

JAYANTA BHATTA'S
NYĀYA-MANJARĪ

[*The Compendium of Indian Speculative Logic*]



TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY

JANAKI VALLABHA BHATTACHARYYA

00.07.2.25
VOL. I

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Delhi :: Varanasi :: Patna

© MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

Indological Publishers and Booksellers

Head Office : BUNGALOW ROAD, JAWAHAR NAGAR, DELHI-7

Branches : 1. CHOWK, VARANASI-1 (U.P.)

2. ASHOK RAJPATH, PATNA-4 (BIHAR)



First Edition : Delhi, 1978

Price

ORIGINAL PRICE
\$29.50

Printed in India

BY SHANTILAL JAIN, AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS, A-45, PHASE-I, INDUSTRIAL AREA, NARAINA, NEW DELHI-28, AND PUBLISHED BY SUNDARLAL JAIN, FOR MOTILAL BANARSIDASS, BUNGALOW ROAD, JAWAHAR NAGAR, DELHI-7

An introduction to the hypothesis of mutual relations

Let not a sphoṭa which stands for a word or a sphoṭa which stands for a sentence convey a sense. Let not a sentence or the meaning of a sentence be partless. Let the hypothesis of words or sentences as suggested by you be approved. But say how are the meanings of words mutually related.

The meanings of words such as a cow, a horse, a man and an elephant remaining unrelated do not constitute the meaning of a sentence. A judgment of memory or of introspection which closely follows the knowledge of the meaning of the last word only refers to the meanings of words as cognised before. Now, we should discuss how the knowledge of their mutual relation comes up.

Rival hypothesis on this Topic

We admit that teachers differ in opinion so far as this point is concerned. Some hold that words convey their meanings as mutually related. If we do not subscribe to it, words cannot constitute a sentence. Others hold that words denote their meanings as mutually unrelated. They, being thus denoted, point to their mutual relation when they are judged from the stand-points of reciprocal reference, material non-contradiction and proximity.

This point is to be debated. Instruction plays the very important part to reveal the meaning of a word or of a sentence since a word or a sentence remains ever unintelligible if the meaning of a word or of a sentence is not taught. Are we initiated into the meaning of a sentence or into that of a word? Are we taught that this sentence conveys this meaning or that this word conveys this meaning? If we hold that we are initiated into the meaning of a sentence then we advocate the doctrine of Anvita-abhidhāna. If we hold that we are initiated into the meaning of a word then we subscribe to the doctrine of Abhihita-anvaya.

The doctrine of abhihita-anvaya

Now, a question arises viz., "which one (of the above two-hypotheses) is to be accepted?" Our simple answer is that the hypothesis of Abhihita-anvaya should be approved since the ascertainment of the meaning of a sentence presupposes the determination of the meanings of its constituent words. If one is not acquainted with the meanings of words, he cannot make out the meaning of a sentence. The meanings of words are classed under different heads. We say "This word denotes a universal, this word means a substance, this word stands for an attribute and this word conveys an action. This statement becomes relevant if words express the above meanings which remain at first unrelated. But if the meaning of a word is qualified by the meanings of other words then there is no hard and fast rule that a particular meaning is determined only by another particular meaning since all meanings are simultaneously presented to our consciousness." In other words, the propounders of the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya substantiate their hypothesis by a negative argument. They hold that if the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna had been true then the meaning of each word would have been presented to our consciousness as qualified by the meanings of all other words since it is impossible to draw a line of distinction. Now, the upholders of the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna may contend that by the joint method of agreement and difference the meaning of one word is distinguished from that of another word.

Such a contention does not hold water since there is no occasion for the application of the joint method of agreement and difference to individualise the meaning of a word. The presentation of all meanings as being mutually related does not come to a stop. We do never hold that a sentence is constructed with words the meanings of which are mutually related. But if words are isolated from a sentence, they express such meanings as are in themselves, i.e., as stand unrelated. If all words which are the source of meanings assemble together then all the meanings of words are also presented to our consciousness in their mutual relation. In that case, it is very difficult to single out the meaning of a word. Now, if a sentence is

independant of the meanings of words then the sentence "Bring a cow" may be taken as the mandate "Tie down a horse." Thus we see that real meanings of words are required for the understanding of a sentence. If they are so required then they should be grasped in their well-defined character. Hence, one is compelled to admit that the relation which holds between a word and its meaning is natural. When one learns the meaning of a sentence from the usage of the experienced persons he does so deciphering the meaning of each constituent word. If one does not subscribe to this view then he will have to learn the meaning of each sentence. As sentences are infinite in number so it is impossible to obtain mastery over language. The net result of this hypothesis is this that all verbal transactions will be defunct. It is also noticed that a person who is conversant with word-meanings makes out the sense even of a new poem, composed by a poet. This is possible because of the knowledge of words and their meanings. If one subscribes to the hypothesis that a sentence is the indivisible unit of a language and the meaning of a sentence is to be learnt then none will understand the meaning of a new poem. Therefore, the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna is not sound.

Reasons which invalidate the rival hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna are as follows. If the hypothesis under discussion is accepted then only one word in a sentence should be competent enough to express the meaning of the sentence and all words should be rudundant. As we know the meaning of a word, we also know the meanings of other words which qualify it. The dictum of anvita-abhidhāna-vādins is that a word conveys its own meaning as qualified by the meanings of other words. Thus we see that a single word conveys a word of objects to be denoted by other words. Now, let all our verbal transaction be executed with a single word. But, as a matter of fact, we cannot transact all our business with a single word. If we say "A cow" then all predicable attributes and actions flash in our mind. But we cannot select the acceptable meaning. To know all things at a time is in a sense to remain ignorant since a listener can take no action upon a word. To a man of taste an ocean, full of water, does not appear to be distinct from a desert since saline water does not serve the purpose of pure

water. But we see no reason why the word 'cow' will convey its own meaning as qualified by the exact attribute or action which will suit the purpose of the listener.

Now, the upholder of the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna may contend that the word in question is accompanied by other words and these accompanying words will fix up the exact meaning of it. Does the said association of words help to convey the above meaning? Or, does the word itself communicate its own meaning? If you insist on the truth of your suggestion then we say in reply that the association of other words is not as significant as that of some words in a mantra which is muttered. It makes no difference whether these words are present or absent since a word serves no useful purpose if we do not know that it denotes such-and-such meaning. Now, if you hold that other words help to determine the meaning of the said word by conveying their own meanings then you subscribe to the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya. Therefore, we arrive at the conclusion that the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya is better. The meanings which are conveyed by words become related to one another from the stand-points of mutual requirement, reciprocal proximity, and absence of contradiction.

The meaning of a word which is required by that of another word is related to that. The objects denoted by words which are adjacent to one another are mutually related. If the object denoted by a word is not incompatible with another such object then they are mutually related. In other words, an object which is related should be fit to be related. If these conditions of being related are not fulfilled then a relation between two objects does not take place. For this reason, the sentence, "A hundred herds of elephants stand on the finger-end" has the meanings of its words mutually unrelated since these meanings are unfit to be related. In other words, there is material contradiction. Thus, the above sentence conveys no meaning. But if we subscribe to the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna then the said sentence should convey a sense since according to the above hypothesis a sentence does never express a meaning which is unrelated. But, in reality, the said sentence communicates no meaning. Hence, it is reasonable to hold that the meanings of words which are conveyed enter into relation-

ship. Some scholars have also said to this effect that words, having conveyed their own meanings, complete their task and afterwards these meanings, being grasped, point to the meaning of a sentence.

The refutation of the hypothesis of abhikita-anvaya

Now, the upholders of the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna take their stand and review the remarks of the propounders of the hypothesis of abhikita-anvaya. They point out that a word does not illuminate an object just like a lamp since a listener must be initiated into the meaning of a word in order to understand it. One learns the meaning of a word, noticing the usage of experienced persons. The experienced employ sentences in order to communicate their ideas. The sentences are never replaced by words. The reason is that mere words are never used to express one's ideas.

When a matter is discussed some other matter flashes in our mind. A word is employed to communicate this new idea. This word should be considered as a sentence. A speaker employs a sentence in order to communicate a system of ideas in which all ideas are mutually connected. The listener also understands in that way. A third person who stands by them also learns the meaning of a sentence in that manner.

This is what is called the communication of the meaning of a sentence. Do you say what is a sentence? Words which conjointly express a unity of meanings are called a sentence. Linguists hold that a collection of words, expressing a unity of meanings, is a sentence. If we subscribe to this view then a collection of words conveys a unity of meanings. If only a single word had expressed such a unity of meanings then words could not conjointly convey a complex whole of meaning. As external conditions such as faggots etc. conjointly maintain the act of cooking, all bearers conjointly carry a palanquin and three pieces of stone keep a pot boiling so all words without an exception point to the meaning of a sentence. This is what is called anvita-abhidhāna (an expression of mutually related meanings). If a word could express a self-complete meaning which is in no way connected with the meanings of other words

then all words would have no usefulness to convey the meaning of a sentence.

Now, the adverse party invites the attention of the upholders of the hypothesis in question to the open question, viz., if a single word is capable of conveying the same meaning as all words conjointly do then the utterance of all other words is superfluous since a single word completes the whole task. The said objection is not tenable. It is impossible for a word to express a complete idea without receiving the assistance of other words. Now, you admit that a single word cannot convey a complete meaning. Such an admission is contrary to the corollary of your own hypothesis. The reason is as follows. Each word falls within those the operation of which yields a complete result. If such a single word is present then an operation which brings about a complete result takes place. Again, such an operation does not take place if such a single word is not present. Thus we say that a single word produces a complete result.

Now, if the above objection goes to such a length then we say "Let the collection of words convey the requisite meaning." We also feel no necessity of holding that individual words which constitute the said collection convey the meaning in question. The hypothesis, thus revised, amounts to this that a sentence and its meaning admit of no parts. Such a logical conclusion is not sound since as the working of an assemblage is noticed so the working of an individual is also observed. What is the working of a collection? And what is the working of an individual? The communication of the meaning of a sentence is what a collection does—whereas the exact expression of the meaning of a word is the work of an individual word. Let us cite an example. The assemblage of all conditions produces an act, viz., the act of cooking whereas individual conditions perform separate acts, e.g., faggots burn and a pot holds articles to be cooked.

If a word has a distinct operation of expressing its own meaning then it should be admitted that the meaning of a word keeps itself aloof from those of other words. Now, the upholders of the hypothesis under discussion join issue with their opponents and emphatically assert that the meaning of a

word does not stand unrelated. The reason is this that a word is employed to serve the purpose of a collection of words. Though a word is included in a collection of words yet it is not a fact that the specific operation of a word is not grasped. Hence, we do not share the view that a sentence is partless since the specific contribution of each word comprised within an assemblage of words is known to us. It is also observed that words which fall within a collection of words conjointly perform the work of the collection. The said collection is not noticed to maintain itself as distinct from the constituent words themselves. Though words in a body perform a team work yet the individual activity of each work is detected by us. Let us cite an example to elucidate our point. A carriage consists of several parts. We do not single out each part and say that this part, being made up of this stuff and that part, being made up of that stuff, separately perform the action of a carriage. Similarly, a single word is never employed. Even if it is employed, it does not point to the meaning of a sentence. But a word, being combined with other words, engages itself to convey the meaning of a sentence. So, it is reasonable to think that the above word throws light on the hypothesis of a complex whole of meanings. Hence, we have stated that words conjointly convey their meaning. Words which convey their meanings in this way constitute a sentence. In other words, a collection of words which expresses a complex whole of meanings is a sentence. For this reason as we know the contribution of each part so we agree with the grammarians in not denying etymological meanings to words. Again, as we definitely know that each word goes on with its operation unless and until the final goal is reached so we agree to differ from other Mīmāṃsakas in the point that a word denotes its meaning as qualified by those of other words.

An answer to the charges levelled Against the Hypothesis of Anvita-Abhidhāna

Our objectors have pointed out that if one subscribes to the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna then he should admit that the meaning of each sentence is to be learnt, otherwise, a person who knows only the meanings of words cannot make out the

meaning of a verse composed by a modern poet. Such an objection has been raised by one who is ignorant of the science of meanings. The word 'a cow' does not convey its meaning, viz., a white cow since an exception is noticed. It also refers to a black cow as its meaning. One cannot also hold that the word 'a cow' denotes cows having all sorts of attributes since objects, thus denoted, are infinite in number and difficult to comprehend. But the meaning of a word is fixed up by means of requirement, fitness of relation, and proximity. A sentence is only competent to suggest the meaning of a word. The ascertainment of the right meaning is arrived at by means of the joint method of agreement and difference. The application of this method is also confined only within the four walls of a sentence. Though the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence extends up to that of a word yet the starting point of the knowledge of a meaning is that of a sentence. From this we understand that there is no reference to a meaning which remains unrelated. This reason behind the above conclusion is this that an experienced man who orders and an experienced man who is ordered do never employ a mere word. This point has been stated before. Though we subscribe to the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna yet it is not a truism that the exact meaning of a word is not determined. With the illustration of the different functions of various parts of a carriage we have shown the different workings of various words in a sentence by means of the joint method of agreement and difference. Thus we see that the meaning of a sentence does not necessarily constitute an indivisible unit. With the help of accessory conditions such as requirement, fitness of relation and proximity we have sometimes determined the meaning of a sentence together with those of words. These meanings of words are also exactly determined. This knowledge of the meanings of words furnishes us with a clue to understand the meaning of other sentences which consist of these words since the denotation of a word, properly deciphered, does not change. Hence, we shall be able to understand the meaning of a new poem, composed by a modern poet. We have also stated before that if words denote merely isolated meanings then we shall have never an access to the meaning of a sentence since

such meanings are not the means of the determination of the meaning of a sentence.

Another objection to this hypothesis has been recorded to this effect that the utterance of other words is superfluous. An answer to it has also been given. The reason behind our answer has been stated thus—"when other words come in close proximity all words play their part full well. You may ask, 'If other words come in close proximity, what does a word do?' Our answer is that the same charge may also be levelled against all conditions. But you admit that all conditions conjointly bring about an action. i.e., produce a result. Similarly, if all words co-operate to convey the meaning of a sentence, expressing their own meanings then the hypothesis of *abhihitānvaya* (unrelated meanings) does not stand to reason since one is never initiated into the unrelated meaning of a word. Again, if we do not admit that the meanings of words are presented to our consciousness in their relational character then we cannot establish that they are related to one another afterwards since an unrelated meaning finds no ways and means of being related.

Now, the objector may contend that unrelated meanings may relate themselves to one another with the help of accessory conditions such as requirement, fitness and proximity. This point has been already discussed. Our reply to this contention is this that the said contention is not tenable. This requirement belongs to whom? Does it belong to a word, or to its meaning, or to a knower? As a word and its meaning are unconscious so they have no requirement since requirement presupposes consciousness. Hence, we simply display empty words when we say that a word requires another word and a meaning requires another meaning. But a knower who definitely understands the meaning of a sentence enjoys the freedom of thought. But this requirement is not a source of valid knowledge since one cannot acquire the true knowledge of things by an act of will. At the outset words reveal things as they are the source of valid knowledge. Then, a desire for relating these things springs up in the mind of a person. It follows the direction of words. It is, thus, the source of the knowledge of mutual relation among things. If words are held

to be responsible for the knowledge of things then we are to admit that words have long-lasting operation like arrows since, if words pass away, then the mere desire of a person cannot manufacture the mutual relation of things, denoted by words.

Thus, we see that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not derived from the verbal source without an impediment. If we are in a position to demonstrate that words directly convey the meaning of a sentence then it is unwise on our part to hold that words indirectly convey the meaning of a sentence.

The concluding portion of the hypothesis of Anvita-Abhidhāna

In fine, we arrive at the conclusion that words convey relational meanings since it is the only way of communicating relation.

As we know for certain mutually related meanings so it is understood that related meanings have assembled. There is no other source of the knowledge of relation. If one says 'Bring a white cow,' he does not necessarily refer to a relation. In some cases of usage the experienced persons make mention of words denoting relation. Though an ignorant person uses a sentence involving a word which points to relation yet the relation does not function as a bond of union. Let us cite an example. If such a person says 'There are ten pomegranates' the meaning of the word 'ten' is not related to that of the word 'pomegranates'. Thus we see that the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna (related meanings) is reasonable.

Now, the upholder tries to find out an answer to the problem 'How do you explain the sentence that there are a hundred herds of elephants on the tip of a finger from the stand-point of anvita-abhidhāna?'

The defender puts the same question to his objector and says 'O upholder of the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya ! how do you solve this very problem ? As you hold that meanings, being expressed, enter into mutual relation so you just explain how the meanings of words contained in the sentence are related to one another after their expression.'

Now, the upholder of the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya says in replies to the question, 'As the meanings of words of the sentence are not fit to be related, they are not mutually related. What we intend to say is this that expressed meanings are mutually related only when the conditions of mutual relation, viz., requirement, fitness and proximity are satisfied.'

The upholder of the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna (expression of related meanings) says, "I have also held that words convey mutually related meanings provided that they satisfy the conditions of requirement, fitness and proximity. As the said conditions are not fulfilled, words contained in the above sentence, do not express a related meaning."

The propounder of the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya presses his point with the following words, 'As you preach the doctrine of anvita-abhidhāna so you hold that the above sentence will convey no sense since it is absurd for the meanings of words to be mutually related. In other words, if the meanings of words cannot unite themselves with one another then a sentence which contains words having unrelated meanings clearly fails to communicate its meaning. But I advocate the doctrine of abhihita-anvaya. Hence I hold that though the meanings of words in the above sentence stand unrelated yet the sentence conveys its meaning. Saying this I am not open to the charge of inconsistency.'

The upholder of the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna retorts thus :—'Though you are a judge, having keen insight yet you have not followed the process adopted by a word to convey its meaning. It is natural function of a word to convey its meaning. But the speaker may have merits or demerits. When they are taken into consideration it is determined whether these words of the speaker have been rightly or wrongly used. Words convey an additional sense. It is this that they point to the relation which holds between a case and a verb. But owing to the perversion of the intellect of a speaker the knowledge of relation which holds between a case and a verb becomes false.'

Some thinkers have said on this point that knowledge, derived from other proofs, contradicts the truth of the said verbal knowledge.

Now, the upholder of the doctrine of anvita-abhidhāna says, 'The intrinsic validity of verbal knowledge is, therefore, supreme. This or that sentence produces verbal knowledge without being disturbed as long as it does not face an opposition. Let us discuss whether the sentence that there are a hundred herds of elephants communicates a meaning or not. There is nothing wrong with the syntactical arrangement relating to words since the sentence consists of words which indicate the locative case, the subject standing upon the locus and the verb along with this meaning is clearly communicated to us. If the said meanings were not communicated, the said sentence would not have been constructed. But, in reality, both of us hold the same view that it is an impossible feat for the meanings of words to be mutually related since they are not fit to be so related.

If it is held that there is no syntactical arrangement of words in the above sentence then the so-called sentence should be a mere enumeration of several letters like a mention of letters such as ka, ca, ṭa, ta, pa, etc., but should not be a real sentence. If we take into consideration the mere syntactical arrangement of words in this case as we do in the case of the sentence 'There are ten pomegranates' then the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna does not violate the rules of reasoning.

The sentence is formally correct but materially incorrect. The opposition which it faces comes from another quarter but not from the quarter of words. This point has been clarified already. Words have an intrinsic power by dint of which they operate smoothly. Under these circumstances we can boldly assert that the Vedas will carry their intrinsic validity, facing no opposition. As the Vedas do not owe their existence to an author so they do their work i.e., correctly convey their meaning without any hindrance. The knowledge which is derived from the Vedas bears the stamp of intrinsic validity. It is above all defects. A lengthy discussion on this point is unnecessary.

Thus we see that if we subscribe to the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna, we can explain how a sentence communicates its meaning. May we also suggest that the learned scholars should

discard the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya since it has no educative value.

The Refutation of The Doctrine of Anvita-Abhidhāna.

The critics do not endorse the above solution. Your statement that one learns the meaning from the usage of the experienced persons is true. It is also a truism that all verbal transactions are executed by means of sentences. It is a fact that all words, like the bearers of a palanquin, assemble together to convey the meaning of a sentence by their joint effort. Let us now discuss how one acquaints himself with a meaning. Does he acquaint himself only with a composite meaning which is worked out by the totality of all words? Or, is he taught only the meaning of each word. Now, if one is to learn an indivisible whole of meaning then it is unavoidable for him to gather the meaning of each discrete sentence. In that case, as we have pointed out, learning will be impossible since sentences are infinite in number. If the truth of the second suggestion is admitted, the exact meaning of each word should be ascertained. The propounders of the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna have cited an example, viz., the different parts of a carriage have distinct functions. The narration of it suggests that the distinct function of each word is to be admitted. If the truth of the above suggestion is denied then the necessity of the knowledge of the etymological meaning of a word will not be required for the understanding of the meaning of a sentence. In that case, a speaker who intends to communicate the meaning of the sentence "Bring a cow" may also use the word "a horse" instead of the word 'a cow'. Unlike the grammarians you hold that the knowledge of the meaning of a word is necessarily required for the understanding of the meaning of a sentence. By the joint method of agreement and difference one picks up the extent of the meaning of the word 'a cow'. The same extent of this meaning becomes active to constitute the meaning of a sentence in which the word 'a cow' finds a place.

The Refutation of the Hypothesis of Anvita-Abhidhāna.

O Mimāṃsakas! You have held that the word 'cow' in

question conveys its meaning qualified by such other meanings as are required, involve no material contradiction in order to be related and are in close proximity. You do not commit this mistake because the word 'cow' is always noticed as engaged in the service of a collection of words. The word 'cow' conveys as much meaning as its force of conveying primary meaning permits it to do. We shall have to make out what is the exact primary meaning of a word, i.e., how much a word denotes and how much it does not do. Though the primary meaning of the word 'cow' is invariably associated with other meanings which are reciprocally required, are mutually related without involving material contradiction, and are in close proximity yet it cannot be left out. What cannot be brushed aside constitutes its meaning. The meaning may be only the mere universal of 'cowness or the concrete universal. Thus the primary meaning of the word 'cow' maintains its identity in the midst of its relation with other meanings. This meaning cannot be ignored. It is detected by the joint method of agreement and difference.

Moreover, a single word is never used. In order to use a word, a sentence shall be constructed. The series of a collection of words are essentially required for this purpose. Nobody has noticed the skill of a single word in constructing a sentence without having the aid of a collection of words. An individual word, being included in the collection of words, plays its part to convey the meaning of a sentence. Its power of conveying the primary meaning does not help it much. But its power of conveying the intended meaning helps it to communicate the meaning of a sentence. The *Mimāṃsakas*, having failed to recognise this distinct power of conveying the intended meaning, admit the truth of the hypothesis of *anvita-abhidhāna*. But such an admission is not logically sound. The power of conveying the primary meaning has no special aptitude for the expression of one and all meanings. If one is not acquainted with distinct laws which govern the communication of the meaning of a word and that of sentence then he cannot escape the charge of using superfluous words in a sentence. In other words, if a word, contained in a sentence, expresses the meaning of a sentence then other words, used in it, become superfluous.

The hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna cannot get rid of such defects. The word 'cow' has been used in a sentence. Its meaning is related to those of other words in it. Now, the word 'cow' should denote the related meaning by its power of conveying the primary meaning. If it does not do it, the knowledge of the related meaning does not arise in our mind. How does the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna stand this criticism? The hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna leads to another absurd conclusion. The word 'cow' denotes a meaning which is related to another object. If the second object is not denoted by the word 'cow' then the related meaning cannot be communicated by it. Thus the hypothesis amounts to this that an object which relates to a cow is not apprehended but a cow as related to it is presented to our consciousness. Such a conclusion (faces) a glaring contradiction in the above hypothesis. Now, if the upholders of the said hypothesis admit that the word 'cow' also denotes the relation of a cow then they should admit that each word denotes all objects. So, we hold that the power of expressing the primary meaning cannot logically communicate all shades of meanings which the words are competent to convey. Therefore, the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna is not tenable.

The upholders of the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna should also explain the problem, viz., 'How does the syntactical relation take place in the sentence that there are a hundred elephants on the tip of a finger?' The sense of the objection lies in this. As the meaning of the sentence involves material contradiction, how can a related meaning be denoted by a word? Now, they may contend that in the above case the syntactical relation is merely verbal and there is no actual relation between the meanings of words. Such a contention does not hold good. If the meaning of a sentence involves material contradiction then words are not related to the real meanings to be conveyed by them. In other words, there is no syntactical relation among words. Now, the upholders of the hypothesis may further contend that the function of a word is to reveal its meaning only but a word does not judge whether a meaning is consistent or not. The critics review this contention and hold that there is an element of

truth in it that a word does not judge the consistency or otherwise of its meaning. But they should also know that a word does not denote a related meaning. We cannot also frame a general proposition that all words cannot but denote related meanings. We notice instances which contradict the truth of the above general proposition. The sentences, viz., 'There are ten pomegranates' etc., are an exception to it. Now, if the upholders of the hypothesis hold that the so-called sentences are no sentences then the critics will also point out that the sentence that there are a hundred elephants on the tip of a finger is no sentence. But the knowledge of the locus, the located, the verb and their relation is merely illusory. Therefore, the hypothesis that words denote related meanings does not stand to reason.

Do words denote such meanings as stand mutually unrelated like iron-pikes? A hypothesis which points a view like this is not also sound since usage does not justify it. If words denote unrelated meanings then it is next to impossible to find out their mutual relation since words, having completed their task, are never noticed to resume their work. In other words, a word does never accomplish its work by fits and starts. When it works it completely exhausts its capacity to bring about the result. Thus, the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya does not get the sanction of our experience. Therefore, the above two hypotheses, i.e., the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna and that of abhihita-anvaya, do not come off well.

Some critics have said to this effect. The above two hypotheses do not hit our fancy. The hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna does not take its stand upon reasoning. Similarly, the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya does not stand to reason.

Another Hypothesis and Its Refutation.

Some other logicians use quibbles and hold that words denote meanings which, being related point to the relation of such meanings as are being expressed. This hypothesis is not to our taste.

These two distinct acts are not experienced by us. These two acts have been mentioned thus :—One is the act of

expressing the meanings and the other is the act of relating them.

Do these acts occur successively or simultaneously ? If they take place successively and if the act of relating precedes then the new hypothesis is nothing but that of anvīta-abhidhāna. It is not the hypothesis of anvīyamāna-abhidhāna (the expression of meanings being related). Again, if words convey their meanings at first then it is the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya but not that of abhidhīyamāna-anvaya (the relation of meanings being expressed). In other words, they mean to say that as soon as meanings are expressed, they are cognised as being related and that meanings are related as soon as they are being expressed. These two acts are not simultaneously experienced. The act of expressing refers to words. The act of relating refers to meanings. When words are employed the act of relating which refers to meanings is not experienced.

The competent judges have arrived at the conclusion after close examination that the act of expressing is absolutely distinct from that of relating since if meanings are not expressed, they cannot be related. The judgement that this is a white cow points to the co-ordination of the two properties of an individual cow. These two properties are the universal of cowness and the colour 'white'. If there are no terms to indicate their co-ordination then how can we grasp their mutual relation ?

Thus we see that the propounders of the two hypotheses, viz., the hypothesis of anvīyamāna-abhidhāna and that of abhidhīyamāna-anvaya simply play upon words. They have coined new words only. They express no new objects which are experienced by us. All defects which cling to the above two hypotheses do not fail to infect it.

The Knowledge of meanings in Relation by means of Tātparya-Śakti

Some logicians hold that the hypothesis of anvīta-abhidhāna represents the rough draft of the real thesis but that of abhihita-anvaya stands for the minute draft of it. Let us illustrate this point. If the word 'a cow' communicates its meaning as being related to abstract universals of attributes and actions but not as being related to specific attributes and actions then the hy-

pothesis is called as anvita-abhidhāna. If the relation of a cow to a specific attribute such as the colour 'white' etc., is communicated by other words and a minute information is thus given then the hypothesis is known as abhihita-anvaya. This new exposition makes no improvement upon the old one.

The defects which have been pointed out in the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna visit the new exposition of the said hypothesis viz., words express their meanings in relation to abstract universals. The same defects as have been shown to vitiate the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya infect its new explanation, viz., the relation of the meaning of a word to a specific attribute etc., is conveyed by other words.

The hypothesis in question points to nothing new. It is in no way distinct from the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya. When the specific meaning of a sentence is stated the hypothesis of abhihita-anvaya is adhered to. Thus it is evident that the ancient path is welcome to convey the meaning of a sentence. How do you explain everything by adopting the routine method that words point to the meaning of a sentence only by their power of expressing primary meanings? But we find that this path is also beset with various troubles as all the previous hypothesis are infected with many defects.

The defenders of the hypothesis under discussion say in reply that the path of conveying the meaning of a sentence is immune from all defects since it has been said before that words conjointly express the meaning of a sentence. The meaning of a sentence which all words conjointly communicate is nothing but the meaning of a principal word as related to the meanings of other subordinate words. In other words, the meaning of a sentence is nothing but the organization of the meanings of words in which one plays the important part and others play the secondary ones. Where is the room for defects?

Now, a question arises in our mind. Do you intend to revive the old hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna? They say in reply 'No sir! the hypothesis in question is not that of anvita-abhidhāna'. The critics ask, 'If this is not the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna, how is it that words conjointly express the meaning of a sentence?' The defenders give the following answer 'Though these words conjointly express the meaning

of a sentence yet this is not the hypothesis of anvita-abhidhāna. Words conjointly bring about the related meaning but do not convey the related meaning'. The objectors again ask 'what do you say? Do words conjointly produce the meanings of a sentence as lumps of earth and other factors in mutual co-operation produce a jar? The defenders answer, "This is not so since words simply indicate the above meaning but do not produce it'. The objectors again put this question to them. 'Do you not indulge in quibble if you hold that words conjointly work but do not convey the related meaning?' The answer to the above question is as follows:—

We mean to say that words indicate the mutually related meaning but do not convey such a related meaning. The power of conveying the primary meaning does not point to the related meaning. But the joint method of agreement and difference reveals the exact meaning of each word.' But these words have another power which is called Tātparya-śakti. The function of this power is to reveal the meanings of words contained in a sentence, as being in relation with one another since this power is the common effect of powers belonging to all words. This new power lasts so long as these words do not produce an independent judgment which represents a self-contained unity of ideas.

Let this suggestion be fully explained.

Perceptual or indirect non-verbal knowledge reveals its object in different manner. It incompletely or completely reveals its object which is in front of us.

But verbal knowledge is a class in itself. Its working is absolutely different. Words go on functioning unless and until a self-contained judgment is not produced.

For this reason, in this world, a single word is never employed. Because a single word cannot produce as much knowledge as serves the purpose of a listener.

Now, we put a question to you. It is this—Do words possess some other power beside the power of expressing their primary meanings? Is it conducive to a complete result? (A complete result stands for a self-contained judgment). An answer to this question is in the affirmative. Those who subscribe to the thesis of relation cannot refute the existence of such a power.

The relation of meanings is not conveyed by the power of conveying the primary meaning. But a sentence conveys the correlation of meanings.

Now, some logicians suggest that if the related meaning is denoted by a word then the relation of meanings is presented to our consciousness and if this condition is not fulfilled then the relation of meanings is not cognised. This suggestion is not tenable. The meanings of words are bound up together by means of a relation since words denoting these meanings work conjointly since if causes produce jointly their effects then these effects are never seen to remain isolated. A stem and a suffix, attached to it, imply each other and convey their meanings jointly. But a stem does not denote the meanings of a suffix since an injunction, the meaning of a *liñ* suffix, is not denoted by the basic root, *yaj*, and the *liñ* suffix does not denote the meaning of a basic root, such as *yaj*. A sacrifice is denoted by the basic root 'yaj'. It cannot be denoted by the *liñ* suffix. They do not independently bring about their effects. Similarly, words conjointly produce their own effects but one word does not denote the meaning of another word. Sentences also convey their meanings with reference to their context but point to no independent meanings. This view has been expressed by some other thinkers.

As a stem and its suffix imply each other so a word implies another and a sentence implies another.

This hypothesis is better. According to it words conjointly produce their effects but the meanings conveyed by words, maintain their individuality but do not interpenetrate.

If one denies that words imply one another then words look like so many detached iron-pikes. But if the hypothesis of *anvita-abhidhāna* is adhered to then the use of words other than one in a sentence becomes superfluous.

But if we stick to the hypothesis that words conjointly communicate their meanings then it becomes free from all defects. This path should be followed since it is not beset with thorns.

We agree to the point that words have power to denote their own primary meanings. They have an additional power which is called 'Tātparyā-śakti'. This power continues to work unless

and until the meanings of words are presented to our consciousness as being in relation with one another.

Hence, we do not subscribe to the hypothesis of *anvita-abhidhāna*. But of course we surely hold that a sentence conveys a unity of meanings in which they are mutually related.

We utter words with this object in view that they will conjointly produce their main effect but not that they will merely communicate their own primary meanings. In other words, we utter words with the intention of communicating the meaning of a sentence. The author of *Śloka-vārttika* has said to this effect.

Words which constitute a sentence engage themselves in communicating the meaning of a sentence. In order to do it they have an intervening process as its invariable associate viz., the expression of their primary meanings. Similarly, sticks of wood burn in order to accomplish their main task, viz., the act of cooking.

It is this great creeper of understanding. Knowledge is its main root. The arrangement of words is its bright sprout. The impressions due to the experience of all antecedent letters are its broad leaves. The meanings of words which have been expressed are its full blown blossoms. The excellent meaning of a sentence is its palatable fruit. One should not put it in mouth. It is to be put in heart. When it enters our heart the listeners long for no other objects.

Kumārila has said in his *Tantra-Vārttika* to this effect. The knowledge which is derived from words by a listener blooms in the shape of the meanings of words and lastly bears fruits in the shape of the meaning of a sentence.

The knowledge which follows from this method is sound. We have said before that the meanings of words, being mutually related, constitute the meaning of a sentence.