Dignāga's Philosophy of Language

Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti V
on *anyāpoha*

Part 1: Text

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locative merely has the function of imitating the original locative pl. of the definition of *naimittikā °śabdāḥ*, from which we only have to extract the term *śabdāḥ* in order to restore the original Sanskrit phrase. Thus the grammatical structure of Dignāga's text is carefully reflected in Jinendrabuddhi's explanation, which makes it possible to restore the original sentence complement in the locative: *naimittikeṣu śabdeṣu*. This restoration matches the syntax of the Tibetan translations of K and V and is mirrored in the subsequent noun phrase *yādṛcchikeṣu tu katham*, which Jinendrabuddhi subsequently quotes.

6 Dignāga's philosophy of *anyāpoha*

6.1   The objective of this study is to present an analysis of the essential features of Dignāga's *apoha* thesis as expounded in PSV V,[66] which is a crucial complement to Dignāga's philosophy of inference as it presents the only definite exposition of his theory of induction. Dignāga develops in this central chapter the idea that joint absence (*vyatireka*) of word and referent in contrast to their joint presence (*anvaya*) defines exclusion of other referents and simultaneously justifies the invariable concomitance of word or speech element and the thing denoted. Thus, by extension, joint absence establishes the invariable connection between the logical indicator (*liṅga*) and the thing indicated (*liṅgin*) because Dignāga claims that verbal cognition is subject to the same constraints as those that characterize knowledge obtained through inference.[67]

6.2   All sources indicate that *anyāpoha* was conceived as a substitute for real general properties. Kumārila claims, for instance, in the first *śloka* of his *apoha* critique, that exclusion of non-cows as *sāmānya* in principle does not differ from the general property cowhood (*gotva*) as

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[66] The analysis draws on the explanations of crucial paragraphs of PSV V presented in the annotations to the *translation*.

[67] Cf. the frequently quoted statement, which Buddhist writers attribute to Dignāga: *apohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyām eva pratipādyate.* See PVSV 25,27f; TSP 367,17 commenting on Kumārila's statement at ŚV Apohavāda 73ab: *na cānyavyāvṛttimuktā pravṛttiḥ śabdaliṅgayoḥ.*

real entity (*vastu*), and Dignāga rejects the assumption that real general properties are real entities. Kamalaśīla explains that Kumārila's use of the term *sāmānya* in his presentation of the *apoha* doctrine presupposes Dignāga's thesis that the general property (*sāmānya*) as denotable object is characterized by exclusion (*apohalakṣaṇam*).[68] The question is, however, in what way *apoha* could be presented as a general property like *sāmānya*, which contemporary Sanskrit grammarians and non-Buddhist philosophers assumed is the semantic condition for the application of words (*pravṛttinimitta*). As the Buddhists reject as untenable the idea that extramental real general properties inherent in the object of denotation are grounds of application of words, they were somehow forced to present a theoretically consistent explanation of the cause of denotation, which dispenses with real general properties like existence (*sattā*) and substanceness (*dravyatva*) or the like. The *apoha* theory is thus very much part of the contemporary Indian philosophical scene at the time when Dignāga propounded his *apoha* doctrine. He addresses the inherent ontological difficulties that attach to the thesis of real general properties in the second chapter of PSV II 16[69] and substitutes *anyāpoha* for real general properties, claiming at PSV V 36d that *anyāpoha* has the same properties as real general properties without being subject to the same absurd consequences as the thesis that real general properties constitute the semantic condition for denotation.

6.3   In PSV V Dignāga also claims that words denote things (*bhāva*) as qualified by preclusion (*nivṛtti*) of other referents (*arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭa*).[70] In a theoretically related fragment – presumably from the SPVy – we find a similar phrase which substitutes *vastu* for *bhāva*, claiming that the referent is a real object qualified by preclusion: *nivṛttiviśiṣṭaṃ vastu śabdārthaḥ.*[71] It is thus clear that the *śabdārtha* qualified by *nivṛtti* is conceived as a real object (*vastu*) or entity (*bhāva*). These definitions of denotation and the concomitant function of *nivṛtti*

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[68]   Cf. TSP 360,15: *apohalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyaṃ vācyatvenābhidhīyamānam.*

[69]   Cf. PSV II 16 restored and translated n. 504.

[70]   Cf. the crucial paragraph PSV V 36d.

[71]   Cf. *Translation* n. 182.

raise the obvious question of what a term like *nivṛtti* denotes in this particular context. Neither *nivṛtti* nor its synonyms have verbal implications *per se*. In grammatical contexts *nivṛtti* is recorded in the sense of cessation or removal and is thus semantically related to *apoha* in the sense of exclusion. It is difficult, however, to relate these terms and their well attested denotations to verbal knowledge and inference as described by Dignāga in PSV V.

6.4   Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine and its basic presuppositions as presented in PSV V were never adopted by post-Dignāga Buddhist scholars without modifications. Their views on *anyāpoha* were inevitably influenced by the works of the central Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti, and post-Dharmakīrti thinkers. In fact, the theory of knowledge underlying the original version of the *apoha* doctrine as expounded in PSV V is incompatible with its subsequent elaboration by Dharmakīrti. In spite of an undeniable family likeness between Dignāga's original theory and Dharmakīrti's version of it, there are substantial differences between them, and we must differentiate between Dignāga's views and those of Dharmakīrti and later generations of Buddhist thinkers. Thus it is obvious that the expression "apoha theory" does not designate a uniform theory with an invariable set of theoretical presuppositions. This study therefore aims at shedding light on the theoretical obscurities of the *apoha* theory by focussing on some of Dignāga's statements in PSV V, which are crucial to our understanding of its basic presuppositions, and hopefully thereby paving the way for an in-depth study of what suggested to Dharmakīrti to reformulate, in his remarkable œuvre, some of the basic presuppositions of the *apoha* doctrine in the light of the criticism it met with.

Verbal knowledge as inference

6.5   There is one assumption whose importance far outweighs all other elements of the *apoha* theory: Dignāga's claim that verbal knowledge (*śābda*) and inference (*anumāna*) share the same properties. He rejects the commonly acknowledged doctrine that verbal knowledge presupposes the existence of real general properties inherent in things. In

PSV II 16[72] he addresses its absurd consequences and substitutes *anyāpoha* for real general properties, claiming that exclusion has the same properties as real general properties without being subject to the same consequences. Thus Dignāga presents the *apoha* theory as a theoretical achievement superior to the doctrine of real general properties.[73] The question is in what way it is possible for Dignāga to maintain that there is a functional homology of exclusion or preclusion of other referents and real general properties without generating an ontological *aporia* similar to the one he has shown pertains to the thesis of real general properties. In the first paragraph of PSV V 1 Dignāga propounds the fundamental hypothesis of the *apoha* theory, that verbal knowledge (*śābda*) does not differ from inference (*anumāna*)[74] since a word denotes its referent (*artha*) by means of exclusion of other referents (*anyāpoha*) in the same way as indicators like "being produced" (*kṛtakatva*). And Dignāga continues explaining that when a word is applied to an object (*viṣaya*) it denotes any given part or attribute (*aṃśa*) of it by exclusion of other referents (*artha*), like the general property "being produced,"[75] which excludes things that are not produced (*akṛtaka*).[76]

6.6   The reason why Dignāga introduces the abstract term *kṛtakatva* in the context of explaining that verbal cognition is inferential, is to show that exclusion of other referents (*anyāpoha*) is in fact equivalent

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[72] Cf. *Translation* n. 504 where PSV II 16 is restored and translated.

[73] Cf. PSV V 36d where its superior merits (*guṇotkarṣa*) are mentioned; cf. *Translation*.

[74] This assumption, however, was re-interpreted by Dignāga's influential commentator, Dharmakīrti, whose work was to dominate Buddhist epistemology and logic for centuries. Dharmakīrti's work shows that the inferential nature of verbal cognition was no longer of any theoretical concern because he re-interprets Dignāga's original statement about the inferential nature of verbal cognition in such a way that the inference is presented as one of the speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*) and not of the referent (*artha*) as Dignāga originally assumed. Cf. *Translation* n. 9.

[75] Cf. *Translation* PSV V 33ab.

[76] For the implications of Dignāga's introduction of the abstract affix *tva* after *kṛtaka*, cf. *Translation* n. 14.

to a general property (*sāmānya*). This is shown by an important passage at PSV V 33ab in which Dignāga explains that:

> In the exact same way as the general property (*sāmānyam*) 'being produced' (*kṛtakatvam*) is [explained] to indicate 'impermanence' (*anityatvagamakam*) through its exclusion of what is not a product (*akṛtakavyudāsena*), the general property in a word (*śabde*) is explained [to be] due to its exclusion of other words (*śabdāntaravyavacchedena*); and only through this (*tenaiva ca*) does it indicate its referent (*arthapratyāyakaḥ*).

Although this explanation is intended to describe what constitutes the general property in a word (*śabde*), the explanation is evidently presented on the analogy of the general property in a referent (*arthe*), which by definition is characterized as *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Thus, Dignāga's explanation makes it possible to conclude that the general property "being produced" (*kṛtakatva*) qualifies produced things (*kṛtaka*) by excluding them from things that are not produced (*akṛtaka*). Dignāga rejects the view that general properties are ontologically singular entities inherent in things, but he does not reject the idea that there are general properties, although of a different order. In fact, he defines general properties as exclusion of other, which leads to the question of how he justifies establishing an invariable connection between indicator and indicated and word and referent with the background of preclusion or exclusion of other.

6.7   Dignāga's theory of knowledge is characterised by a well-known set of dichotomies. The object of immediate sensation (*pratyakṣa*) is the *svalakṣaṇa*, i.e. the individual character of things, which by definition is beyond linguistic representation. The object of the indicator or the word and the thing indicated or the referent is the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, i.e. the general character of things, and the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is according to Dignāgan epistemology the domain of inference and language. The term *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is rarely used in PSV and Dignāga never defines its exact scope, but limits himself to state without any qualifications that it is the object of inference and verbal communication. However, the explanation at PSV I $2c_2$–d_1 is in a way an implicit definition of the content of the term:

svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ hy avyapadeśyavarṇatvābhyāṃ varṇā-
di gṛhītvā nityatayā cānityaṃ varṇādīti manasā saṃdhatte.[77]

"For having perceived a colour or the like through its individual
and general characters, i.e., through what is not denotable and
colourness, [respectively], as well as through [the general prop-
erty] impermanence, one combines [the two] at the thought:
'Colour, etc., is impermanent.'"

In this phrase we notice the distinction Dignāga makes between the
general property *varṇatva*, i.e. colourness and the term *varṇa* denoting
a particular colour. He also introduces the abstract term *anityatā* in or-
der to explain the judgement "colour or the like (*varṇādi*) is imperma-
nent (*anityam*)." Although Dignāga never defines *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and
the implications of this term in the context of Dignāga's ontology and
theory of knowledge have never been answered, it is clear as shown by
PSV V 33ab quoted above that *sāmānya* is defined in terms of exclusion
of other referents.

6.8 Exclusion of other referents presupposes that the relation (*sam-
bandha*) between the word and the thing it denotes is subject to the con-
straints of invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*): They are supposed
to be invariably concomitant (*avinābhāvin*) in the same way as the
logical indicator and the indicated. Dignāga assumes that the relation
(*sambandha*) between the word and its referent is comparable to that
of the inferential sign (*hetu* or *liṅga*) and the thing it indicates, which
shows that Dignāga established his philosophy of language on the basis
of his logical theory. This is confirmed by a passage in the chapter on
the role of exemplification (*dṛṣṭānta*) presented at PSV IV 5[78] in which
he explains the connection between the word and its referent in terms
of the rules that must be observed for establishing the connection be-
tween the indicator and the thing indicated. In other words, they are
subject to the triple constraints of the *trairūpya*.[79] The severe criticism

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[77] For a translation and analysis of this phrase, cf. *Translation* n. 1.

[78] Cf. *Translation* n. 9.

[79] Cf. *Translation* n. 9.

which Kumārila, for instance, levelled at Dignāga's view of *śabda* as similar to the logical reason of an inference takes this assumption for granted,[80] and PSV V and contemporary sources indicate beyond doubt that Dignāga established the *apoha* theory on the analogy of his philosophy of logic.

6.9   Thus the postulated similarity of the logical indicator and the word are fundamental to the *apoha* theory. The question is how Dignāga avoids the absurd implication that the word occurs *at* the thing it indicates in the same way, for instance, as the logical indicator smoke, which could justifiably be said to occur *at* the thing it indicates viz. fire. His presentation and vocabulary makes constant use of the locative to denote the referent, which any word denotes. However, words do not occur *at* their referents like logical indicators. The word 'smoke,' for instance, does not occur *at* smoke, nor *at* fire. The theory would thus seem to be based upon patently absurd assumptions. Dignāga's critic, Kumārila, subjected this apparent absurdity to a thorough examination in the Śabdapariccheda chapter of his *Ślokavārttika*. The problem relates to the semantics of the locative and the ambiguities entailed by the application of the *trairūpya* to the presuppositions of verbal knowledge without adjusting the expressions of the theory of logic to a different although comparable context, that of verbal knowledge.[81]

6.10   Since Dignāga elaborated the *apoha* thesis on the basis of his philosophy of logic, it is essential to understand how the connection (*sambandha*) between a term and the thing it denotes is established as invariably connected (*avinābhāvin*). In PSV V 50b towards the very end of the chapter, Dignāga describes how the connection between the word "*panasa*," breadfruit tree, and a prototypical instance of a breadfruit tree is taught. The discussion centres on the question of whether

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[80] See Kumārila's criticism at ŚV Śabdapariccheda 68–98. Cf. 6.9 below.

[81] Dignāga's statements are ambiguous as their interpretation depends upon the meaning of his use of the locative. See PSV V 34 and *Translation* n.s 416, 419 where I suggest that it is possible to interpret the use of the locative in terms that are compatible with its use in Sanskrit grammatical literature and lexicography.

or not verbal cognition is comparable to inference in the situation where someone is taught the denotation of words. Dignāga answers that learning the denotation of a word is not inference because learning the denotation of a word is the condition of *apoha* and thus of verbal cognition as inference. This paragraph addresses the process of *vyutpatti*: teaching the denotation of a word by ostentation (*hastasaṃjñā*).

6.11 Dignāga's description of *vyutpatti* assumes that someone points to a prototypical example of a breadfruit tree, and explains "this is a breadfruit tree" (*ayaṃ panasaḥ*). Thereby the learner understands the connection between the term "*panasa*" and the thing it denotes. Dignāga puts weight on the deictic function of the demonstrative pronoun "this" (*ayaṃ*) which accompanies the ostentation because the syntactical agreement between the pronoun and the term "*panasa*," the name of the object, secures the grammatical validity of the reference. In PSV V 50c Dignāga continues explaining that the connection (*sambandha*) between the word and its referent is mentally constructed at the thought "this is the word for that thing." *vyutpatti* thus implicates two separate moments: first, the moment of learning how a term is used by observing its application to its referent, and second, the subsequent moment of constructing the connection in the mind (*manas*).[82] Dignāga closes the paragraph by pointing out that the connection between any term and the thing it denotes is similar to the connection between inference and inferred (*anumānānumeyasambandha*).

6.12 However, the mentally constructed connection needs to be reified. That is, the person who is learning the denotation of a name like the word "*panasa*" or any other term through *vyutpatti* must ascertain that it refers to *all* instances of the breadfruit tree and not only to the prototype which his teacher is showing him. However, it is impossible to justify the invariable connection of the term *panasa* and its referent, the breadfruit tree, by showing how it applies to every single instance as instances are infinite. Dignāga addresses the problem at PSV V 2b

[82] In a different context Dignāga explains that *vyutpatti* relates to observed instances of referents (*dṛṣṭārtha*), in other instances to those that are not observed (*adṛṣṭārtha*). Cf. *Translation* n. 631.

that a general term like "existent" does not denote all particulars (*bheda*) because

> it is impossible (*aśakyaḥ*) to tell (*kartum*) the connection (*sambandhaḥ*) of particulars [with a general term like 'existent'] when they are infinite; and as the connection of the word [with particulars] is not told (*akṛtasambandhe śabde*), it is not justified that it denotes its referent because merely its own form is cognized (*svarūpamātrapratīteḥ*).

Denotation thus presupposes that the connection of a term like "existent" and its referent is established, which is not possible on the assumption that its connection with every particular instance is ascertained by enumeration showing every single referent, as particulars are infinite. In addition the use of the word "existent" is ambiguous as it denotes many different things like substances or qualities and so on. As mentioned above Dignāga addresses the problem of infinity of particulars at PSV V 2ab and presents at PSV V 34a solution to this classical problem of induction.

6.13 He explains that

> the word's connection is feasible (*sambandhasaukaryam*) and there is no ambiguity (*vyabhicāritā*) as it is not observed (*adṛṣṭeḥ*) [to apply] to the referent of other words and is also (*api*) observed (*darśanāt*) [to apply] to a member (*aṃśe*) of its own referent. (PS V 34)

The explanation pivots on the implication of "observation" (*darśana*) and "non-observation" (*adṛṣṭi*) because Dignāga claims that the feasibility of the connection (*sambandhasaukarya*) depends upon the application of e.g. the term "existent" to an example of its referent and non-observation of its application to the referent of other words. The question is what the two terms imply in terms of theory of cognition. The following explanation gives the answer: Dignāga assumes that non-observation is the fundamental element of the process of reification. In fact, he equates non-observation to joint absence of word and referent and observation to their joint presence:

For (*hi*) joint presence and joint absence (*anvayavyatirekau*) are
a means (*dvāram*) to the word's denoting its referent. And these
two are its application to what is similar and its non-applica-
tion to what is dissimilar. In this case, however (*tu*), application
to all that is similar is by necessity not statable with regard to
any [referent] whatsoever (*kvacit*) because stating it is impos-
sible (*ākhyānāsambhavāt*) as the referent is infinite (*ānantye
'rthasya*). On the other hand, stating its non-application to what
is dissimilar is possible, even though it is infinite (*atulye saty apy
ānantye*), through mere non-observation (*adarśanamātreṇa*);
and just therefore (*ata eva ca*) it has been explained that [the
word's] denoting its own referent (*svārthābhdhānam*) is an infer-
ence from [its own referent's] exclusion from these [other ref-
erents] (*tadvyavacchedānumānam*), from its not being observed
[to apply] to other [referents] than its own relata (*svasam-
bandhibhyo 'nyatrādarśanāt*). (PSV on PS V 34)

6.14 Dignāga thus claims that it is easy to justify the connection by
means of joint presence (*anvaya*) and absence (*vyatireka*) but he omits
addressing the implications of the term "feasibility" (*saukarya*). We
must therefore assume that the meaning of the term was evident to
contemporary philosophers and that there was no need for explaining
its implications. Dignāga's presentation shows that the feasibility of the
connection (*sambandhasaukaryam*) depends on the fact that the word
is observed to apply to an instance of its referent and not observed to
apply to the referents of other words. Non-observation, however, is of
a different order than that of temporarily not observing a referent that
is not where it would be expected to be, because it has been removed
from its locus. It is noteworthy that Dignāga's use of non-observation
does not address non-observation of things that have been temporarily
removed from their expected place, but rather the universal non-exis-
tence in time and space of other things in the locus of the thing to which
the indicator refers, and the same goes for the word and its denotation.
Thus non-observation ascertains the non-occurrence of other words or
indicators in a context where the observer is able to perceive that e.g.
the word "tree" denotes a tree and not any other thing with which it is
incompatible in terms of its nature and the word used to denote it, and

on the basis of this observation to generalize the non-existence of other things in the locus of the referent, and thereby to ascertain the invariable concomitance of word and referent.

6.15 Dignāga's use of the term "feasibility" becomes clear from the writings of non-Buddhist philosophers, who address the implications of *sambandhasaukarya*. Dignāga presupposes that a person who is being taught the connection of word and referent (*vyutpatti*) by ostentation (*hastasaṃjñā*) is standing in some place (*ekadeśastha*) next to a prototypical instance of the referent (*artha*), i.e., a member (*aṃśa*) of the domain of similar referents. A knowledgeable person points to the referent explaining that "this x is y." As the referent thus defined occurs in a particular locus and no special conditions apply to it and its locus, the *ekadeśastha* may reify the application of y to any given x through the means of their joint presence (*anvaya*) and absence (*vyatireka*), their joint absence being ascertained merely through not observing (*adarśanamātra*) the application of y to any other thing but the referent x, inferring that y denotes all instances of similar things to the exclusion of all things occurring in the domain of dissimilar things.

6.16 As mere non-observation of other things in the locus of the prototypical *aṃśa* is easily performed, Dignāga assumes that the reification of the connection between y and x is feasible on the basis of mere non-observation, emphasizing the role of *vyatireka*, joint absence, as the primary means of establishing the connection, the object of non-observation being the non-existence (*abhāva*) of other referents in the locus of the prototypical example. It is therefore understandable that *vyatireka* was interpreted as the primary cause of exclusion being supported by mere non-observation of the word's application to the referents of other words. It is obvious that non-observation in this case does not refer to temporary non-observation of referents that might have been observed to occur in the locus of the taught referent on other occasions. The absence of other referents is substantial: no non-tree (*avṛkṣa*) is ever observed where a tree (*vṛkṣa*) is found. It is therefore possible to conclude from the use of any given term that the referents of other words are not found in the locus of the referent of a particular word which therefore excludes them from its scope. It is thus obvious that verbal knowledge

as inference is based upon joint absence of word and referent, which presupposes the non-existence (*abhāva*) of other things in the locus of the thing inferred.

6.17 Only on this assumption is it possible to avoid the paradox of uncertainty and the ensuing doubt about the nature of the referent. As Dignāga explains:

> If, however, the inference were by means of joint presence (*anvayadvāreṇa*), the word 'tree' should not give rise to doubt (*saṃśayaḥ*) appearing as *śiṃśapā*, etc. (*śiṃśapādyābhāsaḥ*), about one and the same entity (*ekasmiṃ vastuni*). Yet, in the same way as there is doubt about it, there will also be doubt appearing as earthenness and substanceness, etc. However, since the word 'tree' is not observed to denote what is non-earthen, etc., the inference is only by means of joint absence (*vyatirekamukhenaiva*). (PSV on PS V 34)

In this explanation Dignāga addresses the implications of verbal knowledge as inference. The explanation addresses the extension of individual terms. The term "tree," for instance, denotes different kinds of trees such as the *śiṃśapā* or the like. The argument addresses the logical implications of basic predication: a *śiṃśapā* is a tree, and a tree is an earthen object, and a substance, and so on. As there are more trees than *śiṃśapā*s, and more earthen things than trees, and more substances than earthen things, the individual terms are related in a logical hierarchy according to their individual extension, which makes it possible to infer from the application of the term *śiṃśapā* that it is a tree (*vṛkṣa*), earthen (*pārthiva*), and a substance (*dravya*), and existent (*san*) and knowable (*jñeya*). Consequently the inference is based upon joint absence as it presupposes the exclusion of all non-trees from any tree, which is the function of the word "tree," and only exclusion of non-trees ascertains the validity of the inference. This raises the question of the purpose of a term like "non-tree."

6.18 Dignāga addresses this question in the commentary on PSV V 43b, which is a crucial paragraph of the *apoha* chapter:

For the [word] does not exclude a different general property (*anyāṃ jātim*) for each individual substance (*pratidravyam*), but rather (*kiṃ tarhi*) with the intention of denoting the things to be excluded (*vyavacchedyavivakṣayā*) by means of a single general property (*ekena sāmānyadharmeṇa*). And on this point it has been explained (*uktaṃ cātra*) that the inference [of the referent] is from mere non-observation [of the word's application] to what belongs to the class of dissimilar things (*vijātīye 'darśanamātreṇānumānam*).

Any word or speech element is thus seen to denote a prototypical observed instance of the referent but not to denote things that fall outside the scope of denotation of the word whose connection is being taught, i.e. anything that is dissimilar to the referent. Thus observation is context bound, as learning the denotation of any term relates to observation of individual instances of the referent and individual instances of the word applied to denote the referent. However, an inferential rule has to be established which makes it possible to infer that the word "tree" denotes the referent tree irrespective of its individual character. Whatever is dissimilar to the prototypical object is characterized by a single property (*ekadharman*) which is its being non-x. In order to express the absence of the property of being non-x in things that are x Dignāga coined the negative term non-x, which has the purpose to denote the single property (*dharma*) of things that are non-x. Thus the term non-x is derived from the positive term x by means of *vivakṣā* as a convenient means for denoting things that are dissimilar to any x. The terms "tree" and "non-tree" mirror a privative relation that concerns the non-existence of non-x in the locus of any x. Although Dignāga does not attribute reality to things that are aggregates of atoms, which are the only ultimate things that are ontologically real, it is obvious nonetheless that objects have a derived secondary reality, in spite of which it is still possible to maintain that cows or trees are discernible entities to which one may refer by the word "cow" or "tree."

6.19 This leads inevitably to the conclusion that the inferential status of verbal cognition is based upon the fact that any instance of a thing is dually marked: by its individual character which is only accessible

through perception and as such inexpressible and by its general character which is defined by exclusion, as the identity of any given cow as the referent of the word "cow" is due to the fact that it excludes non-cows. It is not possible to construe non-existence of non-cows in the locus of any cow as an instance of double negation on which many discussions about *apoha* pivot. However, double negation does not exist. The word "non-cow" for instance is merely a secondary derivative of the word "cow." It has been coined to denote anything that is not a cow: a typical *apoha* inference therefore reads "it is a cow as it is not a non-cow." Non-cow, however, is only a generalized referent denoting the single property (*ekadharma*) that defines the negated referent of the word "cow."

6.20 Dignāga equates verbal cognition to inference by means of joint absence (*vyatirekamukha*),[83] which explains why commentators compare *apoha* to *vyatireka* and unanimously refer to Dignāga's *apoha* theory as "having joint absence as the chief thing" (*vyatirekapradhāna*).[84] Classical Indian scholars interpret *vyatireka* as characterized by non-existence (*abhāvalakṣaṇa*),[85] and Dignāga assumes that joint absence of word (*śabda*) and referent (*artha*) is equivalent to mutual non-existence of any speech unit and non-speech unit and any referent and non-referent, which is implied by his claim that existence of the nature of one thing presupposes the non-existence of the nature of other things.[86] Jayamiśra, Kumārila's commentator, interprets *apoha* in terms of *itaretarābhāva* "mutual non-existence," which mirrors Dignāga's basic assumption that *apoha* presupposes mutual non-existence of excluded and not excluded.[87] With this background this study will address

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[83] Cf. PSV V 34: *vyatirekamukhenaivānumānam.*

[84] Cf. *Translation* n. 188; Pind 1999: § 8. Kumārila's commentator Jayamiśra refers to followers of Dignāga's *apoha* theory as *vyatirekavādins*, cf. ŚVṬ 46, 18.

[85] Cf. *Translation* n. 425.

[86] Cf. *Translation* PSV V 45 and the statement: *ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti.*

[87] Cf. e.g. *Translation* n.s 466, 517, 523.

Dignāga's attribution of all the commonly acknowledged features of real general properties to exclusion.

6.21 Dignāga evidently conceived *apoha* as a substitute for real general properties. As mentioned above (**5.2**) the remarkable Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila attributes the view to Dignāga that exclusion of non-cows (*agonivṛtti*) is equivalent to a general property (*sāmānya*).[88] Śāntarakṣita quotes the verse at TS 914 and his commentator Kamalaśīla explains that exclusion of non-cows as general property means general property as qualified by exclusion[89] (*apohalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyam*), and elsewhere he expressly equates *apoha* to non-existence (*abhāva*).[90] This interpretation of the underlying purpose of the *apoha* theory is, for instance, confirmed by Kumārila, who states loc. cit. that "it is obvious that those who imagine that exclusion of non-cows (*agonivṛtti*) is the denotable general property (*sāmānya*) have designated by the term "exclusion of non-cows" (*agopohagir*) nothing else but [the general property] cowhood (*gotva*) which is a real object (*vastu*)." Kumārila's conclusion is clear: *apoha* is just another name for *sāmānya*, general property. Thus he indirectly corroborates the assumption that *apoha* is a substitute for general properties. However, the role of *apoha* as semantic justification for denotation similar to that of real general properties leaves many questions unanswered.

6.22 Kumārila continues his criticism asking Dignāga to explain "what the entities (*bhāva*) [viz. cows] are, whose nature consists in exclusion of horses or the like (*aśvādinivṛttyātman*), as it has been explained [viz. by me, Kumārila] that a non-entity (*abhāva*) is equivalent to another entity (*bhāvāntaram*)." Thus, Kumārila, on the one hand, equates preclusion or exclusion, *nivṛtti* or *apoha*, with the category of general property (*sāmānya*), on the other hand, he interprets Dignāga's view

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[88] Cf. ŚV Apohavāda 1: *agonivṛttiḥ sāmānyaṃ vācyaṃ yaiḥ parikalpitam / gotvaṃ vastv eva tair uktam agopohagirā sphuṭam.*

[89] Cf. Dharmakīrti's definition of the general property of referents as qualified by exclusion: *arthānāṃ yac ca sāmānyam anyavyāvṛttilakṣaṇam, yannisṭhās ta ime śabdā, na rūpaṃ tasya kiñcana*, PV II 30ab.

[90] Cf. TSP 960,15.

of exclusion as involving nothing but the privative opposition between different entities (*bhāva*), one being the negation of the other and thus a non-entity (*abhāva*), which Kumārila interprets as just a different entity (*bhāvāntaram*).[91] Kumārila's observation is not invented *ad hoc*. Indeed, there are statements in the fifth chapter of PSV that corroborate Kumārila's introductory remarks of the *apohavāda* chapter of *Ślokavārttika*; and Dharmakīrti, for instance, addresses the question of how the general property is exclusion of other referents (*katham idānīm anyāpohaḥ sāmānyam*) at PVSV 39,1ff in an important and theoretically charged paragraph of the *apoha* section of PVSV.[92] And the assumption that *anyāpoha* is equivalent to *sāmānya* is mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi

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[91] Cf. ŚV Apohavāda 1–2. Kumārila connects elsewhere in ŚV *apoha* as *sāmānya* to *abhāva*; cf. the important discussion in ŚV Śūnyavāda 135ff.

[92] I made the following observation in Pind 1991: 271–272: "One thing is clear: The *apoha* theory represents Dignāga's solution to the epistemological problem raised by his denial of the existence of universals (*jāti* or *sāmānya*). As is well-known, they were conceived by the Nyāyavaiśeṣika tradition as ubiquitous entities inherent in substances (*dravya*), thereby differentiating them (*viśiṣṭa*) as belonging to a certain class of things having certain definable features. In fact, Dignāga's *apoha* theory only becomes fully understandable when we realize that he used it as a substitute for universals, in contexts where the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school of philosophy would formulate its theories with reference to the existence of universals. Thus, for instance, the Dignāgan expression *arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭa* is the exact equivalent of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika *jātiviśiṣṭa*. Moreover, in the important section of the *Vṛtti* on PS V 36d [q.v.], he explicitly attributes the properties of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika universal (*jāti*) to the *apoha* ... It appears from a revealing passage in the *Vṛtti* ad PS II 16, in which Dignāga shows the consequences of the assumption that universals are real entities, that certain philosophers attempted to solve the problem of how to justify the existence of universally valid connections between properties [e.g., between smoke and fire], by claiming that knowing the universal in a single substratum is equivalent to knowing it in all. This claim is understandable since it was tacitly assumed that universals would always instantiate in the same way. Hence they could serve as a means of establishing universally valid connections of the kind that was required by the development of contemporary logical theory. However, if one rejects the idea of the universal as untenable, one is left with the problem of accounting for the possibility of universally valid connections. Dignāga evidently solved this fundamental epistemological problem with reference to the *apoha* theory."

too in an interesting discussion recorded in PSV II 4c.[93] However, the question is, in what way *apoha* could be presented as a general property in contrast to real general properties as semantic condition for the application of words (*pravṛttinimitta*). Since the Buddhists rejected as untenable the idea that extramental real general properties inherent in things are grounds of application of words, they were somehow forced to present a theoretically consistent explanation of the cause of denotation, which dispenses with real general properties like existence (*sattā*) and substanceness (*dravyatva*) or the like.

6.23 The *apoha* thesis is centred on exclusion as qualifier of the referent of any word. In a central passage Dignāga claims that words denote things (*bhāva*) as qualified by preclusion (*nivṛtti*) of other referents (*arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭa*).[94] In a theoretically related fragment – presumably from the SPVy – we find a similar phrase which substitutes *vastu* for *bhāva*, claiming that the referent is a real object qualified by preclusion: *nivṛttiviśiṣṭaṃ vastu śabdārthaḥ*.[95] It is thus clear that the *śabdārtha* is conceived as a real object (*vastu*) or entity (*bhāva*) qualified by *nivṛtti*. These definitions of denotation and the concomitant function of *nivṛtti* raise the obvious question of what a term like *nivṛtti* denotes in this particular context. Neither *nivṛtti* nor its synonyms have verbal implications *per se*. In grammatical contexts *nivṛtti* is recorded in the sense of cessation or removal, which implies preclusion and is thus semantically related to *apoha* in the sense of exclusion. It is difficult, however, to relate these terms and their well attested denotations to verbal knowledge and inference as described by Dignāga in PSV V. In order to understand the implications of Dignāga's statements it is necessary to review each of his claims. In the first place it is necessary to address the claim that verbal knowledge is inferential, because it presupposes invariable connection, i.e. concomitance between the word and its referent.

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[93] Cf. *Translation* n. 2.2 (1) where Jinendrabuddhi's explanation is quoted and translated.

[94] Cf. the crucial paragraph PSV V 36d.

[95] Cf. *Translation* n. 182.

6.24 The evidence recorded in PSV V clarifies the issue. It shows unexpectedly that the *apoha* theory pivots on the concept of non-existence (*abhāva*) and describes non-existence of other referents or words *in* the referent (*arthe*) or *in* the word (*śabde*) as the foundation of preclusion of things and words, thus seemingly imitating well-established philosophical usage among Sanskrit grammarians and non-Buddhist philosophers: It is not inherent real general properties in things or words that are the causes of application of words and identity of words, but rather non-existence or preclusion of other, whether things or words. Thus Dignāga attributes the properties of real general properties to exclusion of other referents. A crucial passage at PSV V 45 explains that the statement that "the nature of one thing is the non-existence of the nature of other things" (*ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti*), has been formulated with regard to (*prati*) the denotable [object]. Thus the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* lies outside the domain of perception and must be considered an abstract entity comparable to a type.

6.25 The main question is in what way it is possible for Dignāga to maintain that non-existence of other things understood as exclusion or preclusion of other referents and real general properties are homologous without generating an *aporia* similar to the one that pertains to the thesis that each general property inherent in every single object of denotation is the cause of application of words (*pravṛttinimitta*). Dignāga's claim at PSV V 36d that properties (*dharma*) of exclusion like "being one, eternity, and extension to each single particular" (*ekatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāpti*) are similar to those of real general properties (*jāti*)[96] is difficult to understand with the background of *apoha* as characterized by joint absence (*vyatireka*) or non-existence (*abhāva*). Dignāga's justification for this claim is particularly illuminating.

6.26 He explains that these properties are confined to exclusion

> because (1) [exclusion of other referents] is not a particular (*abhedāt*), because (2) its substratum is not discontinued (*āśrayasyāvicchedāt*), and because (3) its referent is cognized com-

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[96] Cf. PSV V 36d.

pletely (*kṛtsnārthapratīteḥ*). (PSV on PS V 36d)

The explanation first addresses the question of the distribution of *apoha* among the particulars like a real general property whose postulated oneness (*ekatva*) is transformed into a particular because of its distribution among the particulars. This argument is only understandable with the background of the postulate that "exclusion of other referents," *anyāpoha* is qualified by non-existence (*abhāva*) of other referents in the referent. And non-existence is not, like real general properties, divisible because mere non-existence as qualifier of things implies absence of other things from their substrata. It is noteworthy that Dignāga introduces the term *āśraya*, substratum, to justify that *anyāpoha* is eternal like general properties, because this term was commonly used among contemporary grammarians and philosophers to denote the substratum of real general properties. The argument seems obscure, but Dignāga intends to explain that since *apoha* has substrates and as substrates of non-existence are not discontinued, *anyāpoha* is eternal. The substratum of *anyāpoha* thus mirrors the objects (*vastu*) or things (*bhāva*) which according to Dignāga are qualified by preclusion of other referents (*anyārthanivṛttiviśiṣṭa*). As all substrata of the same kind are qualified by non-existence of other referents Dignāga concludes that their knowledge is comprised by exclusion of other referents. It is noteworthy that Dignāga takes care to emphasize that exclusion is not just another type of general property (*bhāva*).[97] However, non-existence *per se* is an indivisible absence, and the universal non-existence of other referents in any particular referent,

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[97] Cf. PSV V 36c; 38d; cf. Siṃhasūri's critique at NCV 735,17–18: *abhāvāntaratvād arthāntarāpohasyāpohavān arthaḥ śabdavācyo na bhavati, ato nāpoho viśeṣaṇaṃ nāpohavān so 'rtha iti yadi tvayeṣṭam.* "If you claim that since the exclusion of other referents is not a different [kind of] entity, exclusion is not a qualifier and the referent is not exclusion possessing." NCV 734,20: *atha svamatena brūṣe na sāmānyaṃ na vyāvṛttimad iti kutas tadviśiṣṭavastvabhidhānam. khapuṣpaśekharaviśiṣṭavandhyāputrābhidhānavat.* "Now, if you say in accordance with your own theory that [exclusion of other] is neither a general property, nor is [the referent] exclusion possessing, then how could the [word] denote a thing as qualified by it [viz. exclusion]. It is like denoting the son of a barren woman as qualified by a wreath of sky flowers!"

e.g. a tree, is the object of inference which qualifies verbal knowledge (*śābda*) as not different from inference.

6.27 As shown in PSV V 34 Dignāga claims that the inference is based upon joint absence which he qualifies as inference from exclusion of what is other than the referent. Dignāga never presents an *apoha* inference, but Mallavādin's commentator Siṃhasūri gives an example of such inference at NCV 732,10–13:

> *arthāntarāpohaḥ sad ity asan na bhavatīti nāsadbhāvamātram evocyate, kiṃ tarhi, arthāntarāpohena viśiṣṭaṃ vastv eva sad ity ucyate, yasmin vastuni so 'pohaḥ kriyate, tac ca dravyaṃ śabdārthaḥ, nāpohamātram. sa cāpohaviśiṣṭo 'rtho dravyādiḥ sacchabdena vyāpto 'parityāgāt, na tu sākṣād uktaḥ.*

> "Exclusion of other referents as in the statement 'it is existent as it is not non-existent' does not merely express its being non-existent, but rather, that the entity for whose sake the exclusion is effected, is indeed an entity which, being qualified by exclusion of other referents, is said to be 'existent.' And this substance is the referent of the word, not mere exclusion. And the referent that is qualified by exclusion viz. a substance, etc., is encompassed by the word 'existent' because it is not rejected by it, but it is not denoted directly."

At NCV 752,21–22 he presents a similar example of an *apoha* inference:[98]

> *yatraivādarśanam uktaṃ vṛkṣābhāve 'vṛkṣe, tato vyavacchedānumānam 'avṛkṣo na bhavati' iti. evaṃ ca kṛtvā vṛkṣaśabdād dravyatvādyanumānam upapannaṃ bhavati.*

> "Only with regard to the thing about which non-observation is stated, i.e. with regard to the non-existence of a tree which is a non-tree, the inference is from its exclusion from this [non-tree] at the thought 'it is not a non-tree;' and on such grounds the inference of substanceness, etc., from the word 'tree' is justified."

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[98] Cf. *Translation* n. 427.

Verbal cognition as inference is thus based upon what the inferred thing is not, e.g., a tree which is not a non-tree. The latter term is as mentioned above an instance of what Dignāga designates as intention to denote the excluded objects (*vyavacchedyavivakṣā*), "non-tree" denoting things as qualified by the single property (*ekadharma*), non-existence of trees, and the term "tree" as excluding these. As appears from Siṃhasūri's presentation of an *apoha* inference the negation "is not" (*na bhavati*) merely conveys the notion of negation of non-existence (*abhāva*), and in the present context the notion of negation of non-existence of non-trees. An *apoha* inference would thus seem to be an instance of the type of inference known as *kevalavyatirekin* which is a purely negative type.[99]

Conclusion

6.28 Dignāga attempted to show that observation of a prototype of the referent of a word teaches the relation of the word to its referent, which is reified by mere non-observation, i.e. by not observing that the word denotes other things. Thus the *apoha* doctrine pivots on non-existence (*abhāva*) of other things in the referent. Exclusion is thus in the final analysis a matter of ontology. The theory, so it seems, presupposes an extreme ontological parsimony: things are aggregates of atoms which by definition are beyond perception. Dignāga quotes a Sāṃkhya verse to the effect that atoms are not perceptible. Thus words denote things as aggregates of atoms, and the aggregates are the things that exclude other things in accordance with their nature. What Dignāga's critics found unacceptable was the idea that an absence may qualify things like a general property. The qualifying function, however, is constructed on an absence of other things from the referent. It is in the nature of the referent to exclude from its locus any other referent. The absence is thus basically inscribed in the nature of the referent as a defining property. The idea appears to have been that the absence of other things from any particular referent is equivalent to a general property and as absence is indivisible, the *apoha* theory avoids the ontological problems

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[99] Cf. Randle 1930: 241ff.

of the view that denotation presupposes real general properties inherent in things.

6.29 Dignāga established the *apoha* theory on the analogy of real general properties. As he rejects the assumption that denotation presupposes that real general properties inherent in the objects of denotation define the identity of verbal denotation and cognition, he must have realized that a possible way of accounting for the identity and difference of things as referents, i.e. as denotable objects, would be to start from the principle of the mutual absence of any given x from the loci of all non-x. This could be formalised by means of joint presence and absence (*anvayavyatireka*) as a qualifier-qualified relation in which the predominant joint absence of all non-x from any given locus of x qualifies the latter as x. Induction presupposes, of course, *vyutpatti*, teaching the connection of any given word to the thing it denotes, which involves identification of the referent by ostentation accompanied by the use of the demonstrative pronoun "this," as Dignāga explains at PSV V 50b–c.

6.30 Dignāga conceived exclusion or preclusion as a generalized absence of all non-x from all x. Thus the inferential component of the theory is based on the principle that since no non-x is found in the locus of any x it is safe to conclude that the term used to denote x accomplishes this through joint absence (*vyatireka*). The connection established presupposes observing a knowledgable person who teaches the denotation by pointing at the referent (if the referent is an observable entity) saying this is x, the use of the demonstrative pronoun ascertaining through co-reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) the linguistic validity of the reference. Since non-existence of other things in the referent is indivisible, non-existence does not entail the usual problems that attach to the theory of real universals. If they are singular real entities they become particulars when divided among the infinite number of individual referents. This problem, however, does not affect non-existence which being indivisible is adduced by Dignāga for defining the identity of things. If any x is not non-x, and non-x as already mentioned is not to be understood as anything but a term derived from the positive term for the purpose of denoting things that are not *x*, it becomes easy to understand why Dignāga thought it would be possible to interpret any

statement like the referent (*artha*) of the word "tree" as not a "non-tree" to one implicating the non-existence of non-trees at any tree.

6.31 It is not clear how Dignāga understood the qualifying function of non-existence as it is nothing but an absence. However, it is an absence of something from something else: non-trees are absent from trees. Dignāga apparently thought that this would define trees in general and that this universally applicable observation would qualify as a substitute for real general properties and thus constitute the ground of application of words. Thus, in the final analysis the inferential component of the theory concerns the possibility of establishing an inferential canon that involves non-existence as a premise: the use of the word "tree" leads to the inference: it is a tree because it is not a non-tree. The inference, however, is about things and exclusion is exclusion of other referents or other speech units, not denotation or representation.

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MVyu – *Mahāvyutpatti*. 2 vols. Compiled by R. Sasaki. Reprint. Tokyo 1965 (First edition, Kyoto 1916–1925).

NBh – *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* (Vātsyāyana). See NSū.

NC – *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa. With the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa. Part II*. Ed. with critical notes by Muni Jambūvijayajī. Bhāvnagar: Jain Ātmanand Sabhā 1976.

NCV – *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī Nayacakravālavṛtti* (Siṃhasūri). See NC.

NM – *The Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla. Varanasi: Jaya Krishna Dās Haridās Gupta 1936.

NMGBh – *Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*. Ed. Nagin J. Shah. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology 1972.

NMu – *Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*. Taishō XXXII, 1628; 1629.

NR – *Nyāyaratnākara* (Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra). See ŚV.

NSū – *Nyāyasūtra* (Gautama) – *The Sūtras of Gotama, Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.* Ed. P. Shāstrī and H. Shukla. Kashi Sanskrit Series 43. Varanasi: Chowkhamba 1970 (First edition 1942).

NV – *Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara.* Ed. Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda Dvivedin. Reprint. Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers 1986 (Bibliotheca Indica edition, Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press 1907).

NVTṬ – Vācaspatimiśra's *Tātparyaṭīkā* on Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttikam.* In *Nyāyadarśana of Gotama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati & the Pariśuddhi of Udayana.* Vol. I. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute 1967.

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PBh – *Praśastapādabhāṣyam* (Praśastapāda) – See *Kiraṇāvalī.*

Pind 1991 – Ole Holten Pind, "Dignāga on *śabdasāmānya* and *śabdaviśeṣa.*" In *Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference. Vienna, June 11–16, 1989.* Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 269–280.

Pind 1997 – Ole Holten Pind, "Dhammapāla's Reference to Dignāga's Apoha Theory and the Question of his Date." "Pāli Miscellany." In *Bauddhavidyāsudhākaraḥ. Studies in Honour of Heinz Bechert on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday.* Swisttal-Odendorf: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 523–527.

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PSV – *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga).

PSV$_S$ I – Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Chapter 1. Ed. Ernst Steinkellner 2005. Published online (http://ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf).

PSṬ Ms B – The Sanskrit *codex unicus* of Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā Viśālāmalavatī.*

PSṬ I – *Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, chapter 1. Part I: Critical edition; Part II: Diplomatic edition with a manuscript description* by Anne MacDonald. Ed. Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic. Beijing/Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House / Austrian Academy of Sciences Press 2005.

PSṬ V. See Hattori 1982.

PVBh – *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya or Vārttikālaṃkāra of Prajñākaragupta.* Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute 1953.

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PVSV – *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti) – *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The first chapter with the autocommentary.* Ed. Raniero Gnoli. Rome: IsMEO 1960.

PVV – *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin) – *Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the commentary "Vṛtti" of Acharya Manorathanandin.* Ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati 1968.

PVVṬ – *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* (Karṇakagomin) – *Karṇakagomin's commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti.* Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Reprint. Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co. 1982 (First edition, Allahabad 1943).

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Śarkarikā. See ŚVṬ.

ŚBh – *Śabarasvāmin's Bhāṣyam* zu den *Mīmāṃsāsūtren* I,1,1–5. See Frauwallner 1968.

ŚV – *Ślokavārtika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra.* Ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi: Tara Publications 1978.

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ŚVṬ (Umveka) – *Ślokavārtikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā of Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa.* Ed. Ramanatha Sastri. Reprint. Madras: University of Madras 1971.

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ful Knowledge, vol. 86, pt. 3. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.

SPVy – *Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa* (Dignāga).

Śṛṅgāraprakāśa – *Maharaja Bhojaraja's Shringaraprakasha*. Ed. G. R. Josyer.
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STP – *Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇa of Siddhasena Divākara with Abhayadevasūri's
commentary Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*. Vol. I–II. Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co. 1984.

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T – Tibetan translation of PSṬ V as ed. in Hattori 1982.

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TS – *Tattvasaṃgraha* (Śāntarakṣita) – *Tattvasaṃgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita
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TSP – *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla). See TS.

TV – *Tantravārttikam* (Kumārila) – In *Śrīmajjaiminīyapraṇīte Mīmāṃsadarśane Bhaṭṭa Kumārilapraṇīta-Tantravārtikasahita Śābarabhāṣyopetaḥ*. Poona: Ānandāśrama 1984.

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VNṬ – *Vādanyāyaṭīkā – Vadanyayaprakaraṇa of Acharya Dharmakirtti with the commentary Vipanchitārthā of Acharya Śāntarakṣita*. Ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati 1972.

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VPP II – Helārāja's commentary *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* on Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya III – Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the commentary of Helārāja. Kāṇḍa III, Part II*. Ed. K. A. Subrahmaniya Iyer. Poona: Deccan College 1973.

VPṬ – Puṇyarāja's *Ṭīkā* on Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya II*. See VP II.

VPV I – Bhartṛhari's *Svavṛtti* on VP I. See VP I.

VPV II – Bhartṛhari's *Svavṛtti* on VP II. See VP II.

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VSūV – Candrānanda's *Vṛtti* on VSū. See VSū.

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YSū – *Yogasūtra* (Patañjali). See YSūBh.

YSūBh – *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* (Vyāsa) – *Pātañjalayogasūtrāṇi*. Poona: Ānandāśra-ma 1904.