the Upamāna.¹⁰ Thus analysed, the explanation of Vātsyāyana suggests that the *karana* is the authoritative statement, the *avāntara vyāpāra* is the recollection of the sense of the authoritative statement and the Upamiti is the knowledge of the relation of the name with the denotation.¹¹ Thus, Vātsyāyana seems to hold that the causes of Upamāna are the memory of the assertion of the authoritative person and the perception of the animal, while the most efficient among them is the authoritative statement itself.

Vātsyāyana offers two more examples of Upamāna. A person is asked by the doctor to bring the medicinal herbs called *Mudgaparnī* and *Māṣaparnī* and is told that the *Mudgaparnī* is like Mudga and the *Māṣaparnī* is like *Māṣa*. The person desirous of collecting these herbs goes to the forest and comes across the herbs resembling *Māṣa* and *Mudga*. Through the Upamāna that the *Māṣaparnī* is like the *Māṣa* and *Mudgaparnī* is like Mudga he comes to ascertain that the herbs before him are *Māṣaparnī* and *Mudgaparnī*.¹²

Uddyotakara clearly differentiates between the means of knowledge and the resultant knowledge. He analyses the nature of Upamāna in a different manner. The term *prasiddhasādharmya*, according to him, denotes the object having well known similarity (*prasiddham sādharmyam yasya*) or which has got the similarity with a well known object (*prasiddhena vā sādharmyam yasya*). The upamiti is the knowledge through that.¹³ Here, one may get the impression that simply the *gavaya* or the perception of it is the Upamāna according to Uddyotakara and this may turn the process of rise of upamiti unintelligible. But, here the *gavaya* is not merely the *gavaya* but that endowed with the similarity with the cow. The perceiver, in fact, sees the similarity. The similarity, however, is the quality of *gavaya* related to it through the relation of inherence. Hence, the statement of Uddyotakara

comes to mean the perception of the similarity existing in the *gavaya*.

Like Vātsyāyana, he considers the object of Upamāna as the knowledge of the name and its denotation.¹⁴ He explains the process of Upamāna thus. When one hears from someone that the *gavaya* is like a cow and thus when the similarity of cow and *gavaya* becomes well known, he himself sees the similarity between cow and *gavaya*. Then he comes to know the relation of the term *gavaya* to its denotation.¹⁵

Here, we find a difference of opinion between the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārttika*. There is no difference regarding the nature of resultant knowledge for according to both the resultant knowledge is the relation of the name with its denotation. However, there is a clear-cut difference regarding the means of cognition, which further results into the difference regarding the process in cognition. The *karana* is the authoritative statement according to the *Bhāṣya* but the perception of similarity according to Uddyotakara. Moreover, according to the *Bhāṣya* the similarity is apprehended through the recollection of the sense of the authoritative statement while according to the *Vārttikakāra* the similarity is directly perceived.

Uddyotakara further feels that the mere knowledge of similarity cannot lead to the knowledge of the relation of the name with a particular class of objects. It is experienced in our common life that one does not necessarily know the name of the object the similarity of which is comprehended with some other object. Therefore, Uddyotakara adds that it is not merely the knowledge of similarity which leads to the knowledge of the name and the named but this knowledge should be associated with the revival of the impression caused by the sense of the authoritative statement.¹⁶ Thus, Uddyotakara correlates the authoritative statement and knowledge of similarity. Vācaspati Miśra states that the above statement of

Uddyotakara brings out the sense implicitly expressed by the *sūtrakāra*. He explains that the term *prasiddhasādharmyāt* used for defining Upamāna in the *sūtra* includes both. The knowledge of the similarity is of two kinds: derived through perception and that derived through verbal testimony. The earlier is exemplified as after perceiving the *gavaya* directly one observes that the object before him is qualified by the similarity to the cow. The latter is derived through the assertion like 'as the cow, so the *gavaya*'. Thus, the knowledge derived through perception and assisted by that derived through the authoritative statement is the cause of understanding the denotative relation.¹⁷ He seems to understand Upamāna as a means of denotative relation through the knowledge of similarity assisted by the authoritative statement.

Uddyotakara makes further innovation by introducing the element of *vaidharmya* (dissimilarity) as the basis of Upamāna. He thinks that the expression *sādharmya* is symbolic in the *sūtra* and includes *vaidharmya* as well.¹⁸

Vācaspati Miśra is particular in understanding the Upamāna strictly in the sense of *Karaṇa* (means). He suggests that the word *yataḥ* should be inserted in the *sūtra* forming the definition of Upamāna so that it should without doubt be applicable to the *Karaṇa* (means) only.¹⁹ He shows the significance of the words of *sūtra* forming the definition. Merely the expression *sādhyasāadhanam* cannot form the definition because it would apply to the other means of knowledge and also to the means of pleasure, pain, etc. Hence, the word *prasiddhasādharmyāt* forms the essential part of the definition.²⁰ Though Upamāna may be defined as *prasiddhasādharmyam-upamānam* because the sense of instrumentality would be denoted by the term Upamāna which is a specific means of knowledge, yet the word *sādhyasādhana* is used in the definition to exclude Upamānābhāsa.²¹

Vācaspati Miśra further adds that the term *sādharmya* is used elliptically for the properties in general. The Upamiti can as well be derived through the unique characteristics. The person from north India tells a person of south India that a camel is an animal which is ugly in looking, has a very long and crooked neck and long lips, and lives on hard and sharp thorns. After that, the person of south India comes across such an animal in north India and comes to understand that this is the object denoted by the term camel. This is also a case of Upamāna.²² Vācaspati Miśra tries to trace the authority for his supposition to the statement of the Bhāṣya that in this way other things are known as objects of Upamāna in our day-to-day life.²³

Jayantabhaṭṭa finds a divergence of opinion among his predecessors regarding the nature of Upamāna. Motivated by this divergence of views he takes into account the views of his predecessors under two heads : earlier and contemporary. He presents the view of the earlier Naiyāyikas as follows. The Upamāna is the authoritative statement which enlightens the similarity which the unknown object bears to a known object and which aims at ascertaining the denotative relation between a name and its denotation. For example, a city-dweller who does not know the nature of *gavaya* asks a forest-dweller what is the nature of *gavaya*. The forest-dweller replies 'as the cow so the *gavaya*'. This sentence is the Upamāna. It informs of the similarity which the unknown object bears to the known object and leads to the knowledge that the word denotes the *gavaya* class.²⁴

The contemporary logicians also, like the earlier logicians, hold that Upamāna generates the knowledge of the denotative relation. However, the Upamāna, according to them, is the perceptual knowledge of the similarity which the unknown object bears to the well known one. This, according to them, should be accepted as a distinct means of knowledge because

it leads to the cognition of some unknown object, though in itself it is cognised through the senses. The case is analogous to the perceptual knowledge of smoke which leads to the cognition of fire. A city-dweller who has heard the authoritative statement rambles in the forest and comes across an animal similar to the cow. Then, he recollects the statement of the forest-dweller and comes to know that the animal is denoted by the word *gavaya*.²⁵ In this way, the resultant knowledge of denotative relation and the proximate cause of such a relation is called Upamāna. He records the definition offered by Vātsyāyana under the earlier head and that by Uddyotakara under the latter. Jayanta's main contribution is to wage a fierce intellectual warfare with the opponents the views of the Naiyāyikas. He alleviates the objections levelled against the earlier and the contemporary logicians.

Thus, Gautama and Vātsyāyana regarded Upamāna at of one kind only, i.e., based on similarity. Uddyotakara introduces another basis of Upamāna, viz., dissimilarity and it comes to be of two kinds. Vācaspati Miśra further introduces statement of characteristics also as the basis of Upamāna and thus, it comes to be of three kinds. The later texts of the Naiyāyikas maintain that Upamāna is of three kinds: (i) *sādharmyopamāna* (Upamāna through similarity), (ii) *vaidharmyopamāna*... (Upamāna through dissimilarity) and (iii) *dharmamātropamāna* (Upamāna through mere properties)²⁶. The *sādharmyopamāna* is the means of knowing the unknown denotative relation through a description in terms of its similarity to some well known object, just as the name of the animal *gavaya* is known through the authoritative statement propounding the similarity to the cow. A person hears the authoritative statement 'as the cow, so the *gavaya*', and goes to the forest and recollects the statement (at the sight of the *gavaya*). His ascertainment (or investigation) of the application of the name *gavaya* to the animal similar to the cow through

which the *gavaya* bears to the cow is a case of Upamāna through the similarity.²⁷ The *vaidharmyopamāna* is the means when the name of the object to be known is conveyed in terms of its dissimilarity to a well known object as 'the horse is the animal which has the dissimilar hoofs to the cow. A person asks the specialist about the form of a horse. The specialist tells him that it does not have two hoofs like a cow. He recollects the above statement at the sight of the horse and ascertains the application of the name horse to the animal through the dissimilarity which the horse bears to the cow in respect of having one hoof.²⁸ Or, it may be illustrated as follows : when one asks about the form of earth and is told by some specialist that the earth is having dissimilar properties to the water and ascertains the application of the name earth to the object through the perception of such an object and the recollection of the statement informing of the dissimilar properties, it becomes a case of the knowledge of the denotative relation through dissimilarity.²⁹ The *dharmamātropamāna* is that where the object is cognised through the statement of peculiar characteristics as the camel is known through the description of its peculiar characteristics as 'the camel is an animal having long neck, projecting lips, and eats the thorns.'³⁰ Or, as the earth is known through the statement that the earth is that which has the smell as its peculiar characteristic.³¹

Gautama's definition of Upamāna leaves it unexplained what he exactly intends as the purpose of Upamāna. According to Diñnāga, Gautama postulates Upamāna to cognise the similarity which *gavaya* bears to the cow or to cognise the *gavaya* as qualified by its similarity to the cow, in the example given by the Naiyāyikas.³² R.D. Randale thinks that Diñnāga brings out the correct purport of the *sūtra*.³³ The later commentators of the *sūtra*, however, do not accept the interpretation of the *sūtra* offered by Diñnāga. Vātsyāyana is the first commentator who clarifies the idea of practical utility

of Upamāna. He points out that the Upamāna helps to collect the medicinal herbs like *Mudgaparnī* and *Māṣaparnī*.³⁴

Here, Jayantabhaṭṭa states that Upamāna has no bearing upon the final realisation or final emancipation in the way as the other three means of knowledge have a special service to the purpose of Nyāya. But still, Upamāna is not absolutely useless since it has unique part to play in the performance of a vedic rite which enjoins the killing of a *gavaya*. The *gavaya* cannot be killed if one is not acquainted with it. Moreover, this means of knowledge is servicable to identify the medicinal herbs like *Mudgaparnī* and *Māṣaparnī*.³⁵ Gautama has defined Upamāna with a view to render useful service to all, though it has no bearing upon final emancipation. In fact, the Nyāya system is merely a science of sources of valid knowledge and, therefore, should discuss the means of knowledge only. The objects to be known also serve as the means of achieving the final emancipation. Upamāna helps in acquiring the knowledge of the objects to be known.³⁶

The Naiyāyikas spare no pains to establish Upamāna as an independent means of knowledge. Gautama realises that the opponent may criticise the view of accepting Upamāna on the ground that similarity is understood in term of degree and the degrees of similarity, i.e., perfect, partial or great is not competent to prove something. Hence, Upamāna being based upon similarity, cannot be a means in establishing something.³⁷ This seems to be an argument raised by the Cārvākas who reject Upamāna as a means of valid knowledge, though there is no textual support for such a supposition. To this argument, Gautama replies that Upamāna does not depend upon the degree of similarity, what it requires is only the similarity of the unknown object.³⁸ Uddyotakara further adds that the well known similarity may be perfect, partial or great, it will surely yield the result.³⁹ Gautama further alleviates an objection that

Upamāna is a case of inference.⁴⁰ The later Naiyāyikas further argue that the Upamāna cannot be reduced to the other means of knowledge also. Now we proceed to discuss the views of the systematists who include the Upamāna under some other means, and Naiyāyikas' arguments against such a possibility.

It is admitted by all the systematists except the Cārvākas that the process involved in Upamāna leads to a valid knowledge and as such it cannot be rejected as means of non-valid knowledge. However, the other systems are not prepared to allot an independent status to it. Therefore, they try to reduce it to the other pramāṇas accepted by them. Here, we proceed to discuss first the reasons of non-acceptance of its independent position and the views regarding inclusion of Upamāna under the other pramāṇas, and then to consider the possibility of its inclusion under the other pramāṇas as suggested by other systematists.

There is nothing new cognised by Upamāna. The *gavaya*, in the case of the familiar example, is cognised through perception and similarity is the case of remembrance.⁴¹

Here, the Naiyāyikas argue that the object of Upamāna is neither the *gavaya* nor the similarity but the combination of the two. It is the *gavaya* qualified by its similarity to the cow which forms the object of Upamāna. This kind of object is neither cognised through perception nor is it the case of remembrance.⁴² The argument, states Kumārilbhaṭṭa, is right, but it does not turn the position of Naiyāyikas faultless. It involves other absurdities. Here, it may be asked whether it produces any idea over and above the one expressed in the authoritative statement or not. If the second alternative is accepted, it will not have anything more than remembrance and as such it would not be a means of knowledge at all because it would be the mere repetition to the knowledge already acquired and does not, like remembrance, have some

more objective.⁴³ The acceptance of first alternative turns it into a case of perception. If it is argued that it is not only the object which is conveyed through the authoritative statement but, in addition to it, the form of the *gavaya* qualified by the similarity to the cow which forms the object of Upamāna, it would not be something more than the perception because so long as the cognition arises through sense-object it is the case of perception. The form of *gavaya* and its being qualified by the similarity to the cow are cognised by sense-object contact and, hence, forms the object of perception.⁴⁴ The Naiyāyikas come forward with the argument that knowledge of similarity of *gavaya* to the cow certainly exceeds perception in the present case and, therefore, it is not a case of perception. Kumārilabhaṭṭa rejects the plea on the ground that the factor of remembrance which exceeds perception is invalid.⁴⁵ Pārthasārathimiśra adds that the invalidity attaches to the part remembered but it does not enter into the part known through perception. The same knowledge can be both valid and otherwise at a time due to the difference of its objects. Hence, the part of knowledge based upon remembrance is invalid while the part based on perception is valid.⁴⁶ The knowledge of the authoritative statement regarding similarity does not serve any purpose because such persons who have known the cow and happen to see the *gavaya* come to know the similarity even without the knowledge of the authoritative statement.⁴⁷ Here, the Naiyāyikas come forward with the theory that the object of Upamāna is the denotative relation and such knowledge does not arise without knowing the authoritative statement. Kumārilabhaṭṭa strikes the root of the Nyāya theory arguing that the knowledge of denotative relation cannot be the object of Upamāna because it is already cognised through the authoritative statement.⁴⁸ The Naiyāyikas may argue that the object of Upamāna in that case, will be the recognition of the fact that a particular word denotes a particular object. The

power of denotation (*vācyavācakaśakti*) is beyond the senses and, thus, it is not an object of recognition. To this Kumārilabhaṭṭa replies that the knowledge of this type of power is also a case of remembrance.⁴⁹ Pārthasārathimiśra further adds that it can also not be argued on the part of the Naiyāyikas that the power being supra sensuous is not the object of perception and is cognised only through inference. The power is nothing exceeding space and time and since it is not a separate category, it cannot be an object of some distinct means of knowledge. This is simply a case of remembrance⁵⁰.

Here, the Naiyāyikas are presented as trying to establish Upamāna as different from perception. The perception depends upon the sense-object contact while Upamāna requires the authoritative statement in addition. This also, states Kumārilabhaṭṭa, does not turn the stand of the Naiyāyikas faultless because the factor of sense-object contact is found in this case as well.⁵¹ Here, it may be observed that Kumārilabhaṭṭa criticises all the points different from his own position on Upamāna. He differs from the Naiyāyikas mainly on the issue of the object of Upamāna, and the nature of resultant knowledge through Upamāna. In brief, the Naiyāyikas cannot explain the object of Upamāna. To establish the existence of some independent means of knowledge there must be some object which can be cognised exclusively through that means. In the absence of such an object the Nyāya theory falls to the ground. Nārāyaṇa adduces the following additional arguments against the theory of the Naiyāyikas. This theory, being mistaken, should be discarded because the knowledge of denotative relation is produced merely by verbal testimony assisted by perception.⁵² It is experienced in our common life that the knowledge of the denotative relation is possible through words assisted by perception. For example, after hearing the statement that the merchant has *nava* (nine or new) blankets one goes to the market and after seeing nine

blankets with the merchant remembers the sentence and concludes that the purport of the sentence was a particular number and thus, understands the meaning of the sentence.⁵³ Narāyaṇa further adds that it is also experienced in our day-to-day behaviour that Upamāna is used where there is similarity and not in the case where there are uncommon attributes in general. Even the authoritative statement heard at some other place is well known in case of a sentence declaring common attributes only. Hence, there is no usage of Upamāna through the uncommon attributes of the attributes in general.⁵⁴

Śālikanātha objects to the view of the Naiyāyikas that they cannot explain the nature of Upamāna as a distinct means. In the stock example of the Naiyāyikas, the first knowledge that the *gavaya* is similar to the cow arises through the authoritative statement and is not the result of Upamāna. The knowledge of *gavaya* and its similarity to the cow arising in the man who has gone to the forest are recognition and perception respectively. The understanding that this object is denoted by the word *gavaya* is the inferential knowledge. When a word is used in certain sense, one comes to know the denotative relation with the object. 'After acquiring the knowledge of the denotative relation in the forest, the final cognition 'the name known to me is of that animal only' is the case of remembrance. Thus there is no scope for Upamāna.⁵⁵

The followers of the Advaita school of the Uttara-mīmāṃsā also criticise the Nyāya concept of admitting Upamāna as an independent means of cognising the denotative relation. Ānandapūrṇa states that Upamāna, according to the Naiyāyikas, is the investigation or examination in the object named of the meaning of the sentence containing the name the denotation of which is not yet cognised. For example, one hears from the reliable person that the *gavaya* is similar to a cow and he

happens to see a *gavaya* in the forest. Then, he recollects the meaning of the reliable statement and, thus, arises in him the knowledge of the denotative relation. The knowledge of the denotative relation is cognised through Upamāna only. Hence, the Upamāna is a distinct means of knowledge.⁵⁶ Objecting to the above view, Ānandapūrṇa states that it is reckless statement that such a relation cannot be cognized through any other means of knowledge. Such a relation can be known through Inference. The form of syllogism may be put in the following manner. The word is the conveyer of the object in the sense of which it is used without taking recourse to some other power of denotation, as the word cow denotes the cow class. The word *gavaya* is used in the sense of the class resembling the cow without taking recourse to other power of denotation. Hence, the word *gavaya* denotes the *gavaya* class.⁵⁷

The Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Uttaramimamsā also holds that it is needless for the Naiyāyikas to postulate Upamāna for the purpose of knowing the denotative relation. Vedāntadeśika states that the Upamāna is not different from verbal testimony. It is a statement which conveys the denotative relation through similarity, dissimilarity or peculiar properties.⁵⁸ Nor is it correct to hold that Upamāna is the means of recognition of the object meant by the authoritative statement because in this case also the denotative relation is already cognised.⁵⁹ The factor of restricting the use of a certain word in a certain sense, viz. similarity, was also known through the authoritative statement and it becomes clear at the sight of the *gavaya*.⁶⁰ The unclear image of an object cannot be denied. On the contrary, such cognition is supported by our common experience. Nor can it be argued that the denotative relation is not cognised through such an image. The denotative relation in case of the supra sensuous divinities like Rāma is cognised through such a general or the unclear image.⁶¹ Meghanādasūri further establishes that the Upamāna as a means envisaged by the Naiyāyikas, is the

perception of similarity and it comes to be a case of recognition.⁶² Otherwise, the Naiyāyikas will have to admit some other means for such a cognition 'this is the same Devadatta.'⁶³ The resultant knowledge is simply a case of remembrance since the denotative relation between the word *gavaya* and its denotation was already cognised through the authoritative statement.⁶⁴ Moreover, if the similarity is the means, the similarity being manifold would require many *pramāṇas* to determine the denotative relation in case of several objects.⁶⁵ Śrīnivāsadāsa is in favour of including it under any of the perception, inference and verbal testimony in accordance with the stress laid upon the particular aspect of it. It is a case of inference if the stress is laid upon the denotative relation as conveyed through the invariable concomitance.⁶⁶ It is a case of perception when the stress is laid upon the perception of similarity cognised earlier,⁶⁷ and it becomes a case of verbal testimony if the stress is laid upon the authoritative statement.⁶⁸

The Dvaita school of Uttaramīmāṃsā also objects to the independent status of Upamāna. Jayatīrtha states that the purpose of Upamāna is served by inference only.⁶⁹ It is also not correct to argue that the form of invariable concomitance, etc., postulated in case of the syllogistic form for Upamāna differs from that found in the formal type of inference which is supposed to be of many kinds due to the form of invariable concomitance and hence the Upamāna may also be taken as a particular type of inference.⁷⁰ Moreover, like inference, the Upamāna envisaged by the Naiyāyikas also depends upon the similarity between the *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā*.⁷¹ So, it is needless to accept Upamāna as a means of valid knowledge.

The Śuddhādvaita school of Uttaramīmāṃsā also does not find the need of accepting Upamāna as an independent means for cognising the denotative relation through similarity, etc. The purpose of Upamāna is served by the cognitive organ.

in association with the remembrance of similarity conveyed through the authoritative statement.⁷² Otherwise, the Naiyāyikas will have to postulate the other means for cognising the perceptible objects which exist but are not observed at a particular time.⁷³ Nor should it be argued here that there is no operation of the cognitive organs at the time of deciding the denotative relation through Upamāna. The purpose is served by the earlier operation of the cognitive organs the impression of which still persists.⁷⁴ If the operation of the cognitive organs is thought to be necessary, it may be considered to be the result of mental operation as it is found in the case of cognising the denotative relation with reference to the words like *Madhukara*.⁷⁵ The position is supported by the form of *anuvyasāya* which ascertains the nature of the knowledge and the means of it.⁷⁶

The Dvaitādvaita school of Uttaramīmāṃsā does not approve the independent position of Upamāna. Mukunda Mādhava thinks that the Upamāna is a case of instance which forms a component of the syllogism in inference.⁷⁷

The Buddhists also criticise Nyāya view of Upamāna mainly for the purpose of rejecting it as an independent means of knowledge. Dignāga holds it to be a case of perception or verbal testimony since the knowledge arising out of it can be acquired either through perception or through verbal testimony.⁷⁸ Śāntarakṣita argues that the idea of denotative relation arises through the authoritative statement itself and it is remembered at the time of perceiving the object denoted by that name. It would, thus, be a case of remembrance which is not a means valid knowledge at all.⁷⁹ Moreover, the Nyāya theory involves the incongruity of infinite number of the means of knowledge since the notion of denotative relation is formed by endless means even apart from similarity.⁸⁰ Mokṣākaragupta adds that Upamāna lacks the necessary condition for admitting

an independent means of knowledge since it has no object to be cognised exclusively through it.⁸¹ It is not logical to postulate the denotative relation as an object of Upamāna. There is no relation such as the denotative relation.⁸²

The Jainas also criticise the Nyāya theory mainly with a view to reject it as an independent means of knowledge. Akalaṅka argues if the similarity is the basis for denotative relation, the Naiyāyikas should postulate some other means for the denotative relation through dissimilarity or general characteristics.⁸³ Moreover, they will have to postulate some additional source for the knowledge 'this is nearer, farther, latter, less or greater than the other.'⁸⁴

The Sāṃkhyas also criticise the Nyāya view on the ground that it is unnecessary to postulate Upamāna as an independent means of knowledge. The *Yuktidīpikā* states that Upamāna is a case of verbal testimony. It cannot be argued that the Upamāna requires similarity as an additional factor since the similarity is only a mode of expression.⁸⁵ Like verbal testimony, Upamāna also depends upon the validity of the statement.⁸⁶ Moreover; the view that Upamāna leads to the knowledge of denotative relation will lead to accept the indefinite number of the means because all the other types of indications leading to the knowledge of the denotative relation will have to be considered as independent means of knowledge.⁸⁷ Vācaspati Miśra's criticism implies that neither the totality of causal conditions nor the resultant knowledge requires Upamāna as an independent source. As to the view of Vātsyāyana, he states that the authoritative statement which serves as a means is a case of verbal testimony because the knowledge arising out of it is a case of *āgama* while the resultant knowledge through Upamāna is inferential in nature.⁸⁸

The Vaiśeṣikas also reject the view of the Naiyāyikas with a view to include Upamāna under inference. The

denotative relation is conveyed through verbal testimony and since the verbal testimony is included in inference, it is the case of inference.⁸⁹ Śrīdhara adds that the *Karaṇa*, i.e., the authoritative statement accepted by the bhāṣyakāra and the knowledge arising out of it is a case of verbal testimony while the knowledge arising out of the whole process is inferential.⁹⁰ Śaṅkaramiśra further holds that Upamāna may be proved as a case of inference directly also.⁹¹

Among the Naiyāyikas also Bhāsarvajña rejects the normal Nyāya view of admitting Upamāna as a distinct means of knowledge. He includes the Upamāna envisaged by the syncretist Naiyāyikas under verbal testimony. If the Upamāna is held to be a distinct means of knowledge on the basis of conveying comparison, it will involve undesirable contingency of admitting indefinite number of means of knowledge because every individual object would require a distinct *pramāṇa* for the determination of the denotative relation.⁹² To defend their theory the Naiyāyikas may argue here that in such cases there is an implicit understanding that the term cow applies to all animals of the same class. To this, Bhāsarvajña replies that even in case of Upamāna there is the implication that an animal that resembles a cow bears that particular name.⁹³ He further tries to establish that this does not go against the view of the *sūtrakāra* since the *sūtrakāra* does not intend to establish the Upamāna as a distinct means but mentions it as it is serviceable to establish the validity of verbal testimony.⁹⁴ Gautama discusses it only to show that like presumption it is valid but is included under other means of knowledge.⁹⁵ Its distinction from inference established in the *sūtras* does not establish its distinction from verbal testimony also.⁹⁶ *Sūtrakāra*'s enumeration of the *pramāṇas* as four and not as three shows that here, as at some other places, the *sūtrakāra* does not state his view carefully.⁹⁷

As regards the inclusion of Upamāna under other *pramāṇas* the view of different systems may be summarised thus. As stated above, there are three elements in Nyāya concept of Upamāna : (i) communication about the denotative relation through the authoritative statement, (ii) observation of a certain object as resembling the one perceived earlier and (iii) the resultant knowledge. There is the difference of opinion among the Naiyāyikas themselves regarding the status of the first two. Vātsyāyana lays stress on the first while Uddyotakara lays more stress on the second. This has given rise to the further difference regarding the *kaṛaṇa* in Upamāna. Vātsyāyana holds that the *kaṛaṇa* in Upamāna is the authoritative sentence itself while Uddyotakara takes *kaṛaṇa* to be the perceptual knowledge of similarity. The nature of resultant knowledge is the same in both the cases.

Some critics of Nyāya have clearly noted the difference and have included these two views under different *pramāṇas*. The other are not so strict about the difference and include both the views under the same *pramāṇa*. Some systematists include it under a single *pramāṇa* while the others consider it a combined process of two or more *pramāṇas*. The grounds of inclusion of Upamāna under other *pramāṇa* are different. Bhāsarvajña seems to take note of Vātsyāyana's view only and includes it under verbal testimony.⁹⁸ Udayana in his *Kiraṇāvali* also includes the Nyāya view under verbal testimony.⁹⁹ Śrīdhara includes Vātsyāyana's view under verbal testimony and further holds that since verbal testimony is a case of inference the Upamāna is also included under inference.¹⁰⁰ As regards the view of Uddyotakara, Śrīdhara says that it contains three elements : statement of authoritative person, perception of similarity and the resultant knowledge. They can be taken as the case of verbal testimony, perception and inference respectively and consequently Upamāna may be taken to be any of the above three.¹⁰¹

The Yuktidīpikā also considers Upamāna to be case of verbal testimony itself.¹⁰² Vācaspati in his *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī* favours its inclusion under verbal testimony or the inference when the stress is laid upon the authoritative statement and the resultant knowledge respectively.¹⁰³ Gauḍapāda favours its inclusion under verbal testimony.¹⁰⁴ The *Jayamaṅgalā* includes it either under verbal testimony or inference.¹⁰⁵ It clarifies that the knowledge of the denotative relation after hearing the authoritative statement and before seeing the *gavaya* directly, is a case of verbal testimony and the term *gavaya* is applied to the animal *gavaya* through inference.¹⁰⁶ Māṭhara,¹⁰⁷ the *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*¹⁰⁸ and *Vijñānabhikṣu*¹⁰⁹ include it under inference.

Dignāga, as quoted by Uddyotakara,¹¹⁰ includes it under perception or verbal testimony. According to Śāntarakṣita Upamāna is a case of memory¹¹¹ or inference.¹¹² The Jainas include it under *pratyabhijñā*.¹¹³ Vedāntadeśika favours its inclusion under verbal testimony¹¹⁴ while Meghanādasūri takes it as a case of recognition,¹¹⁵ and Śrīnivāsadāsa says that it can be included under any of the perception, inference and verbal testimony.¹¹⁶ Jayatīrtha includes it under inference.¹¹⁷ Puruṣottama considers it as the case of perception.¹¹⁸

Upamāna versus Perception

Some authors lay stress upon the element of perception of similarity which is considered to be *karana* of Upamāna by Uddyotakara. They are further aware of the fact of admitting the remembrance of the authoritative statement as additional to it and solve the problem of disproving the criterion of additional factor in their own way. Kumārilabhaṭṭa states that as the knowledge of denotative relation is supposed to issue from perception of similarity, it can very well be a case of perception.¹¹⁹ He further explains that the element of remembrance is not a valid piece of knowledge.¹²⁰ Hence, what

induces to the knowledge of denotative relation is the sense-object contact only. Śrīdhara¹²¹ and Śrinivāsadāsa¹²² also join hands with Kumārilabhaṭṭa. Puruṣottama lays stress upon the perceptual character of Upamāna more elaborately and in a slightly different way. He holds that the purpose of Upamāna can be served by the sense-object contact assisted by the remembrance of the similarity conveyed through the authoritative statement.¹²³ Thus, he thinks that the object denoted is perceived while the similarity is remembered. If it is admitted to be a case of independent pramāṇa on the ground of the addition of one element of similarity, it would lead to the undesirable contingency of admitting distinct means for the knowledge of an object which is perceptible but is not perceived at that time.¹²⁴ It should not be argued that the above position would not leave the indirect nature of Upamāna. The Upamāna should be taken as a case of direct perception.¹²⁵ The Naiyāyikas may again come forward with a plea that the cognitive relation was known through the authoritative statement and it is confirmed through the perception of similarity. To this also Puruṣottama replies that the impression of earlier contact of the cognitive sense with object still persists and there is no need of postulation of a fresh contact.¹²⁶ Puruṣottama shows his awareness of over-pervasion of the scope perception and, hence, finally takes Upamāna as a result of mental operation. The denotative relation is cognised through mental operation as is the case with the denotative relation of the words like *madhukara*.¹²⁷ Puruṣottama supports his view with the help of another argument based upon *anuvyavasāya* which determines the nature of knowledge. In the present case, the *anuvyavasāya* arises in the form 'I know the object as denoted by certain word.'¹²⁸ Such a knowledge requires the mental operation as a means and thus, there is no scope for Upamāna. Dinnāga, as quoted by Uddyotakara, suggests one of the alternatives to include it under perception. When, in the stock example of the

Naiyāyikas, one directly perceives both the cow and the *gavaya*, it is known through sense-object contact that the *gavaya* is similar to the cow.¹²⁹

The Naiyāyikas leave no stone unturned to establish Upamāna as distinct from perception. They strongly oppose inclusion under perception. As to the view of Diñnāga, Uddyotakara says that it is based upon misunderstanding of the real purpose of Upamāna. Diñnāga thinks that what is really apprehended through Upamāna is either the resemblance to the cow or the existence of *gavaya* as qualified by the resemblance to the cow. This misunderstanding leads him to reject Upamāna as an independent means of knowledge. If Diñnāga claims to derive such a meaning from the *sūtras* of Gautama, the criticism is based upon the non-understanding of the correct meaning of the *sūtra*. The purport of the statement of Gautama, however, is that one realises the denotative relation through well-known similarity.¹³⁰ Jayantabhaṭṭa rejects the perceptual character of Upamāna more elaborately. He states that the view of the opponent is based upon considering the perception of similarity which the *gavaya* bears to the cow as a *karāṇa* in Upamāna. Here, the opponent ignores the fact that perception of the mediate fact does not turn the concerned means into perception. The case is analogous to inference which is regarded as an independent means of knowledge, though the mediate fact is an object of perception. The perception of smoke in a hill leads to the inferential knowledge of the unperceived fire. Similarly, the perception of *gavaya* gives rise to the knowledge of the denotative relation.¹³¹ Moreover, the scope of Upamāna is not covered by perception. In the case of perception the stress is laid upon the knowledge of an object while Upamāna gives rise to the knowledge of denotative relation in case of an object which was not perceived earlier.¹³² Udayana adds that the purpose of Upamāna, viz. The cognition of the denotative relation, cannot be served by perception

because otherwise there would arise the undesirable contingency of rise of such a cognition even in the case of the person who has not heard the authoritative statement earlier.¹³³

Upamāna versus Inference

Some esystematists include Upamāna under inference. They lay stress upon the fact that the element of resultant knowledge of denotative relation can be attained through inference also. The Naiyāyikas hold that one knows the word denoting certain class of word from the authoritative statement and with the perception of a mark of similarity, etc., in the object denoted by that word he applies it to that object. In this way, the Upamāna serves the purpose of knowing the denotative relation. However, the other systematists think that this can very well be a case of inference also. Their grounds of its inclusion under inference are divergent in many respects. Among the Vaiśeṣikas, Praśastapāda states that in the stock example of the Naiyāyikas the knowledge of the denotative relation is based upon the use of the word *gavaya* in the sense of animal *gavaya* and, hence, it can very well be reduced to inference.¹³⁴ Śrīdhara suggests one of the alternatives to include Upamāna under inference and holds that the knowledge of the denotative relation in the stock example of the Naiyāyikas is derived through the consistent use of a word in a particular sense. Here, he suggests the form of the syllogism as : the object (present) is denoted by the word *gavaya*, because the word *gavaya* is used with reference to it. The word denotes an object in the sense of which it is consistently used. The word *gavaya* also is consistently used in the sense of animal *gavaya* by the forest-dweller. Therefore, the animal is denoted by the word *gavaya*.¹³⁵ Śaṅkaramiśra also favours the inclusion of Upamāna under inference. However, he holds that the denotative relation is known at the time of hearing the authoritative sentence itself. The denotative relation is known

through the fact that the object similar to cow and the word *gavaya* conveyed through the authoritative statement refer to the same object. Hence, the object similar to cow should be denoted by the term *gavaya*.¹³⁶ Here, the Naiyāyikas may argue, adds Śaṅkaramiśra, that *gavayatva* which determines the use of the term *gavaya* in the sense of animal *gavaya* is not known at the state of hearing the authoritative statement and as such the knowledge of the denotative relation cannot arise. Śaṅkaramiśra alleviates the objection stating that the knowledge of *gavayatva* is possible through a figurative sense and, hence, presents no problem.¹³⁷

Śālikanātha also argues that the Nyāya concept of Upamāna can be reduced to inference and the syllogism can be formed as : the term *gavaya* denotes the animal *gavaya* because it is used in the sense of the latter. The word denotes an object with reference to which it is used. Thus, one comes to know the denotative relation.¹³⁸ Vācaspatimiśra also includes Upamāna under inference. Like Śrīdhara and Śālikanātha, he considers the use of a certain word in a particular sense by experienced persons as a probans but adds a condition 'when there is no function other than direct denotation'. such a purpose is fulfilled by the use of the idea of consistent use employed by Śrīdhara. Vācaspati puts the syllogism like this : the *gavaya* denotes the animal *gavaya*, because it is used in the sense of the latter by experienced persons when there is no function other than direct denotation. When there is no function other than direct denotation, a term used by the experienced person in the sense of a particular object is regarded as denoting that object just as the term cow. The term *gavaya* is used in the sense of an object similar to cow. Therefore, it should be accepted as denoting the animal *gavaya*.¹³⁹ Ānandapūrṇa a logician of Advaita Vedānta school also adduces the same argument to include Upamāna under inference.¹⁴⁰ Māṭhara,¹⁴¹ Vijñānabhikṣu¹⁴² and the *Sāṃkhyacandrikā*¹⁴³ also include it

under inference but suggest no form of syllogism. The *Jayamaṅgalā* suggests that the denotation of the word *gavaya* is known through the authoritative statement, and after perceiving the animal *gavaya* the term *gavaya* is applied to it through inference. Here, the horns, etc., which are perceived to be similar in the case of cow and *gavaya* serve as a probans for the application of the term *gavaya* to the animal *gavaya*.¹⁴⁴

Jayatīrtha also advocates the inclusion of Upamāna under inference. He suggests the following process of inference. The subject of enquiry is denoted by the term *gavaya*, because itself a non-cow it is similar to cow, just as a jar by agreement in absence.¹⁴⁵ Rāghavendratīrtha shows the significance of the terms itself a non-cow (*agotve sati*) and similar to cow (*gasadṛśa*). The former wards of the possibility of the application of such inference to the cow which bears the similarity to the other cow and the latter excludes the possibility of the overpervasion of the application of such an inference to the pot, etc.¹⁴⁶

Jayatīrtha suggests the form of syllogism in case of the *sādharmyopamāna* only under the impression that it will make it easy to comprehend the syllogism with reference to the other two kinds of Upamāna also.¹⁴⁷ Rāghavendratīrtha mentions the syllogistic form in case of the other two also. The subject of enquiry is denoted by the word horse because it has got one hoof and thus is dissimilar to the cow. The third case will be as the object of enquiry is denoted by the word camel because it possesses long neck, etc., just as a cow by agreement in absence.¹⁴⁸ Jayatīrtha further says that the upholders of Upamāna as an independent means of knowledge may argue that the form of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) etc., differ in the case of Upamāna from that found in the actual inference. To this, Jayatīrtha replies that Upamāna is considered to be a particular type of inference. The form of *vyāpti* differs in case

of positive (*anvayī*) and negative (*vyatireki*) type of inference, but still they are included under inference. Similarly, in case of Upamāna the *vyāpti* is of a particular type and thus, does not cease to be a case of inference. Moreover, like inference, the similarity between the *vyāpti* and the *pakṣadharmatā* is required here also. Hence, it cannot be further argued that it is not a case of inference because it establishes a particular fact, viz., the denotative relation.¹⁴⁹ Śāntarakṣita also suggests the inclusion of Upamāna under inference as one of the alternatives. If the stress is laid upon the fact that the words envisage a specific individual, the resultant knowledge becomes a case of inference. The animal which is similar to the cow is denoted by the term *gavaya* just like another *gavaya* present in the mind at the time of learning the denotative relation from a reliable person.¹⁵⁰ Here, the denotation of the name *gavaya* is the probandum, similarity to the cow is the probans, the *gavaya* present in the mind at the time of learning the denotative relation serves as a corroborative instance and the animal *gavaya* which is the subject of enquiry serves as a subject (*pakṣa*).¹⁵¹ Nor can it be argued here that the *gavaya* was not present at time of learning the denotative relation, otherwise it cannot be known as to with reference to what the convention in the form that it is similar to the cow was made.¹⁵²

The Naiyāyikas leave no stone unturned to disprove the inclusion of Upamāna under inference. Even in the *sūtras* of Gautama we find an attempt to establish Upamāna as different from inference. Gautama states that the supporters of inclusion of Upamāna under inference may argue that Upamāna is not different from inference because like the latter it gives knowledge of the unperceived object through the perceived one.¹⁵³ Gautama alleviates the objection on the ground that it is not that the purpose of Upamāna is to give rise to the knowledge of unperceived object like *gavaya*.¹⁵⁴ Vātsyāyana

explains the argument more vividly. Actually, the Upamāna gives us the knowledge of the denotation when both the cow and the *gavaya* are perceived while inference leads to the knowledge of the unpercieved object through the perceived one. Hence, it is not a case of inference.¹⁵⁵ Gautama further argues that Upamāna, unlike inference, is always expressed in the form 'asso.....' and hence is not identical with inference which is expressed in terms of relation of grounds and consequence.¹⁵⁶ Vātsyāyana states that in the case of Upamāna it is necessary that the resemblance must be pointed out by some authoritative person but in the case of inference the ground of *vyāpti* may be deduced by one's own experience without such an authoritative statement.¹⁵⁷ Vātsyāyana further adds one more point of difference between Upamāna and inference. Upamāna is always for the sake of another person only while inference is for one's own benefit also. In the case of Upamāna the proposition is made by a person who knows both the members of similarity. It is, therefore, not a case of inference.¹⁵⁸ Vācaspati suggests that the syllogistic form based upon the use of a particular word in the sense of an animal similar to the *gavaya* cannot prove the denotative relation in the given example. Here, the probans may be put as—because the word *gavaya* is used in the sense of an animal similar to cow. However, the *gavayatva* which serves as the cause of the use of the word in the sense of the animal *gavaya* was not cognised through the authoritative statement and hence, the process of Upamāna cannot be put in a faultless syllogism. If the knowledge of *gavaya* is supposed to be acquired by its similarity to the cow, it would involve the fault of interdependence. Nor can it be said that the sense of *gavayatva* can be attained metaphorically because the *gavayatva* is not indicated through the similarity to the cow.¹⁵⁹ Jayantabhaṭṭa adds that Upamāna cannot be a case of inference also since, unlike inference, the knowledge arising through Upamāna does

not depend upon the positive or the negative invariable concomitance. The invariable concomitance between the word and its denotation was not yet ascertained before deducing it through Upamāna. Thus, the denotative relation is cognised independently of the knowledge of invariable concomitance whereas in the case of inference such an invariable concomitance plays a major role.¹⁶⁰

Udayāna tries to disprove the inferential character of Upamāna more elaborately. The opponents may include it under inference thus. The word *gavaya* denotes the animal *gavaya* because it is applied to the latter by cultured people when there is no other function of the word than direct denotation (*abhidhā*) just as the word *go* used in the sense of cow by the cultured persons denotes the cow.¹⁶¹ To this, Udayana replies that here the probans is vitiated by the fallacy of the non-establishment of the reason (*asiddhatva*). The condition for the probans, viz., its application without some other power of denotation cannot be fulfilled until the denotation of the word *gavaya* in the sense of the animal *gavaya* is fully comprehended.¹⁶² And, if the relation is supposed to be known earlier, the very purpose of such an inference would be disturbed.¹⁶³ Udayana further presents the opponent arguing that the statement of the authoritative person, viz., that which is similar to a cow is called *gavaya* expresses the case of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) and after ascertaining such an invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) and perceiving the similarity to the cow in the *gavaya* one remembers the invariable concomitance and, thus, reaches the conclusion that the object present is denoted by the term *gavaya*.¹⁶⁴ Udayana controverts the argument on the ground that it is based upon incorrect interpretation of the purpose of the authoritative statement. This would have been the position if the question to the authoritative person is supposed to come from a person

who has got the knowledge of the object similar to the cow and now enquires about its denotation. But, actually the quest here refers to the case like this. After knowing the object *gavaya* in general (i.e., without knowing the particular shape) one asks the authoritative person how is this animal.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, here the pervaded (*vyāpya*) is that denoted by the word *yat*. Hence, the invariable concomitance in the form that whatever is similar to cow is called *gavaya* cannot lead to the desired inference.¹⁶⁶ The opponent may again come forward with a plea that the statement of the authoritative person may be considered as a response to the question regarding the nature of *gavaya* and, thus, it can be a case of inference.¹⁶⁷ Udayana objects to the plea thus. In this way it would be a case of the *kevalavyatireki* (having the counter example only) kind of inference as is found in the case of the general rule regarding the peculiar characteristic of an object. Thus, we would get the counter example only and the form of the *vyatirekavyāpti* would be as that which is not *gavaya* is not similar to cow, as the elephant. However, the counter example also is not yet established. Hence, it cannot be a case of inference.¹⁶⁸ Nor is it correct to take the authoritative statement as a response to the question regarding the probans to infer the denotative relation. In the present case, it is not that the denotative word or the denoted object is cognised and the probans is not yet cognised.¹⁶⁹ The *anuyavasāya* (introspective consciousness) which determines the nature of knowledge also establishes the difference between inference and Upamāna. In inference one feels 'I infer', but in case of Upamāna one feels 'I know from similarity.'¹⁷⁰

Upamāna Versus Verbal testimony

Some systematists include Upamāna under verbal testimony. Most of these authors take recourse to Vātsyāyana's

view according to which the *karaṇa* is the authoritative statement while the others who include Uddyotakara's view of Upamāna under verbal testimony absolutely or as one of the other alternatives lay stress upon the element of authoritative statement.

Bhāsarvajña includes Upamāna under verbal testimony. He thinks that the Upamāna, like the latter, depends upon the authoritative statement. The acceptance of Upamāna as an independent means of knowledge would lead to the undesirable contingency of admitting as many means of knowledge as the objects because each object would require a distinct means for its cognition.¹⁷¹ He finally concludes that his interpretation brings forth the correct meaning of the statement of the *sūtrakāra*. The author of the sūtras does not intend to establish Upamāna as an independent means of knowledge but mentions it for its serviceableness to prove the validity of verbal testimony.¹⁷² Praśastapāda also includes Upamāna under verbal testimony.¹⁷³ Śrīdhara further thinks that the element of verbal testimony and the knowledge arising of it in case of Uddyotakara's view is also of the nature of verbal testimony.¹⁷⁴ Udayana seems to include the view of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara under verbal testimony. He is of the opinion that the nature of the causal condition and the resultant knowledge lead to the same conclusion. The element of similarity which exceeds here does not turn it altogether different from verbal testimony. The denotative relation is known through the essence of *gavaya* (*gavayatva*) which is conveyed through the authoritative statement itself.¹⁷⁵

The *Yuktidipikā* holds that in case of Upamāna the knowledge of denotative relation is acquired through the authoritative sentence only.¹⁷⁶ As regards the statement of similarity, the *Yuktidipikā* states that it is merely a mode of expression and, thus, is not a factor for making Upamāna an

independent means of knowledge.¹⁷⁷ Otherwise, the other modes like waving the hand and closing the eye would be independent means of knowledge.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, Upamāna like verbal testimony depends upon the fact whether the speaker has visualised the object or not, and upon particular words.¹⁷⁹ Otherwise, knowledge of *gavaya* would arise through the statement 'as the horse, so the *gavaya*'.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, the Naiyāyikas will have to admit some other means of knowledge for the sentences which convey the denotative relation through other elements like description.¹⁸¹ Vācaspati thinks that the knowledge arising from the statement called Upamāna by Vātsyāyana is verbal in nature and hence, it is not different from verbal testimony.¹⁸² Gauḍapāda favours to include Upamāna under verbal testimony.¹⁸³ The Jayamaṅgalā holds that the knowledge is derived through the authoritative statement and it is applied through inference to the object denoted.¹⁸⁴ Dinnāga, as recorded by Uddyotakara, holds when one comes to know the similarity through hearing the authoritative statement, it becomes a case of verbal testimony.¹⁸⁵ According to Veṅkaṭanātha, the Upamāna is the authoritative statement. It is of three kinds as it conveys the elements of similarity dissimilarity and the descriptive qualities. The sentence conveying these, however, is not different from verbal testimony.¹⁸⁶

Veṅkaṭanātha criticises the view of Udayana that through Upamāna we recognise the object denoted by the authoritative statement. Here, objects Veṅkatanātha, the knowledge of the denotative relation which forms the purpose of Upamāna is cognised through the authoritative statement itself.¹⁸⁷ Nor can it be proper to say with Udayana that the similarity is here the factor for restricting the use of a certain word to the certain object and it is not cognised through the authoritative statement. The similarity in general was cognised through the authoritative

statement and becomes clear at the sight of the *gavaya*. If it is not admitted that the object is cognised in general, it would lead to the undesirable contingency of the non-arising of knowledge in case of the supra sensuous objects like Indra because the particular arrangement of the component parts which are the factors for restricting the words in a particular sense are not cognised in these cases.¹⁸⁸ It can in no way be denied that the general meaning is not apprehended in these cases.¹⁸⁹ Śrīnivasādāsa also states that Upamāna may very well be included under verbal testimony if the stress is laid upon the authoritative statement.¹⁹⁰ Diñnāga, as quoted by Uddyotakara, favours the inclusion of Upamāna under verbal testimony as one of the alternatives. If one comes to know the similarity through hearing the authoritative statement, it becomes a case of verbal testimony.¹⁹¹ Kumārilabhaṭṭa records the view of Vātsyāyana that Upamāna is the authoritative sentence itself. This is, however, included under the verbal testimony.¹⁹² Here, the validity of meaning conveyed depends upon the knowledge of the speaker of the authoritative statement. It turns it into a case of verbal testimony only.

The Naiyāyikas spare no pain to prove the Upamāna as different from verbal testimony. The view of Diñnāga, states Uddyotakara, is based upon misunderstanding of the purpose of Upamāna. Diñnāga wrongly thinks that what is apprehended through Upamāna is either the resemblance to the cow or the existence of *gavaya* as qualified by the resemblance to the cow, Diñnāga wrongly deduces such a meaning from the *sūtras* of Gautama. The purport of the statement of Gautama, however, is that one realises the denotative relation through the well known similarity.¹⁹³ Vācaspati tries to prove that Upamāna cannot be a case of verbal testimony. The verbal testimony cannot lead to the knowledge of denotative relation. It conveys that the object denoted is different from the object of its own class and those of other classes. That is why even after hearing

the authoritative statement one is observed to be desirous of knowing the object denoted.¹⁹⁴ Moreover, the denotative relation cannot be comprehended without the perception of one of the relata to the genus. The *gavaya* unlike the sky, etc., (i.e., singular terms) is a general term which denotes many *gavayas*. Thus, the word like *gavaya* conveys the object through the knowledge of the genus of the object. Such a relative is not comprehended merely through the sentence conveying the similarity. The perception of *gavaya* is the source of knowing the genus of *gavaya* and the denotative relation between the word *gavaya* and the animal *gavaya* is conveyed through the authoritative statement. Therefore, authoritative statement alone cannot lead to the knowledge of the denotative relation.¹⁹⁵

Jayantabhaṭṭa is aware of the objections against the view of Vātsyāyana and argues that Upamāna cannot be included under verbal testimony. The totality of cause is not the same in both the cases. The verbal testimony operates through the verbal understanding or the validity of the knowledge of the speaker. The Upamāna, however, requires the additional factor of other means, i.e., well known similarity. It would have very well been included under verbal testimony if the forest-dweller would not have instructed the city-dweller desirous of knowing the *gavaya* about similarity to the well known object which serves as a means of knowing the *gavaya*.¹⁹⁶ The case is analogous to the inference for other (*parataḥ anumāna*) where the knowledge is derived through a probans, but the words are inevitable to convey the sense.¹⁹⁷ Similarly, here also the knower knows the object through well known similarity and not merely through the words. The knower understands the well known similarity through the authoritative statement and knows thereby the denotative relation. Thus merely the authoritative statement does not lead to the knowledge acquired through Upamāna. It is the understanding of the well known similarity that the

reliable person conveys which leads to the knowledge of the denotative relation.¹⁹⁸ Jayantabhaṭṭa is further aware of the fact that some systematists try to include Uddyotakara's view of Upamāna also under verbal testimony. Against such an attempt Jayantabhaṭṭa argues that Upamāna cannot be a case of Verbal testimony also. The knowledge of the denotative relation cannot be generated by the statement of the forest-dweller only for the *gavaya* is not present at the time of instruction given by the forest-dweller and the knowledge of such a relation is possible when both the name and its denotation are known and not otherwise.¹⁹⁹ The authoritative statement does not directly lead here to the knowledge of denotative relation because the object conveyed is not present at a time of hearing the statement. In the case of Upamāna, all the rational doubts about the contents of the knowledge are not satisfactorily answered at the time of hearing the statement. It depends upon perception for the completion of the expressed sense. Verbal testimony, however, carries with it a sense of completion and requires no other proof for the complete expression of its object.²⁰⁰ It may be argued here that the authoritative statement conveys the denotative relation with the class and it is verified through the perception of the individual object. This will, however, not disprove the position of the Naiyāyikas since the class is not definitely known without perceiving an individual.²⁰¹ Moreover, if the knowledge is said to be derived through the verbal testimony, it would be a case of doubtful knowledge because we have no faith in the veracity of the statement.²⁰² Udayana further adds if the resultant knowledge through Upamāna is considered to be a case of verbal testimony, such a knowledge would be admitted as arising in a person who has heard the authoritative statement but has not perceived the *gavaya*.²⁰³ Moreover, the similarity to the cow is not a cause of usage of the word *gavaya* in the sense of the animal *gavaya*.

Otherwise, the denotation of the word *gavaya* would not be known by the people who do not know the cow. Hence, the similarity conveyed through the authoritative statement does not serve as a cause to know the denotative relation between the word *gavaya* and the animal *gavaya*.²⁰⁴

Udayana further tries to prove that the Upamāna cannot be case of the combination of the perception and verbal testimony as well. In the case of Upmāna the perception of *gavaya* and the authoritative statement regarding the denotation take place at different times. The authoritative statement is heard earlier and the perception of the object takes place afterwards. However, the objects which produce the effect together should operate and should be present at the same time in producing the effect.²⁰⁵ Nor should it be argued that the remembrance of the authoritative statement is still present at the time of perceiving the *gavaya*, thus they can be postulated as present at the same time and consequently Upamāna may be a case of the combination of perception and verbal testimony. The knowledge of similarity cannot be a result of perception for according to the Vaiśeṣikas, as in the case of the followers of Kumārilabhaṭṭa, the similarity is not a genus so that it may be perceived by the same organ which perceives an object. Thus, in the absence of knowledge of similarity such a remembrance is not effective.²⁰⁶ Again, if it is argued that Upamāna is the combination of the result perception and verbal testimony, it would involve the undesirable contingency of inclusion of inference and verbal testimony also under perception because they are result of *liṅga parāmarśa* and the knowledge of the *pada* respectively which are in turn the result of perception.²⁰⁷

Upamāna versus recognition

The Jaina logicians and Meghanādasūri a follower of Viśiṣṭādvaita system include Upamāna under recognition. They hold that the purpose of Upamāna postulated by the Naiyāyikas,

can be served by recognition. The process involves elements of more than one means of knowledge. Recognition found in the cases like 'this is the same pot' is based upon earlier cognition of the pot. Similarly, in the case of Upamāna also the object to be known is already cognised. In the stock example of the Naiyāyikas the knowledge of denotative relation is already cognised through the statement of the forest-dweller. There is, therefore, no factor to differentiate Upamāna from recognition.²⁰⁸ Meghanādasūri quotes the view of Udayana and maintains that Upamāna envisaged by him is a case of recognition.²⁰⁹ Otherwise, we have to postulate some additional means of knowledge in the case like 'this is the same Devadatta'²¹⁰ or the sense conveyed through the sentences like 'there are fruits on the bank of the river.'²¹¹

The Naiyāyikas, however, would not admit such a position for Upamāna. Firstly, the Jaina view presupposes the theory that the denotative relation was cognised through the assertion of the authoritative person. As stated in the Naiyāyikas' objection to the inclusion of Upamāna under verbal testimony, the Naiyāyikas do not admit that the denotative relation was already cognised through the verbal assertion. It is also wrong to say that the denotative relation is perceived later on. Secondly, the recognition cannot have the denotative relation as its object because the denotation of the words is beyond the senses. It cannot be argued further that the Naiyāyikas would have to accept some other *pramāṇa* for the cases like 'this is the same Devadatta', because the Naiyāyikas include such cases under perception itself. The other example supplied by Meghanādasūri is a case of verbal testimony. Moreover, it would again be wrong from the Nyāya point of view to include Upamāna under recognition because it involves the element of two means of knowledge. Though it has the element of perception and verbal testimony, yet its independent nature cannot be denied because the resultant knowledge as a whole cannot be explained by two only.²¹² Thus, it would not be

plausible to include it under the recognition which according to the Jainas include any type of knowledge containing the elements of more than one means of knowledge.

Upamāna versus Remembrance

Śāntarakṣita suggests as an alternative that the Nyāya view of Upamāna can be included under remembrance. He argues that in the stock example of the Naiyāyikas the denotative relation is known at the time of hearing the authoritative statement and as such the Upamāna does not convey something new.²¹³ Here, the Naiyāyikas cannot argue that the name was not cognised earlier. Otherwise, no one would have the notion that this is the object the name of which was heard by him.²¹⁴ Śāntarakṣita further reiterates the view of Aviddhakaraṇa which is adopted by Udayana also that through the authoritative statement one knows the denotative relation of a word to the class and it is through Upamāna that the same is known with reference to a single object.²¹⁵ To this also Śāntarakṣita objects that it is incongruous to know the denotative relation with reference to one thing and to apply it to the other.²¹⁶ Śāntarakṣita further argues that the theory of the Naiyāyikas contains two things, viz., the name and its denotation. The name is known through communication of the convention by the authoritative person and the denotation is directly perceived because the denotation has no existence apart from the objects denoted. Thus there remains nothing to be cognised through Upamāna. The case is analogous to the knowledge of 'fragrant' and 'sweet.' There is, thus, nothing to differentiate Upamāna from remembrance.²¹⁷

The view of Śāntarakṣita is based upon the assumption that the denotative relation is known through the authoritative statement. This is, however, discussed in details in connection with Naiyāyikas, attempt to disprove the inclusion of Upamāna

under verbal testimony and, hence, it would be needless to repeat the whole discussion here.

Here, it may also be observed that besides the arguments against the independent status of Upamāna, a set of arguments is directed against Upamāna as a mode of conveying the denotation. The critics suggest that uncommon attributes and the attributes in general should not be grouped with similarity firstly for such a notion goes against our common experience²¹⁸ and secondly because if the modes are taken to be the means of knowledge, it would imply as many *Pramāṇas* as the modes.²¹⁹ However, both the points have little force. It is also contradicted by our common experience that object is not known through a statement of dissimilarity or the description of common properties. The examples offered by Vācaspati and others explain the position beyond doubt. Nor does the position imply the acceptance of indefinite number of the *pramāṇas* because the analysis of the modes involved in Upamāna shows that there is no more mode of conveying the denotative relation involving Upamāna. It cannot be stated that all the other modes like grammar, dictionary, etc., conveying the denotative relation fall in the category of Upamāna because such a position is not accepted by any one. It can only be stated that the Upamāna is the mode of conveying the denotative relation. It is never state that all the modes of conveying denotative relation fall under Upamāna. Through Mokṣākaragupta does not admit such a relation, yet it does not present a serious problem. Some kind of relation between the word and the object denoted by it will have to be accepted, though it may not be given a particular name. Such a relation can be conveyed through Upamāna in some cases.

In this way, we can say with Bhāsarvajña that Upamāna is serviceable to verbal testimony. But, at the same time the view of including it under verbal testimony cannot be accepted

because the Upamāna, unlike the verbal testimony, does not depend upon the statement only. It requires in addition the perception of the similarity for the complete expression of its object while in the case of verbal testimony the sense is completed at hearing the statement of the reliable person only. Nor can it be proper to say that the Upamāna is a case of remembrance for the remembrance is caused by the past impressions only while the Upamāna requires the perception of the object as well.

The criticism of the Nyāya concept of Upmāna found in the texts of the other systematists further reveals that most of the arguments of the opponents are centred around the absence of some object to be cognised merely through Upamāna. Kumārilabhaṭṭa and his followers contend that the result achieved through Upamāna can be attained through the combination of the perception and the verbal testimony or by the verbal testimony assisted by perception. The argument can be alleviated by the Naiyāyikas on the basis of their theory of *pramāṇasamplava*. They hold that it is not a condition for a *pramāṇa* to cognise some object not cognised by some other source of knowledge. What determines the independent nature of *pramāṇa* is its totality of causal condition and the nature of resultant knowledge. When these are different from all other means of knowledge in the case of Upamāna, the Upamāna is considered as an independent source of knowledge. So through it is a combination of totality of causal conditions of perception and memory, it leads to the acceptance of independent means of knowledge.

As a matter of fact, the critics are right to say that the elements of Upamāna can be explained through one or the other means of knowledge. The observation of similarity which the perceptible object bears to the remembered one is a case of perception; the statement of the reliable person is a case

of verbal testimony; the recollection of the meaning of the statement is a case of memory and the element of cognising an unknown object through the well known one is a case of inference. However here the critics ignore to examine the combined process which, of course, requires novelty in the activity of mind. The mental operation is distinct from that involved in the other means of knowledge. This, in turn, results into more than a single means of knowledge. This leads the Naiyāyikas to accept Upamāna as a distinct means of knowledge.

Footnotes :

1. N.S.1.1.1

2. प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनमुपमानम् ।

N.S. 1.1.6

3. N.S. 1.1.4

4. N.S. 1.1.7

5. अत्यन्तप्रायैकदेशसाधर्म्यादुपमानासिद्धिः.

6. प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादुपमानसिद्धेर्यथोक्तदोषानुपपत्तिः ।

N.S. 2.1.46

7. N.V.2.1.45

8. प्रज्ञातेन सामान्यात्प्रज्ञापनीयस्य प्रज्ञापनमुपमानमिति ।

N.V. 1.1.6

9. समाख्यासम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिः उपमानार्थ इत्याह ।

N.B. 1.1.7.

10. यथा गौरिवं गवय इत्युपमाने प्रयुक्ते ।

N.B. 1.1.6

11. Here, it may be observed that Vātsyāyana refers to both—similarity and the authoritative statement as the means. In the process of attaining the knowledge, however, both of these are different. The authoritative sentence is heard first and the knowledge of similarity arises through remembering the statement and as such the latter comes to be the Vyāpāra.

12. N.B. 1.1.6

13. प्रसिद्धं साधर्म्यं यस्य, प्रसिद्धेन वा साधर्म्यं यस्य, सोऽयं प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यो गवयः ।
तस्मात् साध्यसाधनमिति ।

N.V. 1.1.6

14. समाख्यासम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिरूपमानार्थः ।

N.V.1.1.6

15. यदा ह्यनेन श्रुतं भवति यथा गौरैवं गवय इति, प्रसिद्धे गोगवयसाधर्म्ये पुनर्गवयसाधर्म्यं पश्यति प्रत्यक्षम् । ततस्तस्य भवत्ययं गवय इति समाख्यासम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिः ।

N.V.1.1.6

16. आगमाहितसंस्कारस्मृत्यपेक्षं सारूप्यज्ञानमुपमानम् ।

N.V.1.1.6. and N.V.T.T. thereon

17. प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादित्यत्र प्रसिद्धिरुभयी श्रुतमयी प्रत्यक्षमयी च । श्रुतमयी यथा गौरैवं गवय इति । प्रत्यक्षमयी च गोसादृश्यविशिष्टोऽयमीदृशः पिण्ड इति । तत्र प्रत्यक्षमयी प्रसिद्धिरागमाहितस्मृत्यपेक्षा समाख्यासम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिहेतुः ।

N.V.1.1.6

18. प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यस्य वैधर्म्यस्य चोपमानहेतुत्वादप्रतिषेधः ।

N.V.2.1.45

19. अत्रापि यत इत्यध्याहार्यम् ।

N.V.T.T.1.1.6

20. साध्यसाधनमित्युच्यमाने प्रत्यक्षादिसाधनेषु सुखदुःखसाधनेषु प्रसङ्गः । अत उक्तं प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादिति ।

N.V.T.T.1.1.6

21. N.V.T.T.1.1.6

22. साधर्म्यग्रहणं च धर्ममात्रोपलक्षणमिति करसंज्ञाप्रतीतिफलमप्युपमानमेवेति नाव्याप्तिः ।

N.V.T.T. 1.1.6.also

ननु यदोदीच्येन क्रमेलकं निन्दतोक्तम्, धिक्करभमतिदीर्घवक्रग्रीवं प्रलम्बोष्ठं कठोरतीक्ष्णकण्टकाशिनं कुत्सितावयवसन्निवेशमपसदं पशूनामिति, तदुपश्रुत्य दाक्षिणात्य उत्तरापथं गतस्तादृशं वस्तूपलम्ब्य नूनमसौ करभ इति प्रत्येति ।

N.V.T.T. 1.1.6

23. अत एव बहून्युदाहरणान्युक्त्वाप्याह स्म भगवान् भाष्यकारः एवमन्योऽप्युपमानस्य लोके विषयो बुभुत्सितव्य इति ।

N.V.T.T. 1.1.6

24. N.M. Part I, p. 128

25. N.M. Part I., p. 129

26. अत्रातिदेशवाक्यार्थस्त्रिविधः परिगृह्यते ।

साध्यं धर्ममात्रं च वैधर्म्यं चेति भेदतः ॥

T.R., p.87

27. तत्र यथा गौस्तथा गवय इति श्रुतातिदेशवाक्यस्य पश्चाद् वनं गतस्य नागरिकस्य वाक्यानुभूतस्य गोसदृशस्य गवये यत् प्रतिसन्धानमयमसौ गोसदृश इति तत्साध्योपमानम् ।

N.Sa.S., T.R., p. 87

28. वैधर्म्योपमानं तु कीदृगश्च इति प्रश्ने गवादिद् द्विशफो न भवत्यश्च इत्यतिदेशवाक्याद्गवादिवैसादृश्यमधिगतवतः पश्चादेकशफत्वादिरूपस्य वैसादृश्यस्य तुरङ्गमे प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ।

N.Sa.S., T.R., p.87

29. वैधर्म्यविशिष्टपिण्डदर्शनं करणम् , जलादिविधर्मगुणवती पृथिवीत्यतिदेशवाक्यार्थ-स्मृतिव्यापारः ।

Dinakari, p. 263

also cf. N.Si. M., p. 127

30. N.Sa.S., T.R., p. 88

31. एवं गन्धवती पृथिवीत्युत्तरेऽपि ज्ञेयम् ।

N.S.M., p. 127.

32. गवा गवयसारूप्यं प्रतिपद्यते गवयसत्तां वेत्यहो प्रमाणाभिज्ञता भदन्तस्य ।

N.V.1.1.6. and

तदीदृशमुपमानफलमविद्वान् सादृश्यविशिष्टवस्तुज्ञानं चोपमानफलमिति भ्रान्तो भदन्तो दिग्नागः ।

N.V.T.T.1.1.6.

33. Fragments from Diñnāga, p. 50-51.

34. N.B. 1.1.6.

35. N.M. part I, P. 132

36. प्रमाणशास्त्रत्वादस्य प्रमाणमेवार्थपरिच्छित्तिसाधनमिहोपदिश्यते प्रमेयं तु मोक्षाङ्गमेवोपदिश्यते इत्यलं प्रसङ्गेन ।

N.M., Part I, p. 132.

37. अत्यन्तप्रायैकदेशसाम्यादुपमानासिद्धिः ।

N.S. 2.1.45.

38. प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादुपमानसिद्धेर्यथोक्तदोषानुपपत्तेः ।

N.S. 2.1.46.

39. N.V. 2.1.46.

40. N.S. 2.1.47-49.

41. प्रत्यक्षो गवयस्तावत् सादृश्यस्मृतिस्त्र तु ।

S.V., up. 7.

42. ननु सादृश्ययुक्तेऽर्थे न स्मृतिर्नेन्द्रियाद् गतिः ।

S.V., up. 7

43. पूर्वावाक्यार्थविज्ञानान्नाधिक्यं गवये यदि ।
स्मरणादविशिष्टत्वात् सङ्गतेर्न प्रमाणता ॥

S.V., up. 8.

44. अथ त्वधिकता काचित् प्रत्यक्षादिवशाद् भवेत् ।
यावद्धीन्द्रियसम्बन्धे तत्प्रत्यक्षमिति स्मृतम् ॥

S.V., up., 9.

45. स्मर्यमाणस्य चांशस्य विवेकेनाप्रमाणता ।

S.V., up, 10.

46. N.R., up. 10.

47. श्रुतातिदेशवाक्यत्वं न चातीवोपयुपज्यते ।
येऽपि ह्यश्रुततद्वाक्यास्तेषामपि भवत्ययम् ।
प्रत्यक्षदृष्टगोत्वानां वने गवयदर्शिनाम् ॥

S.V., up. 10-11

48. न च शब्दार्थसम्बन्धः प्रमेयोऽत्र तदेष्ट्यते ।
सादृश्यावधृते वाक्ये वाक्यादवगतो ह्यसौ ॥

S.V., up. 13

49. न चास्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानं पुनरुत्पद्यते वने ।
शक्त्योरतीन्द्रियत्वेन स्मृतिरेव हि सेष्यते ।

S.V., up. 14

50. स्यादेवं यदि शक्तौ देशकालाधिक्यं स्यान्न तु तदस्ति, ततोऽनधिकार्श्रत्वात् शक्तिज्ञानं
स्मृतिरेव ।

N.R., up. 14

51. शब्दानुविद्धबोधेऽपि प्रत्यक्षमुपपादितम् ।

S.V., up. 15

52. यदिदं दुर्मतं हेयं यतः सम्बन्धधीरियम् ।
प्रत्यक्षानुगृहीतेन शाब्देनैवोपजन्यते ॥

M.M., p. 115

53. M.M., p. 116

54. उपमानपदं लोके सादृश्ये सति विश्रुतम् ।
वैधर्म्ये धर्ममात्रे च तत्प्रयोगः कथं हि वः ॥
तथातिदेशशब्दोऽपि वाक्ये साधर्म्यबोधके ।
प्रसिद्धः सोऽपि चान्यत्र कथ्यमानो दुनोति माम् ॥

M.M., p. 116

55. P.P., p. 271

56. N.C., p. 290

57. N.C., p. 290

58. त्रिविधमप्यतिदेशवाक्यागम एव ।

N.P., p. 491

59. तदप्यनुपपन्नं प्रागेव व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धेः ।

N.P., p. 491

60. प्रथममेव वाक्यार्थतया प्रतीतेः गोसादृश्योपलक्षितः कश्चित्त्वार्थविशेषो गवय इति हि प्रतीतिः । पश्चात् प्रत्यक्षितगवयस्य वैशद्यमात्रमेव ।

N.P., p. 491

61. एवं नित्यातीन्द्रियविषयसंस्काररामादिशब्दानामपि नित्यमव्युत्पत्तिरेव ।

N.P., p. 491-2

62. तत्र, गवयगवयशब्दयोः सम्बन्धिधियः प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्यक्षत्वात् ।

N.D.M., p. 215

63. प्रमाणान्तरे च सोऽयं देवदत्तः इत्यादावपि तथात्वम् ।

N.D.M., p. 215

64. न च 'अस्य गवयशब्दसंज्ञा' इति धीरुपमानम्, तस्य वनेचरवाक्यादवगतत्वेन स्मृतित्वात् ।

N.D.M., p. 215

65. सादृश्यं चानेकम् । तच्च सदृशानेकावयवजम् ।

N.D.M., p. 215

66. व्याप्तिग्रहणापेक्षात्वादनुमानेऽन्तर्भावः ।

Y.M.D., p. 35

67. स्मरणरूपत्वात्तस्य प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावः ।

Y.M.D., p. 35

68. वाक्यजन्यत्वात् शब्दे वा अनर्भावः ।

Y.M.D., p. 35

69. तदेतत् त्रयमप्यनुमान एवान्तर्भूतम् ।

70. यथा खल्वन्ययिनो व्यतिरेकिणश्च प्रयोगप्रकारवैचित्र्येऽपि नानुमानाद्बहिर्भावः अनुमान-
विशेषत्वात् ।

Jay. On P.P., p. 46

71. अपेक्षितसाधर्म्यसद्भावाच्च तथाऽत्रारीति ।

Jay. On P.P., p.46

72. P.R.K., p. 148

73. अन्यथा योग्यानुपलब्धेरपि मानान्तरत्वापत्तेः ।

P.R.K., p. 148

74. P.R.K., p.148

75. ibid

76. तदुत्तरमेतत्पदवाच्यत्वेनैवं जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायेन मानसत्वनिश्चयाच्चेति ।

P.R.K., p. 148

77. उपमानस्य दृष्टान्तमात्रैकविग्रहत्वेनानुमानावयव उदाहरणेऽन्तर्भावः ।

P.P.G.V., p. 244

78. N. V.I.I. 6

79. तथा परिगृहीतार्थग्रहणान्न प्रमाणता ।
स्मृतिरेवोपमानस्य करणार्थवियोगतः ॥

T.S., 1564

80. अनन्तोपायजन्याश्च समाख्यायोगसंविदः ।

T.S., 1580

81. यतः प्रमाण्यं नाम विषयवत्तया व्याप्तम् । न चास्य निपुणमपि निरूपयन्तो विषयं
पश्यामः ।

B.T.B., p. 6

82. तथा हि समाख्यासम्बन्धस्तस्य विषयो वर्ण्यते । स च परमार्थतो नास्ति ।

B.T.B., p. 6

83. उपमानं प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनम् । तद्वैधर्म्यात् प्रमाणं किं स्यात् संज्ञाप्रतिपादनम् ।

Laghiyastraya 3.10. Quoted by Hemacandra in
Pramāṇamimāṃsā, p. 30.

84. इदमल्पं महद् दूरमासन्नं प्रांशु नेति वा ।
व्यपेक्षातः समर्थेऽर्थे विकल्पः साधनान्तरम् ॥

Laghiyastraya 3.12, Quoted by Hemacandra in Pramāṇa-
mimāṃsā, p. 39

85. साधर्म्याऽव्यतिरेकः उपायभूतत्वात् ।

Y.D., p. 32

86. आख्यातप्रामाण्यादेव प्रतिपत्तुर्गवयविज्ञानमुत्पद्यते ।

Y.D., p. 32

87. अथैवंजातीयकानामपि प्रमाणान्तरत्वमिष्यते तेनात्यल्पमिदमुच्यते चत्वारि प्रमाणानीति । किं तर्हि पाणिविहाराक्षिनिकोचप्रभृतीनामप्युपसंख्यानं कर्तव्यम् ।

Y.D., p. 32

88. उपमानं तावद्यथा गौस्तथा गवय इति वाक्यं तज्जनिता धीरागम एव । योप्ययं गवयशब्दो 'गोसादृश्यस्य वाचक इति प्रत्ययः सोऽप्यनुमानमेव ।

S.T.K., 5

89. आप्तेनाप्रसिद्धगवयस्य गवा गवयप्रतिपादनादुपमानमाप्तवचनमेव ।

P.B., p. 214

90. तेषामपि यथा गौर्गवयस्तुथेति वाक्यं तज्जनिता च बुद्धिरागम एव । यदपि गोसदृशस्य गवयशब्दवाच्यत्वज्ञानं तदप्यनुमानम्, तत्र तच्छब्दप्रयोगात् ।

N.K., p. 533

91. Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra 3, p. 508

92. गोपिण्डान्तरेऽपि संकेतग्रहणे प्रमाणान्तराभिधानप्रसङ्ग इति ।

N. Sāra, p. 73

93. N. Sāra, p. 73

94. शब्दप्रामाण्यसमर्थनं प्रयोजनम् ।

N. Sāra, p. 75

95. परीक्षा त्वर्थापत्तिवत्प्रमाणस्य सतः प्रमाणेष्वन्तर्भावविज्ञापनार्थमिति ।

N.Sāra, p. 76

96. अन्तर्भावस्त्वनुमान एवास्य यथाश्रुतोऽपि निराकृतो नागम इति ।

N.Sāra, p. 76

97. अस्य सूत्रकारस्यैवंस्वभावत्वाद्यत्तिसिद्धान्तमपि क्वचिन्नाभिधत्ते । यथा कृत्स्नैक-देशविकल्पादिनावयविनिराकरणे ।

N.Sāra, p. 77

98. N. Sāra, p. 76

99. 'यथा गौस्तथा गवयं' इति आप्तवचनमेवातिदेशवाक्यमेवोपमानं प्रमाणमित्यर्थः । वाक्यादेव सञ्ज्ञासञ्ज्ञिसम्बन्ध परिच्छेदस्यापि सिद्धेः ।

Kiraṇāvalī, p. 215

100. N.K., p. 530-31

101. N.K., p. 533-34

102. Y.D., 4

103. S.T.K., 5

104. G.B., 4

105. Jay., 4

106. Jay., 4

107. M.V.4

108. S.C., 4

109. उपमानैतिह्यादीनां चानुमानशब्दयोः प्रवेशः ।

S.P.B., 1.88

110. N.V.1.1.6 and N.V.T.T. Thereon.

111. S.T., 15.64

112. T.S., 1574-5

113. ibid

114. त्रिविधमप्यतिदेशवाक्यागम एव ।

N.P., p. 491

115. गवयगवयशब्दयोः सम्बन्ध धियः प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्यक्षत्वात् ।

116. Y.M.D., p. 34-35

117. Jay. On P.P., p. 46

118. P.R.K., p. 148

119. यावद्दीन्द्रियसम्बद्धं तत्प्रत्यक्षमिति स्मृतम् ।

S.V., up. 9

120. स्मर्यमाणस्य चांशस्य विवेकेनाप्रमाणता ।

S.V., up. 10

also N.R. thereon.

121. प्रत्यक्षे गवये सादृश्यज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षफलम् ।

N.K., p. 534

122. स्मरणरूपत्वात् तस्य प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावः ।

Y.M.D., p. 34-35

123. सादृश्यातिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणसहकारेण चक्षुरादिनैव
संज्ञासंज्ञिपरिच्छेदोपपत्तौ सादृश्यज्ञानादेर्मानान्तरत्वकल्पनस्यायुक्त्वात् ।

P.R.K., p. 148

124. अन्यथा योग्यानुपलब्धेरपि मानान्तरत्वापत्तेः ।

P.R.K., P. 148

125. न चैवं सत्युपमितेः सत्युपमितेः परोक्षत्वं व्याहन्येतेति वाच्यम् । इष्टापत्तेः ।

P.R.K., p. 148

126. P.R.K., p. 148

127. *ibid*

128. तदुत्तरमेतत्पदवाच्यत्वेनैनं जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायेन मनसा मानसत्वनिश्चयाच्चेति ।

P.R.K., p. 148

129. N.V. 1.1.6 and N.V.T.T. thereon.

130. N.V. 1.1.6

131. तद्धीन्द्रियजनितमपि धूमज्ञानमिव तदगोचरप्रमेयप्रमितिसाधनात्प्रमाणान्तरम् ।

N.M. Part I, p. 129

132. प्रत्यक्षं तावदेवैतद्विषये न कृतश्रमम् । वनस्थगवयाकारपरिच्छेदफलं हि तत् ।

N.M. Part I, p. 129

133. नापि प्रत्यक्षफलम् अश्रुतवाक्यस्यापि प्रसङ्गात् ।

N.Ku. p. 334

134. P.B., p. 530-1. and N.K. thereon.

135. N.K., p. 534

136. *Vaiśeṣikasūtrapaskāra*, p. 507

137. अतिदेशवाक्यश्रवणसमये गवयत्वं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं न ज्ञातमतः कथं संज्ञापरिच्छेद इति चेत् लक्षणया तत्प्रतीतिसम्भवात् ।

Vaiśeṣikasūtrapaskāra p. 507

138. P.Pan., p. 271

139. S.T.K., 5

140. N.C., p. 290

141. M.V., 4

142. S.P.B., I.88

143. S.C., 4

144. Jayam. 4

145. Jay. On P. Pra., p. 46

146. *Rāghavendraṭikā* on Jaya. On P. Pra, p. 47

and Śrinivāsatīrtha's commentary thereon

147. अत्रोपमानद्वयस्यान्तर्भावानुक्तिः अतिस्फुटप्रतिभासत्वात्..... ।

Jay. On P.Pra., p. 46

148. *Rāghavendraṭikā* on Jay. On P. Pra., p. 47

149. Jay. On P. Pra., p. 46

150. T.S. 1574-75

151. *Pañcikā* on T.S. 1575

152. बुद्धिस्थो न चेत् तस्यामवस्थायां भवेदसौ । क्रियते समयः कस्मिन्नयं च सदृशो गवा ॥

T.S. 1576

153. प्रत्यक्षेणाप्रत्यक्षसिद्धेः ।

N.S. 2.1.48

154. Ibid

155. N.S. 2.1.48

156. तथेत्युपसंहारादुपमानसिद्धेर्नाविशेषः ।

N.S. 2.1.49

157. N.B. 2. 1.48

158. परार्थं चोपमानम्, यस्य ह्युपमेयमप्रसिद्धं तदर्थं प्रसिद्धोभयेन क्रियते इति ।

N.B.2.1.48

159. N.V.T.T., p. 358

160. N.M.Part I, p. 131

161. अस्त्वनुमानम् । तथाहि—गवयशब्दो गवयस्यवाचकः । असति वृत्त्यन्तरेऽभियुक्तैस्तत्र प्रयुज्यमानत्वात्, गवि गोशब्दवदिति

162.....न । असिद्धेः न ह्यसति वृत्त्यन्तरे तद्विषयतया प्रयोगः सङ्गतिमविज्ञाय ज्ञातुं शक्यते ।

N.Ku., p. 347

164. N,Ku., p. 349

165. N. Ku., p. 349

166. तथा च तद्योगप्राथम्याभ्यां तस्यैव व्याप्यत्वम्, ततः किं तेन ? प्रकृतानुपयोगात् ।

N.Ku., p. 349

167. किलक्षणोऽसाविति प्रश्नार्थः ।

N.Ku., p. 350

168. तदा व्यतिरेकपरं स्यात्, लक्षणस्य तथाभावात् ।

N.Ku., 350-1

169. न ह्यनेन लिङ्गमविज्ञाय गवयशब्दस्य वाचकत्वं कस्यचिद्वाच्यत्वं नावगतं येन तदर्थं प्रश्नः स्यात् ।

N.Ku., p. 352

170. नाऽनुमिनोमिनशृणोमिनस्मरामिकिन्तूमिनोमीतिप्रतीतेरपिप्रमित्यन्तरमेवोपमितिरिति भावः ।

171. गोपिण्डान्तरेऽपि सङ्केतग्रहणे प्रमाणान्तराभिधानप्रसङ्ग इति ।

N.Sār., p. 73

172. शब्दप्रमाणसमर्थनार्थं प्रयोजनम् ।

N.Sār., p. 75

173. आप्तेनाप्रसिद्धगवयस्य गवयस्य गवा गवयप्रतिपादनादुपमानमाप्तवचनमेव ।

P.B., Kiraṇāvali., p. 214

174. तेषामपि यथा गौर्गवयस्तथेति वाक्यं तज्जनिता च लोके यः खलु गवय इति श्रूयते स गोसदृशः बुद्धिरागम एव ।

N.K., p. 533

175. Kiraṇāvali, p. 215.

176. Y.D., 4

177. साधर्म्याऽव्यतिरेकः, उपायभूतत्वात्

Y.D., 4

178. Y.D., 4

179. अस्ति चोपमाने वक्तृविशेषापेक्षा ।

Y.D., 4

180. Y.D., 4

181. Y.D., 4

182. S.T.K., 5

183. G. on S.K., 4

184. Jayam, On S.K., 4

185. N.V.I.I. 6 and N.V.T.T thereon

186. त्रिविधमप्यतिदेशवाक्यागम एव ।

N.P., p. 491

187. तदप्यनुपपन्नं प्रागेव व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धेः ।

N.P., p. 491

188. एवं चानभ्युपगमे कथमिन्द्रादिशब्दव्युत्पत्तिः न ह्यत्र निमित्तभूतसेस्थानविशेषादिदृष्टिः ।

N.P., p.491

199. N.P., p.491-2

190. वाक्यजन्यत्वात् शब्दे वा अन्तर्भाव उक्तः ।

Y.M.D., 35

191. N.V.I.I.6. and N.V.T.T. thereon.

192. S.V. up. 1-2

193. N.V. I. I. 6 and N.V.T.T:thereon

194. N.V.T : T. I. I. 6.

195. N. V. T. T. I.I.6

196. N.M. Part I, p. 129

197. उपायमात्रावगमे तु शब्दव्यापारो यथा परार्थानुमाने ।

N.M.Part I, p. 128-9

198. प्रतिपत्ताऽपि नागरको नारण्यवाक्यादेव तं प्राणिनं गवयशब्दवाच्यतया बुध्यते किं तु सारूप्यं प्रसिद्धेन गवा तस्य पश्यति_____।

N.M. Part I, p. 129

199. आगमादपि तत्सिद्धिर्न वनेचरभाषितात् । तत्कालं संज्ञिनो नास्ति गवयस्य हि दर्शनम् । संज्ञांज्ञिनोश्च परिच्छेदे सति तत्सम्बन्धः सुशको भवति नान्यथा_।

N.M.Part I, p. 129

200. M.M. Part 1, p. 130

201. सम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिश्च सामान्ये यदि नेष्यते ।

तदप्यविदितव्यं न सम्यगवधारितम् ॥

N.M.Part I, p. 130

202. गवयाकारवृत्तिश्च तदानीं बुद्धद्युप प्लवः । सम्बन्धेऽपि द्व्यधिष्ठाने दधाति श्यामलां धियम् ।

N.M., Part I, P. 130

203. सेयं न तावद् वाक्यमात्रफलम् अनुपलब्धपिण्डस्यापि प्रसङ्गात् ।

N. Ku., p. 33

204. न हि गवयशब्दस्य सादृश्यं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् अप्रतीतगूनामव्यवहारप्रसङ्गात् ।

N.Ku., p. 341

205. N.Ku., p. 334

206. वाक्यतदर्थयोः स्मृतिद्वारोपनीतावपि गवयपिण्डसम्बन्धेनापीन्द्रियेण तद्गतसादृश्यानुपलम्भे समयपरिच्छेदासिद्धेः ।

N.Ku., p. 335

207. फलसमाहारे तु तदन्तर्भावे अनुमानादेरपि प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

N.Ku., p. 336

208. एकत्वसादृश्यप्रतीत्योः सङ्कलनज्ञानरूपतया प्रत्यभिज्ञानतानतिक्रमात् ।

P.K.M., p. 345

209. गवयगवयशब्दयोः सम्बन्धाधयः प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्यक्षत्वात् ।

N.D.M., p. 215

210. प्रमाणान्तरवे च 'सोऽयं देवदत्तः' इत्यादावपि तथात्वम् ।

N.D.M., p. 215

211. किंच 'नद्यास्तीरे फलानि' इत्यादिवाक्यगतविषयप्रत्यक्षस्यापि प्रमाणान्तरत्वम् ।
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212. Nyāya theory of Knowledge, p. 305
213. T.S. 1564
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217. T.S. 1577-79
218. उपमानपदं लोके सादृश्ये सति विश्रुतम् । वैधर्म्ये धर्ममात्रे च तत्प्रयोगः कथं हि वः ।
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219. अनन्तोपायजन्याश्च समाख्यायोगसंविदः ।
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