


# INDIAN THEORIES OF MEANING

K. KUNJUNNI RAJA

M.A., Ph.D. (Madras), Ph.D. (London)

*Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit  
University of Madras*



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## ANVITĀBHIDHĀNA AND ABHIHITĀNVAYA

*Relation of words in a Sentence : Bheda or Saṃsarga*

IF every word has its own definite meaning, how is it possible for a sentence, which is only a collection of words, to have a unified meaning? The same problem arises in the case of compound words also. Two explanations are given to this question.<sup>1</sup> Vājapyāyana who, like the Mīmāṃsaka-s, held that the meaning of a word is the universal or the *jāti*, said that the meaning of a sentence is the *saṃsarga* or the mutual association of the word-meanings. In the case of a phrase like 'the white cow' (*gauḥ śuklā*), the word 'cow' connotes 'cowness' merely; the other word which is syntactically

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the two views about the import of sentences, see M. Hiriyanna, 'Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana', *IHQ*, vol. XIV, pp. 261 ff.; *Mbh.*, I, p. 364; Puṇyarāja on *VP*, II. 155; Helārāja on *VP*, III, Jāṭisamuddeśa, v. 5; *Śabarabhāṣya* on *sūtra* II. 1. 46; Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, *Tantravārttika*, p. 446 f.; Pārthasārathimīśra on *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 854 f.

connected with it indicates its association with the quality of whiteness. Thus, the sentence means the association of cowness and whiteness, and as that is one, the words constitute a syntactic unity.<sup>1</sup>

Vyāḍi, on the other hand, held that the meaning of a word is any particular (*dravya*) of a class. It is a concrete thing rather than a quality. According to him the function of a word in a sentence is to distinguish the thing it means from all similar things.<sup>2</sup> Thus, a 'cow' means not so much 'what is characterized by cowness as what is distinguished from a horse. In a sentence words signify things not as having certain attributes, but rather as excluding some. Thus, in the case of the phrase 'the white cow', the word 'cow' can point to any concrete particular, which includes cows of all colours, white, black and so forth; therefore, the word 'white' does not indicate the connection of whiteness with the cow; it should be explained as negatively qualifying the cow, denying all colours other than whiteness to it. Similarly, the term 'white' can denote anything that is white, including white cows, white horses and so on; hence, the term 'cow' in the

<sup>1</sup> Helārāja, loc. cit.: *jātivādinā vājapyāyanasya tu mate samsargo vākyaṛthaḥ sāmānyānām samśleṣamātrārūpatvād vākyaṛthasya*. Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, op. cit., p. 447: *samsargo 'pi padārthānām anyonyenānu-rājanam . . . gotve śuklatvasamsargaḥ, śuklatve vā gotvasamsargaḥ*.

<sup>2</sup> Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, loc. cit.: *bhedo nāma padārthānām vyavacchedaḥ paraśparam . . . vyaktipadārthapakṣe sarvavyaktinām gavādīpa-denaivopāttatvād viśayaśabdaiḥ śuklādibhiḥ kṛṣṇādivyavacchedamātram vaktavyam*. Helārāja, loc. cit. *vyāḍimate bhedo vākyaṛthaḥ, pada-vācyānām dravyānām dravyāntaranivṛttitātparyeṇābhīdheyatvāt*.

phrase, means only the exclusion of all white things other than cows. In this view of Vyāḍi we find the early stage of the Apoha doctrine maintained by the Buddhists.<sup>1</sup> Kumārilabhaṭṭa also refers to this view, that the import of a sentence is *bheda* or the mutual exclusion of the word-meanings.<sup>2</sup>

Kaiyaṭa says<sup>3</sup> that these two views are not mutually exclusive, since each view implies the other. In the discussion of the meaning of the term *sāmarthya*, which is given by Pāṇini as the condition that should exist between the members of a compound word, Patañjali says<sup>4</sup> that, according to some, *sāmarthya* means either *saṃsarga* (mutual association) or *bheda* (exclusion). Even though Patañjali is discussing compound words, the principle involved is the same.

### *Anvitābhidhāna Theory of Verbal Comprehension*

Prabhākara and his followers denied that words convey a meaning except in the context of a sentence, even though they regarded words as real and actual constituents of language. Each word has a definite

<sup>1</sup> This is discussed separately in the section on Apoha, *supra*, pp. 78 ff. Note that Diṇnāga's theory about the import of sentences is the same. Thus, in the phrase 'the blue lotus', he also maintains that the term 'blue' means the exclusion of all lotuses that are not blue and the term 'lotus' means the exclusion of all blue things that are not lotuses.

<sup>2</sup> *Tantravārttika*, p. 447.

<sup>3</sup> *Pradīpa* under *Vārttika* 2 on Pāṇini, II, 1. 1: *tatra bhedaḥ saṃsargāvinābhāvito'ād anumīyamānasasṃsargaḥ sāmarthyam, saṃsargo vā bheda'vinābhāvyanumeyabhedaḥ*.

<sup>4</sup> *Mbh.* I, p. 364: *āpara āha bhedasasṃsargau vā sāmarthyam iti*.

meaning, but it is also clear that the purpose of the word is to serve as part of a sentence. On hearing the words of a sentence, we get a unitary sense which is the meaning of the sentence. The problem is whether this unitary sense arises directly from the collection of the words, or indirectly through the recollection of the meanings of the individual words that comprise it. The *anvitābhīdhāna* theory takes the former view, while the *abhihitānvaya* theory takes the latter.

The meaning of a sentence is made up of the individual word-meanings and their mutual relation. According to the *anvitābhīdhāna* theory, both the individual word-meanings and their mutual relation are conveyed by the words themselves; but according to the *abhihitānvaya* theory, the words convey only the individual word-meanings; the mutual relation is conveyed by the word-meanings, and not by the words. Among modern writers on linguistics, Wundt seems to represent the *anvitābhīdhāna* theory; for he says that 'in determining the nature of a sentence, no addition to what is expressed by the words should be assumed'.<sup>1</sup> Polemizing against this view, Paul maintains the *abhihitānvaya* view that such an assumption is usually necessary.<sup>2</sup> The commonplace statement in modern linguistics that the sentence is the unit of speech<sup>3</sup> is comparable to the *anvitābhīdhāna* theory.

<sup>1</sup> A. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 58.

<sup>2</sup> ibid.; see also Paul, *Prinzipien*, p. 130 n. 1. His leanings towards the *abhihitānvaya* theory are not quite clear.

<sup>3</sup> A. Gardiner, op. cit., p. 63.

The statement of procedure adopted by the followers of the *anvitābhidhāna* theory is quite similar to many modern statements. 'Thus a root or suffix is analysed out on the basis of a paradigm, and complete words are recognized on the basis of substitution in sentences.'<sup>1</sup> The Prābhākara-s who follow the *anvitābhidhāna* theory lay particular stress on the natural method by which children learn the meaning of words. It is by watching the usage and activity of elders in daily life that children come to know the significance of words.<sup>2</sup> One person, addressing another, says, 'Bring the cow' (*gām ānaya*); the latter thus addressed immediately brings the cow. A child, who hears the sentence uttered by the former and observes the action that follows, infers vaguely that the meaning of the sentence is a command to carry out the act of bringing the cow. At this stage what the child understands is only that the whole of that statement means the whole of what is signified. Later, the child hears one man saying to another, 'Bring the horse' (*aśvam ānaya*), and observes the latter bringing the horse. From this he again infers that the meaning of this sentence is a command to carry out the act of bringing the horse. By comparing the two sentences he understands that the term 'bring' (*ānaya*)

<sup>1</sup> J. Brough, 'Some Indian Theories of Meaning', p. 165.

<sup>2</sup> *Vākyārthamālykāvṛtti*, p. 5; *Ślokaavṛttika*, Saṃbandhākṣepa section, vv. 140-1; *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, Śabda section; *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, V. See also the section on 'How Do We Learn the Meaning of Words?', *supra*, pp. 26 ff.

common to the two sentences must mean the command to bring, and that the terms 'cow' (*gām*) and 'horse' (*aśvam*) must refer to the two different animals. Thus by comparing the various sentences uttered by people and by observing the action produced, the child is able, by the mental process of exclusion and inclusion (*āvāpa* and *udvāpa* or *anvaya* and *vyatireka*) to have a general idea about the meaning of individual words. This process of substitution is natural and subconscious, rather than deliberate and conscious. Later, the child is able to understand the meanings of even new sentences containing the words he has already come across.<sup>1</sup>

It is only the injunctive sentences that normally produce a visible reaction on the part of the listeners, and therefore, it is only from such sentences in the imperative (or potential) mood that the meanings of words can be naturally understood.<sup>2</sup> The Mīmāṃsaka's preoccupation with the injunctions of the Vedic texts with regard to religious duties led to the view that a typical sentence should be in the imperative mood, since the whole direct denotation of the Veda must, according to them, lie in enjoining something to be done. In cases where such an interpretation is not

<sup>1</sup> Jha, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā in Its Sources*, p. 135 f.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 136; *Mānameyodaya*, p. 92. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Naiyāyika-s, reaction on the part of the listener is visible even in the case of indicative sentences. Thus, *putras te jātaḥ* (A son is born to you) may produce joy, and *kanyā te garbhīṇī* (Your unmarried daughter is *enceinte*) a shock of despair to a father.

possible, the comprehension of meaning must depend upon something indirectly connected with the injunction. The Vedāntin-s, on the other hand, held that the direct denotation of the important Vedic texts lies not in commanding something, but in pointing out some well-established facts; thus to them the importance lies in indicative sentences. The later Indian logic also deals with such indicative sentences. Prabhākara holds that even in the case of indicative sentences, the comprehension of the denotation of the words can be obtained only by observing the usage of elders, and that this can be known only from injunctive sentences.<sup>1</sup>

If the meanings of words can be known only when they occur in injunctive sentences, it follows that every word must express its meaning only as related to the other factors of the injunction. The verb denoting the command to do the act is the principal word in a sentence, and the remaining words possess a meaning only in relation to the action. Thus, the Prābhākara-s hold that no word can be comprehended as having an independent meaning, when isolated from a sentence. The meaning of words is always understood only as related to something which has to be done (*kārya*). Prabhākara says <sup>2</sup> that all usage is through the sentence and its meaning. According to him what is permanent is the relation that the sentence bears to its meaning.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jha, loc. cit.

<sup>2</sup> *Bṛhatī*, p. 188: *vākyaārthena vyavahārah*.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 135.

Commenting on that statement, Śālikanātha says: 'The word alone, by itself, never expresses any meaning; it is only the sentence that does it; as is clear from the fact that we learn the meaning of verbal expressions only from the usage of older people,—and this usage is only in the form of sentences; and every single word is understood only in so far as it is related to the other words in the sentence; hence it is established that what is expressive of the meaning is the sentence only, not any word alone by itself.'<sup>1</sup>

The Prābhākara-s do not deny the existence of individual words and their isolated meanings; they only assert that it is impossible to comprehend the isolated meaning of a word apart from its relation in a sentence. Words certainly recall their senses separately; but they do not stop with that. Even though the listener knows the general meaning of the words, his experience tells him that the words are meaningful, only when they are connected in a sentence and not when isolated. The words themselves convey their meanings only as related to one another on the strength of the three well-known factors, *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṃnidhi*. The words convey not only their individual meanings, but also their syntactic relation. Thus, the sentence-meaning is directly conveyed by the words themselves.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Rjuvimalā* on the same, p. 135. See Jha, *Pūrvamīmāṃsā in Its Sources*, p. 137.

<sup>2</sup> *Vākyaarthamātrkāvṛtti*, p. 5:

*ākāṅkṣāsaṃnidhiprāptayogyāarthāntarasamgatān  
svārthān āhuḥ padānīti vyutpattiḥ saṃśritā mayā.*

The ancient Mīmāṃsaka-s seem to have held the *anvitābhidhāna* theory; *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, I. I. 25 gives tacit support to it, *tadbhūtānāṃ kriyārthena samāmnāyaḥ, arthasya tannimittatvāt*.<sup>1</sup> But the *Śabarabhāṣya* passage explaining the comprehension of the sentence-meaning seems to go against this theory, when it says: <sup>2</sup> *padāni hi svam svam artham abhidhāya nirṛttavyāpārāṇi, athedānīm padārthā avagatāḥ santo vāk्यārtham gamayanti*. (The words perform the task of expressing their own individual meanings, and cease functioning when this task is finished; the word-meanings thus conveyed later produce the meaning of the sentence.) Prabhākara and his followers explain this passage as supporting their theory; according to them what is brought about by the meaning of a word is the notion of a qualified thing—the meaning of words as qualified by one another.<sup>3</sup>

Abhinavagupta refers to this theory as the *dirghavyāpāravāda*, since according to the *anvitābhidhāna* theory there is no limit to the extent of the meaning that an expression can convey.<sup>4</sup> Just as the range of an arrow is not limited, but varies with the difference in the power with which it is discharged, so also the range of

<sup>1</sup> See also Jha, op. cit., p. 125.

<sup>2</sup> *Śabarabhāṣya* on *sūtra* I. 1. 25.

<sup>3</sup> See *Bṛhatī* on the passage. See also *Vāk्यārthamātrkāvṛtti*, p. 21. In the *Nyāyaratnamālā*, *Vāk्यārthanirṇaya* section, this interpretation is criticized as unjust.

<sup>4</sup> *Locana*, p. 18 f.: *yo 'py anvitābhidhānavādī yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārtha itī hṛdaye grhītvā śaravād abhidhāvvyāpāram eva dirghadīrgham icchati . . .*

*abhidhā* or the expressive power can be extended farther and farther. Not only the word-meaning, but also the syntactic relation is conveyed by the function of *abhidhā*. Bhartṛhari seems to refer to this idea when he says that according to some the meaning of an expression is just what it conveys, neither more nor less.<sup>1</sup> This theory is said to explain even the subtle implications and suggestions in literary language.<sup>2</sup>

According to the *anvitābhidhāna* theory the sentence has a unitary meaning of its own; the constituent words possess meaning only as they are related to this unitary sentence-meaning. Thus, in the sentence 'Bring the cow' (*gām ānāya*), the word 'cow' means not the isolated concept of cowness, but 'cow as related to the action of bringing'; so also the word 'bring' means the 'action of bringing in relation to the cow'. The words give their own meaning and their syntactic relation to the other words in the sentence, so that the sentence meaning is directly conveyed by the words themselves. Though there are many words, and therefore many meanings, the unity of the sentence-meaning is achieved through the unity of purpose.<sup>3</sup>

This theory has been strongly criticized by the Mīmāṃsaka-s of the Bhāṭṭa school. They argue<sup>4</sup> that

<sup>1</sup> *VP*, II. 329.

<sup>2</sup> See the ch. *Vyañjanā*.

<sup>3</sup> *Vākyaṛthamātrkāvṛtti*, p. 2:

*bhūyāṃso yady api svārthāḥ padānāṃ te prthak prthak  
prayojanatayā tv ekavākyaṛtham sampracakṣate.*

<sup>4</sup> *Tattvabindu*, p. 93: *padāntarasya vaiyarthyam aśrutānvayabodhane.*

if it is held that the first word or any one word in its full sense means the unitary sense of the sentence itself, the other words in the sentence will be superfluous. This argument is similar to the one brought against the *sphota* theory also. Two possible explanations are that the subsequent words repeat the same sentence-meaning so as to make it clear, and that the other words are used to restrict the meaning indicated by the first word. Another objection is that this theory involves the fallacy of interdependence.<sup>1</sup> If one of the words, say the first, in a sentence is to convey its own meaning as well as its relation to the other words, the full meaning of the word can be comprehended only after understanding the other words; similarly, the meanings of the other words depend on this word. Thus, in the sentence *ukhāyām pacet* (cook in the pot), the word *ukhāyām* (in the pot) can convey its meaning and the relation to the other word only after knowing the meaning of the word *pacet* (cook); so also the meaning of *pacet* depends on that of *ukhāyām*.<sup>2</sup> If it is held that the individual word-meaning and its relation to the other words are not conveyed simultaneously, but gradually, the individual word-meaning being conveyed first, and the relation later, then there will be no fallacy of interdependence; but then this explanation will involve the unwarranted assumption of two separate functions for the primary power *abhidhā*.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 93: *śrutānvitābhidhāne tu vyaktam anyonyasamśrayam*.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 93 f.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 94.

The *anvitābhīdhānavādin-s* argue that there is only one potency for words to express the meaning as related to the rest of the words. It is through recollection that we remember the meanings of words, and this is by rousing the mental impressions of previous experiences of the use of the words. It is a matter of experience that we never come across words except as related in a sentence; isolated words have no existence in everyday speech-activity (a one-word sentence is a sentence, not an isolated word). The word-meaning and the relation to the other words are known by *abhīdhā* itself.<sup>1</sup>

The Mīmāṃsaka-s of the Bhāṭṭa school take objection to this view also.<sup>2</sup> They say that even though we observe words functioning only in different contexts of situations, in all of which they occur as related in a sentence, still we are able to understand the isolated meanings of the words separately also. Otherwise, a word learnt from its use in one context cannot be applied in another context. Moreover, the very principle of recognition is based on our capacity to recognize something isolated out of its context; we are able to recognize a person in a place and time different from those when we had met him previously.<sup>3</sup> It may be observed here that even in such cases we

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 94 f.: see also *Rjuvimalā* on *Brhātī*, p. 397: *vyddha-vyavahārayutpattāv eva, kevalena padārthena vyavahārābhāvād anvīta eva padārthe padānām vyutpattiḥ*.

<sup>2</sup> *Tattvabindu*, p. 95.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 116 ff.

recognize him only in some place and time, not as isolated from all situations.

Another objection raised against the *anvitābhidhāna* theory is that the meaning of a sentence can be known from the meanings of the words remembered, even though the words might have been forgotten. It is a matter of experience that in long sentences we forget the earlier words, but remember only their meanings, and even then we are able to have the meaning of the sentence.<sup>1</sup> The relation of the words in a sentence is not the same as that of the letters in a word; in the case of a word we do not understand the word, if we forget some of the letters.

#### *Abhihitānvaya Theory of Verbal Comprehension*

According to the *abhihitānvaya* theory of verbal comprehension upheld by the Mīmāṃsaka-s of the Bhāṭṭa school and by some of the Naiyāyika-s,<sup>2</sup> the meaning of a sentence is a concatenation of the individual items expressed by the words. The individual words have in themselves meanings which can be comprehended separately. On hearing a sentence, we have first an understanding of the separate meanings of the words one after the other; then we put together

<sup>1</sup> *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 153:

*pūrvabhāṣeṣu vākyasya viśmṛteṣu api dṛśyate  
vākyārthāvagatiḥ puṃsām padārthasmṛtiśālinām.*

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 153 ff.; *Nyāyaratnamālā*, Vākyārthanirṇaya section; *Tattvabindu*, pp. 91-161; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 93 ff.; *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, Śabda section.

these meanings according to the three factors *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṃnidhi*, and we arrive at the meaning of the sentence.

Śabara seems to refer to this theory when he says:<sup>1</sup> *padāni hi svam svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi, athedānīm padārthā avagatāḥ santo vākyārtham gamayanti.* (In a sentence the words express their own meanings, and stop with that; the meanings of the words thus known convey the meaning of the sentence.)<sup>2</sup>

Kumārilaḥṭṭa says<sup>3</sup> that the meaning of a sentence is always conveyed by the meanings of words obtained from the words themselves. Unlike the words, the sentence does not have a meaning of its own independently. 'The meanings of words having been expressed by each word, independently of one another, it is solely from the connection among these word-meanings, that there follows the cognition of the meaning of the sentence . . .'<sup>4</sup> The three factors *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṃnidhi* constitute the grounds of relationship.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Śabarabhāṣya on sūtra I. 1. 25.

<sup>2</sup> The Prābhākara-s explain it differently, taking *artha* in the sense of syntactic relation (*anvaya*). See *Vākyārthamātrkāvṛtti*, p. 22: *arthaśabdena bhāṣyakāro 'nvayam āha.*

<sup>3</sup> *Tantravārttika*, p. 445: *padārthaiḥ padavijñātair vākyārthaḥ pratipādyate.*

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*: *prthagbhūtair eva padair itaretaranirapekṣaiḥ sveṣu padārthe-śūkteṣu tatsaṃsargād eva padavyāpārānapekṣo vākyārthapratyayo bhavati.* See Trans., p. 586 f.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p. 455:

*ākāṅkṣā saṃnidhānam ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam sambandhakāraṇatvena kṣiptam nānantaraśrutiḥ.*

It may be noted here that this theory of *abhihitānvaya* is based on the views advocated by the great grammarian Vājapyāyana that the meaning of a sentence is the *saṃsarga* or the mutual association of the individual word-meanings expressed by the words.<sup>1</sup> Thus, it is one of the earliest theories about the nature of a sentence-meaning. The other theory, of Vyādi, that it is the mutual exclusion of the word-meanings was later developed into the Apoha theory.<sup>2</sup>

There are two different views about the nature of cognition produced by a word. It is by observing the use of words in actual contexts of situations that we learn their meanings; therefore, a word can indicate its meaning only by rousing the mental impressions of such contexts, and hence, the knowledge of the meaning of a word is only a kind of recollection. This is the view held by the *anvitābhidhāna* school of Prabhākara and also by some scholars of the *abhihitānvaya* school like Cidānanda, author of the *Nītitattvāvirbhāva*.<sup>3</sup> Kumārila-bhaṭṭa himself refers to this view when he says that a word is nothing more than a reminder of the meaning.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *supra* 'Relation of Words in a Sentence,' pp. 191 ff.

<sup>2</sup> By the Buddhist logicians. See above pp. 78 ff. on Apoha.

<sup>3</sup> *Mānameyodaya*, p. 93: *śabdo 'pi saṃskārod bodhanadvāreṇaiva padārthaṃ bodhayatīti smaraṇam eva padārthajñānam iti cidānandaprabhṛtayaḥ*; *Nītitattvāvirbhāva*, p. 233:

<sup>4</sup> *Śloka-vārttika*, Śabda section, p. 432:

*ṣ adam abhyadhikābhāvāt smarakān na viśiṣyate.*

See also *Vārttika*, quoted in *Vākyārthamāṭṛkāvṛtti*, p. 15:

*te 'pi naivāsmṛtā yasmād vākyārthaṃ gamayanti naḥ  
tasmāt tatsmaraneṣv eva saṃhateṣu pramāṇatā.*

Vācaspatimiśra also says that, strictly speaking, the relation between the word and the meaning is that between the recollector and the recollected<sup>1</sup> and that the word produces the cognition of the meaning not directly and independently, but by rousing the mental impressions of the things previously known. But according to Pārthasārathimiśra and some other scholars, the meaning of a word is conveyed by the primary significative potency of the word (*abhidhā*).<sup>2</sup> It is a matter of experience that a word conveys its meaning directly and not by reminding us of the various contexts of situations in which the word was used; moreover, it is simpler to assume that the word conveys the meaning through its expressive power than to consider that it reminds us of our former experiences of situations when the word was used and thus gives us the idea of its meaning.<sup>3</sup>

Of these two views the former is based on the psychological analysis of the process of learning a language; for the use of language itself is a kind of

<sup>1</sup> *Tattvabindu*, p. 160: *vācyavācakatvaṃ ca pratyāyapratyāyakatvaṃ, tac ca vicāryamāṇaṃ smāryasmārakatvaṃ eva*. See also p. 159: *na ceyaṃ sāksād arthadhiyam ādhatte, yena na tatsādhikā syāt, api tu saṃskārod bodhanakrameṇa*. See also *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, III. 17: *saṃketas tu padapadārthayor itaretarādhyāsarūpaḥ smṛtyātmakah*.

<sup>2</sup> *Mānameyodaya*, p. 93: *padaiḥ padārthabodhanaṃ śabdaśakti-janyatvād abhidhānam eveti pārthasārathimiśrādayaḥ*.

<sup>3</sup> *Nyāyaratnamālā*, p. 107: *śabdānantaram arthapratyayadarśanāt tasyaiva tatra kāraṇatvaṃ kalpayitum yuktam, na tu śabdāt saṃskārod bodhas tataś cārthapratītiḥ iti yuktam; prapālyāṃ pramāṇābhāvāt. tasmād abhidhā-yakam eva padam, na smārakam*.

conditioned reflex; the experiments of Pavlov have demonstrated how such reflexes can be produced even in animals. When a context has affected us in the past, the recurrence of merely a part of the context will cause us to react in the way we reacted before.<sup>1</sup> We learn a language through the observation of various contexts of situation; the linguistic phrases uttered are associated with the contexts of situation; having experienced several such situations, we assume a kind of relationship between the utterances and the contexts. Meaning can be explained only in terms of a relationship of the utterance with the abstract context of situation.<sup>2</sup> The Mīmāṃsaka-s were fully conscious of this process; but to them the relation between a word and its meaning is something natural and permanent, and the experience of situations only reveals this natural relation. The primary significatory power of the word is based on this relation; when once this relation is known, the word can directly denote its meaning, says Pārthasārathimiśra.

When we hear a sentence, we have first an understanding of the separate meanings of the words one after another; then these word-meanings are related on

<sup>1</sup> Urban, *Language and Reality*, p. 102.

<sup>2</sup> The 'Context of Situation' theory is given by Malinowski in the Appendix to *The Meaning of Meaning* by Ogden and Richards. Prof. Firth has pushed the analysis of 'context' much farther in his dealings with 'formal scatter' and 'meaning by collocation'. See 'Modes of Meaning,' *Essays and Studies*; 'Technique of Semantics', *TPS*.

the basis of *ākāṅkṣā* (expectancy), *yogyatā* (consistency) and *saṃnidhi* (proximity), and we arrive at the unified meaning of the sentence as a whole. The expression of the individual word-meanings precedes the knowledge of the logical connection among them. The different isolated ideas expressed successively by the words are put together by the collective memory of the listener (*samūhālambana-smṛti*). The individual word-meanings are remembered separately until all the words are heard; then there is a simultaneous cognition of the sentence-meaning in which all the word-meanings are properly related to one another on the basis of *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *saṃnidhi*.<sup>1</sup>

The sentence-meaning is something more than the sum of the word-meanings. When the meanings of the different words in a sentence are related with one another on the basis of the *ākāṅkṣā*, etc. there arises some additional signification which is distinct from the totality of the word-meanings.<sup>2</sup> This unified sentence-meaning is referred to by different terms: *vākyaṛtha* (sentence-meaning), *saṃsarga* (association of the word-meanings) and *tātparyārtha* (the purport or the intention of the speaker). It is difficult to explain where this

<sup>1</sup> According to the *anvitābhīdhāna* theory, on the other hand, each word, as it is being uttered, contributes to the meaning of the sentence which is revealed step by step, becoming clearer and clearer with the utterance of subsequent words.

<sup>2</sup> *Kāvya-prakāśa*, II: *ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsaṃnidhivaśāt padārthānām samānvaye tātparyārtho viśeṣavapur apadārtho 'pi vākyaṛthaḥ samullasatīty abhīhitānvayavādinām matam.*

special signification comes from. Some call it the power of the sentence to convey a connected sense (*vākyaśakti*), others call it *saṃsargamaryādā* or the law of association, and yet others postulate a power called *tātparyaśakti*, the power of the sentence to convey the intended sense in the form of a related and unified meaning.<sup>1</sup>

‘How is this *saṃsarga* conveyed? It is mysterious and has not yet been satisfactorily explained. In sentences we have a juxtaposition of words and the element of the relation between the words is conveyed, we have to say, by suppression.’<sup>2</sup> This suggestion of the connection of the word-meanings is on the basis of the intention of the speaker and the incompatibility of the isolated word-meanings to convey the intended sense. Speech is normally resorted to with the intention of conveying a connected sense.

The individual words have exhausted their function by conveying their own isolated meanings; so they cannot be considered to be capable of performing another function, namely, that of conveying their mutual relations also, in order that the sentence-meaning may be understood. Moreover, the words cannot directly convey the mutual relation, since between the words

<sup>1</sup> VP, II. 42:

*sambandhe sati yat tv anyad ādhikyam upajāyate  
vākyaārtham eva taṃ prāhur anekapadasaṃśrayaṃ.*

See also Puṇyarāja’s commentary thereon: *padānām parasparānwaye padārthavaśād yad ādhikyaṃ saṃsargaḥ sa vākyaārthaḥ*; cf. *Mbh*, I, p. 462: *yad atrādhikyaṃ vākyaārthaḥ saḥ*.

<sup>2</sup> Kuppaswami Sastri, *Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit*, p. 21.

and the sentence-meaning lie the word-meanings. So it is the word-meanings that convey the sentence-meaning, and this is in the form of their mutual relation. This is the view of the *abhihitānvayavādin*-s.<sup>1</sup> There is a slight difference between the Naiyāyika-s and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s regarding the way in which the mutual connection is conveyed. To the Naiyāyika-s the sentence-meaning is only the mutual relation of the word-meanings; but the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s explain that the sentence-meaning is always conveyed by the secondary power of words.<sup>2</sup> The two conditions of *lakṣaṇā*, namely the incompatibility of the expressed sense and the relation between the primary sense and the intended sense, apply here also. In a sentence the isolated words are by themselves unintelligible, since they refer to the generic form without any syntactic relation. This is against the purport of the sentence, which is to convey a unified sense. So the general sense of the words, through secondary implication, gives the particular senses consisting in mutual syntactic relation.

This does not mean that the sentence-meaning is not derived from the words. Kumārilabhaṭṭa says that even though the letters of words convey the word-meanings directly, they do not stop with that; the mere knowledge of the word-meanings is of no use to

<sup>1</sup> *Mānameyodaya*, p. 93 f.

<sup>2</sup> Kumārilabhaṭṭa, quoted in *Tattvabindu*, p. 153:

*vākyaṛtho lakṣyamāno hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ.*

the hearer. The conveying of the individual senses by the words is indispensable for the cognition of the sentence-meaning, just like the production of fire by fuel is indispensable for the purpose of cooking.<sup>1</sup>

The *abhihitānvaya* theory is supported by the following reasons: 'If the words of a sentence have no separate meanings of their own, then the classification of words into nouns, adjectives, verbs, etc. becomes meaningless. Further, in every case in which we are to understand the meaning of a sentence, we must first understand the meaning of its component words. Without a previous understanding of the words no one can understand the meaning of a sentence. Moreover, if the meaning of a sentence were quite independent of the meaning of its constituent words, then any sentence could convey any meaning. Lastly, when we understand the meaning of a new verse, we do so obviously on the basis of our knowledge of the words and their separate meanings. This cannot be explained by any understanding of the sentences, since they are new and unintelligible to us. So it is concluded that the meaning of a sentence is just the synthesis of the separate meanings of its words.'<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 943 (also quoted in *Tattva-bindu*, p. 153):

*sākṣād yady api kurvanti padārthapratipādanam  
varṇās tathāpi naitasmin paryavasyanti niṣphale.  
vākya-rthamīlaye teṣāṃ pravṛttau nāntarīyakam  
pāke jvāleva kākṣhānām padārthapratipādanam.*

<sup>2</sup> S. C. Chatterjee, op. cit., p. 372.

The *anvitābhīdhāna* theory seems to be an advance on the *abhihitānvaya* theory.<sup>1</sup> The meaning of a sentence dominates the meanings of its words; both the speaker and the listener are concerned only with the sentence-meaning. We use words without fully understanding their exact meaning; that does not mean we are talking nonsense. 'It is obvious that knowing a language consists in using words appropriately and acting appropriately when they are heard. It is no more necessary to be able to say what a word means than it is for a cricketer to know the mathematical theory of impact and of projectiles.'<sup>2</sup> The ubiquitous importance of context as a deciding factor in determining the meaning of a word in a sentence points out the fact that the claim of words to have an independent meaning in isolation is very weak. The well-known statement by St. Augustine on the real nature of time applies to the meaning of words also: '*si nemo ex me quaerat scio; si quaeranti explicare velim nescio.*'<sup>3</sup> It is 'something that we know when no one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed to give an account of it'.

Later writers in India tried to reconcile the two theories. Thus, Mukulabhaṭṭa, in the *Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā*, says that both the *anvitābhīdhāna* and the *abhihitānvaya*

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 374 f.

<sup>2</sup> Bertrand Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> *Confessions*, quoted by Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, § 89. See also Frege's view that 'a word has meaning only as part of a sentence'. *ibid.*, § 49.

theories contain partial truth: looked at from the point of view of the words the *abhihitānvaya* theory seems to be preferable; but looked at from the point of view of the sentence, preference must be given to the *anvitābhidhāna* theory. Mukulabhaṭṭa accepts a combination of the two views and calls it the theory of *samuccaya*.<sup>1</sup>

### *Tātparya as a Separate Vṛtti*

Among the Ālaṃkārika-s it is Abhinavagupta who for the first time refers to *tātparya* as a separate *vṛtti* or function of words accepted by the *abhihitānvaya* theory of verbal comprehension to explain the syntactic unity of a sentence. Abhinavagupta speaks of four distinct functions of words: *abhidhā*, *tātparya*, *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā*, and arranges them under four separate classes: <sup>2</sup> *abhidhā* is the power of the words to signify the primary meaning; this primary meaning refers only to the universal and not to the particular. In a sentence the individual words by their primary function of *abhidhā* refer only

<sup>1</sup> *Abhid'āvṛttimātrkā*, p. 15: *anyeṣāṃ tu mate padānāṃ tattat-sānānyabhūto vācya 'rthah, vākyasya tu parasparānvitāḥ padārthā iti padāpekṣayābhihitānvayaḥ, vākyāpekṣayā tv anvitābhidhānam. evaṃ caityaḥ . . . samuccaya iti.*

<sup>2</sup> *Locana*, p. 16 f.: *trayo hy atra vyāpārāḥ samvedyante—padārtheṣu sāmānyātmāsu abhidhāvvyāpārāḥ, sāmānyāpekṣayā arthāvagamanasaktir hy abhidhā. samayaś ca tāvaty eva, na viśeṣāṃśe, ānantyād vyabhicārāc caikasya. tato viśeṣarūpe vākyārthe tātparyasaktiḥ parasparānvitē, 'sāmānyāny anyathāsiddher viśeṣaṃ gamayanti hi' iti nyāyāt . . . . bhaktir hi lakṣaṇāvvyāpārāḥ tṛtīyakakṣyāniveśi. caturthyāṃ tu kakṣyāyāṃ dhvanana-vyāpārāḥ.*

to the isolated word meanings. The syntactic relation of these is conveyed by the *tātparyasākti* of the words. The intention of the speaker, or the general purport of the utterance is obviously to give a unified purposeful sentence-meaning. Hence the words are considered to have a power to convey the syntactic relation among the various isolated word-meanings. This power is called *tātparyasākti*. *Lakṣaṇā* is the third power recognized according to this theory; it is accepted only when the primary meanings cannot be syntactically connected to give a meaning.<sup>1</sup> Abhinavagupta says that even according to this theory *vyāñjanā* or suggestion will have to be accepted as the fourth function of words.

It may be noted here that even though Ānandavardhana refers to the importance of the speaker's intention in conveying the meaning of a passage, he never refers to *tātparya* as a separate *vṛtti* or *śakti* of words; in fact he says that in linguistic discourse there are only three functions or powers of words to be accepted: the primary, the secondary and the suggestive.<sup>2</sup>

Among the Ālaṃkārika-s, Bhoja has a unique way of treating *tātparya*.<sup>3</sup> Used in the general sense of total meaning, Bhoja's *tātparya* is divided into three types:

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*: *mukhyārthabādhāyāṃ lakṣaṇāyāḥ prakṛtiḥ. bādhā ca virodhapratītiḥ eva.*

<sup>2</sup> *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 194: *tad evaṃ śābde vyavahāre trayasḥ prakārāḥ—vācakatvaṃ guṇavṛttir vyāñjakatvaṃ ca. tatra vyāñjakatve yadā vyāṅgya-prādhānyam tadā dhvaniḥ. Ānandavardhana refers to vakyārthapadārthanyāya (vide infra, p. 216, n. 2) but does not call it tātparyavṛtti.*

<sup>3</sup> Dr. V. Raghavan, *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*, second ed., p. 19.

expressed, implied and suggested (*vācya*, *pratiyamāna* and *dhvanirūpa*). In a restricted sense the term is used as equivalent to the intended meaning or suggestion. These have nothing to do with the conveying of the syntactic relation of word-meanings. Regarding that, Bhoja accepts the position of the *anubhayavādin-s* who reject both the *abhihitānvaya* and the *anvitābhidhāna* theories and prefer a third view according to which words convey the sentence-meaning by their cumulative effect or *saṃhatyakāritā*.<sup>1</sup> This, we may note, is what the Naiyāyika scholar Jayanta advocates in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, where he attributes this cumulative effect or *saṃhatyakāritā* to the *tātparyaśakti* of words.<sup>2</sup>

Later, Dhanika, the commentator on Dhanamjaya's *Daśarūpaka*, advocates the theory that *dhvani* is included in *tātparya*.<sup>3</sup> He says that it is not necessary to recognize a new function called *dhvani* and refutes the *ghaṭapradīpanyāya* advocated by Ānandavardhana to explain the relationship between the expressed and the suggested meanings, since the two senses are not entirely different as the pot and the lamp. The relation between Kāvya and Rasa is one of *vācyavācaka* or *lakṣyalakṣaka*. Dhanika says that there is no limitation of the term *tātparya* to the expressed sense; it can cover the whole

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 21: *anubhayavādinah punar itthaṃ samarthayante. nānvitābhidhānaṃ na cābhihitānvayaḥ. kiṃ tarhi? samudītaiḥ padair eko vākyārthaḥ pratyāyyate. . . . nedam anvitābhidhānaṃ. kim tarhi? saṃhatyakāritā padānām ucyate.*

<sup>2</sup> *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 371 f.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. V. Raghavan, *op. cit.*, first ed., p. 155; Dhanika, *Avāloka* on *Daśarūpaka*, p. 156 f.

range of the speaker's intention and cover all implications coming up in the train of the expressed sense.<sup>1</sup>

It may be noted that Dhanika's criticism is pointed to the statement of Ānandavardhana in the third Uddyota of *Dhvanyāloka* referring to the view that the relation between the expressed sense and the suggested sense is like that between the word-meaning and the sentence-meaning. Ānandavardhana refutes that view by saying that in the former case the relation is like that of the lamp and the object illuminated, while in the latter case it is like that of the pot and the mud with which it is made; the light shines itself while illuminating other objects; so also the suggestion of ideas is not by suppressing the expressed meaning.<sup>2</sup>

Following Abhinavagupta, later Ālaṃkārika-s like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha have referred to the *tātparyavṛtti* as a separate function for conveying the syntactic relationship among the various word-meanings according to the *Abhikhitānvaya* theory. In the *Kāvyaṣa* there are references to *tātparya* as a separate *vṛtti*<sup>3</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*:

*etāvaty eva viśrāntis tātparyasyeti kimkṛtam*  
*yāvatkāryaṣaṣāritvāt tātparyam na tulādhr̥tam*

<sup>2</sup> *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 189 f.: *na ca padārthavākyaṛthanyāyo vācyavyaṅgyayoḥ . . . tair vākyaṛthapadārthayor ghaṭatadupādānakāraṇanyāyo 'bhyupagantavyaḥ . . . vākye tadarthe vā pratīte padatadarthānām teṣām tadā vibhaktatrayopālambhe . . . na hi vyaṅgye pratīyamāne vācyabuddhir dūri-bhavati . . . ghaṭapradīpanyāyas tayoḥ.*

<sup>3</sup> *Kāvyaṣa*, II. 18: *taṭādau ye viśeṣāḥ pāvanatvādayas te cābhidhātātṣaṣaṣāṇābhyo vyāpārāntareṇa gamyāḥ. tacca vyaṅjanadhvanana-dyotanādīśabdavācyam avāśyam eṣilavyam.*

Mammaṭa has also explained its function in the second chapter of the text.<sup>1</sup>

Viśvanātha in the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* repeats the same idea and refers to the *tātparyavṛtti* as being accepted by the *abhihitānvaya* theory of verbal comprehension.<sup>2</sup> He further states that it is the sentence as a whole that conveys the *tātparyārtha* or the sentence-meaning, and so the power of *tātparya* must rest with the sentence as a whole. Many of the later Ālaṃkārika-s have also referred to this function of *tātparya*, mainly on the basis of the statements of Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa.<sup>3</sup>

It is well known that the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s who followed Kumārila-bhaṭṭa are staunch supporters of the *abhihitānvaya* theory of verbal comprehension; as a result of this whenever the term is found, there is a tendency among commentators to associate it exclusively with the Bhāṭṭa school, without waiting to inquire whether the theory explained is the same as that adopted by the Bhāṭṭa-s. Some of the ancient

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, II. 6: ' *tātparyārtho 'pi keṣucit' . ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsaṃnidhivaśād vakṣyamāṇasvarūpānām padārthānām parasparasamanwaye tātparyārtho viśeṣavapur apadārtho ' pi vāk्यārthaḥ samullasatīty abhihitānvayavādinām matam.*

<sup>2</sup> *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, II. 20:

*tātparyākhyām vṛttim āhuḥ padārthānvayabodhane  
tātparyārthaṃ tadārthaṃ ca vākyaṃ tadbodhakaṃ pare.*

*abhidhāyā ekaikapadārthabodhanavīramād vāk्यārtharūpasya padārthānvayasya bodhikā tātparyam nāmā vṛttiḥ. tadārthaś ca tātparyārthaḥ. tadbodhakaṃ ca vākyaṃ ity abhihitānvayavādinām matam.*

<sup>3</sup> Kumārasvāmin's commentary on Vidyānātha's *Pralāba-rudriya*, Kāvya section.

commentators, and modern scholars following them, have thus associated *tātparyavṛtti* with the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā.<sup>1</sup>

But there is one difficulty in such an assumption which many of the scholars have not noticed. All the great authoritative writers on Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā like Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimiśra, Vācaspatimiśra, Cidānanda and Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa have unequivocally stated that, according to the *abhihitānvaya* theory advocated by them, the syntactically unified sentence-meaning is to be conveyed through the secondary power *lakṣaṇā*.<sup>2</sup> Even critics like Śālikanātha who tried to

<sup>1</sup> (a) Commentary on *Kāvyaṇṇakāśa* (II. 6) by Māṇikyacandra: *keṣucid abhihitānvayavādinabhaṭṭeṣu ity arthaḥ*.

(b) Same by Govinda Ṭhakkura: *keṣucin nyāyādinayeṣu, na tu mīmāṃsakamateṣu api*; on this, the subcommentary of Nāgeśa says: *ādinā bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakāḥ . . . mīmāṃsakamateṣu prābhākaramateṣu ity arthaḥ*.

(c) Same by Jhalakikara (*Bālabodhini*): *abhihitānvayavādinām iti . . . bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakānām ity arthaḥ*.

(d) P. V. Kane, *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Notes, p. 86; 'This view is held by that school of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā which is called *Abhihitānvayavādin*.'

(e) K. C. Pandey, *Comparative Aesthetics*, I, p. 217: 'The followers of the Nyāya philosophy and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s maintain the additional power of the word, namely the *tātparyasakti*.'

(f) S. S. Sukthankar, *Kāvyaṇṇakāśa*, Notes p. 36: 'Acknowledged by some Mīmāṃsaka authorities to whom there is a separate *vṛtti* called *tātparya*.'

<sup>2</sup> (a) Kumārilabhaṭṭa quoted in *Tattvabindu*, p. 153 (and *Vāk-yārthamāyikāvṛtti*, p. 13): *vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ*.

(b) Pārthasārathimiśra, *Nyāyaratnamālā*, p. 125:

*padasvarūpābhihitaiḥ padārthaiḥ saṃlakṣyate 'sav iti siddham etat*.

refute this theory have described it in that way.<sup>1</sup> Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa says that *tātparya* is not a separate factor in conveying the syntactic relationship of the word-meanings.<sup>2</sup>

It may be pointed out here that Jayantabhaṭṭa, the great Naiyāyika scholar of the tenth century A.D. who wrote the *Nyāyamañjarī*, was the first to bring forward the theory about *tātparya* being a separate *vṛtti*. The *Abhihitānvaya* theory is not the monopoly of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka-s; we have seen that the Association theory

(c) *Śāstradīpikā* p. 154: *padābhihitaiḥ padārthair lakṣaṇayā vākyārthaḥ pratipādyate*.

(d) Vācaspatimiśra, *Tattvabindu*, p. 131: *labhyate ca samabhi-vyāhārānyathānupapatyā padānām anvitārthaparāṇām svābhidheyārtharūpa-samavetānvitāvasthāpratyāyanam lakṣaṇayā*.

(e) Cidānanda, *Nītitattvāvīrbhāva*, p. 232: *padārthā eva vākyār-thaṃ lakṣayanti*.

(f) Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa, *Mānameyodaya*, p. 94: *vayaṃ tu padārthā lakṣaṇayaiva vākyārthaṃ bodhayantīti brūmaḥ*; see also *Tattvaṇṇadīpikā* by Citsukha, p. 154: *padāni lakṣaṇayā padārthānām anyonyānvaya-pratipattiparāṇi*.

<sup>1</sup> (a) *Vākyārthamātrkāvṛtti*, p. 12 f.: *vārttikakārapādās tu lākṣaṇikān sarvavākyān icchantāḥ padārthānām anwayāvabodhaśaktikalpanām nirākur-van[taḥ] anvitāvastho hi padārtho 'bhikito 'nvitāvasthāṃ svasaṃbandhinim lakṣayati* . . .

(b) Vardhamāna, commentary on *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, p. 476: *nanv anwaye padānām tātparyam tannīrvāhikā ca vṛttiḥ. na ca svārthasaṃ-bandhini svānwaye tātparyāḥ lakṣaṇā, anwayaviśeṣaṇatayā padārthopasthiteś ca na vṛttidvayavirodha iti vācyaṃ*. Jayantabhaṭṭa, however, does not refer to *lakṣaṇā* in the context.

<sup>2</sup> *Mānameyodaya*, p. 101: *tasmād anwayasiddhau tātparyam na kvacit svayaṃ hetuḥ*.

of the grammarian Vājapyāyana, that *saṃsarga* is *vāk-yārtha*, is a kind of *abhihitānvaya* theory.<sup>1</sup> Bhartṛhari has also referred to such views.<sup>2</sup> Early Naiyāyika-s like Gautama and Vātsyāyana have not discussed the problem of the sentence; they discussed only the exact import of the words. Jayanta says that their silence is eloquent as it shows that they believed that the sentence is only a collection of words, and that the sentence-meaning is only the mutual association of the word-meanings.<sup>3</sup> After discussing in detail the various theories about verbal comprehension held by various schools, Jayanta advocates a modified form of *abhihitānvaya* theory.<sup>4</sup> The words express their isolated word-meanings by the power of *abhidhā*; they have another power, the *tātparyasakti*, which indicates the mutual relationship among the word-meanings. The function of this power is to reveal the meanings of the words contained in a sentence as being mutually related. This power belongs to all the words in common and lasts till the independent judgment is produced.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *vide supra*, p. 191 f.

<sup>2</sup> VP, II. 41-2.

<sup>3</sup> *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 333: *vāk-yārthas tu na kvacid api sūtrakāra-bhāṣyā-kārābhyām sūcita iti cet, . . . yad ayam pṛthak padārthebhyo na vāk-yārtham upadiśati sma, tasmād ayam apyāśayaḥ padārthā eva vāk-yārtha iti.*

<sup>4</sup> He does not call it *abhihitānvaya*avāda.

<sup>5</sup> *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 371 f: *padāny anvītaṃ pratyāyayanti, nānvītaṃ abhidadhati. nābhidhātṛ śaktir anvīta-viśayā, kiṃ tv anwayavyāptirekāvagata-niṣkṛṣṭasvārthaviśayaiva, tātparyasaktis tu teṣāṃ anvītavagamāparyantā. . .*

*abhidhātṛ matā śaktiḥ padānāṃ svārthanīṣṭhātā  
teṣāṃ tātparyasaktis tu saṃsargāvagamāvadhiḥ.*

It may be noted that this *tātparyasakti* is the same as the *saṃsargamaryādā* accepted by the later Navya Nyāya school.<sup>1</sup> 'The additional element conveyed by a sentence, over and above the separate concepts conveyed by separate words, is the intended relation of the concepts (*padārthasaṃsarga*) and this additional element, which is the distinctive feature of verbal judgment (*vākyaārtha*) is conveyed through the particular juxtaposition of words (*saṃsargamaryādā*), and not through a primary or secondary significative power of words (*ābidhā* or *lakṣaṇā*).'<sup>2</sup>

What prompted Abhinavagupta to accept Jayanta's modified form of *abhihitānvaya* theory and not that of the real followers of the Bhāṭṭa school seems to be the fact that the Ālaṃkārika-s of the *dhvani* school could not accept *lakṣaṇā* to explain the syntactic relation among the word-meanings, since they accepted it only in cases of *anvayānupapatti* and not in cases of *tātparyānupapatti*.

Some of the discerning commentators of the Ālaṃkāra texts have already pointed out that the view about *tātparyavṛtti* being responsible for conveying the syntactic relation of the word-meaning does not refer to the Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsaka theory, but only to that of the ancient Naiyāyika-s who were also *abhihitānvayavādin*-s.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Gadādhara's *Vyutpattivāda*, p. 1: *śābdabodhe caikapaḍārthe 'para-paḍārthasaṃsargaḥ saṃsargamaryādayā bhāṣate*.

<sup>2</sup> S. Kuppaswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic*, P. 258.

<sup>3</sup> (a) Govinda Ṭhakkura, *Pradīpa*, loc. cit.: *nyāyādinayeṣu, na tu mīmāṃsakādīṣv api*. Nāgeśa twists the meaning of this passage in his subcommentary. *vide supra*, p. 218, n. 1 (b).

In the *Sudhāsāgara* commentary on the *Kāvya-prakāśa* Bhīmasena Dīkṣita explains this point in detail. He says<sup>1</sup> that for all practical purposes this *tātparyavṛtti* may be identified with the *lakṣaṇā* of the Mīmāṃsaka-s, and that it is the same as the *samsargamaryādā* of the later Navya Nyāya school.<sup>2</sup>

The distinction between *lakṣaṇā* and *tātparya* in this case is very subtle. Mere juxtaposition of isolated

(b) Haridāsa Siddhānta Vāgiśa, commentary on *Sāhitya-darpaṇa*, II. 20: *pare prāñco naiyāyikāḥ. ata eva prācīnanaiyāyikā abhihitānvayavādināḥ, navyās tu imām eva tātparyavṛttiṃ samsargamaryādām ācakṣate.*

(c) Rāmacaraṇa Tarkavāgiśa Bhaṭṭācārya, commentary on *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, II. 20: *abhihitānām abhidhaya lakṣaṇayā vā padopasthāpitānām anvayabodhavādinām prācīnanaiyāyikānām matam.*

(d) *Nyāyakośa*, p. 798: *vākyārthabodhane tātparyākhyām vṛttiṃ aṅgicakrur abhihitānvayavādināḥ tārkiṇāḥ . . .*

<sup>1</sup> p. 44 f.: *keṣucin nyāyādinayeṣu, na tu mīmāṃsakādimateṣu api . . . tātparyasya vṛttitvaṃ tajjñānatvena prayojakatvāc chabdasambandhatvāc cākṣatam. anvaye lakṣaṇeti bhāṭṭamatam api tātparyasyaiva nāmāntaralakṣaṇatvena neyam. na tu prācīnalakṣaṇā, mukhyārthabādhābhāvāt . . . kecit tu, 'vastutas tu padārthasaktatvena jñātaṃ padam eva svārthasamarāṇadvārā ākāṅkṣādīsāciviyāt samabhivyāhṛtapadārthena saha svārthānvayaṃ bodhayati. tathaiva kāryakāraṇabhāvakalpanād iti kim anayā tātparyavṛtṭyā. iyaṃ eva samsargamaryādeti ghuṣyate' iti vadanti.*

<sup>2</sup> cf. Dr. Gaurinath Sastri, *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, p. 220 f.: 'It is absolutely certain that Mammaṭa has misrepresented the theory of Kumārila which is called *abhihitānvayavāda*. Unfortunately he calls what is really the Nyāya theory by the name of the theory of *abhihitānvayavāda*. This error has persisted in all the subsequent writings of the Ālankārika-s. It is painful to remark that this celebrated authority on poetics did not have direct access to the work of Kumārila.' The *abhihitānvaya* theory has never been considered by any of the great Ālankārika-s exclusively as held by the Bhāṭṭa-s.

words, giving out a string of unconnected separate concepts, is of no use in linguistic discourse. It is certain that the co-utterance of words is with the intention of conveying a connected unified meaning.<sup>1</sup> It is this apparent contradiction between the juxtaposition of words in a sentence and their not being related to serve some purpose, that gives the power to the words to resort to *lakṣaṇā*, through inference of the *arthāpatti* type, and convey the syntactically related sentence-meaning. The speaker's intention, taken in a general sense, is at the back of resorting to *lakṣaṇā*. According to the Prābhākara-s, on the other hand, the *tātparya* makes the primary significatory power itself capable of conveying not only the individual word-meanings, but their mutual connection as well. Thus even when *tātparya* is not taken as a separate *ṛtti*, it could be referred to as the motive force conveying the syntactic relation; in fact Pārthasārathimiśra himself refers to the function of *tātparya*;<sup>2</sup> and Jayanta quotes Kumārila-bhaṭṭa in support of his theory that *tātparya* is a separate *ṛtti* of the words which conveys the syntactic relation of the word-meanings.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Tattvabindu*, p. 132: *pratipitsitaṃ khalu etad iti pratipādayisyantaḥ padāny uccārayanti*. See also Kumārila-bhaṭṭa quoted therein:

*viśiṣṭārthaprayuktā hi samabhiṇvāhṛtir jane*.

<sup>2</sup> *Nyāyaratnākara* on *Ślokavārttika*, p. 909: *yady api abhidhāvyāpāraḥ padārtheṣu eva paryavasitaḥ, tathāpi tātparyavyāpṛter aparyavasitāyāḥ . . .*

<sup>3</sup> *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 372. He quotes the verse from *Ślokavārttika* giving the analogy that just as fuel effects cooking through the

Professor S. Kuppaswami Sastri says<sup>1</sup> that the *saṃsarga* or the mutual relation of the word-meanings is conveyed by a process of suggestion, and quotes Jespersen's view that 'suggestion is impression through suppression'.<sup>2</sup> A kind of suggestion has to be accepted by all schools of thought; the individual words give only their own individual isolated meanings, leaving the *saṃsarga* or the mutual relation of the meanings to be conveyed by suggestion.<sup>3</sup> The Naiyāyika-s may call it *tātparyavṛtti* or *saṃsargamaryādā*, the Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsaka-s may call it *lakṣaṇā*, and the Prābhākara-s may take it to be an extension of the primary power *abhidhā* itself. *Tātparya*, the speaker's intention or the general purport of the utterance, has to be accepted as a motivating factor in verbal comprehension; but there is no need to assume a separate function of words called *tātparyavṛtti*. That is why it has not been accepted as such by later writers.

### *Bharṭhari's Theory of Akhaṇḍavākyaśphoṭa*

According to Bharṭhari words have no reality of their own. The entire sentence is to be taken as an indivisible, integral unit; and its meaning is also an instantaneous flash of insight (*pratibhā*), or intuition,

flame, words effect the unified sentence-meaning through their individual meanings. *vide supra*, p. 211, n. 1.

<sup>1</sup> *Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit*, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> Jespersen, *The Philosophy of Grammar*, p. 309.

<sup>3</sup> That is why some writers like Dhanamjaya and Dhanika include *vyāñjanā* or suggestion under *tātparya* itself.

which has no parts. The indivisible sentence is analysed into words and again into roots and suffixes by the grammarians for facilitating easy study of the language; but these divisions should not be considered to have real existence, apart from the sentence. In language as we find it in the world there are only complete utterances which may be called sentences; we do not notice the words or the word-meanings or the letters in language in operation. Of course in language-material considered and described by the grammarians, they do have an existence; that is only based on grammatical analysis, and has no absolute reality. Even though the *sphoṭa* theory envisages different subdivisions of the *sphoṭa*, Bhartṛhari accepts only the indivisible sentence-*sphoṭa* as the real unit of speech. The existence of words in language is on a par with the *avidyā* stage;<sup>1</sup> words have only a pragmatic existence; they are useful units of language which build up the higher unit of speech, the sentence.

The sentence which is 'a single undivided utterance' conveys its meaning in a flash.<sup>2</sup> The sentence-meaning is not built up gradually on the basis of the word-meanings. It is grasped by the listener in an instantaneous flash of insight (*pratibhā*). This *pratibhā* is indivisible; and it is grasped in the mind. It is

<sup>1</sup> K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer, 'Pratibhā as the Meaning of a Sentence', *POC*, 1940, pp. 326 ff.; Gopinatha Kaviraja, 'The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy', *ABORI*, 1924.

<sup>2</sup> Puṇyārāja on *VP*, II. 2: *sphoṭātmake vākye pratibhālakṣaṇe vākyārthe vākyavākyārthayor adhyāsarūpaḥ sambandhaḥ*.

because of the indivisibility of *pratibhā*, which is the meaning of a sentence, that the grammarians reject the *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna* theories of verbal comprehension, in both of which the meanings of individual words have an absolute reality. According to Bhartṛhari the sentence-meaning is not only indivisible; it is also indefinable. Even when we have understood the meaning of a sentence, we cannot explain to another the nature of this understanding. He says: 'This (*pratibhā*) cannot in any way be explained to others in terms such as "It is this"; its existence is ratified only in the individual's experience of it, and the experiencer himself cannot describe it.'<sup>1</sup> Bhartṛhari identifies this *pratibhā* with the instinctive urge in animals which prompts them to act. The behaviour of animals is prompted by this instinctive urge of *pratibhā*; it is this that teaches the cuckoo to sing in spring, and the birds to build their nests.<sup>2</sup> It is the same kind of urge that results from a sentence. A sentence becomes productive of this urge, because of repeated usage.<sup>3</sup>

Śāntarakṣita quotes this view in the *Tattvasamgraha*, and while explaining this, Kamalaśīla says<sup>4</sup> that

<sup>1</sup> VP, II. 146.

*idaṃ tad iti sānyeṣām anākhyeyā kathamcana  
pratyātmavṛttisiddhā sā kartrāpi na nirūpyate.*

Translated by J. Brough, 'Some Indian Theories of Meaning', p. 171.

<sup>2</sup> VP, II. 151-2.

<sup>3</sup> VP, II. 119: *abhyāsāt pratibhāhetuḥ śabdaḥ sarvo 'paraiḥ smṛtaḥ.*

<sup>4</sup> *Tattvasamgraha*, v. 892, and *Pañjikā* thereon.

by repeated usage words produce an intuition in the minds of the listeners, and that they do not actually denote any external object. This intuition is an insight leading to an action. If words had been 'directly grounded in an objective reality, there would have been no occasion for the conflicting interpretations of texts or contradictory expositions; and fictions and stories could not have been possible'.<sup>1</sup> A sentence produces an urge to do something, rather than creating an image of something in the mind; this urge varies with each individual and with each sentence. Puṇyarāja goes one step forward and says that even a man who does not know the exact meaning of words, feels an urge to do something, when he hears a sentence addressed to him.<sup>2</sup>

Bhartrhari's theory of the non-reality of words met with strong opposition from other Indian philosophers.<sup>3</sup> It is accepted only by the grammarians in India, but the importance of the linguistic principle underlying the *sphoṭa* theory is very great.

<sup>1</sup> Satkari Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, p. 113 f.

<sup>2</sup> Puṇyarāja on VP, II. 119.

<sup>3</sup> J. Brough, *op. cit.*, pp. 167 ff.