# PADARTHADHARMASANGRAHA

## OF PRAÇASTAPÂDA

WITH THE NYAYAKANDALI OF ÇRÎDHARA.

# TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

BY

# MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA

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## PRAÇASTAPÃDA BHÃSHYA-CHAP. VII.

next birth of the soul, is due to unseen agencies; so also are the actions of the rudimentary elements &c., &c., &c., &c. For instance,.....the Vibration of the elements—e. g. the motion of the Earth; when a person is being examined for theft, a stone over which certain mantras have been pronounced, actually moves to him (if he is really the thief).....all this is due to unseen agencies.

Fix in your hearts the great truth that Action is the cause of the obtaining of the desirable, and the avoiding of the undesirable, experiences. ! 1

## CHAPTER VII.

On Sāmānya-Community.

Text (154): Community is of two kinds-'higher' and 'lower.'

It pervades over all its objectives; has identically the same form (in all cases) inhering in many individuals; it brings about the idea of its own form in one, two or many things; and it is the cause or basis of the notion of inclusion, inhering as it does in all its substrates simultaneously.

Question : " How so ? "

Answer: It is so because as a matter of fact we find that when we cognise each individual objects as belong simultaneously to a particular class, and we have such cognitions repeatedly, then there is produced in our minds an impression; and when in view of this impression we review those past cognitions, we come to recognise a certain factor that inheres in every one of the objects ecgnised; and it is this factor that constitutes the Community. (I-ii-3).

The Community of 'Being' is the highest ; in as much as it is the cause of inclusive cognitions only. In the case of a number of totally different things, such, for instance, as pieces of leather, of cloth, of blanket and so forth,-if all of them are pessessed of the same quality of 'blueness,' with regard to each one of these we have the notion that 'it is llue'; and in the same manner, in the case of the totally different categories. Substance, Quality and Action, we find that with regard to each one of them we have the notion that 'it exists ;' and this all-inclusive notion could not but be due to something apart from the . three categories themselves; and this somethingis what we called 'Satta' or 'Being' And it . is by reason of the presence of 'being' that we have the inclusive notion of a number of things as 'existing'; hence this 'Being' cannot but. be regarded as Community. (I-ii-4, 7 to 10, 17).

The Lower Communities are, the classes of 'Substance' 'Quality' 'Action' and so forth. As these give rise to inclusive as well as exclusive notions, they are regarded as Communities as well as Individualities. For instance 'Substance' is a Community, in as much as it serves as the tasis of an inc usive notion with regard to such mutually different th ngs as earth, water and the like ; and it is an Individuality in as much as it serves as the basis of notion exclusive of Qualities and Actions. Similarly ' Quality' is a Community by reason of its giving rise to a notion including all qualities such as colour and the rest; and it is an individuality, on account of its serving as the basis of a notion exclusive of substances and actions. In the same manner, 'Action' is

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a Community by reason of its serving as the basis of a notion inclusive of all the several actions of 'Throwing Upwards' and the rest, and it is an individuality, in as much as it is exclusive of qualities and actions.

In this same manner, in the case of such Communities as 'Earth' 'Colour,' 'Throwing Upwurds' 'Cow,' 'Jar' 'Cloth' and so forth,—which inhere in animate and inanimate beings,—we find that they serve as the basis of inclusiveas well as exclusive notions; and as such these also are Communities as well as Individualities, Such classes however as 'Sulstance,' 'Quality' and 'Action' include many individuals; and as such they are primarily regarded as Communities; and it is only indirectly or secondarily that they are regarded as Individualities, by reason of their serving to exclude their substrates from other similar Communities. (I-ii-5).

## Commentary.

May the High-souled Brahmä, Vishnu and Mahēswara, the causes of the origin the continuance and destruction of the universe,—be ever victorious !

The author proceeds to describe Community: It is of two kinds &c.—these we have already explained before in the section wherein these several categories to be mentioned by name.

Some people hold that all Communities are all-pervading; and with a view to deny this view the author proceeds to explain the nature of Community.

Page 313.] It pervades over all its objectives. When a certain Community resides in a certain object, this latter becomes its 'objective'; and over all such objectives it pervades. That the Community does not exist in all things (its

objectives as well as other things) is proved by the simple fact of its not being perceived to be so.

It has identically the same form—that is to say; the form in which it resides in one object is the same in which it resides in another object also; and that such is the case is proved by our baving exactly the same notion of the Community in both cases. Then again, the fact of the Community inhering by the same form in many; objects can be proved by our own experience. Nor can there be any incongruity in this, when it is distinctly cognised by some means of right knowledge; in fact we find such things as 'duality' and the rest inhering in many objects at one and the same time.

It might be argued that if such were the case then there would be no difference between Duality &c and Community. And in order to remove this misconception the author adds,— It brings about the idea of its own form &c, &c. For instance, whether we see a single cow, or two cows or many cows, we have the notion of the "cow" in all cases. Such however is not the case with Duality &c. (Each of which exist only in a definite number of objects).

Thus the definition of 'Community' comes to be this:-That which, while inhering in many objects, brings about the idea of itself in one, two or many objects,—is 'Community.' This the author proceeds to explain :-And it is the cause or basis &c., &c. That is to say, as a matter of fact we find that the form that is in one object is present in another object also; and hence the Community comes to be the cause of the inclusive notion of the sameness of its form inhering as it does, in exactly the same form, in a number of objects, simultaneously—i.e., when it subsits in one, it subsists also in the other.

A question having been put as to how it is known that Community inheres in many objects at one and the same time, the Author explains:—When we cognise dc. That is to say, having cognised the Community as subsisting in one object, when at

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some future time, we happen to see another object and find the same generality in it, recognise it to be the same as the one cognised in the previous object,—then we distinctly recognise the fact of the Community inhering in many objects. And as this is a distinctly perceptible fact, it sets aside all notions to the contrary.

The author now proceeds to describe separately the Higher and Lower Communities spoken of above :- The Community of 'Being' is the highest de., de Even though 'Being' is distinctly perceived, yet there are some people who deny that they perceive any such thing; hence for such people the author brings forward an inferential argument :- In the case of a number of totally different things &c., &c. This is quite clear; the argument being thus stated formally :-- The inclusive notion that 'it exists,' which we have with reference to substance &c., must be regarded as based upon the cognition of something apart from these things themselves,-because we find a common inclusive idea extending over different things,-like the notion of 'blue' with regard to the leather, the cloth &c. And as ' Being' serves to bring about only the inclusive notion of substance &c., and not any notions of exclusion, it must be regarded as a Community only, and not an Individuality.

Page 314.] The Lower Communities are the classes of 'Substance' &c., &c. and these are the cause of notions of inclusion as well as exclusion.....

Question : "Are the classes 'substance' and the rest then in reality Communities, or individualities, or both ?"

Answer: Such classes as substance &c., include many individualities &c., &c. That is to say, the word 'Sāmānya' indicates the character of being common; and as the classes of 'substance' &c., have this character of being common to many individuals, the name 'Sāmānya' or 'Community' applies to them exactly; as for the name 'Viçësha' or 'individuality'

however, this could not apply to them exactly; as a Viçësha is that which distinguishes its substrate from all other things (and the classes in question do not distinguish any one of their substrates from all other things). For this reason it is only the name 'Community' that can apply to these classes, primarily; and the name 'individuality' is applied to them only secondarily or figuratively,—this application being based upon the similarity that the class, 'substance' &c, also serve to distinguish their substrate from the objects of other classes, just as the Viçësha distinguishes its substrate from all other things.

> Text 155:—That these Communities belong to a category distinct from Substance, Quality and Action, is proved by the fact of their having a character totally different from these latter. For this same reason too they are eternal. These again are different from one another, by reason of each of them residing in a different set of things, substances, qualities and actions,—and also by reason of prople having a distinct notion with regard to each of them.

> Each of these is regarded as one in all its substrates, because its character in all remains the same, and also because there are no marks of difference. Though Communities do not have their extension limited, yet they are regarded as extending over all their objectives; because of the definitely restricted character of the distinguishing features of the objects, and also because of the fact of these objects having definitely distinct causes of their own. As Communities do not exist, either by conjunction or by inherence, in the intervals (of space between two individuals of the same classes), they are not speken of as existing (in those intervals) (I-ii-11 to 16).

## Commentary.

**Page 315.**] Objection. "The class 'substance' is nothing distinct from the *individual* substance; and hence it is not proper to describe the functions of the two as if they were distinct."

In reply to this the author says—That these Communities do, do. That is to say, as a matter of fact we find that the class 'substance' is congnisable by such cognitions as are inclusive or comprehensive in their character, while the *individual* substance is cognised by a cognition that is wholly exclusive in character; and in as much as this constitutes a difference in their character, the classes cannot but be regarded as belonging to a category distinct from that to which the individuals belong.

For the same reason is the class eternal. That is, in as much as the class is different from the individual, it must be eternal; if it were not so, it would be produced when the individuals are produced, and destroyed when these are destroyed (which is not found to be the case); this predicament is avoided when the two are regarded as distinct.

Some people hold the following view :

"The Community serves to bring about a comprehensive "or inclusive notion of diverse things. As a matter of fact, "in the case of each individual thing, it does not bring about "the cognition of two distinct entities,—one in the form of "Community and another in that of an individuality,—indepen-"dently of each other, as we have in the case of the man and "the stick; nor is there any relation of qualification "possible between the two entities; as it is not that, when ever "we see a cow, we have the idea that 'this is qualified by, "or possessed of, the general character of the  $c_{DW}$ ; in fact "the cognition that we have is that of the two being identical,

"in the form 'this is a cow'; an expression wherein the "general character of the cow is spoken of as identical with "the individual cow seen by the eyes; specially as the two "have no forms apart from each other. As for 'inclusiveness', " this is a character that belongs to the Community of the ' cow'. "as also to all other Communities; and as for 'exclusiveness' " this belongs to the individual cow, as also to all other "individual things; but there is no doubt that the form of "the Community of 'cow' is distinct form the forms of "all other Communities ; just in the same manner as the form " of the individual cow is different form the form of other in-" dividuals; and all this could not be possible unless the two " (the class 'cow' and the individual cow) were identical. Nor "is it possible for one and the same thing (the Community) to "be spoken of as the form of another thing, and also as "something only related to it; as anything that has no form " can have no relationship. Hence it must be concluded that "the real truth is that the generality and the individual are " hoth identical.

"It is this reasoning that serves also to prove the theory of "difference-identity' (*i. e.* the theory that the two are different "as well as identical). For instance, just as we have the "cognition of the 'piebald cow', so also we have that of the "black cow.' Nor do we have any such notion to the "contrary, as that, 'it is the piebald one only that is a *cow*, "and not the black one'; in fact with regard to all cows "we have the same notion that 'this is a cow,' 'that is a cow,' and so forth. And thus the Community 'cow' in the form of the *piebald cow* being found in this cognition to be "identical with the *black cow*,—that Community comes to be "different from the individual piebald cow; specially as the 'only point in which the Community differs from one individual "object is that it is identical with other individual objects also "(which the individual object is not); and the distinguishing

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" feature of the Community also consists only in its being identical "with both (all) individual objects.

"Objection: 'To say that one and the same thing is both "different and non-different is a contradiction in terms."

"Reply: It is not right for you, versed as you are in the "art of reasoning, to say this. That alone can be regarded "as contradictory and absurd which is not found to be in "keeping with the real state of things; and in regard to that "which is always in keeping with the nature of thicgs as "cognised by the valid means of knowledge, the mention of "absurdity itself would be an absurdity.

**Page 316]** "Objection: 'We have nowhere else found "two things to be both different and non-different."

"Reply: Is it necessary for sensuous perception to follow "in the wake of another perception, as it is in the case of "inferential cognition? Well, if it were so, then it would "be necessary to postulate an unending series of perception "after perception. If then, sensuous perception were to "operate by its own inherent capability, then the nature of a "thing must be accepted exactly as it happens to be perceived; "and this cannot be denied on the mere ground of its not "being seen elsewhere; as if this were to be negatived, then "all perceptions would become open to negation.

"Thus we conclude that Community is not only eter-"nal, but both eternal and transient ; because it is pro-"ducible and destructible by the production and destruction of "individuals, and it continues in another individual (even on "the destruction of one individual)."

To the above arguments, we make the following reply :---

(1) Is the perception cognisant of the Community and the individual, exactly in the same form? (2) or is it cognisant of a non-difference between them? (3) Or, does it cognise them in different forms? In the case of the first alternative, there would be only one thing (and not two things in

the shape of the Community and the Individual); and it would not be that there are two things with one and the same form ; as the non-difference of any two things only consists in their being cognised in one and the same form In the case of the second alternative, there is a self-contradiction ; as the cognition of difference is nothing more than the cognition of different forms; and when such a cognition is possible, there can be no cognition of von-difference; and as such, how could you ever establish the non-difference of two different things ? If it is asked-"how then have we the ides of non-difference" ?--we reply-we can have no such idea in any way. Thus then, if we are cognisant of only one form, then there is a single thing, and not two things; and if both forms are cognised, then there is no possiblity of the cognition of non-difference. As for the universally accepted cognition of the 'cow' in regard to all cows, this must be attributed to the inherence (of all individuals in the same Community). In the case of conjunction there would be a distinct cognition of somesort of actual contact ; while the character of inherence is such that in its case the two members related are perceived together in a single lump, just as we find in the case of the fire and the redhot ball of iron. The Community itself - cannot be regarded as the form of the individuality; the fact is that though the two are really distinct, yet the individual is never perceived apart from the Community to which it belongs,-just as the plum in a ditch is not visible apart from the ditch ; though the two are distinctly perceptible as different from each other; for instance. from a distance, even if we do not cognise the Community 'cow' we are cognisant of the individual cow; and even though any particular cow is not seen, we perceive the Community 'cow' in another cow that we see.

For these reasons we conclude that Community is something wholly different from the individual. Such is the process of reasoning adopted by the Logicians.

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These again are different from one another &c., &c. The Communities of 'Substance' 'Quality' and 'Action' reside only in substances, qualities and actions respectively; and with regard to each of these we have a distinct cognition; for these reasons they must be regarded as distinct from each other.

It has been stated before that Community is of the nature of non-difference; and this same fact the author proceeds to prove by means of reasonings:—*Each of them is regarded as one de., dc.* The word *`lakshana' character'* means that whereby a thing is distinguisted; hence, in the present instance, the notion of inclusion (a comprehensive notion of one Community as extending over many individuals); this comprehensive notion is found to be exactly the same in each individual of a Community; nor are there any 'marks' or reasons for regarding them as different in different individuals; and from these two facts it is clear that the Community is one and the same in all individuals that are included in it.

It has also been stated before that the Community inheres in all its objectives only, and not in any other thing; and the auther now proceeds to bring forward reasons in support of this :- Though Communities &c. As a matter of fact it is found that a Community is related to many individuals appearing at all sorts of places; and hence its extension is by no means limited; yet in as much its manifesting cause, in the shape of the peculiar shape of the objects included under it, is one of particular kind, the Community itself becomes restricted in its scope; and then again, by reason of the limited character of the causes productive of the objects, the Community inheres only in its objectives, and in all of these. That is to say, the Community of the 'cow' is manifested or rendered perceptible by a body which consists of the dewlap and such other limbs; and the Community of the 'horse' is manifested by the body consisting of the mein and so forth; the Community of the 'jar' is manifested by a body having a peculiarly shaped neck; all this we infer from the fact of our idea of such and such

things being restricted to such and such forms. These various kinds of bodies too are not found to be common to more than one class of objects; in fact each of them is restricted to one set of objects only; thus then, though every Community is capable of being connected with all such bodies as are its objectives, whenever and wherever such bodies might be produced,—yet it can inhere only in such an object as it happens to be endowed with the body manifesting that Community. In the same manner the scope of the Community would be limited by reason of the particular nature of the causes tending to produce that particular shaped body; for instance, such is the nature of the yarns, that in a thing produced out of these only the Community of 'cloth' can inhere; and such is the character of the *lump of clay* that the generality of the 'Jar' can inhere only in objects produced out of them.

Some people hold the following view :---" The Community being absolutely inactive, could never move from one place to another, and thereby become connected with different objects; hence in the case of an object that did not exist before, when it is brought into existence, the Community could not come to inhere in it; and yet as a matter of fact we find that whenever and wherever the individual object is produced the Community is always present in it; and this leads us to conclude that all Communities exist everywhere (are omnipresent or allpervading)."

With a view to refute this view, the Author adds,—As Communities do not exist either in conjunction & c., & c. The 'interval' here spoken of may be either (1)  $\bar{A}k\bar{a}ca$ ; or (2) the substance Space, or (3) Air not in motion, or (4) absence of corporeal substance; and in any of these the Communities do not exist either by conjunction or by inherence; nor is there any evidence for believing that they exist without any sort of relationship; consequently it is said that they do not exist in the 'intervals'; and yet they become connected with the

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objects that happen to be brought into existence at these intervals,—this being due to the peculiar force of the causes. Conjunction comes about only when one object comes, from another place, and into contact with the other thing; or a thing remaining in its place could have conjunction with another thing that would move up to it. Inherence however is of a different character; and hence wherever the requisite causes are set going towards the producing of the object, there in that object we have the inherence of the Community which does not come from anywhere else, and yet which had no existence at that point of space before the appearance of the object; and this peculiarity we cannot take objection to; as we cannot object to the nature of things as they exist.

The Bauddhas hold that there is no such thing as 'Community'; as we are never actually cognisant of anything as inhereing in a number of individuals, in the manner of the thread passing through all the beads strung on it.'

But this is not right; because as a matter of fact we are cognisant of something that exist in all individual cows, and serves to distinguish them from all other animals, such as the horse and the like. If there were no such common character possessed by all the various kinds of cows, then one individual cow would be cognised to be as different from another individual cow, as it would be from an individual horse; or conversely, the cow and the borse would be regarded to be as like each other, as two individual cows; as there would be no difference in the two cases. As a matter of fact however, we find that all individual cows are perceived to be alike ; and this distinctly points to a certain factor which is present in all cows. and is not present in horses and other animals; specially as this factor is found to serve one and the same useful purpose (that of differentiating the cow from other animals), and as it has one and the same cause (in all cases).