

MĀNAMEYODAYA

AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON THE MIMĀMSĀ

BY

NĀRĀYAṆA

EDITED WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

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भवति नासौ धूमवानिति वक्तव्ये यो धूमवान्न भवति नासावग्निमानिति प्रयोगेऽपि द्रष्टव्यं इति ।

अनुमानप्रपञ्चोऽयं बहुभिर्बहुधोदितः ।
चिदानन्दोक्तरीत्या तु मयैवमिह दर्शितः ॥

४. शब्दः

१. अनुमानतः परस्तादुपमानं वर्णयन्ति तर्कविदः ।
वादिपरिग्रहभूम्ना वयं तु शाब्दं पुरस्कुरुमः ॥

then there is the reverse statement of pervasion. Similarly, when it is to be said "what has no fire does not have smoke," if it is stated, "what has no smoke does not have fire," the same is to be seen here also.

These details of inference are dealt with differently by different persons. But here by me it has been thus pointed out in the way stated by Cidānanda.

(iv) AUTHORITY

1. The Logicians explain Analogy after Inference.
But we place Authority earlier, as it is recognised by a greater number of disputants.

तत्र तावत्पदैर्ज्ञातैः पदार्थस्मरणे कृते ।

असन्निकृष्टवाक्यार्थज्ञानं शाब्दमितीर्यते ॥

२. तदिदं शाब्दज्ञानं व्युत्पत्त्यधीनमिति तत्प्रकारमादौ प्रदर्शयामः । बालो हि गामानय पुत्रस्ते जातः इत्यादिवाक्यानन्तरं प्रवृत्तिहर्षादिकं वा कस्यचिदुपलभ्य तयोर्बुद्धिपूर्वकत्वात् गवानयनपुत्रजननाद्यर्थबुद्ध्यनन्तरमेवास्य प्रवृत्तिहर्षादिकं जातमिति बुद्ध्यमानः तादृशार्थबुद्धेश्च शब्दानन्तरमेव जातत्वात् गामानय इत्यादिशब्दस्य गवानयनाद्यर्थबोधकत्वमवबुध्यते । तदा च पिण्डित एव शब्दः पिण्डितस्यैवार्थस्य बोधकतया

Here, then, when through words that are known, there arises the recollection of the meaning of the words, the knowledge of the sense of a sentence which is not in contact, is called Verbal Testimony (knowledge through Authority).

2. This verbal cognition depends on learning; therefore the method of this we show in the beginning. A young man, indeed, after statements like, "Bring the cow," "A son is born to you" etc., notices an activity or joy etc. in one, and since these two must have some cognition as antecedent, he understands that the activity, joy etc. were produced only in sequence to the knowledge of the sense of "bringing the cow," "birth of a son" etc.; and since such cognitions of the sense were produced only in sequence to the sound, he recognises that the sounds, "bring the cow" etc., convey senses like "bringing the cow" etc. And at that time, the words taken in one mass are understood as conveying a sense in one mass. And

ज्ञातः । ततश्च गां बधान अश्वमानय इत्यादिप्रयोगान्तरेषु पदान्तरयोगत्यागरूपावापोद्वापौ दृष्ट्वा गोशब्दः साक्षादिमतो वाचकः आनयशब्द आनयनक्रियावाचक इत्यादि पदार्थविवेकमवधारयति ।

३. तच्च पदैः पदार्थबोधनं शब्दशक्तिजन्यत्वादभिधानमेव इति पार्थसारथिप्रभृतयः । शब्दोऽपि संस्कारोद्बोधनद्वारेणैव पदार्थं बोधयतीति स्मरणमेव पदार्थज्ञानं इति चिदानन्दादयः ।

४. तथा च पदानां प्रत्येकमर्थेषु नियमितानामपि आदितः प्रभृति परिदृष्टमेकविशिष्टार्थज्ञानतात्पर्यं तावदवतिष्ठते । एवं पदार्थज्ञाने

afterwards, in other usages like, "Tie up the cow," "Bring the horse" etc. he sees insertion and deletion in the form of acceptance and rejection of other words, and he ascertains the differentiation of the sense of words such as that the sound "cow" signifies an object having a dew-lap etc., the sound "bring" signifies the action of bringing, and so on.

3. And this conveying of the sense of a word by the word, since it is produced by the capacity of the sound, is only expression: so say Pārthasārathi and others. But a sound indicates the sense of a word only through the channel of rousing up impressions and so the knowledge of the sense of a word is only recollection: so say Cidānanda and others.

4. And as such, for words, though confined to distinct senses, there is fixed even from the beginning the purport, the knowledge of a unitary qualified object. When the knowledge of the sense of words stands thus, the knowledge of the sense of the sentence produced immediately after that in the form of a knowledge of a

स्थिते यत्पुनस्तदनन्तरमेकविशिष्टार्थाज्ञानरूपं वाक्यार्थज्ञानं जायते तत् पदैरेव वा पदार्थस्मृतिभिर्वा जन्यते इति चिन्तायां पदानां पदार्थबोधोपक्षीणत्वात् व्यवहितत्वाच्च पदार्था एव स्वसंसर्गरूपं वाक्यार्थं बोधयति इत्ययं तावत्तार्किकादिसाधारणः पक्षः ।

५. वयं तु पदार्था लक्षणयैव वाक्यार्थं बोधयन्तीति ब्रूमः । वाच्यार्थानुपपत्त्या हि लक्षणा भवति । अत्र च पदैः स्मार्यमाणा गवादि-पदार्था यद्यन्योन्यान्वयं विना सामान्यरूपा एवावतिष्ठेरन् तर्हि पदानां व्युत्पत्तिसमयावधृतमेकविशिष्टार्थबोधतात्पर्यं विरुध्येत इति सामान्यरूपस्य वाच्यस्यानुपपत्तेरन्योन्यान्वयरूपे विशेषे एव पदार्थाः पर्यवस्यन्ति ।

unitary qualified object—is this produced by the words alone or by the recollection of the sense of the words ? In considering this question, since the words are exhausted with conveying the sense of the words, and are also remote, it is only the sense of the words that convey the meaning of the sentence, which is in the form of a relation among themselves. Now, this is the view common among the Logicians and others.

5. But we say that the sense of the words conveys the meaning of the sentence only by secondary implication. Indeed, secondary implication comes in through the non-intelligibility of the expressed meaning. And here, senses like "cow" etc. recollected by the words, if they should remain in their generic form without mutual syntactical relation, then there would be contradiction of the purport of the words to indicate a unitary qualified object, as determined at the time of learning. And so, since the generic form signified is unintelligible, the meaning of words leads up to

ततश्च गौरियमानीयमानैव आनयनं च गोसंबद्धमेव इति परस्परान्वयलाभात् गवानयनरूपवाक्यार्थसिद्धिः ।

तेनात्र पदावगताः पुनः पदार्था मिथोज्ज्वयं यान्ति ।
 इत्येवमभिहितान्वयसिद्धान्तो दर्शितोऽस्मदादीनाम् ॥
 सकलपदान्तरपूर्तावितरपदार्थैः समन्वितं स्वार्थम् ।
 सर्वपदानि वदन्तीत्यन्येषामन्विताभिधानमतम् ॥

६. गामानय इति प्रथमश्रवणे हि गवानयनरूपस्यान्वितस्यार्थस्य शब्द एव बोधकतया ज्ञातः । अतस्तदनुसारेण पुनरपि पदा-

the particulars consisting in mutual syntactical relation. And hence, this cow is certainly to be brought, and bringing is certainly related to the cow: on account of this relation of the one to the other, we get the meaning of the sentence consisting in "bringing the cow".

Therefore, here, the meanings of the words, which are understood from the words, afterwards enter into mutual relation: in this way is shown the doctrine, according to those of my way of thinking, of "the relation of what are expressed."

When all the other words are completed, each of the words expresses its own meaning as related to the meanings of the other words: this is the doctrine, according to others, of "the expression of what are related."

6. Indeed, on first hearing, "Bring the cow," it is the sound itself that is understood to convey the

नामेवान्वितार्थबोधकत्वं वाच्यं न तु पदार्थानाम् । आवापोद्वापाभ्यां हि पदार्थेषु विविच्यमानेष्वपि तत्र तत्र तैस्तैरन्विता एव पदार्था दृष्टा नत्वेकाकिन इति अन्विते स्वार्थे पदानां शक्तिर्न परित्यज्यते ।

७. ननु किं केवलपदार्थबोधः पदेभ्यो नास्त्येव । अस्तीति ब्रूमः । पदानि तावत्पृथक् पदार्थान् स्मारयन्त्येव । न तु तावता विरमन्ति । स्मारितमेव तु स्वं स्वमर्थं पुनरितरपदार्थान्वितत्वेनाभिधायैव विरमन्तीति राद्धान्तः । अतः पदाभिधेय एवान्वितरूपो वाक्यार्थः न तु पदार्थगम्यः ।

related sense in the form of "bringing the cow". Therefore in accordance with this, it is of the words themselves that conveying a related sense has to be declared, and not of the sense of the words. Indeed, even when the senses of the words are discriminated through insertion and deletion, in each case, the senses of the words are seen only as related to this or that, not as isolated; so the capacity of the words in respect of their senses as related is not abandoned.

7. Now, is it that there is no conveying of the isolated sense of the words by the words? We say that there is. Now, words certainly recall their senses separately; but they do not stop at that. Their respective senses, already recalled, they express again as related to the senses of other words and then alone they stop: this is the final doctrine. Thus the meaning of a sentence in the form of relation is expressed by the words themselves, and is not to be understood from the senses of the words. And if it were to be understood from the senses of the words, there would be a relation with the objects even as

पदार्थगम्यत्वे च प्रमाणान्तरप्रतिपक्षानामपि पदार्थानामन्वयः स्यात् । न चासौ दृश्यते ।

८. तदिदं गुरुमतं गौरवादेव हेयम् । अस्मन्मते हि पदार्थानां स्मृतिसिद्धत्वात् वाक्यार्थस्यापि लक्षणासिद्धत्वात् शक्यन्तरकल्पनैव नास्ति इति पदेषु शक्तिकल्पनाप्रस्ताव एव भवतां गौरवमायातम् । किञ्च पदशक्तिः पदार्थशक्तिरेव लघीयसी । तदा खलु गमनरूपस्यैकस्यैवार्थस्यान्वयबोधकत्वे कल्पिते गमनपर्यायाणामन्येषामपि अन्वयः सिध्यति । पदशक्तौ तु गमनार्थानामनन्तानां पदानां शक्तिः कल्पनीया इति महा-

comprehended by other means of valid knowledge; and this is not seen.

8. This doctrine of the Guru is to be discarded for its prolixity alone. Indeed, in our doctrine, since the senses of the words are made out through recollection, and since the meaning of the sentence too is made out by secondary implication, there is no assumption at all of another capacity. So, for you there has resulted prolixity even in connection with the assumption of a capacity in the words. Further, capacity of the senses of words is certainly more in keeping with parsimony than capacity of words. Then, surely, when it is assumed of a single sense in the form of going, that it conveys a relation, there results relation even in the case of others synonymous with "going". But if the capacity be in the words, there should be assumed capacity for an infinite number of words having the sense of going: so there is great prolixity. And in a single sentence, if by each word, its own sense as related to the others, be conveyed, there would inevitably arise the

गौरवम् । एकवाक्ये च सर्वपदैः प्रत्येकमितरान्वितस्वार्थे बोध्यमाने पदे पदे वाक्यार्थप्रत्ययोऽपि बलादापन्न इति कष्टतरमेतत् इति ।

९. यत्तु पदार्थानामन्वयबोधकत्वे प्रमाणान्तरप्रतिपन्नानामप्यन्वयः स्यादित्युक्तं तत्र ब्रूमः । भवतामपि गां बधान इत्युक्ते विगलितरशनो बन्धनापेक्षोऽपि दृश्यमानस्तुरगो बन्धनेन कथं नान्वयं भजते । तत्र खल्वश्वस्य शब्दप्रतिपन्नत्वाभावादनन्वय इति बलाद्वक्तव्यम् । तथा च तद्वदेव प्रमाणान्तरप्रतिपन्नानामपि शब्दप्रतिपन्नत्वाभावादेवानन्वयः सिद्ध इति तत्रापि नास्माकं किञ्चिदधिकं कल्पनीयम् । तस्मादस्मदुक्त एवान्वयप्रकारो लघ्नीयान् इति ।

comprehension of the meaning of the sentence in word after word ; so this is beset with more difficulties.

9. As for what has been said that if the sense of words conveyed the relation, there would be relation even with the objects comprehended by other means of valid knowledge, to this we reply: according to you too, when it is said, "Tie up the cow," how is it that even a horse, seen with its bridle loose and requiring to be tied up, does not come into relation with "tying up" ? Here, surely, since the horse is not comprehended through a word, there is no relation: you will be forced to say so. And therefore, in the same way, since what have been comprehended through other means of valid knowledge, have not been comprehended through words, for this very reason, non-relation is established. So, there too we have not to assume anything further. Therefore, the mode of relation as explained by us is more in keeping with parsimony.

१०. अत्राकाङ्क्षा च योग्यत्वं सन्निधिश्चेति तत्रयम् ।
 वाक्यार्थावगमे सर्वैः कारणत्वेन कल्प्यते ॥
 गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्तीत्याकाङ्क्षारहितेष्विह ।
 अन्वयादर्शनात्तावदाकाङ्क्षा परिगृह्यते ॥
 अग्निना सिञ्चतीत्यादावयोग्यानामनन्वयात् ।
 योग्यतापि परिग्राह्या सन्निधिस्त्वथ कथ्यते ॥

११. शब्दैः सन्निहितत्वेन बोधितत्वं हि पदार्थानां सन्निधिरित्युच्यते । अतः सन्निहितत्वाभावात् शब्दबोधितत्वाभावाच्च द्वेधा

10. Here, expectancy, compatibility and proximity —these three have been assumed by all as causes in understanding the sense of a sentence.

“Cow, horse, man, elephant”: here, since they have no mutual expectancy, there is found no syntactical relation ; and hence is expectancy accepted.

In cases like, “One sprinkles with fire,” since there can be no syntactical relation among what are incompatible, compatibility too has to be accepted. Then, proximity is explained.

11. To be signified by words in proximity is, indeed, the proximity of the sense of words. Thus non-proximity is of two kinds, because of not being near and because of not being signified by words. Of these, there is no syntactical relation, since there is no nearness between the

सन्निध्यभावो भवति । तत्र भिन्नकालोच्चारितयोः गां आनय इति पदयोः सन्निहितत्वाभावादनन्वयः । गां बधान इत्यत्र बन्धनापेक्षस्य दृश्यमानस्य अश्वस्य शब्दबोधितत्वाभावादेवानन्वयः । अतः शब्दप्रतिपन्नानामेवान्वयः इति नियमः सिद्धः । गुरुस्तु बुद्धिसन्निधिमात्रमेव सन्निधि मन्यते न तु शब्दसन्निधिम् । सोऽपि गां बधान इत्यत्र अश्वस्यानन्वयं वारयितुमशक्नुवन् शब्दानामेवान्वय इति अकामेनापि अनुमंस्यते इति प्रागुक्तम् ।

१२. ननु तत्र वाक्यस्याश्वं प्रति तात्पर्याभावादेव तस्यानन्वयोऽस्तु न शब्दत्वाभावात् । मैवम् । तथा सति अग्निना सिञ्चेत् इत्यादावपि तात्पर्याभावादेव अनन्वय इति योग्यत्वादीनामपि अपरिग्रहप्रसङ्गात् ।

two words "cow" and "bring" uttered at different times. In "Tie up the cow," simply because the horse seen as requiring to be tied up is not signified by words, there is no syntactical relation. Thus is established the rule that syntactical relation is only for what have been comprehended through words. But the Guru considers as proximity, merely the proximity of cognition, not proximity of words. Even he, unable to prevent syntactical relation of the horse in "Tie up the cow," admits, though unwillingly, that syntactical relation is only of words; this has been already said.

12. Now, in this case, let the absence of syntactical relation of the horse be due merely to the fact that the sentence has no purport with reference to the horse, not because it is not comprehended through a word. It cannot be so. If it be so, even in cases like, "One should sprinkle with fire," the absence of syntactical relation may be due to want of purport, and hence there would result the non-acceptance of compatibility etc.

तस्मादन्वयसिद्धौ वात्यर्थं न स्वयं कचिद्धेतुः ।
सामग्र्यन्तरभावे नियमार्थं त्वर्थ्यते पुनस्तदपि ॥

इति स्थितिः ।

एवं गत्यन्तराभावादगुरुणापि समाश्रितः ।
शब्दानामेव संसर्ग इत्ययं नियमोऽधुना ॥
तेन द्वेधोपकारो नस्तत्रैकः पूर्वमीरितः ।
मानान्तरावबुद्धानां नान्वयः स्यादितीदृशः ॥
अन्योऽपि द्वारमित्यादावध्याहारे भविष्यति ।
शब्दस्यैवान्वयार्हत्वाद्द्वारमात्रियतामिति ।
शब्दाध्याहार एव स्यादित्येवं मादृशां मतम् ॥

Therefore in making out syntactical relation, the purport is not in itself a cause. When the rest of the causal aggregate exists, that too is again required for the sake of restriction.

This is the position.

Thus since there is no other choice, even the Guru has now recognised a rule like this, that only what are brought to mind by words have relation.

Therefore, for us there are two purposes : of these one has already been said, namely that there is no syntactical relation with what are understood through other means of knowledge.

The other too occurs in importation in cases like, "The door"; since only what are

गुरुस्त्वावरणार्थस्य तत्राध्याहारमिच्छति ।
 बुद्धिसन्निधिमात्रेणाप्यन्वेतीति दुराशया ॥
 तत्र यद्यवलिप्तोऽयं गुरुर्नाद्यैव शिक्ष्यते ।
 अर्थाध्याहृतिरेवेति तर्हि गर्जिष्यति ध्रुवम् ॥

इत्यास्तामेतत् । उक्तस्तावद्वाक्यार्थज्ञानप्रकारः । असन्निकृष्टवाक्यार्थज्ञानं च शाब्दमित्युक्तम् । इदमेवागम इति चोच्यते । असन्निकृष्टपदेन च अनुवादानां बाधितार्थानां च वाक्यानामप्रामाण्यमुक्तम् ।

cognised through the mind are capable of syntactical relation, there may be the importation of words alone in the form, "Let the door be closed." This is the doctrine of those of my way of thinking.

But the Guru is for importing the idea alone of "closing," in this case, in the false hope that there can be syntactical relation even by the proximity of cognition.

There, if the Guru, who has grown very haughty, is not taught a lesson at least now, then, surely, he will begin to shout that there is the importation of the idea alone.

Let this remain at that. Now has been explained the method of knowing the meaning of a sentence. It has been said that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence which is not in contact, is verbal cognition. And this itself is called Revelation. And by the expression "which is not in contact," there is stated the non-validity of sentences which are re-statements or whose contents are sublated.

१३. तच्च शाब्दं द्विविधं पौरुषेयमपौरुषेयं च । तत्राप्तवचः पौरुषेयं वेदवचोऽपौरुषेयम् । गुरुस्त्वाह । वैदिकमेव शाब्दमस्ति । पुरुषवचनानि तु वक्तृभिप्रायानुमापकान्येव न स्वयमेव वाक्यार्थं बोधयति शङ्काकुण्ठितशक्तित्वात् । व्युत्पत्तिसमयसिद्धापि शब्दानां बोधकशक्तिर्व्यभिचारबहुलेषु पौरुषेयवचनेषु तदाशङ्कया कुण्ठिता भवति । तत्र च अनेन वक्तृतामुपमर्थमवबुध्यैव वाक्यं प्रयुक्तं इति यावन्नानुमीयते तावदन्यथात्वशङ्का न निवर्तत इति वाक्यमुदास्ते एव । तथा तात्पर्यमपि नरगिरां तद्बुध्यधीनमिति वक्तृबुध्यनुमानं विना तात्पर्यानिश्चयादपि वाक्यमुदास्ते । तस्मात् वक्तृधीस्तावदनुमातव्या । तत्र नद्यास्तीरे फलानि सन्ति इति

13. This verbal cognition is of two kinds, human and super-human. Of these, the words of a reliable man are human, and the words of Scripture are super-human. But the Guru says: the Scriptural alone is verbal cognition. The words of a man, however, simply lead to the inference of the intention of the speaker, and do not convey by themselves the meaning of a sentence; because their capacity is made blunt by doubt. The capacity for significance of words, although established at the time of learning, becomes blunt in the words of men with their profusion of inconstancies, on account of doubts about those inconstancies. And there, so long as it is not inferred that the sentence has been stated by the speaker only after knowing such and such a meaning, doubt regarding its being otherwise does not vanish; and so, one ignores the sentence. Similarly, the purport of the words of men too depends on the cognition thereof. So, without inferring cognition in the speaker, there cannot be the determination of the purport, and for this reason too, one

वाक्ये श्रुते पदार्थेषु च पृथक् पृथक् स्मृतेशु अनुमिनोति । एतानि पदानि एतेषां पदार्थानां संसर्गमवबुध्यैव प्रयुक्तानि आसप्रणीतपदत्वात् गामानयेति पदवत् इति । एवं च वक्तुः पदार्थसंसर्गज्ञानमवगन्तुं परिश्रान्तः श्रोता पदार्थसंसर्गरूपं वाक्यार्थमपि बलाल्लभते इति अनुमेय एव नरवचस्तु वाक्यार्थः ।

एवं व्यभिचारभये गलिते वाक्यार्थनिर्णये जाते ।

पुनरभिधत्ते शब्दोऽप्यनुवादतयेति तस्य राद्धान्तः ॥

ignores the sentence. Therefore the cognition in the speaker is first to be inferred. Then when one hears the sentence, "There are fruits on the banks of the river," and when the meanings of the words are remembered separately, one infers: "These words have been used only after cognising the relation to these meanings, because they are words uttered by a reliable man, like the words, 'Bring the cow'." And thus the hearer, attempting to understand the speaker's cognition of the relation of the meanings of words, understands in virtue thereof, the meaning of the sentence too, consisting in the relation of the meanings of the words; hence, the meanings of the sentences in the utterances of men, is certainly to be inferred.

Thus, when fear of inconstancy has been expelled, and when there has arisen the ascertainment of the sense of the sentence, the sound too expresses that sense once more as a re-statement: this is his final doctrine.

१४. तदिदमयुक्तम् ।

व्यभिचारविशङ्कामप्यनादृत्येन्द्रियादिवत् ।
स्वमर्थमभिधातुं किं समर्था न पदावली ॥
तात्पर्यमपि सुज्ञानं स्वतो ज्ञानानुमां विना ।
यथा वेदे यथा चान्येष्वनालोचितकर्तृषु ॥
वक्तृज्ञानानुमानान्तं यदि च प्रतिपाल्यते ।
तर्हि तस्याप्यशक्यत्वाद्भग्नशः किं करिष्यसि ॥

१९. आप्तप्रणीतत्वं खल्वत्र हेतुत्वेनोक्तम् । आप्तत्वं च
भ्रान्त्याद्यभावोऽभिमतः । भ्रान्तिश्चास्य पुरुषस्य नास्त्येवेति कचिदपि न

14. This does not stand to reason.

Without paying heed even to doubts of inconstancy, is not a series of words capable, like the sense-organs etc., of expressing its own sense?

The intention too is easy to understand by itself, without an inference of cognition; for example in the Vedas, and, for example, in other works where the authorship has not been considered.

If you wait on till the stage of inferring the cognition of the speaker, then what will you do in your despondency when that too is not possible?

15. Here, verily, being composed by a reliable man is stated as the probans. Reliability is considered to be

निरूपयितुं शक्यते । ऋषीणामपि भ्रान्तिराशङ्क्यते किमङ्ग पुनरर्वा-
चीनानां इत्युक्तत्वात् । एवं अस्मिन् देशे काले वा अस्य भ्रान्तिर्नास्ति
इत्यपि दुर्निरूपमेव । तस्मादन्ततः अस्मिन् वाक्यार्थस्य भ्रमो नास्ति
इति वाक्यार्थज्ञानपुरःसरमेव भ्रान्तिर्निवारणीया । अतो वाक्यार्थाव-
गमात्पूर्वमाप्तत्वमसिद्धमेव इति कथं तेनानुमीयते इति हतं गुरुमतम् ।

१६. एवं लौकिकशब्दानामनुमानत्ववारणात् ।

सर्वशब्दानुमानत्ववादिनोऽपि हि खेदिताः ॥

द्विप्रमाणा हि काणादयो गुरुक्तप्रकारेणैव सर्ववाक्यार्थानां अनुमेयत्वमाहुः ।

the absence of delusion etc. It is not possible to ascertain anywhere that there is no delusion in this man at all; because there is the saying, "Delusion has been suspected even in Sages; what, then, sir, about the moderns?" Similarly, "In this place, or at this time, there is no delusion in this man": this too is not easily ascertainable. Therefore, as a last resort, in the form, "There is no delusion in him with reference to the meaning of this sentence," the delusion is to be discarded only after the cognition of the meaning of the sentence. Therefore, before understanding the meaning of the sentence, reliability is non-established; so how can there be inference from that? Thus is annihilated the doctrine of the Guru.

16. Thus, when the inferential nature of ordinary words has been set aside, those who uphold the doctrine of all verbal cognition being inferential, are also over-powered.

The followers of Kaṇāda etc., who, indeed, accept only two means of valid knowledge, say exactly in the manner

तेऽप्यनेनैव निरसनीयाः । तैरपि हि निर्दोषवाक्यत्वादिभिरेव वाक्यार्थोऽनु-
मातव्यः । निर्दोषत्वं च भ्रान्त्यादिराहित्यम् । तच्च वाक्यार्थनिरूपणपुरः-
सरमेव निरूपणीयमिति पूर्वोक्तप्रकारेण तेषामपि हेत्वसिद्धिरेवेत्यास्तां
तावत् । तदेवं लौकिकं वैदिकमपि शाब्दं सिद्धम् ।

१७. तत्र—

दुष्टवक्तु प्रणीतत्वदोषः शब्दे यदा भवेत् ।

तदा स्याद्व्यभिचारोऽपि पौरुषेयगिरां क्वचित् ॥

अपौरुषेये वेदे तु पुरुषस्पर्शसंगतः ।

कलङ्को न विशङ्क्येत तत्कुतो व्यभिचारिता ॥

of the Guru, that the meanings of all the sentences have to be inferred. They too have to be refuted in the same way. According to them too, the meaning of a sentence has to be inferred through probans like the sentence being free from fault etc. And freedom from fault is the absence of delusion etc. And this can be ascertained only after ascertaining the meaning of the sentence. So, in the manner stated above, for them too, the probans is non-established. Let it remain at that. Therefore, verbal cognition both ordinary and scriptural has thus been established.

17. There,

When there arises in words the defect of being composed by a defective person, then in words of human origin, there can sometimes be inconstancy.

In the Veda, however, which is of non-human origin, one should not doubt a taint, which

१८. वैदिकं च विधिमन्त्रार्थवादभेन उपदेशातिदेशभेदेन च बहुविधम् इत्यादि तु परिमितकथया न बोधयितुं शक्यते इति उपरम्यते ।

५. उपमानम्

१. दृश्यमानार्थसादृश्यात् स्मर्यमाणार्थगोचरम् ।
असन्निकृष्टसादृश्यज्ञानं ह्युपमितिर्मता ॥

would be intelligible if there were relationship to a person ; how then can there be inconstancy ?

18. And "the Scriptural" is of various kinds, being divided into "injunctions", "formulas" and "praises", and divided also into "direct teaching" and "transfer". This and other things cannot be made clear in a brief treatise ; and so it stops here.

(v) ANALOGY

1. The knowledge of the similarity of what is not in contact, having as its sphere an object that is remembered, and arising from the similarity to an object that is seen—this, indeed, is recognised to be Analogy.