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NANDITA BANDYOPADHYAY

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INTRODUCTION

In Indian philosophy there is an interesting controversy centring round the possible ontological status of similarity. One extreme viewpoint is represented by the Buddhists who decline to confer any ontological status on *sādrśya* (similarity). This can be easily deduced as a corollary from their theory of *svlakṣaṇa*, or the self-complete self-defined unrelated momentary particular, as the real *par excellence*. It follows hence that there cannot be anything really common between two such pin-point particulars of the moment. Any such commonness is bound to compromise the pristine purity of an unmixed particular, for it would presuppose a mix-up or partial identity of two particulars. Thus observes Dharmakīrti:

“sarva eva hi bhāvāḥ svarūpasthitayo nātmānaṁ pareṇa
miśrayanti, tasyāparatvaprasaṅgāt”

(PV, Dharmakīrti's Auto-commentary on Śvārthānumāna,
p. 115, Rahul's Edn., Allahabad.)

[All the reals resting in their pure essence do not mix up their identity with one another, for in that case the self-same identity would become something other than itself.]

The context of this remark is the refutation of universals as members of the real world, but it is equally applicable to the case of similarity. So according to Dharmakīrti similarity at best is a mere logical category or an intellectual construct having no corresponding referent in the world of reals. Elaboration of the Buddhist view is beyond the chosen scope and purpose of the present article.

The view-point on the opposite extreme belongs to the Prabhākara School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā which accepts similarity not only as an undeniable reality, but also as a fundamental category of the reals on a par with substance, quality, universal and the like. It is highly significant that a later sub-school

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of Navya-Nyāya is completely in agreement with the Prabhākara School as regards the ontological status of similarity.

Between these two extremes an intermediate position is held by Kumārila Mīmāṃsā. On the one hand it recognises similarity as a reality in opposition to the Buddhists, while on the other it firmly rejects the Prabhākara view that similarity is a basic category. The test of validity, according to the Kumārila School, is the uncontradictedness of cognition. Hence that which emerges as an object of uncontradicted knowledge should be accepted as real. Similarity is such an object and so cannot be dismissed as an unreal appearance or a mere logical construction (*Vikalpa*). Kumārila remarks:

Sādṛśyasyāpi vastutvaṃ na śakyamapabādhitum /
(SLV / Upamāna 18)

[It is not possible to reject the reality of similarity.]

Sucaritamīśra comments:

Sādṛśyantu jātyādivadabaddhitabuddhivedyaṃ kathamanyathā
bhaviṣyati na hi dṛṣṭe'nupapannam nāma kiñcidasti
(Kāśikā on the above)

[Similarity is an object of uncontradicted knowledge like the universal etc. and so how can it be unreal? Nothing is inconsistent about that which is established in experience.]

This is derived from Kumārila's basic philosophical outlook which is compressed in the following sharp and compact expression:

na sarvalokasiddhasya lakṣaṇena nivartanam /
(SLV / Pratyakṣa / 133)

[Nothing which is established in universal experience can be dismissed by *a priori* argument.]

Before going into the details of the respective positions held by the Kumārila and the Prabhākara Schools of Mīmāṃsā it will be convenient for us to examine the position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School in this regard.

I. THE TRADITIONAL NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA VIEW

The students of Indian philosophy are quite familiar with the following definition of similarity:

(Sādrśyam) tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhūyodharmavattvam /

(Viśvanātha's Muktāvalī under Kārikā 2, also Vardhamāna's and Śaṅkaramiśra's commentaries on Vallabha's Nyāyalīlāvalī, p. 76).

[One entity being different from another, similarity is the possession by one of many properties belonging to the other].

Though this definition has been popularised mostly by the Naiyāyikas its origin may be traced to the famous Vaiśeṣika treatise, *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of Vallabhācārya. Vallabha defines *sādrśya* as *sāmānyāderanekavṛttitvam*. (Similarity is the existence of properties such as the universal etc. in more than one substrata). It is the same as two or more different entities having some common properties. Here one need not put any premium on the adjective *bhūyaḥ* in the first definition, because even a single common property is adequate for conveying the sense of similarity. A can be called similar to B on account of their tallness alone. Śaṅkaramiśra remarks in this connection that similarity is not a separate category, since it can be easily included in *Sāmānya*. Here, as it has been interpreted both by Vardhamāna and Śaṅkaramiśra, the term *sāmānya* should be taken not in the technical sense of the universal, but in the wider sense of a logical concept. The reason for accepting this wider sense is not far to seek. Suppose we realise that the pitcher is similar to a piece of cloth on the basis of both having the common property of substanceness (the universal '*dravyatva*'). We cannot properly say here that this universal itself is the similarity. It is accepted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system that the perception of a single particular of a class is enough for the perception of the universal inhering in it without reference to any other particular of the same class. That means that the knowledge of a single man is sufficient for the knowledge of the universal 'man-ness'. In other words, to perceptually recognise A as a man we need not drag into our perception B also as a member of the mankind. This is technically put in the following way: — To perceive 'man-ness' in A we do not necessarily go as far as the knowledge of a relation between the two terms, A and B, which in the case of similarity may be respectively called the correlate (*anuyogin*) and the counter-correlate (*pratiyogin*). But the apprehension of similarity necessarily involves such a relation. We can say 'A has the universal, man-ness' without any reference to the further statement that B has the universal, man-ness. But we cannot say 'A has similarity' or 'B has similarity' independently of each other. It is nonsensical to simply say 'A is similar' or 'B is similar'. To

attain any sense in a similarity-statement we must say ‘A is similar to B’ or ‘A has similarity with B’. In a similarity-statement the subject-substantive (*uddeśya*) figures as the correlate and the predicative term (*vidheya*) as the counter-correlate. Similarity appears as the relational affirmation operating between these two entities. All this shows that the universal in itself cannot be counted as similarity. The same reason may be applied *mutatis mutandis* to show that other properties like quality and action cannot constitute the essence of similarity.

As regards the possibility of a universal standing as similarity there is also another serious objection. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas a universal cannot be a substratum of another universal. When two universals are understood as similars, if similarity is equated to a universal we land in the absurdity of one universal resting in another universal. We can say: — Just as cowness is eternal so is horseness (*Yathā gotvaṁ nityaṁ tathā āsvatvaṁ apī*). Evidently here there is similarity between the two universals, cowness and horseness, in respect of their eternity. If it is said that here similarity is nothing but eternity itself and if eternity is conceived as a universal we arrive at the anomalous position of one universal existing in another universal. It may be argued that eternity is not a universal, but only a construct (*upādhi*). Even then the difficulty does not leave us. Let us take the statement: — Just as cowness is a universal so is horseness (*Yathā gotvaṁ sāmānyaṁ tathā āsvatvamapī*). Obviously here we affirm similarity between cowness and horseness on the basis of their both being universals. Now if similarity is the universal itself we get at the same unwelcome point of one universal inhering in another universal. It may be again argued that here what is common between two universals is universality (*sāmānyatva*) which is, however, not a universal, but only a convenient logical construct. Then it is admitted that the universal in the technical ontological sense cannot be accepted as similarity itself. Moreover there are other properties like quality and action serving as the basis of similarity. Hence if one is fond of the word *sāmānya* and wants to retain the position that similarity is a *sāmānya*, one has got to extend its meaning beyond the technical ontological sense to the wider logical sense of a conceptual construct. Such a wider *sāmānya* is often called an *upādhi*.

Now let us look back to Vallabha’s definition of similarity — “*taddhi sāmānyāderanekavṛttitvaṁ*”. Śaṅkarmīśra explains:

anekavṛttitvameva upādhisāmānyaṁ sādrśyam ityarthah /

This is further understood as equivalent to '*tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhūyodharmavattvam*'. Vardhamāna too understands it in the same way (Comm. on NLV, p. 76). The purport of this interpretation may be explained thus: — A thing may have a real property like a universal, a quality or an action. Now such a property standing in common between two terms cannot in itself be conceived as similarity. Similarity is the *having* of this common property by the two terms. Now a universal, a quality or an action is a real property. But over and above this there is no such real property as may be called '*having, possessing or sharing* such a common property. Two books have red colour, but have no such real property as '*having a common red colour*'. Now it is said that similarity is nothing but '*having or sharing a common property by two terms*', which is nothing but a conceptual construct. This interpretation obviously obviates the difficulty that is presented by a universal not residing in another universal, or by a universal, unlike similarity, not requiring a cognised counter-correlate for its own cognition. In the statement, '*cowness is eternal just like horseness*', or in the statement '*cowness is a universal just like horseness*', '*having eternity or universality*' is not an ontologically approved universal, but only a logical construct. So the objection that one universal cannot reside in another universal does not arise. This is clearly stated by Vardhamāna in the following words:

Sāmānyam ca jātyupādhisādhāraṇam / tena sāmānye sāmānyā-
ntarābhāve'pi *lakṣaṇarūpopādhisattvāt* sadṛśyavahārah /
(NLV pp. 76–77)

[The word *sāmānya* is commonly used to connote both the universal (*jāti*) and a conceptual construct (*upādhi*). Hence though a universal does not inhere in another universal, the use of the word '*similar*' is quite justified because the two terms of similarity possess the same conceptual construct which is expressed in the definition of similarity (i.e. '*having some property in common*').]

Again, since an *upādhi* is not an ontologically accepted universal, the question of *sāmānya* not requiring a cognised counter-correlate (*pratiyogin*) and of *sādṛśya* requiring such a counter-correlate does not arise. This is how Śaṅkaramiśra explains the point:

tadbhinnatve sati tadgatabhūyodharmavattvasya *upādheḥ*
sādṛśyatvena pratiyogigrahāpekṣagrahatvam ityarthah /
(Comm. on NLV, p. 76)

Vardhamāna's interpretation is slightly different: — yadyapi
sāmānyam apratiyogikaṁ tathāpi tadbhinnatve sati tadgata-
bhūyodharmavattvaṁ sādṛśyam / ato viśeṣaṇāṁśasya sapratiyogi-
katvāt tadviśiṣṭamapi tathā ityarthah /

(Comm. on NLV, p. 76)

What Vardhamāna means is this: — It is true that a universal does not depend on a cognised counter-correlate for its own cognition. But we define similarity as — 'two terms being different from each other, similarity is the possession by one term of some property or properties belonging to the other term'. Now this definition gives us a logical concept, not a pure universal. The adjectival part of the definition, namely, 'two entities being different from each other', involves a relation between a correlate and a counter-correlate. This is so because the very concept of difference requires a term (*anuyogin*) which is different and also a term (*pratiyogin*) from which the other is different. Thus the relation between the correlate and the counter-correlate, which is present in the qualifying adjective, invades the qualified totality (*viśiṣṭa*).

But all this is possible because of the basic position that the meaning of the definition is only a logical concept, not a real universal. So Śaṅkaramiśra's explanation is not only more simple, but also more relevant.

After going through all this interpretation should we be wrong to suggest that in the final analysis *sādṛśya* or similarity, as conceived in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, loses its ontological character altogether and turns into a mere logical or conceptual property? If it is so it is doubtful if the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position in *this* regard is basically different from the Buddhist position.

Udayana's short treatment of *sādṛśya* in *Nyāyakusumāñjali* in connection with the Nyāya view of *upamānapramāṇa* does not also enlighten us on the ontological status of *sādṛśya*. No doubt he refutes in this context the Prabhākara view endowing similarity with an independent categorical status. But he seems to skip over the question whether similarity can be counted as a point of reality at all. Udayana here is mainly concerned with determining the object of *upamānapramāṇa*. He proceeds to show that *sādṛśya*, whether accepted as an independent category (Prabhākara view), or as a sort of universal under some qualifying conditions (Kumārila view), can in neither way be called the object of *upamānapramāṇa*. Udayana makes a very

interesting observation to the effect that if the cognition of *sādrśya* requires the services of a separate *pramāṇa* called *upamāṇa*, we can likewise demand the services of another *pramāṇa* for the cognition of *vaisādrśya* or *Vaidharmya* (dissimilarity).

sādharmyamiva vaidharmyaṃ mānamevaṃ prasajyate /
(NK. 3/9.)

If similarity is not a separate category, and even then if it is to be conceived as a part of the worldly reality, then the Naiyāyikas must clearly and convincingly state under which basic category of the sevenfold scheme they want to place it. We shall see later on how and why the Prabhākara School has felt the need of recognising *sādrśya* as an independent basic category. The followers of Prabhākara have elaborately shown why *sādrśya* cannot be accommodated in the sevenfold Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scheme. A thorough reply to the Prabhākara School on this issue has not come forth from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika standpoint.

The interpretation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika definition of *sādrśya* that has been offered in the later treatises such as the *Dinakarī* commentary on Viśvanātha's *Muktāvalī* does not help in clearing the confusion. Of course, the *Dinakarī*, after explaining the traditional view, emphatically asserts that according to a later section of Navya-Naiyāyikas similarity should be considered a separate basic category. Elaboration of this view is reserved by us for a later part of this article. At present we shall take up *Dinakarī*'s interpretation of the traditional view and see how and why it is not free from confusion. We remember the emphatic assertion of both Vardhamāna and Śaṅkaramiśra that *sādrśya* is nothing but a logical concept (*upādhi*) of 'having or sharing of some common properties by two different terms'. Viśvanātha repeats the same in his *Muktāvalī*. *Dinakarī* explains:

Sādrśyaghaṭakadharmāśca kvacij jātīrūpo yathā ghaṭasadrśaḥ
paṭa ityādau / kvacid upādhirūpo yathā gotvaṃ nityaṃ
tathāśvatvamityadau, yathā vā candrasadrśaṃ mukham
ityādavāhlādakatvādi, atiriktakalpane gauravādi.

(Comm. on *Muktāvalī*, p. 73 Madras Edn.).

The confusion starts from the explorable meaning of the term '*ghaṭaka*' in the expression, '*sādrśyaghaṭakadharmā*'. Does it mean 'constituting' or 'determining'? In different contexts the word is used both for a constituent

and a limiting determinant (*avacchedaka*). It seems that *Dinakarī* takes the word in the first sense. Otherwise it cannot be linked with the conclusion that similarity need not be counted as a separate category. As to the second meaning the followers of Prabhākara would also agree that similarity which is an independent category may be determined by a universal, a quality, an action or even an *upādhi*. The Prābhākaras, however, prefer the term ‘*prayojaka*’ to ‘*ghaṭaka*’. Now if we take the first meaning the question remains open whether the constituent (*ghaṭaka*) and the constituted (*ghaṭita*) are different or identical. In the former case it would mean that a property serves as the constituent of the logical concept, ‘having a common property by two different entities’. Now this over-all definitional concept is not a reality over and above the reality of the property. Yet it cannot be said that the concept and the property are one and the same. Had it been so similarity would have been identical with the property itself and the definition might have been more reasonably shortened into the form: — ‘Similarity is a common property or properties like universal, quality etc.’, and not lengthened into the available form: — ‘Similarity is the having of some common properties by two different terms’. Thus if *sādrśya* is discarded as a basic category we come to the position that it turns into a mere definitional concept without any status of reality. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do not clearly assert this position. The nearest clarity is offered by Vardhamāna when he observes that *sādrśya* is a definitional concept (*lakṣaṇarūpopādhi*) and also by Śaṅkaramiśra who explains that *sādrśya* is nothing but the conceptualised universal such as ‘the existence of the same property or properties in more than one term’ (*anekavṛttitvam eva upādhisāmānyam sādrśyam*).

Rāmarudra’s elaboration of the traditional view in his sub-commentary on *Dinakarī* contains a laborious attempt to resolve an unforeseen difficulty and as a result the concept of *sādrśya* has been complicated by conceiving an elongated new relation in order to find a common property. In the statement, ‘the face resembles the moon’, delightfulness (= *āhlādatva*) is supposed to be the common property forming the basis of similarity. But the delight caused by the moon is not exactly the same as caused by the face. It follows hence that the delightfulness belonging to the moon is also different from the same belonging to the face. Difference in causal determinants (*kāraṇatāvacchedaka*) necessarily (*āvaśyakatvāt*) leads to difference in cause-ness (*kāraṇatā*). Here faceness and moonness (*mukhatva* and *candratva*) are the two respective causal determinants of the two causes, the face and the moon. This difference

in causal determinants is answered by difference in cause-ness (i.e. delight-causingness) respectively belonging to the face and the moon. Thus delightfulness being different in the two different entities of similarity, we fail to get a common property between those two entities. If we search for a further similarity between these two particular *delightfulnesses* we end up in an infinite regress, for we have then got to seek a further common property between the two particularised properties.

To tide over this difficulty Rāmarudra suggests a modification in the concept of the common property (*sādhāraṇadharmā*). It is true that the delight caused by the face is different from the same caused by the moon. But we can rise over this particularity by supposing that these two cases of delightfulness, however different, are of the same particular type. Then this *type-particularity* (*ekavaijātya*) commonly belongs to both the cases of particular delight produced by the face and the moon. Now let us conceive that the two causes, the face and the moon, are also qualified by the same type-particularity through a single extended relation such as 'creating delight possessing the same type-particularity', which is technically represented by the expression '*svāśrayopadhāyakatvasambandha*', i.e., the relation of 'causing effects serving as the substrata of the same type-particularity'. Here the pronominal term '*sva*' stands for *ekavaijātya* (literally, specific *type-ness*, which for convenience we have called type-particularity). The two cases of particular delight are the substrata (*āśraya*) of this same type-particularity. *Upadhāyakatva* means the property of causing something. Now the substrata, i.e., two particular delights of the same type, are directly qualified by the same type-particularity. But indirectly, the two causes also are qualified by the same type-particularity as commonly belongs to the two effects. The two causes (the face and the moon) are directly qualified by the two effects (two delights) and the effects are directly qualified by the same type-particularity. Now if we suppose that these two serial qualifications constitute a single relation, we may further assume that the causes are also (indirectly) qualified by the same type-particularity. Thus the face and the moon may be considered to possess a common property, namely, 'being qualified by the same type-particularity' (*ekavaijātyaviśiṣṭatvam eva sādhāraṇadharmah*).¹ Shorn of technical niceties, this interpretation means in short that the common property between the face and the moon is 'causing the same type of delight'. Hence similarity in this context, according to our definition, should be 'possessing the property of causing the same type of delight'. It is easy to

see how here also similarity becomes a mere logical concept, not a reality. First, though ‘causing delight’ is a member of the world of facts, there is no such fact as may be called ‘causing the same type of delight’, for ‘type-particularity’ or the type itself is not a real universal, but only a logical category. Secondly, ‘possessing such a common property’, or more technically speaking, ‘being qualified by the possession of such a common property’ turns out to be a logical super-concept of analytical understanding having no exact correspondence to a real category.

II. THE VIEW OF KUMĀRILA MĪMĀMSĀ

We have already seen in the introductory section that according to Kumārila similarity is a definite part of external reality, not a mere logico-epistemic relational concept. In opposition to the Buddhists Kumārila at first proposes the following tentative definition of *sādr̥śya*:

bhūyo’vayavasāmānyayogo jātyantarasya tat
(SLV / Upamāma / 18)

We call this definition tentative because, as we shall see very soon, Kumārila himself has been forced to introduce many modifications in the course of his prolonged discussion. The immediate context of this definition is the determination of the object of *upamānapramāṇa* according to the Mīmāṃsaka. Here he takes into consideration the familiar example, ‘*gosadr̥śo gavayaḥ*’ (the *gavaya* is an animal similar to the cow). Here similarity obtains between two animals of two different classes. While proposing the definition Kumārila perhaps has this example in mind. So the definition is not at all comprehensive, but only tentative. The definition literally means as follows:

‘Similarity is the relation of a thing belonging to a particular class with a multitude of universals which are inherent in the parts of a thing belonging to another particular class’.

Take the example, ‘the *gavaya* is a cow-like animal’. Here the familiar cow has been presented in order to introduce the unfamiliar *gavaya* through its likeness with the cow. The likeness is based on the fact that the major parts of the *gavaya*’s body and the major parts of the cow’s body come under the same multitude of universals such as eyeness, eariness, tailness, hornness, dewlapness (*sāśnātvā*) and so on. These universals reside in the respective parts of both the animals directly through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*).

The two animals also rest in their respective parts through the same relation. Parts of the bodies of both the animals are thus the substrata of the same universals and also of the two bodies. So the bodies and the universals are related through the relation of co-inherence (*ekārthasamavāya*). The universals residing in the parts of both the animals are the same, for a universal does not differ according to difference in particulars in which they inhere. Hence through the wider relation of *ekārthasamavāya* the same universals inherent in the parts of the cow and the *gavaya* equally belong to both the animals. Now finally, similarity between *go* and *gavaya* is the common existence of these part-universals (*avayavasāmānya*) in both the animals through the same relation of co-inherence (*ekārthasamavāya*).

The same definition and interpretation apply in the case of a part of one whole resembling the part of another whole. The only thing is that here the parts are to be considered in relation to their sub-parts. When we say, 'the eyes of the girl resemble the petals of a lotus' we should look for the sub-parts of both the eyes and the petals and also for the corresponding universals inhering in those sub-parts. These divisions and sub-divisions stop short of the indivisible atom. So according to Kumārila there is no question of similarity between two atoms; there exists only a common universal without accounting for any resemblance.²

The definition of Kumārila, on the very face of it, is incomplete for the simple reason that similarity between two things does not necessarily depend on their parts; properties like quality and action may also account for similarity. Kumārila himself and his commentators are conscious of this weakness in the main definition. So it is stated that no special stress is to be put on the word '*avayava*' in the definition. Kumārila himself has first raised the point — what should be the nature of *sāmānya* when we say that a picture resembles the original, say, the picture of a man is like the man himself?

Citrādau yatra sādṛśyaṁ sāmānyaṁ tatra kiṁ bhavet?

(Ibid. V 30).

There are no real part-universals (*avayavasāmānya*) like handness etc. in the imitational parts of the picture. Such real universals exist only in the parts of a real man. So similarity on the basis of *avayavasāmānya* is impossible in such a case (*na hi manuṣyāvayavagatāni hastatvādīni citrāvayaveṣu santi*. — Pārthasārathi on the same).

Kumārila replies that in such cases we should go for such common

universals as we may find in the symmetry of structure, colour and the like in the picture and the original:

tatrāpi pṛthivīvarṇaviśeṣādisamānatā /

SLV, Ibid., V. 30

Pārthasārathi explains:

tatrāpi saṁsthāna-parimāṇa-varṇasāmānyāni santi /

Sucaritamiśra comments that in the case of similarity between a picture and the original we should generally depend on the structural resemblance (*ākṛtisādṛśya*) between the two. An expert artist unfolds this structural unity in the picture:

prāyeṇa cākṛtisādṛśyameva tatravagamyate / Kuśalastu citrakāro
vyaktisādṛśyamunmīlayati

For the sake of convenience in understanding the nature of relation involved in similarity depending on universals other than the part-universals we may take the example of a red rose and its picture. The picture is faithful to the original. An important aspect of this faithfulness refers to the colour. The two particular red colours, one of the picture and the other of the rose, have the same universal, redness, inherent in both of them. Redness inheres in the two red colours which in turn inhere in the rose and its picture. So by the transferred relation of *samavetasamavāya* (inherent-inherence) the same universal, redness, commonly exists in both the rose and the picture. Thus in such cases similarity is constituted by this kind of transferred relation.

guṇādivartināmapi guṇādisāmānyānāṁ samavetasamavāyād
guṇādimadvartitvāt.

Cidānanda's *Nītitattvāvirbhāva*, p. 150

Again no special significance should be attached to the word '*bhūyas*' (many) in Kumārila's definition, for a single universal may sometimes suffice for the determination of similarity. Many universals are generally necessary in cases of similarity based on *avayavas*, but in cases of similarity based on quality etc. often a single quality-universal (*guṇasāmānya*) is sufficient. Thus in determining similarity between sugar and milk the single universal, sweetness, is a sufficient determinant. Kumārila himself is liberal enough to make this concession:

rūparasagandhānām ca kasyacit tulyatā kvacit /
nāvaśyaṃ sarvasāmānyāt sādṛśyamupajāyate //

(SLV / Ibid. / 31).

Sucarita's commentary is very clear and emphatic on this point.³

The definition of similarity has undergone a further modification due to the consideration that similarity is not necessarily limited to two individuals belonging to two separate classes. Members of a twin are often similar to each other, but do not come under different classes. Here also *avayavasāmānyas* (part-universals) form the basis of similarity as in the case of *go* and *gavaya* belonging to different classes. In the case of the twin, however, similarity does not extend from one class to another, yet there is a too pronounced similarity to be denied. Hence one should set no great store by the word *jātyantara* in the definition. So Sucaritamiśra remarks:

jātyantarāvayavasāmānyagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇārtham /
vyaktisādṛśyamapi yamādiṣu dṛṣṭameva /

Kāśikā under SLV / Upamāna / 18.

According to Sucarita similarity between a picture and its original also may be considered a case of mere *Vyaktisādṛśya* (individual similarity) and not of *jātisādṛśya* (class-similarity). (Comm. on. SLV / Upamāna / 30).

It is now evident that Kūmarila and his followers have been compelled to lift the restrictions embodied in the definition one by one and at last have become liberal enough to declare that similarity is to be conceived as it is found in the nature of things, and one should not bind oneself by any dogmatic limitation. (*yathādarśanam tadāśrīyate* — Kāśikā under Ibid. / 31.) Sucarita says the same thing under V. 22 while explaining Kūmarila's remark, '*dṛṣṭatvāt kimihocyate*'.

After all this liberalism we fail to grasp what Kumārila exactly means by *sādṛśya*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position is more clear in contrast. Sucaritamiśra further adds to the confusion by asserting that both the universals themselves and the relation of these universals with their substrata may be accepted as the connotation of similarity. In the context of class-similarity he says — *jātyantarāsamavāya eva teṣāṃ sādṛśyam*. (Similarity is the inherence of the same universals in two members of separate classes). Here the emphasis is on the relational aspect of the common universals. Again he says: — *piṇḍitāni tu jātyantarāsamavāyopahitāni sādṛśyam* (Similarity is the collection of

universals conditioned by their inherence in a member of another class). Acceptance of *sāmānya* or universal as the essence of similarity presents some difficulties which we have already noticed in our treatment of the traditional Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view. There are some other serious problems which it is relevant to discuss in this context.

There is a marked distinction between the cognition of *sāmānya* and the cognition of *sādṛśya*. *Sāmānya* is the object-cause of 'that'-cognition (*tadbuddhihetu*), while *sādṛśya* is the object-cause of 'that-like'-cognition (*tādvadbuddhihetu*). The distinction between 'that' and 'that-like' is too evident to be denied. A universal helps us identify an object by a class-name. In reply to the question, 'what is that?' we say: 'that is a cow'. Here the universal 'cowness' as the essential class-character of the cow identifies the referent of 'that' as belonging to a particular class. The white, red or black cows are all cows. These continuity of the class-character ensures a sort of unity in all the individual cows by virtue of which every individual of the class is identified as a cow. For this continuity and unity in understanding, a universal is called *anuvṛttapratyayahetu* and *ekatvabuddhinibandhana*. But similarity on the other hand directly involves in its cognition a distinct diversity along with unity, for likeness immediately presents before us two distinct terms which are alike in some aspects. Hence here we get no unitary understanding of identification as we get in the case of a universal. This determines the difference between the cow and the cow-like, between 'that' and 'that-like'. It shows that the universal is not the same as similarity, for cowness cannot be the same as cow-likeness. So *sāmānya* and *sādṛśya* are two different object-supports of two different forms of cognition.

Kumārila attempts to defend his position through a device which is presented in the following verse:

pradhānānām tu sāmānyam yatraikam sampratīyate /
sa eveti bhavettatra tadbhede sādṛśatvadhiḥ //

SLV / Upamāna / 29.

Kumārila here makes a distinction between the cognitive functions of major universals and minor universals. In the similarity-statement, 'the *gavaya* is like the cow' the two major universals, *gavaya*-ness and cow-ness respectively belong to the two correlates of similarity, *gavaya* and cow. But these major universals have nothing to do with the determination of similarity. They only identify the individual members as belonging to the respective classes of

gavaya and cow. So the major universals constitute the ground for 'that'-cognitions. But the minor universals belonging to the parts of the two animals such as eariness, dewlapness etc. form the objective support of the cognition of similarity in a way that we have shown in details. Yet even these part-universals (*avayavasāmānyas*) taken in themselves as essential class-characters constitute the ground for the unitary and identificatory content of 'that'-cognitions which are expressed in such statements as 'this is an ear' or 'this is a dewlap'. This aspect of the minor universals has no function in building up the case of similarity. But these minor part-universals constitute similarity in their aspect of being conditioned by their inherence in a member of another class which figures as the other term of similarity. We have shown before that this interpretational alternative has been put forth by Sucaritamīśra.

Cidānanda in his *Nītitattvāvirbhāva* has fallen back upon this interpretation of similarity in defence of the Kūmarila School. He tries to drive home this point by an interesting and ingenious analogy. A person is known as Devadatta and also as a son of Yajñadatta. In knowing the person as Devadatta we directly identify the person in himself (*svarūpataḥ*) through immediate acquaintance. But in knowing the same person as the son of Yajñadatta we do not really identify the person in himself, for the attribute of being produced by Yajñadatta which is expressed in the descriptive phrase, 'the son of Yajñadatta', is not at all a constituent of the meaning of the proper name Devadatta. Such a descriptive qualification which does not enter into the constitution of the meaning of a term is technically called *upalakṣaṇa*. Through *upalakṣaṇa* we know something in a way different from the way of directly knowing it through identificatory acquaintance. This difference in the form of cognition does not make any difference to the objective nature of the thing cognised, because the same thing is the object of both cognitions. In a similarity-statement a part-universal is cognised in its aspect of being related to the member of another class which is the other term of similarity. Yet 'being related to the other term' is a descriptive qualification (*upalakṣaṇa*) which does not constitute the essence of the part-universal. But the part-universal does not in any way lose its essence (*svarūpa*) in being cognised through this descriptive qualification. So we are entitled to say that the part-universals constitute similarity when they are cognised through the descriptive qualification of being related to the other term.⁴ Thus there is no real difference between *sāmānya* and *sādṛśya*. The difference is merely conditional (*aupādhika*). *Sāmānya* itself is *sādṛśya* under a particular condition.

This clever contrivance of Cidānanda (who was probably under the inspiration of Sucarita), is of dubious value in defence of similarity as a reality. It is admitted that there is a definite difference in the cognitions of similarity and the universal. The universal taken in itself cannot be called similarity. If something more is added to the universal in the cognition of similarity the external object-counterpart of cognition definitely gets a new addition without which similarity cannot be cognised. Thus the constitution of similarity, being something more than the constitution of the universal, is bound to constitute a new element of reality. If we do not admit this, the additional element would not really add anything and as such it should be accepted as a mere intellectual construct (*buddhinirmāṇamātra-vikalpa*). Thus similarity being turned into a *vikalpa*, we are landing in the unwelcome company of the Buddhists.

Let us take the two statements — ‘That is Devadatta’ and ‘That is the son of Yajñadatta’. It is wrong to assume that the cognition of these two statements have the same objective-reference. Had it been so we should admit that the two statements, ‘That is a cow’ and ‘That has been bought at the market for a thousand rupees’ have the same objective-reference, which is absurd. The second statement of each of the two pairs, obviously brings in some facts of the world which do not enter into the meaning-constitution of ‘that’.

Pārthasārathi, as the most faithful disciple of Kumārila, puts special emphasis on the word ‘yoga’ (relation) in the original definition. In the body of the definition this word receives *substantive* emphasis (*viśeṣyatvena prādhānyam*) and Pārthasārathi does not fail to notice this. So both in *Nyāya-ratnākara* (comm. on SLV) and *Śāstradīpikā* he gives the same interpretation. In *Nyāya-ratnākara* he assertively adds the following:

na cātra svarūpamātraṁ yogaḥ / kintu jātyantarāsamban-
dhānuraktarūpeṇa yasteṣāṁ jātyantareṇa yogastat sādṛśyam /
(SLV / Upamāna / 18)

What he means is this: — The part-universals in themselves do not constitute the relation. The relation is that which is determined by the part-universals as being commonly shared by two members like *go* and *gavaya* belonging to different classes. Verily that relation is similarity. We have already seen how this relation turns out to be *ekārthasamavāya* or *samavetasamavāya* according to the categorial nature of the terms of similarity. Kumārila himself asserts in

no uncertain terms that neither the properties nor their multitude constitute similarity. It is the objects *having* the multitude of (common) properties that are apprehended to be similar. Kumārila himself observes:

na dharmā eva sādṛśyaṁ bhūyastā vā tadāśrayā /
bhūyastvavaddhi jātyādi sadṛśatvena dṛśyate //

(Ibid. / 21).

Pārthasārathi explains: — The universals are inherent in the parts and the multitude is inherent in the universals. So the multitude of universals is only a constituent of similarity. If the universals or their multitude would have been the same as similarity, mere cognition of a collection of universals would have been the same as the cognition of similarity. Similarity is obviously more than this and this more is the common relation of these universals with the terms of similarity.⁵

III. THE STAND OF THE PRABHĀKARA SCHOOL

(Similarity as an Independent Category)

The definite assertion of the Prabhākara School that similarity is an independent category is primarily traced to Prabhākara's *Vṛhatī* commentary on *Śābarabhāṣya*. In his treatment of *upamānapramāṇa* Prabhākara observes: — Some have said that similarity is only the universal itself. But that is not similarity. A universal is the same everywhere. It is always 'that' (i.e., not 'that'-like). Yet similarity is something which appears as knowable. Some think that there is no such knowable. But it is definitely knowable, for it is cognised as an object through a separate *pramāṇa*.⁶

The independent status of similarity is primarily based on an independent type of knowledge which holds similarity as its object. This independent type of knowledge is *upamiti* which can be justified, according to the Prabhākara School, only on the assumption that similarity is an independent *prameya* (knowable category). Śālikanātha, the most devout follower of Prabhākara, in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, advances the following arguments in defence of the independence of similarity.

Similarity is not a substance, since it rests in quality and action also. Qualities like smell etc. may be cognised as terms of similarity. Actions are also cognised as being similar to one another. For this same reason similarity

is neither a quality nor an action. (For a quality does not inhere in another quality, and an action does not inhere in another action). Similarity is not also a universal, because unlike a universal similarity does not constitute any ground for the sense of a continuant running as a self-same identity through all the particulars of a class. Similarity is not *samavāya*, since it is not a relation. It also does not come under *Viśeṣa* (particularity), because the Mīmāṃsakas do not accept such a category. (PP. B. H. U. Edn. p. 268).

It goes without saying that similarity cannot be placed under *abhāva*, since it is grasped in a cognition with a definite positive feeling of affirmation. So by this method of elimination, we come to the conclusion that it should be counted as a separate category. It should be noted, however, that Śālikanātha's arguments proceed from the technical way in which one conceives the categories. For example, if one conceives that a quality can rest in another quality, or an action in another action the argument that similarity does not come under quality or action falls through. Hence for the most vital arguments against those who do not accept the categorial independence of similarity we are to look elsewhere. The nature of a thing is to be judged from the nature of our cognition. What is or is not is to be finally determined by how our cognition comprehends it. Hence the Prābhākaras go into the depth of things when they observe: *pramāṇam anubhūtiḥ* (Ibid. p. 124). It means that cognition itself is the final criterion of validity, and so knowledge itself is the ultimate means of knowing. In the *Upamāna* Chapter of *Prakaraṇapañcikā* Śālikanātha more emphatically observes: — All objects for their final determination have only one resort to fall back upon, that is knowledge itself. There is the knowledge — 'this is similar to that' (which is incontrovertible). So similarity is established on the basis of the very (uncontradicted) nature of our knowledge. It does not matter whether or not it is included in the traditional lists of categories. (Ibid. p. 268). So we should examine the status of similarity by applying this cognitive test and see whether Kumārila Mīmāṃsā passes this test.

We have noticed two views about similarity among Kūmarila's followers. According to some the emphasis is laid on *sāmānya*, and similarity is equated with *sāmānya* or a collection of *sāmānyas* conditioned by a complicated pattern of relation. According to Pārthasārathi the emphasis is laid on the relational aspect and similarity is the relation itself. We have already discarded the first view by showing that similarity, unlike a universal, does not come into cognition charged with the sense of a self-same continuant running

through the particulars. An identificatory 'that' is different from 'that'-like. The same arguments will apply against Pārthasārathi's position. We know that the statement 'A and B have the property p' or 'A has p which is also possessed by B' is not at all epistemically equivalent to the statement 'A is similar to B'. Now the same logic leads us to conclude that the statement 'A is related to B through p' or 'A and B have p-relation' cannot be epistemically equivalent to the similarity-statement. The wrong assumption of epistemic equivalence proceeds from a confusion between the ground and the grounded, between the determinant and the determinable. The point is that similarity is grounded in or determined by p or p-relation. One may stop at simply noticing that A and B have p or the p-relation, and may not choose to rise above the ground and go for the conclusion that A and B are similar. This is technically expressed as 'p or p-relation is the *prayojaka* (determining ground) of *sādrśya*, but itself is not *sādrśya*'. So the knowledge, 'that is p or p-relation' is not the same as the knowledge, 'that is similarity'. This has been sharply put in *Nayaviveka* by Bhavanātha, an eminent member of the Prabhākara School:

‘tadvat iti taddhīḥ, na tu ‘tat’ iti, sambandha iti vā /

(NV, M. U. Edn. p. 148)

Another technical objection vitiates the position of Pārthasārathi or the Kumārila School in general. If similarity is considered to be nothing but 'Yoga' or property-relation, i.e. the common relation of A and B with a property or properties in the shape of *sāmānyas*, what is the categorial nature of this relation? Kumārila School recognizes only four basic categories, namely, *jati* (universal), *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality) and *Kriyā* (action). The followers of Kumārila, however, use the term, '*samavāya*' to designate the said relation. Obviously then *samavāya*, according to the Bhāṭṭas, should come under the category of quality. Then how should we explain similarity between one quality-particular with another quality-particular, as for example, we get in the statement: 'the smell of snake resembles the smell of Ketakī flower' (*Ketakīgandhasādrśaḥ sarpagandhaḥ*)? If similarity is identical with the type of *samavāya* that we have discussed earlier, similarity between two qualities would mean a quality resting in another quality. This is impossible according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view. The Mīmāṃsakas are not very clear on this point; but it seems from their explanation of similarity between qualities that they also abide by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view. The explanation offered by the Bhāṭṭas is this:

The snake and the Ketakī are two substance-wholes (*avayavidravaya*). These have got their respective parts which also have the same kind of smell. Smell possesses the universal, smellness (*gandhatva*), which commonly belongs to the smell of the parts of both the wholes. Smellness is inherent in the smell-particulars which are again inherent in the parts. So through this relation of *samavetasamavāya* the same smellness exists in the respective parts of both the wholes. This peculiar relation is the similarity between the parts of the Ketakī and the snake. The same relation is then also the similarity between the quality-particulars of the two wholes, because the parts and the wholes have the same kind of smell which possesses the same smellness.

Yadapi guṇayoḥ sādṛśyaṁ yathā ketakīgandhasya sarpagandhasya
ca, tatrāpi avayaviguṇānām avayavaguṇasāmānyayogaḥ sādṛśyam /
(NRK on SLV, Upamāna / 18).

All this means that the similarity between the smell-particulars of the two wholes is nothing but the similarity between their respective parts, which is the same as the *samavetasamavāya* relation of smellness with those parts. In this way we can avoid the problem of a quality resting in another quality, because the *samavāya*-relation (*samavetasamavāya*) does not reside in the two quality-particulars, but in the substantive parts of the wholes.

The long and short of this tortuous explanation is that: — the similarity between two quality-particulars of two substances is nothing but the similarity between their respective parts, which is again nothing but the *samavetasamavāya* of the same quality-universal.

This is, however, a contrivance too clever to be convincing. When we perceive similarity between two red colours of two pencils we never feel like perceiving this unwieldy winding process of reaching similarity at the top. Even if this process is admitted, it at best can furnish the ground of quality-similarity. So the process itself is not the similarity.

Kumārila's position is further complicated by his observation that similarity like the universal is complete in each member.

sāmānyavacca sādṛśyam ekaikatra samāpyate /
(SLV / Upamāna / 35)

It means that similarity, though obtaining between two terms, is not distributed between the two like a relation. *Saṁyoga* (physical contact) is distributed between two terms so that cognition of *saṁyoga* is dependent

on cognition of both the terms, for it is not complete in a single term. Such a distributive existence is called *Vyāsajyavṛttitva* and the relation by which it is distributively completed in two terms taken together is called *paryāptisambandha*. A universal on the contrary is not distributed among the particulars. For this reason one can cognise redness in a single instance of red without reference to the other members of the red-class. But *samīyoga* in one term cannot be cognised without reference to the other term. If *sādrśya* is complete in one term and is also the same in both the terms, one should have been able to cognise it completely in one term without reference to the other, as it is the case with the universal. But that is certainly not the case with *sādrśya*. Kumārila, however, looks for its parity with the universal on the following ground: One can perceive similarity in a single term without perceiving its counter-correlate (*pratiyoginyadrṣṭe'pi tasmāt tadupapadyate* – Ibid.)

But it is doubtful if we really perceive similarity in a single term. If we admit it, our perceptual judgment would take the form: 'A is similar' or 'A has similarity', without including that with which A is similar. But such a judgment is hardly vouchsafed by our experience. If we admit this we may equally admit such a perceptual judgment as 'A is shorter or longer' without reference to the counter-correlate of comparison. But that is absurd. Let A and B be two similars. When I perceive A alone I do not perceive it as being qualified by similarity, though in fact A is similar to B. Technically speaking, in our perception of A alone *sādrśya* does not figure in knowledge as a *prakāra* (qualificatory adjective) qualifying A. But at the same time it is true that in our determinate perception (*savikalpa*) of A the universal 'A-ness' emerges as the *prakāra* of A. This adjectival universal is necessary for identifying A as a member of the A-class. Thus there is an indelible distinction between similarity and universal. If this distinction is not maintained and the parity of similarity with the universal is strictly adhered to, it is difficult to maintain *upamāna* as a separate *pramāṇa*. This has been convincingly shown by Vācaspati in his commentary on *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*.⁷ According to Kumārila when we perceive *gavaya* we perceive its similarity (with the cow) along with it. This perception by law of association leads to the memory of the cow and then we realise that the cow is also similar with *gavaya*. Perception of similarity in *gavaya* is the *pramāṇa* or means of valid knowledge. Remembrance of the cow is the *vyāpāra* or intermediate function and the realisation of the remembered cow as being qualified by similarity

with *gavaya* (*gavayasādrśyaviśiṣṭā gauḥ*) is the resultant knowledge, *upamiti*; or it may be said that the similarity qualified by the counter-correlate, cow, is the *upamiti*, *-(smaryamāṇaiva gauḥ gavayasādrśyaviśiṣṭā, tadviśiṣṭam vā sādṛśyam upamānasya ṭrameyamiti / NRK on SLV / Upamāna / 37)*.

It should be seen that the cow herself does not figure in the perception of *gavaya*, for then the emergence of the cow in memory through the law of association becomes irrelevant. So the perceptual judgment constituting *upamānapramāṇa* will get this dubious form: — ‘the *gavaya* is similar’ without the intrusion of the counter-correlate. Vacāspati argues:

The similarity of *gavaya* with the cow and the similarity of the cow with the *gavaya* is one and the same. Hence perception of similarity in *gavaya* is the same as the perception of similarity in the cow. Thus the case of *upamāna* is covered by perception. If we go upto *yoga* (relation) in the concept of similarity following Pārthasārathi, the situation does not improve, for the relation is the same in reference to both the terms. Thus the perception of the relation in one term is the same as its perception in another term. So nothing remains to be knowable by *upamānapramāṇa*. Apart from what Vācaspati has said we may raise a further objection. When we perceive similarity in *gavaya* and remember the cow through association, the cow alone cannot come into memory leaving aside her similarity with *gavaya*. In other words the cow is remembered as being qualified with her similarity with *gavaya*. Thus the case of *upamāna* is jointly covered by perception and memory.

Kumārila, however, seems to have anticipated these objections and attempted a plausible reply while spelling his final stand on *upamāna* (SLV / Ibid. / 36–39). He admits that a person who for the first time observes a *gavaya* in the forest cannot perceive its similarity with the cow before the pre-perceived cow leaps into his memory. It is only after this recollection of the cow that he perceives the *gavaya* as qualified by its similarity with the cow (*tatra yadyapi gām smṛtvā tadbhānamupajāyate* — Ibid. 36). From this he goes to the conclusion that the cow is qualified by her similarity with *gavaya*. In other words, though similarity is the same yet the two judgments ‘A is similar to B’ and ‘B is similar to A’ are different. They are, however, equivalent in the sense that, similarity being a symmetric relation, the

proposition 'A is similar to B' leads to its equivalent proposition, 'B is similar to A'. The former is the means (*upamānapramāṇa*) and the latter the result (*upamiti*).

The first weakness of this reply springs forth from the confusion between logical equivalence and epistemic equivalence. Logically, one equivalent may be deduced from another equivalent such as, — the proposition 'B is similar to A: is deduced from 'A is similar to B', for 'A is similar to B' if and only if 'B is similar to A'. But there is no such deduction in the epistemic field, because A's similarity with B and B's similarity with A are co-apprehensibles (*tulyavittivedya*) just as A's difference from B and B's difference from A. He who observes the one observes the other *at the same time* in a single structure of knowledge. This seems to be the deeper implication of Vācaspati's objection.

The second difficulty arises with the question — what does excite the memory of the cow? Is it the perception of the *gavaya* alone? Then why does it not induce the memory of a horse? The obvious reply will be — the similarity of the *gavaya* with the cow excites the memory of the cow. But how can one perceive the *gavaya*'s similarity with the cow before remembering the cow which is not present? So we move in a vicious circle. Pārthasārathi asserts that it is the perception of the *gavaya* qualified by similarity which rouses the memory of the cow. (*sādrśyaviśiṣṭagavayadarśanaṁ gosmarāṇasya janakam* — Comm. on Ibid. / 39). Our first statement of *upamāna* follows this interpretation of Pārthasārathi. Evidently it goes against Kumārila's express opinion that the perception of the *gavaya*'s similarity with the cow can come only after the recollection of the cow. This is quite justified, since before having B in knowledge how can one know A's similarity with B?

The only way out of this vicious circle is to suppose that, though at the initial moment of the perception of A its similarity with B is not perceived, yet the similarity by virtue of its very factual existence, unnoticed at the outset, helps A in reviving the memory of B. The helper standing at the wings for the time being enters the stage of perception only after the entry of B. But the acceptance of this proposition would lead the Kumārila School to an unwanted destination, for it paves the way to the acceptance of similarity as an independent external reality almost of a separate category, which is not a far cry from the Prabhākara School. It is a generally accepted principle that the knowledge of a substantive qualified by an adjective involves the knowledge of the adjective (*viśiṣṭagrahaṇe viśeṣaṇasyāpi grahaṇam*). Hence

we know the universal along with the particular, as in knowing something to be a red colour we must have redness in the same knowledge. But here in our case though the *gavaya* factually stands qualified by similarity yet the knowledge of *gavaya* at the initial stage leaves out the adjective from its fold. If such a novel case in the epistemic field is to be admitted, it should also be admitted at the same time that similarity is a novel type of adjective, unlike those which we meet in our traditionally accepted list of categories, because it has the capacity to move things from an unnoticed background without coming to the foreground of knowledge along with the qualified substantive which it undoubtedly qualifies. This is only a pointer to similarity as a basic category.

Bhavanātha in *Nayaviveka* advances a very cardinal point in favour of Prabhākara and against Kumārila. According to Kumārila the universals or their relations which primarily exist in the parts constitute the similarity which exists between the wholes. This is farfetched indeed, for such universals or their relations should have accounted for the similarity between the parts to which they directly belong. Hence the part-universals and the part-relations have been shown as existing in the wholes also through the complicated and elongated relation of *ekārthasamavāya* or *samavetasamavāya*. All these directly violate the very nature of our understanding. We seem to directly perceive similarity between two terms without the need of a complicated network of relations. If the part-universals and the part-relations could have constituted similarity, the knowledge of these constituents should have kept floating in our cognition of similarity. But we have no such feeling of these so-called constituents in our knowledge of similarity. Similarity strikes us as a simple object of perception without these complicative constituents being dragged into its fold. Similarity in itself appears as an indivisible object. When we say 'A is similar to B' we do not mean to say that the parts of A and B have a common set of relations and universals. These relations or universals may belong to the causal nexus which explains and determines similarity. In other words they are *prajñaptas* (causal determinants) and as such are not themselves constitutive parts of the essence of the effect itself. Contact between the object and the sense-organ is the causal determinant of perception, but is not a part of the perception itself. The Kumārila School suffers from a confusion between the determinant causal nexus and the determinable effect. This is further evident from the fact that the part-universals and their relations are many in number while

similarity belonging to an object is one and indivisible. This is so because a plurality of causal determinants may lead to a singular effect.

What we have said here is an elaboration of the following observation of Bhavanātha Miśra:

Kiñca sāmānyayogayorguṇādivartitā, bahuta ca; sādrśyaṁ
guṇādimaḍvarti, abahu ca iti bhedaḥ / guṇādisāmānyaṁ hi
ekārthasamavetasamavāyāt guṇādimadyogi; sādrśyaṁ tu
tadgataṁ dhīstham iti bhedaḥ /

NV, p. 148

(The printed text reads *abahutā ca* in place of *bahutā ca* and *bahutā ca* in place of *abahutā ca*. This seems to be a copyist's mistake unnoticed by the editor. The correct reading which is consistent with the argument is available in Cidānanda's quotation from *Nayaviveka* – NTV, p. 150).

Cidānanda's attempted rejoinder to Bhavanātha takes the following shape:

It is true that the constituent universals are many while similarity figures as an indivisible unity. Yet all these part-universals through *ekārthasamavāya* or *samavetasamavāya* rest in a term of similarity. This term which figures as the *pratiyogin* (counter-correlate) of *sādrśya* as well as of *ekārthasamavāya* or *samavetasamavāya* is one and the same. This sameness of the *pratiyogin* imparts the idea of oneness to similarity. The objection that similarity appears as directly belonging to a term while the universals belong to it through an indirect relation does not make any material difference, for the universals belong to the term in any way. Thus there is no harm if these universals themselves are taken to be constitutive of similarity. The difference lies only in this:

The universals belonging to the parts or qualities vary according to the variation of a specific part or quality. So these universals appear as directly belonging to a part or quality. Similarity on the other hand, properly speaking, is the collection of all the universals belonging to the parts and the qualities of the whole. A collection of such universals directly appears as belonging to the collective whole of parts and qualities and not separately to a single member of the whole. Now since these parts and qualities are not separate from a term of similarity the collection of those universals also appear as belonging to the term itself.⁸

If we pause to think it is not difficult to detect the weakness of this defence. It is difficult to understand that the fact, that the universals appear as directly resting in the respective parts and qualities of an entity while similarity undeniably strikes us as directly resting in the entity itself, does not make any material difference. We have already referred to the generally accepted epistemic principle that the nature of a thing is finally settled by the way it appears in our uncontradicted cognition. Something appears in cognition as directly belonging to an object and something else as indirectly belonging to the same. If these two things are accepted to be one and the same, one may equally argue that redness and pitchiness (*raktatva* and *ghaṭatva*) are also one and the same. Pitchiness appears as directly inherent in the pitcher just as redness in red colour. Yet redness also belongs to the pitcher through the indirect relation of *samavetasamavāya* (inherence in the inherent). Hence following Cidānanda one should not have been wrong in asserting that redness and pitchiness are the same. But that is plainly absurd.

To assert that similarity is a collection of subsidiary universals does not improve the situation a whit, because this collection does not directly exist in a term of similarity, but only in the totality of the parts and qualities of the term. A term is not exactly identical with the totality of its parts and qualities. Moreover, to have a sense of similarity one need not take into account all the parts and qualities of the two terms.

Pārthasārathi, followed by Cidānanda, finds in *quantification* of similarity an insurmountable objection against similarity as an independent category. We say – A is more similar to B than B is to C. ‘More’ and ‘Less’ are expressions of quantity. It is argued that quantity can belong only to a substance. If similarity is a separate category how can it be qualified by some quantity?⁹ This objection, however, does not assail the position of Kumārila School, since a greater number of subsidiary universals would account for a greater similarity and a lesser number of universals for a lesser similarity.

This objection, however, hardly stands scrutiny. When similarity is accepted as an independent category the traditional scheme of categories is undoubtedly modified by a new addition. If it is demanded by reason modification is not a sin. The Kumārila School itself does not accept the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categorical scheme. If the traditional scheme is modified by addition of similarity we can equally modify the principle that quantity can belong only to a substance. It may be easily assumed that similarity as a

distinct category has the distinctive property of bearing a quantity. Or it may be assumed that the quantity of the causal determinants (*prajojaka*) of similarity projects a sense of quantity in similarity itself through a secondary operation (*upacāra*). Moreover the objection raised by the Kumārila School may be turned against itself. Quantity (or number) is a type of quality. A quality on your admission can belong only to a substance. Yet you say in the same breath that quantity and number can belong to the universals also. If it is admitted there is nothing wrong in the assumption that they can equally belong to similarity. Again, if you stick to the principle that a quality can belong only to a substance, what should we do with such empirical expressions as 'this is more blue than that'? Here some sort of quantity appears as belonging to a quality, and quantity is also regarded as a kind of quality. Thus the case for similarity as an independent category stands on a very strong foundation.

The Prābhākaras, however, advance a difficult proposition in their assertion that similarity belonging to two similar things is not the same, but different. In other words A's similarity with B and B's similarity with A are two different similarities. It means that the transposition or reversal of the correlate and the counter-correlate makes a breach in the identity of similarity. When the proposition 'A is similar to B' is replaced by the proposition 'B is similar to A', the similarity itself changes its identity. This is so, because, according to the Prābhākaras, similarity is not a relation standing in common between two relata. It is a non-relational basic category. The point may be understood by contrasting similarity with a relation like *samyoga*. Perception of *samyoga* (physical contact) requires the simultaneous perception of the two relata of contact. On the contrary we can perceive the similarity of *gavaya* with the cow without necessarily perceiving the cow, the counter-correlate of similarity. Mere memory of the cow is enough for a person who perceives the *gavaya* to perceive its similarity with the cow. Thus the perception of similarity does not necessarily demand the simultaneous perception of both the terms. Perception of one term and memory of the other may be enough for the perception of similarity existing in the perceived term. This definitely demarcates similarity from a relation like *samyoga* or *samavāya*. A perceptual judgment such as 'A and B are similars' is really a collective judgment about two similarities, that is, A's similarity with B and B's similarity with A. Hence similarity cannot be equated with a universal or a collection of universals, which continues its unmitigated identity in all

the particulars.¹⁰ The other major difference of similarity from a universal lies in the fact that a universal for its cognition does not require a simultaneous cognition of a counter-correlate, where as cognition of similarity is entwined with the cognition of a counter-correlate, which may emerge either in perception or in an allied memory.

IV. THE LATER NAVYA-NYĀYA VIEW

Prabhākara's position in favour of similarity as a basic category has been reinforced by the strong support provided by a later school of *Navya-Nyāya*. The view of the later school has been recorded in the Dinakarī commentary on Viśvanātha's *Muktāvalī* in the following words:

navyāstū sādṛśyamatiriktameva

(Kārikāvalī, Chow. Edn. p. 44)

Rāmarudra gives the reasons behind this emphatic assertion. He deduces the basic categorial nature of similarity from its cognitive uniformity which is retained intact in all possible similarity – propositions. Let us take the two following propositions:

- (i) The face is similar to the moon.
- (ii) The cloth is similar to the pitcher.

In the first proposition similarity is determined by delightfulness (*āhlāḍakatva*) and in the second by such attributes as substanceness (*dravyatva*), earthness (*prthivīṭva*) etc.

In the cognitive forms of both these propositions similarity stands as a common factor which as a qualificatory adjective uniformly qualifies both the cognitions. Despite the variations of determinants like delightfulness, substanceness, and so on, there is no variation in the uniform nature of similarity which is included in the object-forms of both the cognitions. 'A is similar to B', 'C is similar to D', 'E is similar to F' – the basis of similarity in all these different judgments may be quite different. Yet all of them have a common adjectival form, namely, 'similar'. This common adjectival form running through different cognitions is technically called *ekaparakāratā*. The fundamental nature of similarity is deduced from this *ekaparakāratā*. This *ekaparakāratā* cannot be explained by the simple assumption that similarity is constituted by the common properties belonging to a pair of similars. Those who make this assumption advance the following interpretation:

In the proposition, 'the face is similar to the moon' similarity is nothing but a collection of properties like delightfulness etc. which stand in common between two terms. These properties undoubtedly figure as qualificatory adjectives (*prakāra*) of the corresponding cognition. Again in the proposition, 'the cloth is similar to the pitcher', a collection of properties like substance-ness etc. likewise constitutes similarity between the cloth and the pitcher and as such figures as the qualificatory adjective (*prakāra*) of the corresponding cognition. Thus in these two similarity-propositions or their corresponding cognitions there is a definite difference in the cognitive adjectives or *prakāras*. But the two propositions despite this difference have a common adjectival cognitive form in the shape of 'similar'. Thus different cognitions of similarity with varying entities have two distinct types of elements in their adjectival object-forms, namely, (1) a non-varying element running uniformly through all the cognitions of similarity, whatever be the variation in entities and (2) varying elements which figure as different causal determinants of similarity in different cognitions with different entities.

It is clear from this analysis that mere common properties in a pair of entities; the properties which differ in different pairs and thus figure as different *prakāras* in different cognitions of similarity, cannot be equated with similarity itself which provides varying cognitions of similarity with a non-varying *prakāra*. This *samānākāratā* or *ekaparakāratā* (i.e. the property of having a common adjectival object-form in the shape of 'similar' or *sādṛśa*) is established in our uniform universal experience. This uniformity of experience cannot be explained unless we accept similarity as a basic category. The common properties belonging to a pair of similars are only causal determinants of similarity, and hence they do not come into the constitution of similarity itself.¹¹

Like Prabhākara Rāmarudra also argues that A's similarity with B and B's similarity with A are two different reals. But the argument placed by Rāmarudra is somewhat different. He perceives the following difficulty in conceiving a single similarity as covering all the instances of similar things. In the proposition, 'the face is similar to the moon', let us suppose that the one and the same similarity belongs to both the terms and likewise let a single similarity comprehend all the cases where two things are similar. Now the face is similar to the moon on the basis of their common delightfulness, and the face is also similar to a cloth on the basis of their common substanceness (*dravyatva*) etc. If similarity is the same and identical in both the cases, then

through transferred relation the moon becomes equally similar to the cloth on the strength of the following deduction — the moon is similar to the face and the face is similar to the cloth, so the moon is similar to the cloth. But similarity can hardly be conceived as a transitive relation. From ‘A is similar to B’ and ‘B is similar to C’ it does not necessarily follow that A is similar to C, for A may be similar to B in one aspect and B may be similar to C in a different aspect. So we cannot conclude from this that A is similar to C. Difference in causal determinants in two instances of similarity calls for a difference in similarity itself.

If, however, similarity differs from instance to instance on the basis of difference in determinants, how do we then get a single denomination which should account for cognitive uniformity (*samānākāratā* or *ekaprakāratā*) and thus also for regarding similarity as a basic category? Rāmarudra tries to resolve the difficulty by conceiving an unanalysable super-property (*akhaṇḍopādhi*), called *similaritiness* (*sādrśyatva*) which lies at the root of all cases of similarity and thus accounts for the cognitive uniformity. This super-property is not a real, but only a logical property. If you call it a real property you should better say that the fundamental category should be called *sādrśyatva*, and not *sādrśya* (*similaritiness*, and not similarity). This complication may be avoided by taking *sādrśyatva* to be a logical super-property. The two propositions, ‘the pitcher has colour and ‘the cloth has colour’ together present us with a two-tier cognitive uniformity. The universal ‘colourness’ determines the similarity between the pitcher and the cloth at the first level. Now there being two similarities in the two terms, the logical super-property of similaritiness determines the cognitive uniformity at the second level comprehending both the similarities. If similarity is accepted as differing in accordance with the difference in terms and instances, the solution offered by Rāmarudra is undoubtedly a mark of valuable logical insight.

Yet there is some confusion in Rāmarudra’s approach to the problem. Our problem is whether in the proposition, ‘A is similar to B’ we get two similarities in the two terms. We have not yet raised the question if the two similarity-propositions, ‘A is similar to B’ and ‘B is similar to C’, or, ‘A is similar to B’ and ‘C is similar to D’, express a single identical similarity. Rāmarudra seems to begin with the first problem and yet seems to end with a negative answer to the second problem. He does not make it clear how and why difference in similarities in two instances such as ‘A is similar to B’ and

'B is similar to C', or, 'A is similar to B' and 'C is similar to D', should be extended to a single similarity-proposition, 'A is similar to B', where in A and B are taken to possess two different similarities. One can easily argue (without taking into account the Prābhākaras' counter-arguments) that similarity is a basic relational category which, like *saṁyoga* or physical contact, does not differ in a single instance, though it differs in different instances. Thus when A is in contact with B, A's contact with B and B's contact with A are one and the same. But it does not follow hence that *saṁyoga* is a transitive relation so that 'A is in contact with B' and 'B is in contact with C' should lead to the absurd conclusion that A is in contact with C. Likewise, though A's similarity with B and B's similarity with A are one and the same, yet A's similarity with B and B's similarity with C are not the same, and so, similarity not being a transferrable relation, it is not possible to deduce A's similarity with C from these two similarities. Thus the identity of similarity in A's similarity with B and C's similarity with D does not arise at all. Similarity, unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's *samavāya*, is not a singular entity. It is to be noted that according to the Prabhākara School *samavāya* like *saṁyoga* differs from instance to instance. Cognitive uniformity or *samānākāratā* may be easily explained by accepting Rāmarudra's suggestion of *sādrśyatva* as an unanalysable logical super-property. Hence to account for maintaining the difference between A's similarity with B and B's similarity with A we have got to fall back upon the Prābhākaras' arguments as to why similarity should not be conceived as a relation.

It is difficult to see, however, why the Prabhākara School should show such stubbornness in denying similarity the status of a relation. It is not necessary to assume that a relation must be like *saṁyoga* or *samavāya*. Once we find sufficient reasons to regard similarity as a basic category we may assume it to be a special type of relation unlike *saṁyoga* and *samavāya*. One notable feature of this speciality is that the perception of similarity does not require a simultaneous perception of both the relata. Hence perception of the correlate and memory-knowledge of the counter-correlate may determine the perception of similarity. The relational status of similarity is deduced from the obvious fact that the knowledge of similarity inevitably depends on the knowledge of a correlate and a counter-correlate (*anuyogin* and *pratiyogin*). No doubt it compromises Prabhākara's position that A's similarity with B is different from B's similarity with A. Accepting this compromise we may still maintain that though similarity is the same and common between two

similar, yet it differs from instance to instance so that A's similarity with B is different from B's similarity with C or C's similarity with D. To conceive similarity as a special type of relation does not go against conceiving it as a fundamental category of reality. It is a fundamental relation. We think it reasonable to introduce this much modification in the stand of the Prabhākara School.

V. THE VIEW OF THE RHETORICIANS AND THE GRAMMARIANS

The Ālaṃkārikas and the Vaiyākaraṇas have something significant to say about the problem of similarity. As far as we know the logico-epistemic aspect of the problem was raised for the first time by Jayaratha in his interpretation of the concept of simile in the *Vimarśinī* commentary on Ruyyaka's *Ālaṃkārasarvasva*. The figure, simile requires a common property belonging to both the terms. This, however, raises a difficulty in the case of a simile in *bimbapratibimbabhāva* (the relation between an object and its reflection). Ruyyaka takes the following verse from the sixth canto of *Raghuvamśa* as an illustration:

pāṇḍyo'yamaṃsārpitalambahāraḥ Kṛtāṅgarāgo haricandanena /
ābhāti bālātaparakṣasānuḥ sanirjharodgāra ivādrirājaḥ //

[This king of Pāṇḍya with a pear-necklace dangling down from his shoulders and with his body anointed with red sandalpaste appears like the King of mountains with its slopes reddened by the morning sun and with streams rushing down its body].

Apparently here we do not find any common property between the king of Pāṇḍya and the king of mountains. On the contrary we get two completely different sets of properties belonging to two different objects; necklace and red sandalpaste to the king, and the red rays of the morning sun and the streams to *Himālaya*. In order to find commonness of properties the set of properties belonging to *Himālaya* is conceived as the reflection of the set of properties belonging to the King. Now a reflection is taken to be identical with the object that is reflected. In this way two different sets of properties are poetically accepted as identical and thus the simile is saved.

Jayaratha argues that this method of aesthetically constructed identity is to be accepted even in the case of a simple and ordinary simile, otherwise no simile is possible at all. In a simple simile such as 'her face is like the moon'

a soft lustrous beauty (*lāvanya*) is generally thought to be the property commonly belonging both to the face and the moon. But if we pause to think a little we find that in reality the beauty of the moon is something quite different from the beauty of the face. So how do we reach at a really common property? Hence here also lunar beauty and facial beauty should be aesthetically accepted as one and the same. If we try further to find something common between the two beauties we shall inevitably land in an infinite regress. Thus to attain the logical possibility of simile as a figure of speech we cannot but accept the aesthetic possibility of a constructed identity of two different elements.¹² This is an aesthetic solution of a logical problem and Jayaratha is right within his chosen limits.

The way in which Jayaratha raises the problem and offers his solution points to the fundamental nature of similarity. Within the limits of rhetoric it attains almost the status of an unanalysable aesthetic axiom. But the scope of similarity is not limited to the domain of poetic figures. The wide field of everyday life has to take similarity into consideration almost at every step. Jayaratha's aesthetic solution spills over its aesthetic limits and serves as a pointer to the acceptance of similarity as a basic category. Whether it belongs to the scheme of logical categories alone or also to the scheme of categories of reality is a different question. Jayaratha himself, however, stops short of the problem whether similarity should be considered a basic category or not.

Jagannātha is forthright in directly deducing the fundamental nature of similarity from some figures of speech in which common properties are expressly mentioned, but similarity is brought forth only through an implied suggestion. Thus in the figure *tulyayogitā* such as 'the moon and your face delight my heart', delightfulness is expressly mentioned as the common property, but similarity is only suggested (*gamya*). This shows that similarity is not the same as the common property. Had it been so the distinction in this case between what is directly expressed and what is suggested by implication becomes obviously inconsistent. Hence according to the Ālaṃkārikas similarity is an independent additional category.¹³

In this context Nāgeśa in his commentary on *Rasagaṅgādhara* informs us that the grammarians also hold the same view. That it is at least the view expressed in *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjūsā*. Similarity is established (as a basic category) on the strength of its being the universally appreciable connotation (*śakyatāvachchedaka*) of the word 'similar'. The relation of the

two similar things with a common property serves as a determinant (*prayojaka*) of similarity.

Moreover, it is agreed on all hands that two similar things are related in such a way that the perception of one excites the memory-disposition (*bhāvanāsaṁskāra*) of the other. Now, a cause to be a cause requires an exclusive property which limits its causeness to itself, and so by virtue of which it becomes the cause of a particular effect. Such an exclusive property is technically called the limiter of causeness (*Kāraṇatāvacchedakadharmā*). Thus, contact and separation (*saṁyoga* and *vibhāga*) are restricted to substance (*dravya*) alone in which they exist through the relation of inherence. Hence the substance is called the *samavāyikāraṇa* (loosely speaking, inherent-cause) of contact and separation. That means that the substance must have an exclusive property which limits this causeness to the substance alone in relation to its effects. This limiter-property is *dravyatva* (substanteness) which is thus established as the necessary property required by the substance in order to be the cause of *saṁyoga* and *vibhāga*. The same principle applies to the case of similarity also. A similar thing causes the evocation of memory-disposition of the other similar to it. So a similar thing, to be a cause of this evocation, should have an exclusive property that serves as the limiter determining this causeness in this particular case. That limiting property is similarity (*sādṛśatva* or *sādrśya*) which is thus established as the necessary limiter of this specific causeness. Hence similarity should be recognised as an unanalysable independent basic category (*akhaṇḍātiriktapadārtha*).¹⁴

Though *dravyatva* and *sādrśya* are deduced by the same method, *dravyatva* is easily accommodated in the class of universals. But we have seen reasons to show that *sādrśya* can not be included in any category recognised by tradition. So similarity should be accepted as a separate basic category.

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NOTES

¹ Yadyapi candramukhadarśanajanyoḥ sukhayorbhinnatvena candramukhayornaikam āhlādakaratvaṁ kāraṇatāvacchedakabhedenā kāraṇatābhedasyāvaśyakatvāt tathāpi svāśrayopadhāyakatvasambandhena ekavaijātyaviśiṣṭatvameva prakṛte sādharmaṇo dharmāḥ, mukhacandradarśanajanyaṁ ca ekajātiyameva sukhamiti bhāvaḥ /

Rāmarudra's comm. on Kārikāvalī, Madras Edn. p. 73.

² sādṛśāvayavataṁ tu yatra nāma pratīyate / tadapyavayavānāṁ syāt samānāvayavāntaraiḥ //

evam tāvad yato nāstī parābhedaprakalpanā / tataḥ param tu sāmānyam bhavet
sādrśyavarjitam //

SLV / Upamāna / 27–28.

³ rupādīnām madhye kasyacidekasyāpi tulyatayā sādrśyam bhavatyeva uktamasakṛt
'yathādarśanam tadāśrīyate' iti / tadiha citrādaḥ varṇasāmānyameva, kusumādigandha-
viśeṣānām gandhasāmānyam, kṣīraśarkarādaḥ rasasāmānyam sādrśyam / avaśyam
sarvaguṇasāmānyasamavāyo nānusartavya iti.

Kāśikā on SLV / Ibid. / 31.

⁴ yathā devadatto yajñadattajanyatvenopalakṣyamāṇo yajñadattaputrabuddhiviśayo
bhavati, svarūpeṇa tu niruppyamāṇo devadattabuddhereva / na ca svarūpavailakṣyaṇyāpi;
tasyaiva devadattasyopalakṣaṇabhedena vilakṣaṇabuddhiviśayatvāt, tathā guṇāvayavasāmān-
yānyāpi gavayāśrītākāreṇopalakṣyamāṇāni gavi gavayavadgavayasādrśyabuddhyorviśayaḥ
svarūpeṇaiva niruppyamāṇāni tadityanuvṛttabuddhereva viśayaḥ, na tadvattādrśyabuddhyoriti /

NTV, Triv. p. 150.

⁵ sāmānyāni hyavayavasamavetani, bhūyastā tu sāmānyasamavetā / atastadbhūyastvaṁ
sādrśyasyāvayavasāmānyāni buddhyā grhyeran, gojātyāvayavasāmānyayuktā tu
gavayajātīḥ sādrśyayuktā grhyat iti yoga eva sādrśyamiti.

NRK on SLV / upamāna / 21

⁶ atra sāmānyameva kaiścit sādrśyamuktam; na tat sādrśyam / kiṁ tarhi? tadeva tat,
gotvāderekatvāt / nanu cātra prameyameva nāstīti kecin manyante, tadayuktam;
anubhūtamapi kāraṇāntarāvagamyam prameyamevetyuktam /

Vṛhatī, Vol. I, M. U., p. 109.

⁷ na hyanyad gavi sādrśyamanyacca gavaye, bhūyo'vayavasāmānyayogo hi jātyantaravartī
jātyantare sādrśyamucyate, sāmānyayogaścaikaḥ, sa ced gavaye pratyakṣo gavyapi tathā,
iti nopamānasya prameyāntaramasti yatra pramāṇāntaramupamānam bhavet, iti na
pramāṇāntaram upamānam /

(STK, pp. 118–122 Bālarāma Udāsīna's Edition)

⁸ guṇādivartināmapi guṇādisāmānyānām samavetasamavāyād guṇādimadvartitvād
bahutve'pyekapratyogyaśrītākāreṇa nirupyamāṇānāmekatvāceti /
Yattu guṇādisāmānyāni samavetasamavāyād guṇādimadvartīni sādrśyantu tadgatamiti
bheda iti, tadatisthaviśayāḥ; ubhayatrāpi tadgatatvabuddheḥ aviśeṣāt / na hi sāmānyam
samavetasamavāyāt tadgatam, sādrśyantu samavāyādeva tadgatamiti viśeṣamupalabhāmahe /
iyāmstu bhedaḥ – guṇādisāmānyāni guṇādivartitvāt teṣāṁ ca kvācitkatvāt piṇḍaikadeśe
tadgatatvena bhānti, sādrśyantu guṇādisāmānyasamāhārarūpatvāt tasya ca sakalapīṇḍaga-
tatvāt tadgatatvenaiva bhātīti /

NTV, pp. 150–51.

⁹ ata eva ca sāmānyabhūyastvālpatvavaśena sādrśyaprakarṣāprakarṣau – susadrśam
īṣatsadrśamiti / ye tu sāmānyayogātiriktaṁ anyadeva tattvaṁ sādrśyam manyante,
teṣāṁ prakarṣāprakarṣabhedaḥ kiṁnimitta iti cintanīyam /

SD Chow Edn. p. 212.

See also NTV pp. 151–52.

¹⁰ sāmānyānyāśrayabhede'pi tānyeva; sādrśyam tu na tatheti bhedaḥ / sādrśyam hi
pratyāśrayam bhinnam, na saṁyogādivadekaṁ; sadrśam iti pratyekaṁ dhīḥ pratyekaṁ
bhinnaviśayā; yapi sadrśau dvau iti dhīḥ sā sādrśyadvayadhīpūrvikā / ekadhīsthayorapi
hi pratiyogisvarūpapratibandhānapekṣā pratiyogyantare sādrśyadhīḥ; saṁyoginorekadhī-
sthayostu saṁyogālīngitayoreva dhīrityekaḥ saṁyogāḥ; sādrśyam anekam anyonyaniyatam
ca dhīśiddham padārthāntaram /

NV M. U. pp. 148–49.

¹¹ anyathā sadṛśa ityākārapratīteḥ sarvatra samānākāratānubhavāpalāpāpatteriti śeṣaḥ / pratīteḥ samānatvamekaprakāratvaṁ, tathā ca candrasadṛśaṁ mukhamityādaū āhlādakarativādeḥ prakāratā, ghaṭasadrśaḥ paṭa ityādaū tu dravyatvapṛthivītvāderiti tādrśapratītyoḥ sādṛśyāmśe anubhavasiddhāyāḥ samānākāratāyā apalāpa uktadharmasya sādṛśyatāvādimate duruddharaḥ / sādṛśyamatiriktaḥ padārtha iti mate tu na tadānupattiḥ / yadyapi mukhe candre ca naikam sādṛśyam anyathā paṭe candrasādṛśyapratītyāpattiriti sādṛśyāmśe tādrśapratītyorna samānākāratopapattiḥ, tathāpi ubhayaśādṛśyasādhāraṇasya sādṛśyatvarūpākhaṇḍopādheranugatatayā ghaṭo rūpavān paṭo rūpavāniti pratītyo rūpāmśa iva sādṛśyāmśe samānākāratopapattiriti dhyeyam /

Rāmarudra's comm. on Kārikāvalī, Madras Edn. p. 74.

¹² nanu hāranirjharayostadgāmitvābhāvāt katham sādḥāraṇadharmateti cet, ucyate — asyāstāvād dharmasya sādḥāraṇyaṁ jīvitam / tacca dharmasyaikatve bhavati / na ca vastuto'tra dharmasyaikatvam / na hi ya eva mukhagato lāvaṇyādidadharmāḥ sa eva candrādaū, tasyānvayāsambhavāt / api tu tajjātīyo' trāṇyo'sti dharmāḥ / evam dharmayorbhedāt sādḥāraṇatvābhāvād upamāyāḥ svarūpaniṣpattireva na syāt / atha dharmayorapi sādṛśyam abhyupagamyate tat tatrāpi sādṛśyanimittamanyadanveṣyam, tatrāpyanyadityanavasthā syāt, tataśca dharmayorvastuto bhedepi pratīvēkatāvasāyād bhedepya bheda ityettannimittamekatvamāśrayanīyam / anyathā hyupamāyā utthānameva na syāt / evamihāpi hāranirjharādīnāṁ vastuprativastutayopāttānāṁ vastuto bhedepya abhedavivakṣakatvaṁ grāhyam / anyathā hyeṣāṁ pāṇḍyādrirājayoraupamyasamutthāne nimittatvameva na syāt / na caiśāmaupamyam yuktam iti samanāntaramevoktam / ata evātra bimbapratibimbabhāvavyapadeśaḥ /

Jayaratha's comm. on AS, N. S. P. Edn. p. 35.

¹³ ata evālaṁkārikāṇāmapi sādṛśyam padārthāntaram / na tu sādḥāraṇadharmarūpamiti vijñāyate / anyathā aupamyasyātra gamyatvokteranupapatteḥ /

RG. N. S. P. Edn. p. 317.

ata eva aupamyasyātra gamyatvādeva / apīnā vaiyākaraṇādisamuccayaḥ /

Nāgeśa's comm. on the above.

¹⁴ sādṛśyam tu sādḥāraṇadharmaprayojyaṁ sadṛśādipadaśakyatāvaccchedakatayā siddham, sadṛśadarśane saṁskārodbodhakatvasya sarvasammatatvena tattvena tatkāraṇatāvaccchedakatayā ca siddhamakhaṇḍamatiriktaḥ padārthaḥ /

VSL. Chow. Edn. Vol. I, pp. 634–35.

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arranged by the Titles of the Books Used

- B. H. U. — Benares Hindu University.
 Chow — Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares
 M. U. — Madras University
 N. S. P. — Nirnay Sagar Press, Bombay
 Triv. — Trivandram Sanskrit Series.
 AS — Alamkārasarvasva of Ruyyaka, N. S. P. 1939 ed. Pandit Girijaprasad Dvivedī

- Kārikāvalī of Viśvanātha with Muktāvalī, Prabhā, Dinakarī, Rāmarudrī etc. Bālamānoraṃ Press, Madras, 1923, ed. C. Sankara Rama Sastry
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- NK – Nyāyakusumāñjali of Udayana, Chow. 1912 ed. Lakman Sastri David.
- NLV – Nyāyalīlāvati of Vallabhācharya with comm. of Śaṅkaramīśra, Vardhamāna, etc. Chow. 1934, ed. Pandit Harihara Sastri.
- NRK – Nyāyaratnākara, Pārthasārathi's Comm. on SLV, Tara Publications, Benares, 1978, ed. Svāmī Dvarikadasa Sastri
- NTV – Nītitattvavirbhāva of Cidānanda, Triv. 1953, ed. Narayana Pillai.
- NV – Nayaviveka of Bhavanātha, M. U. 1937, ed. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri.
- PP – Prakaraṇapañcikā of Sālikanātha, B. H. U., 1961, ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri
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- SLV – Ślokavārttika of Kumārila with NRK. Tara Publications, Benares. 1978, ed. Svami Dvarikadasa Sastri
- STK – Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī of Vācaspati, Bālarama Udāsīna's Comm. Gaya, Saka era 1852, ed. Svāmī Ātmasvarūpodāsīna.
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