

THE
CHAUKHAMBA INDOLOGICAL STUDIES
5

ŚLOKAVĀRTTIKAM

OF
KUMĀRILA BHATṬA

With the Commentary
NYĀYARATNĀKARA

OF
Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra

Translated into English from the Original Sanskrit
Text with Extracts from the Commentaries of
Sucarita Miśra (The Kāśikā) &
Pārthasārathi Miśra (The Nyāyaratnākara)

Vol. II

By
M.M. Ganganatha Jha
Ex-Professor of Sanskrit
Muir Central College, Allahabad



CHAUKHAMBA SANSKRIT PRATISHTHAN
DELHI

Śloka-vārttika

Publishers

© CHAUKHAMBHA SANSKRIT PRATISHTHAN

38 U. A. Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar

Delhi 110007

Phone : (011) 23856391, 41530902

e-mail : csp_praveen@rediffmail.com

All Rights Reserved

First Edition : Delhi, 2009

ISBN : 81-7084-427-0 (Set)

Price : Rs. 4500.00 (Vol. I-III)

Also can be had from

CHOWKHAMBHA VIDYABHAWAN

Chowk (Behind Bank of Baroda Building)

Post Box. No. 1069

Varanasi 221001

•

CHAUKHAMBHA SURBHARATI PRAKASHAN

K. 37/117 Gopal Mandir Lane

Post Box. No. 1129

Varanasi 221001

•

CHAUKHAMBHA PUBLISHING HOUSE

4697/2, Ground Floor, Street No. 21-A

Ansari Road, Darya Ganj

New Delhi 110002

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the Publishers.

Printers

A. K. Lithographers, Delhi

अथ अपोहवादः

सौगतसमयसिद्धमपोहरूपं सामान्यं निराकरोति—

अगोनिवृत्तिः सामान्यं वाच्यं यैः परिकल्पितम् ।

गोत्वं वस्त्वेव तैरुक्तमगोऽपोहगिरा स्फुटम् ॥ 1 ॥

ये त्वाहुः—न तावद्व्यावृत्तरूपाणामत्यन्तविलक्षणानां स्वलक्षणानामनुवृत्तः कश्चिदात्मा सम्भवति, न च स्वलक्षणान्यविकल्पत्वादानन्त्यव्यभिचाराभ्यां शब्दाभिधानीयकं लभन्ते; अतोऽतद्व्यावृत्तिरेव सर्वानुगता शब्दार्थ इति । यथा शाबलेयस्यागोव्यावृत्तिरेवं बाहुलेयस्यापीति । यथाहुः—

यद्रूपं शाबलेयस्य बाहुलेयस्य नास्ति तत् ।

अतद्रूपपरावृत्तिर्द्वयोरपि च विद्यते ॥

(प्र. वा. 3-139.40) इति ।

एष च प्रयोगः—यदत्यन्तविलक्षणानां सादृश्यापादकं तदन्यव्यावृत्तिरूपं दृष्टम्, यथा गवाश्वकुञ्जराणामनुष्टुप्त्वम्; तथा गौरयमिति विकल्पाकारो विलक्षणानां शाबलेयादीनां सादृश्यमापादयतीति स्वभावहेतुः, तस्मादगोनिवृत्तिरेव सामान्यं शब्दवाच्यमिति ।

तैर्गोत्वं वस्त्वेव शब्दान्तरेणाभिहितम्, नार्थान्तरम् । अयं च वक्ष्यमाणानेकयुक्ति-संक्षेपश्लोक इति ॥ 1 ॥

कथम्? इत्याह—

भावान्तरमभावो हि पुरस्तात् प्रतिपादितः ।

न चागोनिवृत्तिरूपस्याभावस्याश्रयभूतं भावान्तरं भवन्मते सम्भवतीत्याह—

तत्राश्वादिनिवृत्त्यात्मा भावः क इति कथ्यताम् ॥ 2 ॥

SECTION 14

“APOHA”

Those, who have assumed the Class ('Cow') to be a *negation of the absence of Cow*,—even these people have clearly, by the assertion of the negation of the absence of Cow, admitted of an entity in the shape of “gotva” (the Class 'Cow'). (1)

Note : the Bauddhas assert that the Class 'Cow' is only the negation of all that is not cow. This is what they mean by 'Apoha.' (1)

It has been proved before (by the Bauddhas) that a *negation* is only another form of positive entity; and hence, please tell me what is that positive entity, which consists in the negation of “Horse” etc. (2)

Note : Besides the class 'Cow,' there can be no other positive entity that could be the substratum of the negation of 'not-cow.' (2)

उपसंहरति—

तस्मात् सर्वेषु यद् रूपं प्रत्येकं परिनिष्ठितम् ।

गोबुद्धिस्तन्निमित्ता स्याद् गोत्वादन्यच्च नास्ति तत् ॥ १० ॥

Therefore, that one form alone, which resides in its entirety in

each and every one of the individuals, can be the means of having an idea of cow (*in general*). And this (form) is none other than 'cowness' (*i.e.*, the character or property of belonging to the *Class* 'Cow,' which is common to all individual cows). (10)

दूषणान्तरमाह—

अपि चावस्तुकल्पने ।

प्रागन्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यो न किञ्चिद्वस्तु लभ्यते ॥ 35 ॥

सर्वं सामान्यमवस्थात्मकमिति कल्पने प्राक् परमाणुभ्यो न किञ्चिद् वस्तु लभ्यते;
द्व्यणुकस्यपि द्वयोः सामान्यरूपत्वादिति ॥ 35 ॥

Thus then, all negation (*Apoha*) would rest in positive entities. And again, if (all generic ideas) be assumed to rest in negative entities, then, until we reach the final individuals (atoms), we could not get at any positive entity. (35)

Note : The substrates of all negative ideas having been proved to be positive entities, as qualified by certain limitations,—inasmuch as the Individual, the the black or the red cow, could not be the substrate of an idea of all cows,—you must admit of a positive entity in the shape of the class ‘cow.’ If all generic notions be held to rest upon negative entities, then, for an idea of positive entities, we would have *to go down* to individual atoms, which alone are wholly free from a generic character. But as a

ततः किम्? इत्यत आह—

न चान्त्यैर्व्यवहारोऽस्ति,
न ह्यप्रत्यक्षैर्व्यवहारः सम्भवतीति ।

किञ्च, स्थूलानुपपत्तिकल्याः परमाणवः, तदभावे तेऽपि दुर्निरूपा इत्याह—

शक्यं नैषां निरूपणम् ।

एवं च सौत्रान्तिकैरपि शून्यतैवापोहवाचोयुक्त्या समाश्रिता स्यात्?

इत्याह—

अपोहशब्दवाच्याथ शून्यतान्यप्रकारिका ॥ 36 ॥

ततः किम्? इत्यत आह—

तस्यां चाश्वादिबुद्धीनात्मांशग्रहणं भवेत् ।

तत्रापि किम्? इत्यत आह—

तत्रान्यापोहवाच्चत्वं मुधैवाभ्युपगम्यते ॥ 37 ॥

कथं मुधा? इत्यत आह—

सामान्यं वस्तुरूपं हि बुद्ध्याकारो भविष्यति ।

शब्दार्थोऽर्थानिपेक्षो हि वृथापोहः प्रकल्पितः ॥ 38 ॥

matter of fact we do not fall back upon atoms in our ordinary usages. Therefore, all generic ideas cannot be held to rest upon negatives. (35)

And as a matter of fact, none of our usage is based upon such final individuals (atoms which are imperceptible); nor is any definite cognition of these (atoms) possible. Consequently, the word “*Apoha*” is only (a subterfuge) to express a *void* (*Śūnyatā* = negation of all existences), in other words. (36)

Note : It is only for an explanation of the gross forms of things that we postulate the existence of atoms; hence when the gross forms themselves would be negatives—i.e., non-existences—then the atoms could never be cognised. Thus then, it would come to a negative of all existences. The *Apoha* theory thus comes to be only a round-about way of putting forward the *Śūnyavāda*, which has already been met before. (36)

And in accordance with that theory (of *Śūnyavāda*), all the ideas of *Horse*, etc., would have to rest in their own specific (sensational) forms. And in that case it would be an useless assumption to state that those ideas signify *the negation of (objects) other than themselves* (i.e., the *Apoha*). (37)

Note : The *Śūnyavādi* holds that inasmuch as there are no entities in the world, all idea have their own specific forms for their objects. (37)

And (the ideas signifying themselves), you would have a *Class*,

भवतु बाह्यार्थाऽनपेक्षो बुद्ध्याकार एव शब्दार्थः, सोऽपि त्वपोह एव भवतु, कथं वस्तुरूपः ? अत आह—

वस्तुरूपा च सा बुद्धिः शब्दार्थेषूपजायते ।

तेन वस्त्वेव कल्पेत वाच्यं बुद्ध्यनपोहकम् ॥ 39 ॥

बाह्यस्य हि वस्तुरूपस्य सामान्यस्य व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकादिविकल्पासहत्वादभ्युपेत्याप्यपोहकल्पनाम्, बुद्धिमात्रकल्पितस्य तु शब्दार्थत्वे बुद्धेर्गौरित्येवंवस्तुरूपत्वात् यथाभासं वस्त्वात्मकमेव बुद्धिरूपं बुद्ध्यन्तरानपोहात्मकं वाच्यं युक्तम्, नापोहरूपमिति ॥ 39 ॥

तत्रैव दृष्टान्तमाह—

असत्यपि च बाह्योऽर्थे वाक्यार्थप्रतिभा तथा ।

पदार्थेऽपि तथैव स्यात् किमपोहः प्रकल्प्यते ॥ 40 ॥

वाक्यार्थो हि यथा बाह्यार्थासम्भवाद् बुद्ध्याकारः कल्पितो नापोहरूपः, तथा पदार्थोऽपीति ॥ 40 ॥

in the form of a positive entity, in the shape of the Idea. And therefore it was an useless effort on your part to have assumed an Apoha, as forming the denotation of objects, and yet independent of any external (real and positive) objects. (38)

Note : The object of the Idea of a Horse would be that Idea itself—a positive entity; and thus the Idea itself would constitute a *class* including all *Horses*. (38)

And this *Idea* appears, in the shape of a real entity, with reference to the signification of words. Therefore, we must admit of a positive entity—not in the form of the *negation of other ideas (Apoha)*—to form the object signified (by a word, “Cow” f.i.) (39)

Note : This meets the theory that the above idea is only a negative entity, an *Apoha*. The sense of the reply is that the idea that we have is in the form of a *cow*, which is distinctly a positive entity. (39)

Just, as even in the absence of any external objects, we have a cognition (in a positive form, and not in the form of an *Apoha*) of the meaning of a sentence,—so, in the same manner, we could also have with regard to the word; and why should we assume an *Apoha* ? (40)

न केवलं परमाणुष्वेवायं दोषः, सत्स्वपि स्थूलेष्ववयविद्रव्येषु विधिरूपसामान्यानभ्यु-
पगमेऽपोह्यापाहेकव्यवस्था न सिद्धत्येवेत्याह द्वयेन—

न चाप्रसिद्धसारूप्यानपोहविषयात्मना ।

शक्तः कश्चिदपि ज्ञातुं गवादीनविशेषतः ॥ 71 ॥

अपोह्यानपि चाश्वादीनेकधर्मान्वयाद् ऋते ।

न निरूपयितुं शक्तिस्तत्रापोहो न सिद्ध्यति ॥ 72 ॥

सर्वेषां हि सजातीयविजातीयपिण्डानामविशिष्टः परस्परभेदः । तत्रासत्यां केषुचिदेकस्य
धर्मस्यानुवृत्तौ केऽपोहाधाराः समानजातीयाः, केऽपोह्या विजातीयाः? इति कथं ज्ञायेरेन्,
तदज्ञाने च कथमपोहसिद्धिरिति ॥ 71-72 ॥

No person is able to cognise all individual cows (or horses, etc.), as all equally being the substrates of *Apoha*, so long as any positive similarity among them is not recognised. Nor is any person able to ascertain the objects rejected—horse, elephant, etc.,—unless one single property be cognised as belonging to (all or everyone of) them. And therefore no *Apoha* can be possible. (71-72)

Note : Leaving atoms aside, even in the case of gross individual cows, there can be no differentiation of objects rejected and the substrates of the *Apoha*, so long as a positive generic term is not admitted. For so long as no positive ground of similarity is recognised as belonging to all the individual cows, they cannot be cognised as belonging to the same class; and hence they cannot be regarded as the substrates of the *Apoha* (signified by the word 'cow'). In the same manner, unless a ground of similarity is

ननु जातिवदपोह एव केषाञ्चित्पिण्डानामेकं रूपमस्तु, किं रूपान्तरेण? अत आह द्वयेन—

न चान्वयविनिर्मुक्ते प्रवृत्तिलिङ्गशब्दयोः ।

ताभ्यां च न विनापोहो न चासाधारणेऽन्वयः ॥ 73 ॥

अपोहश्चाप्यनिष्पन्नः साहचर्यं क्व दृश्यताम् ।

तस्मिन्नदृश्यमाने च न तयो यात् प्रमाणता ॥ 74 ॥

जातिर्हि प्रत्यक्षा, सा येषु दृश्यते ते समानजातीयाः; येषु तु न दृश्यते, ते विजातीयः, इति शक्यं विवेकुम् । अपोहस्त्वप्रत्यक्षः केवलं शब्दलिङ्गावसेयः, शब्दलिङ्गयोश्चान्वयाधीना प्रवृत्तिः । न चान्वयग्रहणमसाधारणेन सम्भवति, तस्यातद्विषयत्वात् । तेन चान्वयाग्रहणेऽपोहः कथमनुमीयेत, न चापोहेनान्वयग्रहणं सम्भवति; तस्य प्रागन्वयग्रहणादनिष्पन्नत्वात् । अन्वयग्रहणाधीनत्वात् अन्वयदर्शनस्य अदृष्टे चान्वये कथं तयो प्रामाण्यम् ! अतोऽपोहस्यादृष्टत्वात् तन्निबन्धनः सजातीयविजातीयविभागो न सम्भवति ॥ 73-74 ॥

cognised as belonging to *all* cows, nothing can be recognised as being dissimilar to them. Hence, the horse, the elephant, etc., can never be cognised as being the objects rejected. “*And therefore, etc.*”—because unless there is some ground of similarity among these various objects—a ground not applying to the cow—they can all be regarded as commonly being the objects rejected. And consequently the *Apoha* theory would fall to the ground. (71-72)

Either Inference or Verbal Testimony cannot apply in a case that is devoid of a positive relationship. And without these (Inference and Verbal Testimony), the existence of the *Apoha* can not be established; nor can there be (cognised) any positive relationship with the unspecified abstract specific forms (of objects). And since the *Apoha* itself has not yet been established, where could we have perceived any positive relationship (with the *Apoha*)? And further, no positive relationship being recognised, there can be no validity to any Inference or Verbal Testimony that could be brought forward in support of the *Apoha*. (73-74)

Note : This anticipates the following objection: “Among the individual cows, we have a common elements, in the shape of *Apoha*; and this would form a sufficient ground of similarity.” The sense of the reply is that a Class is perceptible by the senses; and hence all the objects, in which we perceive this existence of this class, are cognised as belonging to that class; and those in which this class is not found to exist are cognised as belonging to different class. Your *Apoha*, on the other hand, is not

ननु विपक्षादर्शनमात्रेणातद्व्यावृत्तिं तौ गमयतः, किमन्वयग्रहणेन? अत आह—

न चादर्शनमात्रेण ताभ्यां प्रत्यायनं भवेत् ।

कारणमाह—

सर्वत्रैव ह्यदृष्टत्वात् प्रत्याय्यं नावशिष्यते ॥ 75 ॥

अदृष्टे ह्यन्वये विपक्षवते सपक्षेऽप्यदृष्टौ लिङ्गशब्दौ कथमिव साध्यं प्रतिपादयेयाताम् ! यथैव हि गोशब्दोऽश्वादिष्वगोषु अदृष्टस्तद्व्यावृत्तिं गमयति, एवं गव्यप्यदृष्ट इति तामपि व्यावर्तयन्न किञ्चित् प्रतिपादयेदिति ॥ 75 ॥

perceptible by the senses; and as such it could only be cognisable by Inference or Verbal Testimony. Both of these however depend upon the affirmation of a *definite* positive relationship. But as a matter of fact, no cognition of any such relation is possible, with regard to the *undefined* specific forms of objects; because these latter are not amenable to any of the recognised means of cognition. And inasmuch as this specific form is the only entity, besides *Apoha*, that you admit of,—when no relationship with such forms is cognised, how can there be any Inference with regard to the *Apoha* ? The relationship, necessary for the establishment of the premiss cannot be based upon the *Apoha* itself; because prior to the cognition of the relationship and the subsequent Inference based thereupon, the *Apoha* has no existence. And inasmuch as no positive relationship is cognised, how can there be any validity to the Inference or the Verbal Testimony, that would apply to the *Apoha* ? Thus then, the *Apoha* itself, not being established, there can be no notions of homogeneity or heterogeneity, based upon it. (73-74)

Nor, on the mere ground of non-perception (of the contradictory), could there be any conclusion arrived at by means of these two (inference and Verbal Testimony). Because, since nothing is perceived nothing is left that could be indicated (by Inference and Verbal Testimony). (75)

Note : This anticipates the following objection: “Inference and Verbal Testimony would establish the fact of *negation by means of the Apoha* (of entities other than that of which the *Apoha* is cognised, f.i. of the cow), on the sole ground of the nonperception of any premiss contrary to the conclusion, which is also a recognised ground of Inference.” The sense of the reply is that when a positive relationship is not perceived, and (according to you) its contrary too is not perceived,—then, in that case, nothing of the relationship being perceived (either in the positive or in the negative form)

अथादृष्टेऽपि केषाञ्चिदैकरूप्ये केषाञ्चिदपोह्यत्वं केषाञ्चिदपोहाधारत्वं कल्पयेत्, ततो व्यवस्था न स्यात्? इत्याह—

अथासत्यपि सारूप्ये स्यादपोहस्य कल्पना ।

गवाश्चयोरयं कस्मादगोऽपोहो न कल्प्यते ॥ 76 ॥

तदेवं शाक्यमते तावदपोहस्य केनचिदप्यदृष्टत्वात् तन्निबन्धनं सजातीयविजातीय-
त्वकल्पन मित्युक्तम् ॥ 76 ॥

यद्यपि चास्मन्मताश्रयणेनानुपलब्ध्याख्यप्रमाणान्तरगम्योऽपोहो न सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षः,
तथापि विधिरूपसामान्याभावे सजातीयविजातीयव्यवस्था न सिद्ध्यत्येवेत्याह—

शाबलेयाच्च भिन्नत्वं बाहुलेयाश्चयोः समम् ।

सामान्यं नान्यदिष्टं चेत् क्वागोऽपोहः प्रवर्तताम् ॥ 77 ॥

how could Inference or Verbal Testimony, in such a case, lead to any conclusion ? For instance, just as the word 'cow,' not perceived in connection with *non-cows* (horse, etc.,) signifies a negation of these latter; so in the same manner the same word, having never before been perceived in connection with the *cow* itself (according to the alleged basis of the Inference of your *Apoha*) could also signify the negation of this also. And thus, signifying the negation of both, the cow and the non-cow, the Word, as well as the Inference based upon a non-perception, would lead to the cognition of nothing ! (75)

If, then, even in the absence of any grounds of similarity (among individual cows),—there be an assumption of *Apoha*,—why should not the *rejection of non-cow* apply both to the *cow* and the *horse*. (76)

Note : If there is no similarity, the distribution of the characters of the *Apoha* (the object rejected by the *Apoha*) and the *Apoha* must be at random, without any controing agency. And in that case, both the horse and the cow could be asserted to be the objects rejected by 'non-cow'—a palpable absurdity ! (76)

Difference from the *black cow* is common both to the *red cow* and the *horse*. And if no generic term (as the *class* "cow") is accepted, then whereto could the *Apoha of the cow* apply ? (77)

Note : Though according to our theories, *Apoha* could be the object of *Negation*, which we hold to be a distinct means of right notion—yet in the absence of a positive generic entity, on what grounds could similarity or dissimilarity be ascertained ? For, *Apoha* means *mutual negation*; and this would apply to the case of the Red and the Black Cow, just as much as to the case of the Red Cow and the Karka Horse. That is to say, just as the

इतरेतराभावो ह्यपोहः सर्वेषां शाबलेयबाहुलेयकर्कादीनामविशिष्टः । न च शाबलेयादिष्वनुगतं कर्कादिभ्यश्च व्यावृत्तमस्ति किञ्चिद् वस्तुरूपं सामान्यम्, तत्र यथैव शाबलेयबाहुलेययोः कर्कव्यावृत्तिः समानेति तन्निबन्धनं समानजातीयत्वम्, तथा शाबलेयकर्कयोः बाहुलेयाद् व्यावृत्तिः समानेति केन विशेषेण क्वचिदपोहमवस्थाप्यान्यान्-पोहपक्षे स्थापयामः । व्यावृत्तिमात्रेण साम्ये त्वत्यन्तविलक्षणानामपि सर्षपवृक्षसिंहादीनामप्यध्यादिव्यावृत्तिसामान्यात् सजातीयत्वं स्यादिति ॥ ७७ ॥

तदेवं प्रयुक्तोऽपि शब्दोऽगृहीतसम्बन्धत्वात्त्रापोहं गमयतीत्युक्तम् । प्रयोगोऽपि तस्य न सम्भवतीत्याह—

इन्द्रियैर्नाप्यगोऽपोहः प्रथमं व्यवसीयते ।

नान्यत्र शब्दवृत्तिश्च किं दृष्ट्वा स प्रयुज्यताम् ॥ ७८ ॥

दृष्ट्वा ह्यर्थं प्रयोक्तारः शब्दं प्रयुज्जते, न चेन्द्रियैरपोहो दृश्यते, यस्त्वपोहादन्योऽसाधारणः न तत्र शब्दप्रवृत्तिः, अतः कथं शब्दः प्रयुज्येतेति ॥ ७८ ॥

Red Cow differs from the Black Cow, so also does the Karka Horse differ from the Red Cow, specially as you do not admit of any such generic property as belongs in common to the different kinds of cows, and not to the horse. Therefore, just as the rejection of the Karka Horse is common to the Red and the Black Cows, so also is the rejection of the Red Cow common to the horse and the Black Cow. Thus then the Red Cow would be as homogenous to the Black Cow, as it is to the Karka Horse. Consequently, there is no ground for specifying the grounds of any *Apoha* (of the "Cow" f.i.) If the mere fact of *rejection* by any one entity be the sole ground of homogeneity, then, inasmuch as this could belong to the most dissimilar and heterogenous substances,—like the Tree, the Lion, etc.,—being, as all these objects are, capable of being rejected by a single word "horse", the Tree, the Lion, etc., would all be regarded to be homogenous ! (77)

The *rejection of non-cow* is not recognised by means of the senses; and the function of the Word too does not apply to cases other than those (that are perceived by the senses); for on (the basis of) the perception of what could the Word function ? (78)

Note : It is only those objects that have been perceived before by the senses that can be mentioned by words; the *Apoha* however is not so perceived; and the only other entity that you admit of is the specific forms (of ideas); but these too are not perceptible by the senses. Under the circumstances on what could you base the use of your words ? In fact the upholder of the *Apoha* cannot explain the use of words at all. (78)

अनुमानादवगम्य प्रयुज्यत इति चेत्? तत्राह—

पूर्वोक्तेन प्रबन्धेन नानुमाप्यत्र विद्यते ।

दृश्यादर्शनं लिङ्गम्, तदपि हि दर्शनाभावरूपत्वाद् दर्शान्तराभावापेक्षमित्यनवस्था
अभाववादे दर्शितेति ।

प्रत्यक्षानुमानानवगम्यत्वेनैव सम्बन्धग्रहणमपि तेन सह शब्दस्य न सम्भवति इत्याह—

सम्बन्धानुभवोऽप्यस्य तेन नैवोपपद्यते ॥ 79 ॥

किञ्च, यदाश्वादीनां प्रत्येकम् अपोह्यत्वमानन्त्यात्र भवति तदावश्यमगोरूपेण
तेषामपोह्यत्वं वक्तव्यम्, गोनिवृत्त्यात्मकं चागोरूपम्, निवृत्तिश्चाप्रत्यक्षा शब्देनैवावगन्तव्या?
तत्र येषां निवृत्तिवाचिनो नञादयो न प्रसिद्धाः, तेषामगोरसिद्धत्वात् तद्व्यावृत्तिरूपो गोशब्दार्थः
प्रतिभासेत । तेषामपि तु प्रतिभासेते, अतो न शक्यं वस्तुरूपसामान्यनिराकरणमित्याह—

निवृत्तिवाचिनः शब्दा न प्रसिद्धाश्च यान् प्रति ।

तेषामगोरसिद्धत्वात् सामान्यनिराक्रिया ॥ 80 ॥

For reasons detailed before (in the Chapter on “Negation”), Inference cannot apply to the present case. And for this reason, there can be no cognition of any relationship (of the *Apoha* with any Word). (79)

Note : The only ground of inferring the existence of something that is not perceptible by the senses is the fact that, though it is not perceived now, yet it is present elsewhere, and if it were present it would certainly be perceived. And in this case, the ground of Inference would be *the non-perception of something otherwise perceptible*; and inasmuch as this too is only a negative factor, we would require another Inference for its establishment; and this again would have to be based upon another negation; this negation too upon another Inference; and so on and on, we would have an endless series of negations and Inferences, which would be very far from desirable. “*For this reason, etc.*” Since the *Apoha* is not amenable either to sense-perception or to Inference. (79)

Those people that do not know the meaning of the negative word (“not”) can never be cognisant of (any such negative entity as) the “non-cow;” (and yet they may be found to have an idea of the cow) hence there can be no (reasonable) denial of a Class (in the form of a positive entity). (80)

Note : The horse, etc., must be regarded to be the object rejected, only in the form of the “non-cow”; this is a negation; and a negation is not perceptible by the senses and hence, it could not but be cognized by means

किञ्च, कोऽयमगौः, यस्यापोहो दृश्यते, यो गोशब्दस्यानभिधेयः सोऽगौः स्यात्, कस्य तदनभिधेयत्वमिति न ज्ञायते? इत्याह—

अगोशब्दाभिधेयत्वं गम्यतां च कथं पुनः ।

इतर आह—

न दृष्टो यत्र गोशब्दः सम्बन्धानुभवक्षणे ॥ 81 ॥

दूषयति—

एकस्मात् तर्हि गोपिण्डाद् यदन्यत् सर्वमेव तत् ।

भवेदपोहामित्येवं न सामान्यस्य वाच्यता ॥ 82 ॥

अथ यो गोरन्यः सोऽगौः? तत्राह द्वयेन—

सिद्धश्चागौरपोहो गोनिषेधात्मकश्च सः ।

तत्र गौरेव वक्तव्यो नञा यः प्रतिषिध्यते ॥ 83 ॥

स चेदगोनिवृत्त्यात्मा भवेदन्योन्यसंश्रयः ।

यदि त्वगोसिद्धयर्थं विधिरूपो गौरङ्गीक्रियते तत्र वृथापोहवागित्याह—

सिद्धश्चेद् गौरपोहार्थं वृथापोहप्रकल्पना ॥ 84 ॥

of the word. Then those that do not understand the meaning of the word “non”—f.i., small boys—cannot understand the word “non-cow”, and yet they do have a cognition of the meaning of the word “cow.” Hence we conclude that the word “cow” must signify a *positive* entity, in the shape of the *class* “cow.” (80)

And further how would you get at the fact of any object being denotable by the word “non-cow”? (If it be urged that) “we would understand *that* to be so denotable, in connection with which we would not find the word ‘cow’ applying, at the time that any relationship with the object so denoted is asserted,”—then (we reply that) if you were (in the above manner) to have, from a single individual (whose relation will have been asserted, on which basis you would get at the denotation of the word “non-cow”), a cognition of all that is different (from that Individual),—then all these latter would be the objects negativited (by the *Apoha* of “cow”); and thereby no denotability would belong to any generic idea. (81-82)

It is an established entity, the *cow*, which is negatived (by the *Apoha*; and this *Apoha* is only the negation of the *cow*. Hence (in order to explain this *Apoha* the *cow* should be explained. And if this (*cow*) be said to be the *negation of the non-cow*, then there would be mutual interdependence. (83-84)

इतरेतराश्रयं विवृणोति—

गव्यसिद्धे त्वगौर्नास्ति तदभावे च गौः कुतः ।

गोशब्देनाप्यगामनभिधाय तन्निवृत्तिमभिधातुमशक्नुवता अवश्यमगौरभिधातव्यः । स च गोनिषेधात्मा, नानभिधाय गामभिधातुं शक्यत इति प्रथमं विधिरूपगौरभिधातव्यः, तदिदमुक्तम् 'गोत्वं वस्त्वेव तैरुक्तम्' (श्लो. वा. अपो. 1) इति ।

अत्र भिक्षुणा जातिमात्रस्य जातिमत्सम्बन्धस्य जातिमतो वाभिधाने दूषणानि दर्शितानि, तान्यपोहवादिनोऽपि तुल्यानीति पश्चाद् वक्ष्यति; सम्प्रत्यपोहवदभिधानेऽधिकमपि दूषणमपौहवादिनो दर्शयति—

नाधाराधेयवृत्त्यादिसम्बन्धश्चाप्यभावयोः ॥ 85 ॥

जातिवादिनो हि सम्भवति जातिविशिष्टा व्यक्तिरभिधेया, सा परं गौरवान्नाभिधीयते । भवतस्त्वपोहविशिष्टं न किञ्चिदभिधेयं सम्भवति । न तावदपोहान्तरम्, अवस्तुनोराधाराधेयादिसम्बन्धाभावेन मिथो विशेषणविशेष्यत्वानुपपत्तेरिति ॥ 85 ॥

न चासाधारणमपोहविशिष्टमभिधेयम्, तस्य शब्दादप्रतीतेरित्याह—

न चासाधारणं वस्तु गम्यतेऽपोहवत् तथा ।

नः साधारणस्यापोहेन सम्बन्धो भवतीत्याह—

कथं वा परिकल्प्येत सम्बन्धो वस्त्ववस्तुनोः ॥ 86 ॥

And if you admit of the cow as an (independently) established entity, for the sake of having an object for you negation *Apoha*, then the assumption of the *Apoha* would become useless (inasmuch as the idea of cow is admitted to be established independently of it). And in the absence of an idea of the cow as an established entity, there can be no idea of *non-cow*; and as such how could you explain the idea of the cow to be based upon the idea of the *non-cow*? (84-85)

Between two negative entities there is no such relationship as that between the container and the contained, etc. Nor is any specific (abstract), positive entity ever cognised as related to *Apoha*. (85-86)

Note : The upholders of the Class-theory can assert the denotability of the *individual as qualified by the class* (though this is not what is admitted by us). As for you, on the other hand, you can never be cognisant of the denotability of anything qualified by the *Apoha*. Because one *Apoha* cannot be qualified by another, as both of them being negative, between them, there can be no such relationship as that of the container and the contained, and the like. Nor can it be asserted that the specific forms of ideas may be qualified by the *Apoha*; as no such specific forms are signified by words. (85-86)

अथानवगम्यमानस्य किमिति विशेष्यत्वं न भवति? अत आह—

स्वरूपसत्त्वमात्रेण न च किञ्चिद् विशेषणम् ।

न हि सत्तामात्रावस्थितस्य किञ्चिद् विशेषणं सम्भवतीति ।

कीदृशस्य विशेषणम्? अत आह—

स्वबुद्ध्या रज्यते येन विशेष्यं तद् विशेषणम् ॥ 87 ॥

विशेषणानुरक्ततया बुध्यमानस्य विशेषणम्, न सन्मात्रावस्थितस्येति ॥ 87 ॥

न चापोहस्य विशेषणत्वमपि सम्भवतीत्याह—

न चाप्यश्वादिशब्देभ्यो जायतेऽपोहबोधनम् ।

वस्त्वाकारा हि गवादिशब्दात् प्रतीतिः, नापोहरूपेति ।

ततः किम्? इत्याह—

विशिष्टबुद्धिरिष्टेह न चाज्ञातविशेषणा ॥ 88 ॥

किञ्च, अभावस्य विशेषणत्वे तदनुरूपमवस्त्वात्मकमेव विशेष्यज्ञानं स्यात्, तन्नास्तीत्याह—

न चान्यरूपमन्यादृक् कुर्याज्ज्ञानं विशेषणम् ।

भावरूपविशेष्यज्ञाने कथमभावस्य विशेषणत्वम्? इत्याह—

कथं चान्यादृशे ज्ञाते तदुच्येत विशेषणम् ॥ 89 ॥

How, too, could any relation be assumed to subsist between a negative *Apoha* and a positive entity (the specific forms of ideas)? There can be no qualification to anything (like the specific forms of ideas) which merely exists (and is not signified by the word). Because it is only that which colours the qualified object by its own idea, that can be called a “qualification.” (86-87)

Note : “That which colours, etc.”—Since the specific forms of ideas are not cognised, they cannot be affected (coloured) by the *idea* of anything; and as such, they cannot have any qualifications. (86-87)

In fact, no cognition of *Apoha* is produced from the words “horse,” etc.; and the cognition of the qualified object cannot be such as is without any idea of the qualification. Nor can a qualification of a certain character bring about an idea of different character. Hence, when the object has been cognised to be of a certain character, how can a qualification, which is of an opposite character, be said to belong to it? (88-89)

Note : The cognition produced by the word “horse” is of the form of a positive entity, in the shape of a *horse*; and never in the negative form of an *Apoha*. Consequently apart from any peculiarities of the qualified

अथ वस्तुरूपे विशेष्ये गम्यमानेऽप्यवस्त्वेव विशेषणम्, ततोऽप्यस्ति अतिप्रतिसङ्ग इत्याह—

अथान्यथा विशेष्येऽपि स्याद् विशेषणकल्पना ।

तथा सति हि यत्किञ्चित् प्रसज्येत विशेषणम् ॥ 90 ॥

सति चाभावस्य विशेषणत्वे तदनुरूपमसाधारणमप्यवस्त्वेव स्यादित्याह—

अभावरूपगम्ये च न विशेष्येऽस्ति वस्तुता ।

उपसंहरति—

विशेषितमपोहेन वस्तु वाच्यं न तेऽस्त्यतः ॥ 91 ॥

एवं च वस्तुरूपमेव विशेषणमिति ॥ 91 ॥

या चेयं बौद्धस्य क्लिष्टाशा—वस्तुरूपं हि निर्विभागं सकलं प्रत्यक्षगृहीतम्, न तत्र लिङ्गशब्दयोरपि प्रवृत्तिर्युक्ताः पुनरुक्तत्वात् । अतो बलादपोहविशिष्टतयैव वस्तुनो विधियत्वमेषितव्यम्, यथाहुः—

“एकस्यार्थस्वभावस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य सतः स्वयम् ।

कोन्यो न दृष्टो भागः स्याद्यः प्रमाणैः परीक्ष्यते” ॥ (प्र. वा. 3-43) इति ।

तत्राह—

यद्यप्यपोहनिर्मुक्ते न वृत्तिः शब्दलिङ्गयोः ।

युक्ता तथापि बुद्धिस्तु ज्ञातुर्वस्त्ववलम्बते ॥ 92 ॥

(specific forms), the *Apoha* itself can never have the properties of a qualification. Inasmuch as the *Apoha* is not cognised as the qualification, there can be no idea of anything qualified by it.

“Non-cow, etc.”—Your qualification, *Apoha*, being of a negative character, it can never be cognised as belonging to the idea of a positive entity. (88-89)

If even in face of the opposite character of the object, a qualification (of the opposite character) be asserted to belong to it,—then any qualification would belong to any object (without any restriction). Hence, when the qualification *Apoha* is of a negative character, no positive character can belong to the qualified (specific forms of ideas). Therefore, you cannot have, as the denotation of the word, any positive entity qualified by *Apoha*. (90-91)

Though Verbal Testimony and Inferential premises cannot properly function towards an idea (or object) which is devoid of (not qualified by) the *Apoha*, yet the cognition of the cogniser (*brought about by a word*) rests upon a positive entity alone. And since no entity in the shape of the specific forms (of objects) appears in our cognition (of the denotation of words),—and again since this

यद्यपि पौनरुक्त्याद् वस्तुरूपे वृत्तिरयुक्ता, तथापि प्रतीतिस्तावत् पौनरुक्त्यमपौनरुक्त्यं वानादृत्य वस्त्वेवाल्म्बते, तत् पौनरुक्त्यमपि सोद्वा यथाप्रतीति वस्तुरूपमेवाल्म्बनमङ्गीकुर्म इति ॥ १२ ॥

स्यादेतत्, अपोहविशिष्टसाधारणं शब्दस्याभिधेयम्, तच्च वस्तुरूपमिति तत्संसर्गादिपोहोऽपि वस्तुवदवभासत इति? तत्राह—

न चासाधारणं वस्तु बुद्धौ विपरिवर्तते ।

अनुवृत्तं हि रूपं बुद्धौ शब्दाद् भासते, नासाधारणं रूपमिति ।

न चाभिधेयत्वमपि तस्य युक्तमित्याह—

न चापि निर्विकल्पत्वात् तस्य युक्ता विशेष्यता ॥ १३ ॥

अनवगम्यमानमपि तदेवापोहविशिष्टं शब्दाभिधेयमिति चेत्? तत्राह—

शब्देनागम्यमानं च विशेष्यमिति साहसम् ।

तदवश्यं गवादिबुद्धेः शब्दस्य च वस्तुरूपमेव सामान्यं विषय इत्याह—

तेन सामान्यमेष्टव्यं विषयो बुद्धिशब्दयोः ॥ १४ ॥

(specific form) cannot be the qualified, because it is an unqualified abstract entity,—and, lastly, since it is sheer recklessness to assert something not signified by the word to be the qualified entity;—therefore, we must accept a positive generic entity to be the object cognised and denoted by the word. (92-94)

Note : This anticipates the following Bauddha argument: “The only positive entities that we admit of are the undefined specific forms of *ideas*; and these, being amenable to Sense-perception, cannot be treated either by Verbal Testimony or by Inference; hence, as an object denoted by a word, you must accept the aforesaid specific form (which is a positive entity) as qualified by the *Apoha*.” The sense of the reply is that, though a word cannot, in accordance with your theory, signify an object unqualified by the *Apoha*, yet, inasmuch as ordinary experience supports the fact of a word signifying a positive entity (without any negative qualifications),—we cannot but accept the truth of such denotation of a positive entity, even without a qualification in the shape of an *Apoha*; because we cannot very rightly deny a fact of common experience. Thus then, it being established that the denotation of a word must be a positive entity, and for the aforesaid reasons, the specific forms of ideas not being capable of being the object denoted by a word,—we cannot but admit of a generic positive entity—in the form of a positive class—as being the object denoted by a word. (92-94)

When the character of being the negatived object cannot belong

इतश्च सामान्यस्य वस्तुत्वमित्याह—

यदा चाशब्दवाच्यत्वात् व्यक्तीनामपोह्यता ।

तदापोह्येत सामान्यं तस्यापोहाच्च वस्तुता ॥ 95 ॥

न हि व्यक्तीनामपोह्यत्वम् । अपोह्यं हि विकल्पबुद्धावारोपितम्, शब्दाभिलापसंसर्गयोग्यश्च विकल्पविषयः, न च स्वलक्षणा व्यक्तयस्तद्योग्याः । तेन सामान्यमेवाश्वत्वादिकमपोह्यम्, तस्य चापोह्यत्वादेव वस्तुत्वमापद्यत इति ॥ 95 ॥

कथमपोह्यत्वाद् वस्तुत्वापत्तिः ? अत आह—

नापोह्यत्वमभावानाम् अभावाभाववर्जनात् ।

तत्सिद्धमपोह्यगोचरत्वे सामान्यस्य वस्तुत्वमित्याह—

व्यक्तोऽपोहान्तरेऽपोहस्तस्मात् सामान्यवस्तुनः ॥ 96 ॥

अंगोनिवृत्त्यात्मकं यदपोहान्तरं तस्मिन् गृहीतव्ये वस्तुरूपस्यैवाश्वत्वादिसामान्यस्यापोहः, अपोह्यत्वमित्यर्थः । ततश्च सर्वस्य सामान्यान्तरेणापोह्यत्वाद् वस्तुरूपत्वमिति ॥ 96 ॥

to individuals,—because these are not denoted by the Word,—then it is only the generic form (class) that could be the object negated (*Apoha*); and because of the fact of its being negated, it must be admitted to be a positive entity. Because no negative entity can be the object negated, on account of the impossibility of the negation of a negative entity (as such continued negation would give rise to an endless series of negations, as shown in the chapter on Negation). (95-96)

Note : Individuals cannot be the objects of denotation by Word; because that would give rise to an endlessness of denotations, the number of individuals being endless. (95-96)

In the case of (the cognition of) one *Apoha*, we have a clear perception of another *Apoha*, in the shape of the rejection of some generic positive entity. If the negation of a negative entity were different from the negative entity itself, then it could only be a positive entity; and if it were non-different from it, then we would have (the absurdity of) the *cow* being the *non-cow*. (96-97)

Note : In the case of the *Apoha*—in the form of the *negation of non-cow*—we have the rejection of a positive generic entity—in the shape of the class ‘horse,’ or ‘elephant,’ etc.; and thus all the objects rejected by an *Apoha* would come to be positive generic entities. If, however, the object rejected be asserted to be of a negative character, then its contradictory—i.e., the class—‘cow’ as rejecting the ‘non-cow’—could

यदि त्वपोह्यमपि त्वभावरूपमिष्यते ततस्तद्व्यावृत्तिरूपं गोत्वं ततो विलक्षणं चेद् वस्तुरूपमेव स्यात्, अविलक्षणात्वेऽत्यन्तविपरीतस्वभावयोरपोह्यापोहयोः सङ्करः समाश्रितः स्यात्, इत्याह—

अभावस्य च योऽभावः स चेत् तस्माद्विलक्षणः ।

भाव एव भवेन्नो चेद् गौरगौस्ते प्रसज्यते ॥ 97 ॥

यद्यपि कथञ्चिद् गवादिशब्देष्वश्वादीनामपोह्यानां भावत्वं स्यात्, सच्छब्दे त्वसद्रूपस्यापोह्यत्वादवर्जनीयमभावत्वम्, अतस्तत्प्रतिज्ञात्मकं सत्त्वं वस्त्वेव? इत्याह—

यद्यप्यन्येषु शब्देषु वस्तुनः स्यादपोह्यता ।

सच्छब्दस्य त्वभावाख्यात्रापोह्यां भिन्नमिष्यते ॥ 98 ॥

यद्यसतोऽपि भावत्वमुच्येत ततो भावाभावयोरैक्यात् केलशः स्यादित्याह—

तत्रासतोऽपि भावत्वमिति क्लेशो महान् भवेत् ।

किञ्च, असन्निवृत्तिरूपा सत्ता, सा सिद्धायामसत्तायां सिध्येत्, असत्तापि सन्निषेधात्मनाऽभावरूपा, अतो नासिद्धायां सत्तायां सिद्ध्येत्, इति इतरेतराश्रयत्वं स्यादित्याह—

तदसिद्धौ न सत्तास्ति न चासत्ता प्रसिध्यति ॥ 99 ॥

only be a positive generic entity; otherwise, if the negation of a negative entity be said to be non-different from it, then we would have 'cow' = 'non-cow,'—a palpable absurdity. (96-97)

Though in the case of other words (like "cow," etc.), we could somehow or other, have positive entities as the objects negated,—yet, in the case of the word "entity" (*sat*), the object negated by it cannot be other than "non-entity" itself; and then (if you were to hold that objects negated must be positive entities), to *non-entity* would belong a *positive* character—an absurd contingency surely ! And further, without the ascertainment of the *non-entity*, we could not have any idea of *entity*; and the *non-entity* (being only a negation of *entity*) cannot be cognised (without the cognition of entity) (and this would involve a most undesirable mutual interdependence). (98-99)

यदपि भिक्षुणोक्तम्—‘तद्वांस्तु भेद एवेष्टः स तु पूर्वं निराकृतः’ इति, तदपि तुल्यमित्याह पादत्रयेण—

भेदाश्चापोहवन्तः स्युस्तेषां चावाच्यतोदिता ।

आनन्त्यव्यभिचाराभ्याम्,

न ह्यनन्तैः सम्बन्धग्रहणं सम्भवति, अगृहीतसम्बन्धस्य च प्रत्यायकत्वे सर्वत्र प्रतीतिप्रसङ्ग इति ।

न च सकलभेदानुगतोऽपोहवान्नाम कश्चिदस्ति, यः शब्दार्थः स्यादित्याह—

अन्यो नास्ति त्वपोहवान् ॥ 128 ॥

The object qualified by your *Apoha* could only consist of different individuals; and you have yourself explained that these (individuals) cannot be the objects of denotation, because of endlessness and contradiction. And certainly, you do not admit of any *single object qualified by Apoha* (that could embrace the individuals in one corporate whole, like our “*Class*.”) (128)

Note : The Apohists have urged against the Class-theory the objection that individuals can never be the objects of denotation, because that would give rise to endless denotations on the one hand, and many overlapping and self-contradictory denotations on the other. The same objection is shown to apply to the *Apoha* theory also. In fact, the upholders of the Class theory escape the anomalies by postulating the *Class*, which forms for them the true denotation of the word, and which, as occasion presents itself, is cognised as qualifying distinct individuals. This loophole for escape is not available for the *Apohist*; because if he admits of such a corporate whole, embracing all individuals, he would only admit the Class theory. (128)