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WITH THE NYĀYAKANDALĪ OF QṚIDHARA.

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

BY

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objects that happen to be brought into existence at these intervals,—this being due to the peculiar force of the causes. Conjunction comes about only when one object comes, from another place, and into contact with the other thing; or a thing remaining in its place could have conjunction with another thing that would move up to it. Inherence however is of a different character; and hence wherever the requisite causes are set going towards the producing of the object, there in that object we have the inherence of the Community which does not come from anywhere else, and yet which had no existence at that point of space before the appearance of the object; and this peculiarity we cannot take objection to; as we cannot object to the nature of things as they exist.

The *Bauddhas* hold that there is no such thing as 'Community'; as we are never actually cognisant of anything as inhering in a number of individuals, in the manner of the thread passing through all the beads strung on it.

But this is not right; because as a matter of fact we are cognisant of something that exist in all individual cows, and serves to distinguish them from all other animals, such as the horse and the like. If there were no such common character possessed by all the various kinds of cows, then one individual cow would be cognised to be as different from another individual cow, as it would be from an individual horse; or conversely, the cow and the horse would be regarded to be as like each other, as two individual cows; as there would be no difference in the two cases. As a matter of fact however, we find that all individual cows are perceived to be alike; and this distinctly points to a certain factor which is present in all cows, and is not present in horses and other animals; specially as this factor is found to serve one and the same useful purpose (that of differentiating the cow from other animals), and as it has one and the same cause (in all cases).

It might be argued that the unity is that of the *individual* cows. But this is not possible ; as if there were no *Community*, there could be no unity either among the Individuals, or of the causes of these Individuals ; as all these are distinct from one another. Then again, if the unity were to be due to the mere unity of the cause, then there would be no sort of unity in the case of those individuals that have diverse causes. As a matter of fact however, we find that there are different causes for things of the same kind ; for instance, fire is produced from such diverse sources as the rubbing together of two pieces of wood, electricity, the rays of the sun falling on the *Sūryakānta* gem and so forth. So also if unity of many things were due to the fact of their producing the same effect, then such unity would have to be admitted in the case of totally different objects ; for instance milk is found to be produced from the cow, as from the buffalo ; and thus the cow would be the same as the buffalo ; and the non-milch cow would not be a cow at all !

Then again, if there were no *Community*, what would be the object of denotation by a word ? The 'specific individuality' of any thing could not be such an object ; as having a momentary existence and being excluded from all things, it could never form the object of any verbal convention (on which the denotations of words chiefly depend). Nor could the *vikalpa*, or 'determinate concrete qualification of a thing', be the object of denotation ; as this also has only a momentary existence, and is not common to any number of things. It might be argued that "the denotation of the word would be of the form of the 'concrete qualification.'" But in that case, is the 'form of the concrete qualification' something different from that 'qualification', or is it non-different from it ? If it is different, then is it common to all such qualifications ? or is different with each qualification ? If it is common to all, then it does not differ from what we call 'Community' ; and the only slight difference that there is between you and ourselves is that you regard this 'Community' to belong to the cognition,

while we attribute it to the object, on account of its being cognised as something outside of ourselves. If then, this form be regarded as distinct from the 'qualification', and changing with each cognition,—or even if it were non-different from the cognition,—in either case, it would not be capable of any verbal relationship; as like cognition it would never form the object of any verbal convention.

It might be urged that, "what the 'concrete qualification' does is to indirectly impose its own external form on the cognition, and thus make it also concrete; as it is only thus that the cognition could come into existence, and this externality of form would form the basis of the verbal relationship."

But in that case, the form of the concrete qualification externally imposed, having its character dependent upon a single thing (viz the qualification itself), would be destroyed as soon as it would be produced on the production of the 'concrete qualification'; and thus being cognised as undergoing destruction, it would be different with each 'concrete qualification'; and we have already shown that there can be no verbal convention with regard to any such thing as would differ with each individual.

Objection: "The 'concrete qualification' of the cow "imposes its appearance externally; and the appearance imposed "by another 'concrete qualification' would be similar to that "imposed by the former. The concrete qualifications too are com- "prehensive of their own forms only; and as such they could "never lead to the apprehension of the difference among the forms "imposed by themselves; as the apprehension of difference "depends upon the apprehension of both the members (between "whom the difference exists). Hence as this difference is not "apprehended, we come to look upon the forms imposed by the "concrete qualifications to be all one only; and thus speak of "there being a single objective for all these qualifications. It is "this objective that constitutes the 'Sāmānya' or 'community';

"and this community is negative in its character; being
 "devoid of any absolute difference from the externally imposed
 "forms of the 'concrete qualifications'; and combining with
 "the four other factors—of (1) the 'specific individuality'; (2) the
 "cognition, (3) the form of the cognition, and (4) the imposed
 "form,—comes to be spoken of as '*ardhapancamākāra* (with a
 "four-and-a-half-fold form); and having *externality* imposed upon
 "it, it becomes expressible by words, and thereby comes to be the
 "objective of the verbal relation. And it is the cognition of this
 "that constitutes the cognition of the 'specific individuality';
 "and the form in which the community is imposed is that
 "of that individuality. This 'community' again has the character
 "of the *preclusion of all other things*; it has both positive and
 "negative forms, as is proved by such assertions as 'the cow is',
 "'the cow is not', and so with all other things; if the communi-
 "ty expressed by the word 'cow' were only in the positive form,
 "then we could not have the assertion 'the cow is'; as such
 "an assertion would be tautological (the idea of 'is' being con-
 "tained in the word 'cow' itself); nor could we have the
 "assertion 'the cow is not'; as this would be a contradiction in
 "terms (no negation being compatible with positive charac-
 "ter); similarly, if it had a purely negative form, the asser-
 "tion 'the cow is not' would be tautological, and that 'the
 "cow is' would be a contradiction in terms; as has
 "been declared in the following words:—'We cannot say that
 "the *jar exists*, as the jar is a real entity; nor can we say the
 "*jar does not exist*, as there is contradiction between *existence*
 "and *non-existence*'. It is for this reason that even distinct
 "individuals appear as one.

"This 'community' is the objective of all 'concrete quali-
 "fications'; and the singleness of this leads to the singleness of
 "these qualifications; and the singleness of these latter leads
 "to the singleness also of their origin in the shape of the
 "abstract unqualified cognitions that we have with regard to
 "each individual object; and this leads to the singleness of the

"origin of these abstract notions,—namely, the objects themselves. This has been thus declared :—"The cognition being the cause, a single idea cannot be diverse; and as the cause of a single cognition the individualities must be one".

To the above we make the following reply: The above reasoning is not sound; as it would seem that the *Bauddhas* give the name 'community' to the unity that is imposed by reason of the non-apprehension of the difference among the forms of the 'concrete qualifications,'—this non-apprehension being inferred from the fact of no other alternative being found to be possible. And on this point we have the following observations to make :—Does the 'imposition of non-difference' consist in the non-apprehension of difference among the forms? or does it consist in the apprehension of non-difference? The former could not be the case; as in that case the imposition of difference too would be as likely; that is to say, just as the differences among the forms of the concrete qualifications are not apprehended, so also is non-difference not apprehended; and hence just as nondifference is imposed by reason of the non-apprehension of difference,—so in the same manner, would difference be imposed by the non-apprehension of non-difference; and thence there could be no usage based upon non-difference. Nor is the second alternative quite reasonable—viz: that the imposition of non-difference consists in the apprehension of non-difference. Because it is only when the *existence of the soul is admitted that a single perceiver can apprehend both difference and non-difference; when however, the existence of the soul is denied (as it is by the *Bauddha*), there can be no one observer of many things; speceally as; the 'concrete qualifications' are each restricted to their own individual forms. Even though there be a single observer of many things,—yet unless there be any ground for singleness, there can be no apprehension of non-difference among different things. In fact, even

*The reading '*abhāvādibh*' does not afford any meaning, hence the translation adopts the reading '*ātmaivādī*'.

if there were such an apprehension; it would be possible also in the case of such different forms as those of the cow, the horse and the buffalo; as there would be no difference in the character of the differences in the two cases.

Page 320.] *Objection:* "In the case of the forms of the cows, we have such a ground for singleness in the form of the *preclusion of non-cows.*"

Reply: What are the 'non-cows' the preclusion whereof imposes singleness on the form of cows? It might be urged that those animals that are not cows are the 'non-cows.' But then, the question would arise—what are the cows that are not 'non-cows'? And thus it would be necessary to determine the forms of the *cow*, the preclusion whereof would determine the form of the *non-cow*; and conversely it would be necessary to determine the form of the *non-cow*, the preclusion whereof would determine the form of the *cow*; and thus the ignorance of one would imply the ignorance of both. As has been thus declared by the great teacher (Kumārila): 'It would only be the well-known *cow* that could be precluded; and as this *preclusion* would be in the form of the negating of the *cow*, it becomes necessary to say what this *cow* is that is negated; until the *cow* is known, there can be no *non-cow*; and when there is no *non-cow*, whence could there be the *cow*? (*Gloka-vartika*—Chapter on 'Apoha').

It might be urged that what constitutes the denotation of the word is the *Apoha* or *negation of the contrary*. To this we make the following reply: what is this 'apoha'? Is the 'apoha,' 'the negation of the non-cow' a positive entity, or a negative one? If the former, then, is this positive entity of the same character as the individual *cow*,? or is it in the form of the individual *non-cow*? If the former, then it becomes something specific (as pertaining to a definite individual) and not generic (pertain-

ing to all individuals; and we have already shown that no verbal process can apply to any such specific entity. If however, it be held to be of the nature of the individual non-cow, then too the same objections would apply; and over and above these there would be the further objection that the cow in that case would cease to form the denotation of the word 'cow'. If then the 'Apoha' be regarded as a positive entity apart from the particular individuals, and pertaining to all of these,—then the difference in our views would be only verbal (as in this case what you call 'apoha' we call 'Sāmānya').

Further, if Apoha be regarded as a negative entity, consisting as it does, of negation or preclusion,—then (being a negative entity) it could never be apprehended by a direct positive sensuous cognition; as it is only that which produces a cognition that can have the apprehensible or cognisable character; and a negative entity is, by its very nature, wholly devoid of the productiveness of any effect. And when a thing is not cognised by Sense-perception, there can be no cognition of a verbal convention with regard to it; and thus no verbal process could apply to a negative entity. When a negative entity is cognised by means of a word, the person hearing the word could not, by its means, be moved to any activity towards a positive object; for the simple reason that the negative is wholly different from the positive entity, and the two are devoid of all relationship between themselves.

Objection : "The verbal process applying to the 'specific individuality' must be regarded as due to non-discrimination or ignorance; since the individuality is cognised in the negative form; that is to say, the cognition of the cogniser is mistaken, being due to their unifying the perceptible and the imaginary, and then attributing a character to a thing to which it does not belong.*"

*This sentence is rather obscure; and appears to be a quotation from an old Bauddha work.

Reply: This is not right ; that which is not cognised cannot have imposed on it any thing as identical with itself, in the form of a negative entity. As a matter of fact, the person hearing the word uttered has at that time no cognition of the object signified ; as the word (according to you) pertains to something wholly different ; and there is no other means available for cognising it ; and yet we find the word giving rise to an activity on the part of the hearer, towards a positive object. And hence we cannot regard a negation to be the denotation of a word.

Nor have we any other ground for singleness (of the forms of individual cows). If all positive entities were to be mere negations of one another, and appearing as a new object at every moment, then no such entity could be cognised by means of any word ; and that which is not directly cognised cannot form the object of avoidance or acceptance, as its capabilities would be absolutely unknown. And yet as a matter of fact, we do find usage based upon words ; and so have we also the activity of all living beings in the world, tending towards the obtaining of the desirable and the avoiding of the undesirable, and proceeding from direct sensuous perception. And it is this usage that establishes the existence of a community common among many individuals ; and it is to these communities that we find the denotations of words to pertain ; and when a man knows of the capabilities of a certain class, and he comes to know that such and such a thing belongs to that class, he acts towards the obtaining of that object, even though he may never have perceived the particular object before.

Thus then the comprehensive cognition pertaining to distinct individuals serves as the basis for Community ; and if this were a mere negation, then the whole activity of the world would be impossible.