

Dignāga's Philosophy of Language

Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti V
on anyāpoha

Part 2: Translation and Annotation

Ole Holten Pind

Edited by Ernst Steinkellner



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Michael Alram, Bert Fragner, Hermann Hunger,
Sigrid Jalkotzy-Deger, Brigitte Mazohl, Franz Rainer,
Oliver Jens Schmitt, Peter Wiesinger und
Waldemar Zacharasiewicz

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§ 1. It has been explained that there are two means of cognition (*pramāṇadvayam*).¹ But some² think that verbal cognition (*śābdam*)³ is a separate means of cognition (*pramāṇāntaram*) too.⁴

¹ Jinendrabuddhi explains this statement with reference to Dignāga's definition of the means of cognition at PSV I 2ab. The purpose is to present the greater merit of Dignāga's theory of the actual means of cognition and to refute the views presented by other philosophers, cf. PST Ms B 191a7–191b1: *yat prāk pratijñātam "pratyakṣam anumānam ca pramāṇe dve eva" iti tad uktam pramāṇadvayam iti svapramāṇaguṇodbhāvanataḥ parapramāṇapratishedhataś ca*. See Hattori 1968: 24, 76 n. 1.11.

In the first chapter of PSV Dignāga sets forth his theory of sensation (*pratyakṣa*) introducing the crucial distinction between *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. *svalakṣaṇa* denotes the individual character of any given thing as observable through sensation, which Dignāga claims is beyond linguistic representation, whereas *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* designates the general character of things as known either by means of an inferential indicator (*liṅga*) or communicated through language. Although Dignāga never explicitly defines *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, it appears indirectly from a passage recorded at PSV I 2c₂–d₁ that *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is comparable to general properties like colourness (*varṇatva*) and impermanence (*anityatā*): *sva-sāmānyalakṣaṇābhyām hy avyapadeśyavarṇatvābhyām varṇādi grhītvānityatayā cānityam varṇādīti manasā saṃdhatte*. "For having apprehended a colour and so on through its individual and general characters, i.e., through what is not denotable and colourness, [respectively], as well as through [the general property] impermanence, one combines [the two] at the thought: 'Colour, and so on, is impermanent.'"

This passage shows unequivocally that *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is equivalent to *sāmānya* "general property," which contemporary grammarians and philosophers claimed to be a real singular property inherent in things and the cause of application of words (*pravṛttinimitta*). Dignāga, however, rejects the theory of real universals and substitutes *anyāpoha* "exclusion of other [referents]" for real general properties. He defines *apoha* as equivalent to preclusion (*nivṛtti*) or non-existence (*abhāva*) of all instances of non-x in all instances of x, thereby qualifying any instance of x as x (excluded from non-x). See PSV V 34ff, and cf. n. 9 below (= Appendix 5) on Dignāga's introduction of the abstract affixes *tva* or *tā* to denote *anyāpoha* as the general property of things and as cause of application of words.

² See Appendix 4.

³ Cf. the definition of *śābdam* at PST Ms B 191b1: *śabdād upajātam asannikṛṣṭe 'rthe jñānam śābdam*. "Verbal cognition is an awareness, which follows from a word, about a referent with which one is not in [direct] sense contact." ŚBh 32,3: *śāstram śabdavijñānād asannikṛṣṭe 'rthe vijñānam*; ŚV Śabda° 3; TSP 530,22ff.

⁴ That is, not only implication (*arthāpatti*) and the rest are separate means of cognition, but also *śābdam*, cf. PST Ms B 191b1: *na kevalam arthāpattivyādīṇy apīśābdārthaḥ*. For the nature and number of *pramāṇas* admitted by the various Indian schools of philosophy, cf. Hattori 1968: 78 n. 1.12.

Now (**tatra*)⁵

verbal cognition is not a means of cognition separate from inference (*anumānāt*).⁶ That is, a [word] denotes⁷ (*bhāṣate*) its own referent (*svārtham*)⁸ by exclusion of other [referents]

⁵ Cf. *de la V* : om. K.

⁶ For Dignāga's explanation of what constitutes the inferential nature of verbal cognition, cf. the theoretically important passage at PSV V 34 and n. 9 below (= Appendix 5). Kumārila contrasts at ŚV Śabda° 15 the views of Sāṃkhya and other schools on *śabda* with those of the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas who include verbal cognition in inference: *tatrānumānam evedaṃ buddhair vaiśeṣikair itaṃ bhedaḥ sāṅkhyā-dibhis tv iṣṭo na tūktam bheda-kāraṇam*. For the Vaiśeṣika definition, cf. Candrānanda ad VSū IX 19: *yathā kāryādismṛtisavyapekṣam anumānam trikālaviṣayam atīndriyārtham ca tathaiva śabdam saṅketasamṛtyapekṣam trikālaviṣayam atīndriyārtham ca. ato 'numānenaiḥ kayopakṣematvād anumānam evety uktaṃ bhavati*. In contrast to this explanation, the statement at PBh § 256 shows that Praśastapāda regards the word as an indicator like the inferential indicator (*liṅga*) and thus subject to the constraints of the triple format of inference (for which, cf. PBh § 247: *śabdādīnām apy anumāne 'ntarbhāvaḥ, samānavidhitvāt. yathā prasiddhasamāyasya liṅgadarśanaprasiddhyanusmaraṇābhyām atīndriye 'rthe bhavaty anumānam, evaṃ śabdādibhyo 'piti*). For the relation between the *trairūpya* and *śabda*, cf. n. 9 below (= Appendix 5). The Vaiśeṣika view that verbal cognition is inference (*anumāna*) because a word (*śabda*) functions in the same way as an inferential indicator (*liṅga*), is also propounded at NSū II 1.50–52; cf., e.g., NSūBh ad NSū 50: *yathānupalabhyamāno liṅgī mitena liṅgena paścān miyata iti anumānam. evaṃ mitena śabdena paścān miyate 'rtho 'nupalabhyamāna ity anumānam śabdaḥ*. See Biarreau 1964: 127; 205.

⁷ According to Kamalaśīla, Dignāga is using *bhāṣate* with the same value as *dyotayati* (for which, see n. 12 below), cf. TSP 540,7f, equating *bhāṣaṇam* with *dyotanam*, i.e., the act of indicating, making known: *tatra bhāṣaṇam = dyotanam, jñāpanam iti yāvat*; PST Ms B 191b5–6: *bhāṣaṇasya śabdadharmatvena rūḍhatvād dṛṣṭāntadarṣṭāntikayor vaiṣamyam mā bhūḍ iti dyotayatīty āha*.

⁸ Throughout PSV V Dignāga uses the term *artha* of the thing or referent denoted by the following classes of speech units: 1. affixes (*pratyaya*), to which Pāṇinian grammar attributes distinct denotations, 2. words (*śabda*) [usually common nouns or adjectives in the nominative, cf. the Pāṇinian definition of the nominative as denoting the mere referent of the nominal stem (*prātipadikārthamātra*, cf. A II 3.46); this class also includes the referents of proper nouns], 3. compounds (*samāsa*), and 4. sentences (*vākya*), utterances or judgements. The referents (*artha*) of words are infinite, cf. PSV V 2b above and the expression *arthasyānantye* at PSV V 34 below. Dignāga does not address the *artha* of verbs in PSV V, but mentions *ākhyātaśabda* at PSV II 4c; cf. n. 2. above (= Appendix 4) and the passages quoted at paragraph 2., especially Jinendrabuddhi's interesting explanation of Dignāga's introduction of the denotation of verbs in the context of the *apoha* thesis.

(*anyāpohena*) like [the general property] ‘being produced, and the like.’⁹ [1]

Since (*hi*)¹⁰ a word¹¹ (*śabdaḥ*) indicates (*dyotayati*)¹² through exclusion of other referents¹³ (*arthāntaravyavacchedena*), that part (*aṁśa*)¹⁴ of the

⁹ See Appendix 5.

¹⁰ The particle *hi* (cf. *ni* VT : *yañ* K) is syntactically equivalent to Sanskrit *yasmāt*. It is to be construed with the restored **tasmāt* < T *de’i* *phyir* KV; cf. the gloss *hiśabdo yasmādarthe* inserted by Dignāga in a Sanskrit fragment from *Sāmānyaparikṣāvyaśa*, q.v. n. 181. As a rule the translators of KV render Sanskrit *hi* by the Tibetan topicalization particle *ni*; cf. Obermiller 1970: (Indices II) 71a.

¹¹ The term *śabda* is somewhat ambiguous: It denotes any given speech unit posited by the Sanskrit grammarians through grammatical analysis, from phonemes through syllables to affixes and finished words. Most of the examples mentioned by Dignāga belong to the last-mentioned category, but he evidently regards phonemes and affixes to be definable within the theoretical framework of the *apoha* theory, cf. Pind 1991 and n. 348 below. Like Bhartṛhari, Dignāga considers any given speech unit posited apart from a sentence as a useful grammatical fiction, the sentence being the principal speech unit, cf. § 61 below.

¹² Dignāga uses *dyotayati* with the same value as *prakāśayati* or *prakāśaka*, the function of the logical indicator (*hetu*, *liṅga*) and the word (*śabda*) being structurally similar; cf. the use of the cpd. *dyotakadyotyā* at PS II 33a–c: *liṅgasyānyena sāmānyam viśeṣāś ca liṅgino na dyotakadyotyā*, qu. PST Ms B 81b5. This is the only instance where Dignāga uses the verb *dyotayati* of the action of denoting. Cf. the similar use at YSūBh 139,2–3 (ad YSū III 17): *sarvābhīdhānaśaktiparihṛtā gākārau-kāravisarjanīyāḥ sāsānādimantam arthaṁ dyotayantīti*.

For the use of *dyotana*, *dyotaka*, *dyotyā* in Sanskrit grammar, cf. Abhyankar 1961 s.vv. *dyotaka*; Renou 1957 s.v. *dyut*.

¹³ See Appendix 6.

¹⁴ The technical term *aṁśa* ‘part’ or attribute denotes any given general property as defined by exclusion of other referents. Things are qualified by a multitude of properties constituting a logical hierarchy, whose characteristics are defined by their position in the hierarchy. These properties, however, are not real general properties that are resident in the things they qualify, but are, according to Dignāgan epistemology, defined by exclusion of other things; cf. PST Ms B 191b4–5: *bahavo hy abhidheyasyārthasyāṁśāḥ sattvajñeyatvādayo na ca taiḥ sarvair vṛkṣādiśabdasyaivīnābhāvitvasambandhaḥ*. “For the denotable object has a multitude of parts such as ‘existence,’ ‘knowability,’ and so on, and the word ‘tree’ is not connected with all of these as invariably concomitant.” Cf. PS V 12–13,34 with PSV V ad loc.

A similar use of *aṁśa* to denote any given part of the referent occurs in the alleged fragment from Dignāga’s *Hetumukha*: *grāhyadharmas tadaṁśena vyāpto hetus tri-dhaiva saḥ*, Frauwallner 1982: 840; for the Dignāgan use of *grāhya*, cf. Dharmakīrti’s PV I 89 with Manorathanandin’s PVV ad loc.

object (*viśayaḥ*)¹⁵ to which (*yatra*) it is applied (*prayujyate*), being connected [to it] as invariably concomitant (*avinābhāvitasambandhaḥ*),¹⁶

Dignāga uses the synonymous term *bhāga* 'part' in the Sanskrit fragment from Dignāga's *Dvādaśaśatikā* quoted in Siddhasenagaṇi's *Tattvārthabhāṣyavyākhyā* V 24: *yathāha Dvādaśaśatikāyām: yady apy uktam aprasaktasya kimarthaṃ pratiṣedhaḥ? iti naivaitat pratiṣedhamātram ucyate, kin tu tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo 'rthāntaravyāvṛtṭyā loke gamyate yathā viśāṇitvād anaśva iti.* "As he claims in the *Dvādaśaśatikā*: Even though it is objected: What purpose does the negation of what is not applicable [e.g. the term *anaśva*] serve? [We answer that] it is not mere negation that is expressed, but rather a certain part of the object in question is inferred in ordinary language (*loke*) through exclusion of other referents like, for instance, in the inference: It is a non-horse because it is horned." Cf. Pind 1991: 269 n. 1.

Dharmakīrti quotes a slightly edited version of it at PVSV 62,26: *arthāntaravyāvṛtṭyā tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo gamyate*; cf. PST Ms B 205a3: *tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo 'rthāntaranivṛtṭyā gamyate*. Jinendrabuddhi seems to quote a similar passage from Dignāga at PST Ms B 61a6: *etad uktam bhavati: arthāntaravyāvṛtṭyupalakṣito yo vastuno bhāgaḥ sa eva vṛkṣaśabdasyārtha iti.* "Only that part of the object that is implied by exclusion of other referents is the referent of the word 'tree.'"

- ¹⁵ Cf. PST Ms B 191b3–4: *yasyārthasya pratyāyanārtham⁽¹⁾ uccāryate, sa tasya viśayaḥ pratyāyyatvāt, yathā liṅgasya liṅgī.* "The referent for the sake of indicating which [the word] is articulated, is its object (*viśaya*) because it is the thing to be indicated, in the same way as the bearer of the inferential indicator (*liṅgī*) is [the object] of the inferential indicator (*liṅga*).

⁽¹⁾ em. (cf. *go bar byed pa T*) : °āprayatvātmāyanārtham Ms

- ¹⁶ *avinābhāvitya* "the being invariably concomitant" defines the *sambandha* "connection" between any given word (*śabda*) or logical indicator (*liṅga*, etc.) and the thing indicated viz. the referent (*artha*) or the thing inferred. Dignāga addresses the fundamental asymmetry that holds between the two relata of the indicator-indicated connection in a crucial passage at PSV II 19–20 that fortunately is extant in Sanskrit:

nanu dvigatatvāt sambandhasya saṃyogivad liṅgidharmanā liṅgena bhavitavyam. naitad asti.

*sambandho yady api dvīṣṭhaḥ sahabhāvyaṅgaliṅginoḥ
ādhārādheyavad vṛttis tasya saṃyogivad na tu. [19]*

yathā hi saty api dvigatatve sambandhasya, na kadācid ādhāra ādheyadharmā bhavati nāpy ādheya ādhāradharmā, tathā na kadācil liṅgaṃ liṅgi bhavati liṅgi vā liṅgam. saṃyogī yathaikaḥ tathā dvitīya iti na tadvad iha. tathā hi

*liṅge liṅgi bhavaty eva liṅginy evetarat punaḥ
niyamasya viparyase 'sambandho liṅgaliṅginoḥ. [20]*

yasmāl liṅge liṅgi bhavati eva, tasmād yuktaṃ yad agnivad dhūmo dravyatvādīnām api prakāśakaḥ, na taikṣṇyādīnām. yasmāc ca liṅginy eva liṅgaṃ bhavati, nānyatra, tasmād yuktaṃ yad dhūmo dhūmatveneva pāṇḍutvādibhir api prakāśayati, na dra-

(**tasmāt*) [verbal cognition] does not differ from inference.

§ 2. On the other hand, some claim¹⁷ that a general term¹⁸ (*jātiśabdaḥ*)

vyatvādibhir iti. evaṃ hi avadhāraṇavaiparītyena sambandho liṅgaliṅginoh.⁽¹⁾

“Certainly the indicator (*liṅga*) will have the property of the indicated (*liṅgi-dharman*) because the connection (*sambandha*) relates to both [the indicator and the indicated] in the same way as [a conjunction relates to its two] conjuncts (*saṃyogivat*)! This is not the case.

Even though the relation between the together connected indicator and indicated resides in both, [nevertheless] its mode of existence is like [that of] a container and the contained, but not like [that of] conjuncts. [19]

Because, just as the contained never has the property of the container or the container never has the property of the contained, even though the relation is found to be resident in both, so also the indicator is never the indicated, nor is the indicated ever the indicator. In the case of a conjunct, however, one is just like the other. Therefore the case is not the same in this context.

That is,

the indicated only exists at the indicator; and the latter, in turn, exists only at the indicated. If the restriction is inverted, there is no connection of indicator to indicated. [20]

Since the indicated necessarily exists at the indicator, it is correct that smoke, in the same way as [it indicates] fire, also indicates substanceness, and so on, but [it is] not [correct] that it indicates [fire's] temperature, etc.; and since the indicator exists only at the indicated, and not elsewhere, it is correct that smoke, in the same way as it [indicates] through smokeness, also indicates through the property of being smoke-coloured, and so on, but [it is] not [correct] that it [indicates] through substanceness. Therefore, if the restriction is transposed, there is no relation of indicator to indicated.”

Dignāga apparently never defines *sambandha* in terms of *avinābhāvitva* in PS or PSV, but Siṃhasūri takes it for granted at NCV 627,21–22, q.v. below n. 26. Jinendra-buddhi's gloss at PST Ms B 72b6: *avinābhāvitvaṃ sambandhaḥ* explains Dignāga's use of the term *sambandha* at PS II 20a: *sambandho yady api dviṣṭhaḥ*; cf. the definition of *sambandha* at PST Ms B 183a7: *avinābhāvitvaṃ hi sambandha iti*.

⁽¹⁾ For the Sanskrit fragments, cf. 1. NCV 678,5ff; 2. NCV 699,18; 3. NCV 678,18–679,19; 4. PM 43; NCV 679,16 (*pāda* a).

¹⁷ Here as elsewhere Dignāga seems to quote the work he is addressing. It is not possible to ascertain the identity of the work and its author. It is noteworthy, however, that the term *niyama* is used by Bhartṛhari in a similar context, cf. n. 20 below.

¹⁸ The theory of denotation to which Dignāga refers is based upon the assumption that a general term denotes all particulars through transfer of the general property to every individual substance in the form of non-difference (*abhedopacāra*). That is, the general property and the thing in which it is claimed to be instantiated become identified through co-reference, in the same way as when one transfers

denotes *all* its own particulars¹⁹ (*svabhedān sarvān evāha*). But when

the properties of a lion to a *brāhmaṇa* boy like in the statement “the *brāhmaṇa* boy is a lion.”

Cf. Sīmhasūri’s lucid exposition of the view Dignāga is addressing at NCV 627,11–13: *yasmāt sacchabdo jātisambandhino jātim upādāyātmarūpeṇa dravyādīn abhedopacārād āha, tasmād abhedopacārahetunā vyapadiśyate jātiśabda iti. yathā siṃho māṇavaka iti siṃhaśabdo māṇavakaguṇān upādāyābhedopacārapravṛtter abhedopacārahetunā vyapadiśyate guṇaśabda iti.* “Since the word ‘existent,’ while being based upon the general property, in its own form denotes substances, and so on, that are the relata of the general property due to transfer in the form of non-difference, it is designated as ‘general term’ on account of transfer in the form of non-difference. Just as the word ‘lion’ in the statement ‘the young *brāhmaṇa* is a lion,’ while being based upon the qualities of the young *brāhmaṇa* is designated as ‘quality word’ on account of transfer in the form of non-difference because it applies by transfer in the form of non-difference.”

Jinendrabuddhi’s explanation of the view at PST Ms B 193a2–3 is similar: *katham punar anabhidheyā satī jātir vyapadeśahetuḥ? abhedopacārahetutvād guṇavat. yathā “siṃho māṇavaka” iti śauryādiguṇaviśeṣaḥ siṃhamāṇavakayor abhedopacārahetur bhavan vyapadeśahetur bhavati, guṇaśabda iti, tathā jātir api śabdasya bhedair abhedopacārahetur iti sādhyavyapadeśahetuḥ.* “How, moreover, is the general property the cause of designation (*vyapadeśahetu*), when it is not denotable? Because it is the cause of transfer in the form of non-difference in the same way as a quality (*guṇavat*). For instance, in the statement ‘the young *brāhmaṇa* is a lion,’ a particular quality like bravery, being the cause of transfer in the form of non-difference of the lion with the young brahmin, is the cause of designation; in the same way the general property is the cause of transfer of the term [denoting it] in the form of non-difference of [the general property] with the particulars. Thus it is the cause of designation of that which is to be indicated.”

The subsequent explanation at NCV and PST would indicate that Dignāga addresses views comparable to those traditionally ascribed to Vyāpyāyana by Kātyāyana at vārt 35–44 on A I 2.64, namely that a term denotes a class property as resident in individual substances; cf. n. 20 below.

Dignāga’s well-known definition of *pratyakṣa* at NM (T 1628 3b15–17; T 1629 8c9–11) is terminologically indebted to this view, although this does not imply that he considers qualifiers to be real entities rather than products of *kalpanā*, cf. TSP 456,15–19 quoting and explaining the passage: “*yaj jñānam arthe rūpādaḥ* (so read) *viśeṣaṇābhīdhāyakābhedopacāreṇāvikalpakaṃ tad akṣam akṣam prati varṭata iti pratyakṣam*” *iti. viśeṣaṇaṃ jātyādi, abhīdhāyakaṃ nāma, tayor abhedopacāro jātyādimadbhīḥ sañjñinā ca. abhedopacāragrahaṇaṃ upalakṣaṇaṃ yatrāpi bhedenā grahaṇaṃ: asya gotvam asyedaṃ nāmeti, tatrāpi kalpaneśyata eva.*

Notice that throughout PSV V Dignāga uses the terms *jāti* and *sāmānya* interchangeably to denote any given general property.

¹⁹ Cf. PST Ms B 193a4–5: *svasyā jāter bhedān⁽¹⁾. yā jātir yasya śabdasya vyapadeśahetuḥ, sā tasya svam bhavati. bhidyante paraspasparato viśiṣyanta iti bhedāḥ. yathā*

they are denoted, a particular term serves the purpose of restriction (*niyamārthaṃ viśeṣāsrutiḥ*).²⁰

jāter dravyaguṇakarmāṇi.

⁽¹⁾ em. : °ām Ms

²⁰ Jinendrabuddhi addresses the implications of the expression *sarvān eva* at PST Ms B 193a5–6: *sarvān evāha, na kiñcid eva. tathā hi brāhmaṇo na hantavya ity ukte sarve brāhmaṇajātibhedā Mātharādayo na hanyanti. yadi jātiśabdo niravaśeṣān svabhedān āha, kimarthaṃ tarhi brāhmaṇaḥ Kauṇḍīnya ānīyatām iti viśeṣāsrutiḥ? yāvataḥ brāhmaṇaśabdenaiva Kauṇḍīnyo 'bhihita iti.* “Denotes all, i.e., not just some. That is, when it is said that one should not kill a *brāhmaṇa*, all individuals of the *brāhmaṇa* class like the son of Māthara are not to be killed. If a general term denotes all its particulars without exception, then what purpose does a particular term serve, like when it is said ‘bring the *brāhmaṇa*, son of Kuṇḍina’ inasmuch as the son of Kuṇḍina is denoted by the word ‘*brāhmaṇa*?’”

The example *brāhmaṇo na hantavya* is taken from Patañjali’s comment at MBh I 242,24f on vārttika 39: *dharmasāstraṃ ca tathā*, whose implications Patañjali explains in the following way: *evaṃ ca kṛtvā dharmasāstraṃ pravṛttam: brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ ... brāhmaṇamātraṃ na hanyate ... yadi dravyaṃ padārthaḥ syād ekaṃ brāhmaṇam ahatvā ... anyatra kāmācāraḥ syāt.* “And on this assumption [viz. that a term denotes a class property] the *dharmasāstra* proceeds: [The injunction] ‘one should not kill a ‘*brāhmaṇa*’ means ‘one does not kill any *brāhmaṇa* at all’ ... If an individual substance was the referent denoted by the word one could do as one pleased by abstaining from killing one *brāhmaṇa*,” cf. Scharff 1996: 118–119.

Mallavādin alludes to the view that the application of a term denoting particulars merely has the purpose of restricting the scope of the general term; he presents his view at in a *kārikā* based upon PS V 2: *na jātiśabdo bhedānām ānāntyād vyabhicārataḥ, vācako niyamārthokter jātimaḍvad apohavān*; cf. NCV 606,21–22 and the passage op. cit. 606,10–13 in which Śiṃhasūri explains that every new term that is added to the preceding general term, like for instance ‘*brāhmaṇa*,’ has the purpose of restricting the scope of the general term in accordance with the intended meaning. Thus any term that is articulated subsequently to the general term with the function of restricting its scope is a particular term. Consequently restriction is the establishing of its own referent, i.e., it is a restriction with respect to the referent: *niyamārthā punaḥpunaḥśrutir vivakṣitārthā, kasmāt? tadartha-tvād viśeṣārthatvād viśeṣānārthatvāt pūrvaśruteḥ sāmānyaśruter brāhmaṇādeḥ. tasmāc chravaṇakālakrameṇa punaḥśrutir iti viśeṣaśabda ucyate. ko 'sau niyamo nāma? ity ucyate: niyamaḥ svārthavyavasthāpanaṃ vivakṣite 'rthe 'vadhāraṇam.*

Cf. also Bhartṛhari’s discussion of the restrictive function of *punaḥśrutih* at VP II 64ff (cf. the expression *niyamārthā punaḥśrutih*, 64b).

Jinendrabuddhi comments briefly on the subject of restriction at PST Ms B 193a7 by introducing the delimitative/restrictive particle (*avadhāraṇa*) *eva*, which Śiṃhasūris’s explanation presupposes: *Kauṇḍīnya eva na Māthara iti yathā kriyā hi dravyaṃ ninayatiṭi ukte punar nādravyam iti niyamārtham ucyate yathā gamyeta dravyam eveti.* “Only (*eva*) Kauṇḍīnya, not Māthara. Just as when it is said ‘for

To this it is replied that

a general term (*jātiśabdaḥ*) does not (*na*)

‘denote’ (*vācaka iti*), as [2c₁] will state (*vakṣyate*),

particulars (*bhedānām*).²¹ [2a]

In the first place, a general term like ‘existent’ (*jātiśabdas tāvat sadādiḥ*) does not denote substances, etc.

because they are infinite (*ānantyāt*).²² [2b₁]

an action moves a substance (towards something),’ and, in addition, it is said for the sake of restriction, ‘not a non-substance,’ so that one understands ‘only a substance.’”

For Dignāga’s use of *eva* as semantically equivalent to *vyatireka* “joint absence” or exclusion, cf. PSV V 38c § 54 below.

²¹ Dignāga refers to the occurrence of *vācakaḥ* in *pāda* 2c, which is to be construed with 2a; Cf. PST Ms B 193b1: *sākāṅkṣatvād aparisaṁāptaṁ vākyam iti vakṣyamānena padenākāṅkṣāvicchedaṁ darśayati*. “Thinking that the clause is incomplete because it entails expectation of a sentence complement (*sākāṅkṣatvāt*) he excludes the expectation of a sentence complement by means of the syntactical word that is going to be used (i.e., *vācakaḥ*).”

The problems which PS V 2a–c caused its Tibetan translators are basically due to the fact that in Sanskrit the negation does not cliticise onto the verb like in classical Tibetan. This excludes the possibility of using it as a morpheme syntactically independent of the verb unlike the negation *na* in Sanskrit. In the present case the negation *na* of 2a has to be construed twice with *vācakaḥ*. Since the translators of K and V have followed the common practice of translating 2a as a syntactically independent clause, they were unable to construct the negation with *rjod par byed pa* = *vācakaḥ* twice. Although V loc. cit. reproduces correctly the sentence complement *vācaka iti vakṣyati* as *rjod par byed pa źes brjod par bya’o*, the introduction of *med* before the complement is syntactically and semantically impossible, whereas the use of *mi* would have been syntactically correct. K, on the other hand, uses *min*, and, moreover, correctly adds, as if to compensate for the syntactical ambiguity of *min*, another negation after the sentence complement, so that K reads *brjod par byed pa ma yin no*, although it occurs in the wrong place after 2b₁ *mtha’ yas phyir dañ* (= *ānantyāt*) without any syntactical connection with 2a. V introduces correctly the negation *min* in 2d, cf. n. 33 below.

²² Cf. PST Ms B 193b1: *ānantyād ity upapattiḥ. kasyānantyāt? prakṛtatvād bhedānām eva*; cf. the similar explanation at NCV 627,14–15, indicating that it is based upon the same source as Jinendrabuddhi’s *Ṭīkā: ānantyād iti hetuḥ. kasyānantyāt? bhedānām, yasmāt te pūrvam prakṛtā na cānyaḥ śrūyate*; TSP 342,12–14: *ayam eva cākṛtasamayativād iti hetur ācāryadiñnāgena “na jātiśabdo bhedānām vācakaḥ,*

For (*hi*) it is impossible (*aśakyah*) to tell (*kartum*)²³ the connection (*sambandhaḥ*) of particulars [with a general term like ‘existent’] when they are infinite;²⁴ and as the connection of the word [with particulars] is not told (*akṛtasambandhe śabde*),²⁵ it is not justified that it denotes its

ānanyād” ity anena nirdiṣṭaḥ. tathā hi “*ānanyād*” ity anena samayāsambhava eva nirdiṣṭaḥ. Uddyotakara presents the argument at NV 324,3–4 as follows: *sacchabdaḥ piṇḍānām vācako bhaviṣyatīti na yuktaṁ piṇḍānām ānanyāt*; cf. n. 29 below for Uddyotakara’s reproduction of Dignāga’s argument.

²³ Cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s gloss at PST Ms B 193,2: *ākhyātuṁ: karoter anekārthatvāt*; cf. the identical gloss at NCV 627,17: *kartum ākhyātuṁ; karoter anekārthatvāt*.

²⁴ Siṃhasūri interprets *ānanyā* as denoting: 1. spatial remoteness, cf. NCV 627,16: *na hi pāṭaliputrādīṣṭhā dravyādaya ihaṣṭhena sacchabdena sahākhyātuṁ śakyāḥ*. “For it is not possible for one who is situated here simultaneously to denote substances, and so on, that are situated in Pāṭaliputra, and so on, by means of the word ‘existent;’” cf. Jinendrabuddhi’s similar explanation at PST Ms B 193b3–4: *ye vidūradeśavartino na ta ihaṣṭhānām svasya pratiyoginaḥ sambandhitvenākhyātuṁ śakyāḥ*; 2. infinity in terms of the variety of particulars, cf. NCV 627,16: *ānanyād vā dravyādīnām. tathā hi te ghaṭapaṭarathādībhedanānantāḥ. evaṁ tāvat sambandhibhedād bhedam abhyupagamyedam ucyate, na tu tasya vastunaḥ svagato bhedo ’sti. tatredam eva kāraṇaṁ yat sambandhāntaraviśiṣṭābhīdhāyī śabdaḥ sambandhāntaraviśiṣṭāśabdavācyaṁ asamartho vaktum, gavāśvādivat. tasmād bhedānām avācakaḥ*. “Or because substances, and so on, are infinite. That is, they are infinite because of the difference between pot, cloth, wagon, etc. Thus, in the first place, this is said on the assumption that the difference is due to difference of the relata. The difference of the entity [from other entities], however, is not understood per se. This then is the reason why a denoting word which is qualified by one connection is incapable of denoting the [entity] that is the denotable object of a word that is qualified by another connection, like [the words] ‘cow’ and ‘horse,’ etc. Therefore it does not denote the particulars.”

Siṃhasūri’s use of the term *sambandhibheda* would seem to allude to VP III 1.33: *sambandhibhedāt sattaiva bhīdyamānā gavādiṣu jātir ity ucyate. tasyāṁ sarve śābdā vyavasthitāḥ*. One cannot therefore exclude the possibility that Dignāga has Bhartṛhari’s view of *sattā* in mind.

²⁵ Cf. PST Ms B 193b6: *yo bhedair anākhyātasambandho na sa teṣāṁ vācako mlecchāśabdavat*.

Siṃhasūri explains *sambandha* in terms of *avinābhāvitva*, cf. NCV 627,21–22: *akṛtasambandha ity anākhyātasambandhe śabda iti dviṣṭhatve ’pi sambandhasya śabdasyaivāvinābhāvitvād arthapratyāyakatvaṁ darśayati*. “By the statement ‘as the connection [of the word] has not been told’ viz. as the connection of the word has not been stated, he shows that although the connection is resident in two things [viz. the word and the thing it denotes] the word exclusively indicates its referent because of being invariably concomitant with it.”

For the technical term *avinābhāvitva* as defining the scope of *sambandha*, cf.

referent²⁶ because merely its own form²⁷ is cognized (*svarūpamātra-pratīteh*).²⁸

Dignāga's use above of the term *avinabhāvitvasambandha* for defining the nature of the relation between a word and its denotation at PSV V § 1 with n. 17. The term *akṛtasambandha* refers to the situation before the denotation of any given word has been taught by pointing at its referent (*vyutpatti*). Dignāga addresses the theoretical implications of *vyutpatti* below at PSV V 50bc (§ 65). The term *akṛtasambandha* occurs once in Bhartṛhari's VP III 166c.

²⁶ Cf. PST Ms B 193b2: *tad etad dhetudvayam uktam: ānantaṃ sambandhāśakyatve hetuḥ, anākhyātasambandhatvaṃ punar anabhidhāne*⁽¹⁾. "The following two reasons are formulated: infinity is the reason for the impossibility of connection; the reason, moreover, for not denoting is the fact that the connection is not told."

A similar explanation is found at NCV 627,22: *atra cānantaṃ pāramparyeṇānabhidhānahetuḥ: tato hi sambandhāśakyatā, sambandhāvyutpatter anabhidhānam*. "And in this case infinity is indirectly the reason for not denoting. For because of this [infinity] the connection is impossible, and as a consequence of not teaching the connection there is no denotation."

Dharmakīrti argues in the same way at PVSV 47,7–10: *syād etad ānantiyād vya-kṛtīnām āśakyaḥ śabdena sambandhaḥ kartum. evaṃ satīdam ānantaṃ tadvaty api samānam. jātyāpi hi viśiṣṭā vyaktaya eva vaktavyā ity akṛtasambandhasyānabhidhānād avaśyaṃ tatra sambandhaḥ karaṇīyaḥ. sa ca na śakyate*.

⁽¹⁾ *āne em. : āno Ms*

²⁷ The technical term *svarūpa* denotes the phonetic form of any linguistic item without reference to its denotation. It is used by Pāṇini at A I 1.68: *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya śabdasañjñā* to indicate that the own form of a linguistic item refers to that element itself, and not to the thing it denotes. The term was interpreted differently in the grammatical tradition. Some considered the *svarūpa* to be any particular instance of any given linguistic item, whereas others considered it to be identical with the word type, cf. Bhartṛhari's exposition at VP I 68–69,83; Pind 1991. See Abhyankar 1961, Renou 1957 s.v.

In the present case Dignāga is using the term in the original sense, cf. NCV 627,23–68,7: *yatra śabdasyārthena sambandho 'vyutpanno yathā mlecchāśabdānām tatra śabdāmātraṃ pratīyate nārtha ityādi*. "When the connection of the word with [its] referent has not been taught as in the case of the words of non-Aryans, only the speech unit is understood, not the referent." A similar explanation, presumably based on the same source, in all likelihood SPV, is given at PST Ms B 193b6: *mlecchāśabde hi śabdasvarūpamātraṃ eva pratīyate, nārthaḥ*.

²⁸ Uddyotakara reproduces almost *verbatim* the content of this paragraph at NV 324,4–6: *sacchabdaḥ piṇḍānām vācako bhaviṣyatīti na yuktaṃ piṇḍānām ānantiyāt. na hy ekasya śabdasyānekadravyaguṇaprapañcena sambandha ākhyātuṃ śakyaḥ. na cānākhyāte śabdārthasambandhe śabdād arthapratipattir yuktā, svarūpamātra-pratīteh*. "It is not justified to claim that the word 'existent' will denote the particulars because they are infinite. For it is impossible to tell the connection of a single

§ 3. Moreover, [a general term like ‘existent’ does not denote particulars]

because of ambiguity (vyabhicārataḥ). [2b₂]

For just as (*yathā hi*) the word ‘existent’ applies to substance (*dravye*), so it also [applies] to quality, and so on (*guṇādīṣv api*); consequently (*iti*) there will be doubt (*saṁśayaḥ syāt*) because of ambiguity (*vyabhicārāt*), but there will be no denotation (*nābhidhānam*).²⁹

§ 4. Someone believes (*yo ’pi manyate*) that the general term [‘existent’], on the other hand, is used to denote the mere general property (**jātimātre*) or its mere inherence relation (**tadyogamātre vā*)³⁰ because

word with a multitude of many substances and qualities. And in that the connection of the word with its referent is not told it is not justified that the cognition of the referent follows from the word because it is merely the own form of the word that is cognized.”

Uddyotakara may have used the infinitive *ākhyātum* because he found it in the source he was quoting, which in all likelihood is *Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa* cf. n. 29 below.

²⁹ Uddyotakara reproduces Dignāga’s argument in a more elaborate form at NV 324,6–9, presumably on the basis of Dignāga’s lost *Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa*: *vyabhicārāc ca. sacchabdaśravaṇāc ca dravyaguṇakarmāṇīti pariplavamānā buddhir avatiṣṭhate; na ca yasmād abhidhānāt pariplavate buddhis tad abhidhānam iti yuktam vaktum. tasmāt sacchabdo bhedānām na vācaka iti.* “Moreover, [the general term ‘existent’ does not denote the particulars] because of ambiguity. Moreover, from hearing the word ‘existent’ the mind remains in a state of confusion as to substance, quality, or action; and it is not justified to claim that the denotation due to which the mind is confused is denotation. Therefore the word ‘existent’ does not denote the particulars.”

Dignāga’s arguments for the impossibility that general terms denote the particulars are mentioned by Kumārila at TV (on MSū III 1.12) p. 39,16ff: *nanu vyaktinām ānantyavyabhicārābhyām anabhidhānam uktam.*

Jinendrabuddhi closes his exegesis of this paragraph with the following discussion at PST Ms B 194a2–5, which presupposes Dharmakīrtian philosophy: *nanu ca jātiśabdāt sarvasvabhedapratītiḥ. na hi sarveṣu saṁśaya upajāyate. na ca sarvasvabhedābhāve kadācij jātiśabdasya kvacid arthāntaravṛttir upalabdhā; tat kuto vyabhicārāḥ? naiṣa doṣaḥ. na hi jātiśabdena bhedābhedarūpasamsparsena pratyāyayate. na ca samastabhedarūpaṁ nāma teṣām sāmānyam asti yac chabde-nābhidhiyeta, bhedarūpaparityāge teṣām eva jātivaprasaṅgāt. na ca bhedarūpeṇa vyāptir asti, parasparavyāvṛttatvād⁽¹⁾ bhedarūpasyeti, nāsty asiddhiḥ.*

⁽¹⁾ Cf. PV I 40–42 and PVSV 24,24 ad loc.

³⁰ The two locatives are used to express “in the sense of” or “to denote,” a usage

Even in the case of Implication (*arthākṣepe* 'pi), there is uncertainty (*anekāntaḥ*).¹⁷⁵ [11c]

For implication (*arthākṣepaḥ*) means obtainment of certainty according to the state of the case¹⁷⁶ (**yasminn arthād niścayotpattiḥ*), like, for instance, the certainty that NN is eating at night (*rātribhojane*) on the basis of [the statement] that he does not eat during the day (*divā na bhuṅkta iti*).¹⁷⁷ In the present context, however, (*iha punaḥ*), when one says 'existent' (*sad ity ukte*) there is no certainty about 'pot,' etc. Therefore (*iti*) there is no implication (*nāsty arthākṣepaḥ*) as there is doubt.

§22. Since¹⁷⁸ (**yasmāt*) it is not justified under any circumstances (**na katham api*)¹⁷⁹ that a general term (**jātiśabdaḥ*) denotes particulars, a general property, the connection [with a general property], or the general

assumed by the word, and this [referent] is by necessity connected to some general property from among potness, etc. And therefore it implies a particular like a pot in that it implies a particular general property."

¹⁷⁵ This statement introduces the rebuttal of the preceding argument, cf. PST Ms B 204a2-3: *imām api kalpanām nirākurvann āha*.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. *gaṇ la don gyi śugs kyis V : don gaṇ la K*. Since the traditional understanding of *arthāpatti* is that it is something that obtains according to the state of the case (cf., e.g., NBh 573,3: *arthād āpattir arthāpattiḥ*), it is reasonable to assume that V has recorded a word that is missing in K.

¹⁷⁷ This example belongs to the category of *śrutarthāpatti*, i.e., implication of an oral statement, cf. ŚBh 32,6: *arthāpattir api dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vā 'rtho 'nyathā nopapadyate ity arthakalpanā*; cf. the discussion at ŚV Arthāpatti° 51 in the context of the criticism of Dignāga's attempt to include *arthāpatti* in *anumāna*: *pīno divā na bhuṅkte cety evamādivacaḥ śrutau rātribhojanavijñānaṃ śrutarthāpattir ucyate*. "When hearing a statement like '(NN) is fat, and yet he does not eat during the day time,' the knowledge that he is eating at night is what is called implication of an oral statement."

¹⁷⁸ Cf. *gaṇ gi phyir K : de'i phyir V*. *gaṇ gi phyir* = *yasmāt* correlates with *tena* of PS V 11d; the readings of K suggest the following restoration: *yasmāt sa jātiśabdo na katham api bhedasāmānyasambandhajātīmadhvācako yujyate*, cf. n.s 181-182 below.

¹⁷⁹ The reading *ji ltar yaṇ ... rigs pa ma yin no K* would translate Sanskrit *na katham api ... yujyate*. V is entirely confused. In addition to misconstruing the *dvanda* compound *khyad par daṅ spyi daṅ daṅ 'brel pa daṅ rigs daṅ ldan pa K* for which V reads *tha dad 'brel pa'i spyi* (NP *cī*) *rigs daṅ ldan pa*, the translators misunderstood the expression *na katham api*, construing *katham* as acc. of *kathā* in dependence on the verb. Thus the adverbial complement *katham api* is reproduced as the noun phrase *lan 'ga' yaṇ*.

property possessor¹⁸⁰ (**bhedasāmānyasambandhajātīmadvācakah*),

(*tena*) a word (*śrutiḥ*) excludes other (*anyāpohakṛt*) [referents].¹⁸¹ [11d]

¹⁸² Therefore, what was stated previously namely that

¹⁸⁰ Cf. NCV 609,19f: *tathā ca jātisambandhajātīmadabhīdhānānām asambhavād 'anyāpohakṛc chrutiḥ.'*

¹⁸¹ Śiṃhasūri regards the *ślokapāda* PS V 11d as *anyāpohalakṣaṇavākyam*, cf. NCV 611,20 and explains it ibid. line 21ff: *tasya vyākhyā: śabdāntarārthāpohaḥ hi svārthe kurvati śrutir abhidhatta ity ucyate ... tadanuvṛtṭyā vyāvṛttir yasmin vidyate svārthe sa gṛhyate na vyāvṛttimātram*. The first line of the explanation is the beginning of a well-known prose fragment defining *apoha*, which evidently belongs in a similar context. The same fragment is also addressed by Mallavādin, cf. NCV 612,5ff, just as Uddyotakara in his critique of Dignāga's *apoha* theory quotes the *ślokapāda* followed by the first line of its explanation as the conclusion of the *pūrvapakṣa*, cf. NV 324,20f. The prose fragment, which was known to all contemporary scholars, stems in all likelihood from Dignāga's SPVy. For the sources of this fragment, which I quote here *in extenso*, cf. NCV loc. cit., and Pind 1999: 318–319: *atha ca jātisambandhajātīmadabhīdhānānām asambhavāt "tenānyāpohakṛc chrutiḥ." śabdāntarārthāpohaḥ⁽¹⁾ hi svārthe kurvati śrutir abhidhatta ity ucyate; hiśabdo yasmādarthe. yasmād vṛkṣaśabdo 'vṛkṣanivṛttim'⁽²⁾ svārthe kurvan svārthaṁ vṛkṣalakṣaṇaṁ pratyāyayatīti ucyate, evaṁ nivṛttivīṣṭaṁ vastu śabdārthaḥ, 'dravyādi san', na nivṛttimātram, alakṣaṇīyam eva ca syān nivṛttimātram, avastutvāt, kharaviṣānakunṭhatikṣṇatādivarṇanāvat*. "And since the denotations of the general property, of the relation, and of the general property possessor are impossible, the word excludes other [referents]. For (*hi*) it is claimed that the word 'denotes' in that it excludes the referents of other words for the sake of its own referent. The word *hi* is used in the sense of 'because': Because it is claimed that the word 'tree' while precluding the word 'non-tree'⁽²⁾ for the sake of its own referent indicates its own referent as having the character of a tree. Thus the word's referent is a thing (*vastu*) as qualified by preclusion, [i.e.] an existent thing like a substance, but not mere preclusion; for (*ca*) mere preclusion would indeed be indefinable because it is an unreal thing, like [the unreal referents of] descriptions like bluntness or sharpness of donkey's horns."

For the referent as an entity (*vastu*) qualified by the non-existence or exclusion of other things from its locus, cf. PSV V 34–36.

⁽¹⁾ Cf. the reading at NCV 640,7: *śabdāntarārthāpohaḥ svārthe kurvati*, which in all likelihood imitates Dignāga's original formulation; the definition was well-known, cf. e.g. TS 1015 and TSP 394,8ff.

⁽²⁾ According to the *apoha* thesis words exclude other words as well as referents of other words. Exclusion defines the general property in words and referents. Cf. e.g. Translation of PSV V 33ab.

¹⁸² This paragraph marks the end of the first section of PSV V. Dignāga concludes that the validity of his own thesis is established because there is no other theoretically

it, [i.e. a word] denotes its own referent through exclusion of other [referents] like [the inferential indicator] 'being a product,' etc. [1cd],

is settled (**tad eva sthitam*).¹⁸³

justifiable solution to the problem of the denotation of words. The two verses that follow PS V 11 introduce topics that are unrelated to those introduced in the previous paragraphs, cf. n. 193 below. Uddyotakara closes his exposition of Dignāga's view in a similar way at NV 324,20–21: *anyatra pratyayābhāvaprasaṅgāc ca, na cānyā gatiḥ asti, tasmād anyāpohakṛc chrutir iti*. "And because it follows [absurdly] that there is no cognition otherwise, and there is no other way, the word excludes other [referents]." As it appears from Jinendrabuddhi's remarks on this paragraph, other Indian scholars did not fail to notice that Dignāga seems to corroborate the validity of the *apoha* theory merely by debunking the opponents' theories without corroborating in detail its epistemological framework, cf. PST Ms B 204b6–205a2: *yathoktājātyādyabhidhānapratīṣedhopasamhāreṇa svayam eva sthīrikaroti. nanu ca "parapakṣapratīṣedhena svapakṣasiddhir alabhyā" ⁽¹⁾ yathoktam āvītapratīṣedhe. naiva doṣaḥ. pūrvam evātra "kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣata" (PS V 1cd) iti pratipāditam śābdasyānumānād abhinnavat. tatra kevalam pramāṇāntaravādidbhir vidhimukhena jātyādaya ucyante ity uktam. tasmīn pratīṣiddhe sa evārtho vyavatiṣṭhate. vaksyamānām ca svapakṣasādhanaṃ hr̥dī kṛtvāivam uktam*. "He corroborates his own theory by means of summarizing debunking [the views] that the word denotes the general property, etc. But is it not so that 'establishing one's own thesis by means of debunking the opponent's thesis is inadmissible' as it has been formulated in the [chapter on the] rejection of the *āvīta* inference? There is no fault at all. The fact that verbal cognition is not different from inference has previously been explained in the [statement]: 'It [i.e., a word] denotes its own referent through exclusion of other referents in the same way as 'the being produced'' (PS V 1cd). In this context it has been said by those who claim that [verbal cognition] is a separate means of cognition that general properties, and so on, are denoted in an affirmative form. In that this has been debunked only this referent is settled. And he has formulated it in this way while keeping in mind the proof of his own thesis that is going to be explained."

After this comment Jinendrabuddhi inserts an excursus on the *apoha* doctrine. It reflects Dharmakīrti's *apoha* theory and includes many quotations from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*. For the Sanskrit text of the excursus, see Appendix 1.

⁽¹⁾ Jinendrabuddhi appears to quote a passage from PSV III where Dignāga debunks the Sāṃkhya opponents view of indirect proof (*āvīta*) as that of the action of establishing one's own thesis through negation of the thesis of the opponent, cf. PST Ms B 122a5: *parapakṣapratīṣedhena svapakṣasthāpanakriyā āvītaḥ*.

¹⁸³ *de nīd* = *tad eva*, cf. the phrase *sa evārtho vyavatiṣṭhate* at PST Ms B 205a1, which probably imitates the original Dignāgan formulation.

§ 23. It is, moreover, explained¹⁸⁴ that

a word does not indicate [its referent] *in toto*, although it is denotable in many ways.¹⁸⁵ On the contrary (*tu*), it performs its purpose which is exclusion¹⁸⁶ in accordance with its own connection (*svasambandhānūrūpyāt*).¹⁸⁷ [12]

¹⁸⁴ According to Jinendrabuddhi this verse settles that only exclusion of other (referents) is the word's referent by showing that it constitutes a part of the referent to be indicated, cf. PST Ms B 208a1-2: *āha cety arthasya pratyāyyasyāṅga*⁽¹⁾ *saṅdarśanānyāpoham eva śabdārthaṃ samarthayate.*

⁽¹⁾ *pratyāyyasyāṅga*° em. (cf. *rtogs par bya ba'i cha T*) : *pratyāśyaṃgi*° Ms

¹⁸⁵ Cf. PST Ms B 208a2-3: *śiṃśapādibhedena puṣpithaphalitādibhedena ca bahuprakāratve 'pīty arthaḥ. abhidheyasyeti vṛkṣāder arthasya. tasyaivam anekaprakāratve 'pi śabdāt sarvaprakāreṇa pratītir nāsti.* "The meaning is as follows: even though it has many modes because of particulars like *śiṃśapā* and particulars such as having flowers and fruits. The denotable object means a referent like a tree. Thus, although it has many modes, there is no cognition of it from the word in all its modes." Śiṃhasūri explains 12a with the theoretical background of PSV V 34 (q.v.), cf. NCV 653,15ff: *bahudhāpy abhidheyasyeti śiṃśapādibhedā atrābhipretā na dravyādayaḥ; tathā hi vṛkṣavad bhedesu saṃśayo dr̥ṣṭo 'rthatas tu dravyādiṣu nīścayaḥ.* "In the present context a particular like *śiṃśapā* is intended, not [particulars] like substance. That is, there is observed to be doubt about the particulars in the same way as there is doubt about [the particulars of] tree, whereas, by implication, there is certainty about substance, etc."

¹⁸⁶ This verse has a close parallel at PS II 13: *<anekadharmaṇo 'rthasya na līṅgāt sarvathā gatiḥ>, anubaddhasya vicchedaṃ tasyānyato gamayati.*⁽¹⁾

K (Kitagawa 1973: 462b2-5 = P 112b7-8): *don gyi chos rnam du ma ni thams cad rtags las rtags ma yin // gaṅ žig rjes 'brel gžan la ni ldog pa rtags par byed pa yin //*
V (Kitagawa 1973: 462a3-6 = P 31b3): *chos don du ma gtan tshigs kyis rnam pa thams cad du rtags min // gaṅ dan 'brel pa yons bcad nas chos gžan dan bral thob par byed //*

"The indicator does not indicate *in toto* the referent with its many properties. It indicates, however, the exclusion from other [properties], of that [property] that is concomitant with it."

⁽¹⁾ For the restored *pādas* ab, cf. PSV V 12b and the parallel formulation at PS I 5ab: *dharmīno 'nekarūpasya nendriyāt sarvathā gatiḥ*, on which, v. Hattori 1968: 27, 91 n. 1.43; *pādas* cd are restored on the basis of *pratīka* and paraphrase at PST Ms B 70a4: *anubaddhasya vicchedaṃ iti ... tasyānyato vivakṣād vicchedaṃ vyāvṛttim gamayati*; PS II 13 also occurs in NM as verse 17, cf. T 1628 3c10-1113, T 1629 8a4-5; Frauwallner 1982: 778.

¹⁸⁷ See Appendix 7.

Even though a word has many properties,¹⁸⁸ it only indicates by means of that [property] by virtue of which it does not deviate¹⁸⁹ from its referent,¹⁹⁰ but not by virtue of the word's being a quality [of ether], etc.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸ Cf. NCV 653,18ff: *sāmānyadharmairḥ khaguṇatvādibhir vṛkṣārthaṃ tasmin vastuni nābhidhatte, tathā hi te vināpi vṛkṣārthena rasādiṣu dṛṣṭāḥ, na tu vṛkṣaśabdo 'nyatra dṛṣṭaḥ, tasmād vṛkṣaśabdenaiva pratyāyanam upapannam.* "It does not, for the sake of this object, denote the referent tree by means of general properties like being an attribute of space, etc. For they are, for instance, observed at taste, and so on, even in the absence of the referent tree. The word 'tree', however, is not observed to apply to other things (*anyatra*). Therefore it is justified that only the word 'tree' indicates." PST Ms B 208a4–5: *atha śabdasya ko 'ṃśo gamaka ity āha. anekadharmā śabdo pītyādi. svasāmānyadharmair anekadharmā; cf. the phrase at VP II 253: śabdasya anekadharmanah.*

¹⁸⁹ Like Bhartṛhari Dignāga uses *ativartate* as a synonym of *vyabhicarati*; cf. VP III 3.51: *etāṃ sattām padārtho hi na kaścid ativartate. sā ca sampratisattāyāḥ prthag bhāṣye nirḍiṣṭā*, alluding to MBH II 391,7 (ad A V 2.94): *na sattām padārtho vyabhicarati*; cf. the use of *ativartate* at PS II 17, q.v. n. 193.

¹⁹⁰ The property to which Dignāga alludes is the general property of the word, e.g., treewordness, which is defined by exclusion of other words, in the same way as the referent of the word. Dignāga addresses this aspect of the general *apoha* theory at PS V 22c § 35, 33ab § 47, qq.v; Cf. PST Ms B 208a5–6: *sāmānyadharmaṇa vṛkṣaśabdatvādīnā yena na vyabhicarati pratyāyayati tenaiveti. sa evāśya dharmo gamaka ity arthaḥ. evaśabdena yad vyavachinnam tad darśayati.* "The meaning is this: It only indicates by means of that (property) due to which it does not deviate viz. the general property treewordness, etc. Only that property of it indicates. The word 'only' indicates that which is excluded." As will become clear later in the chapter, the general property of the word, namely exclusion of other words, is intrinsic to the word (*śabde*) in the same way as it is intrinsic to the referent (*arthe*). Consequently exclusion is an inherent property of words or referents. Cf. the crucial statements of PSV V 22cd above and 33ab below.

¹⁹¹ Cf. PST Ms B 208a6–7: *ādiśabdena śabdajñeyatvādīnām grahanam. apratyāyakatvam punas teṣām vyabhicāritvāt. tathā hi te vināpi vṛkṣārthena rasādiṣu dṛṣṭāḥ, na vṛkṣaśabdatvādikaṃ sāmānyam.* "By the expression 'etc.' is included the word's being knowable, etc. These, however, do not indicate because they are ambiguous. That is, even without the referent tree these are also observed to denote taste, and so on, but the general property treewordness is not" (cf. the similar explanation at NCV 653,18ff, q.v. n. 189 above).

Dignāga's statement is similar to the view which Bhartṛhari propounds at VPV I 53,2–3: *yathā hi ghaṭe dravyatvapṛthivītvaghaṭatvādīnām aviruddhaḥ samavāyah, tathā vṛkṣaśabde 'pi guṇatvaśabdatvavṛkṣaśabdatvādīnām ākṛtviśeṣānām aviruddhaḥ samavāyah.* "Just as the inherence in a pot of general properties such as substanceness, earthenness, potness, and so on, is not in conflict, so also the

(*śabdaguṇatādibhiḥ*).¹⁹² [13]¹⁹³

§ 24. If the word's referent (**śabdārthaḥ*) is merely exclusion of other (*anyāpohamātram*) [referents], how then (*katham*) could words like 'blue' and 'lotus' (**nīlotpalādiśabdānām*) be co-referential (**sāmānādhikaraṇyam*) and related as qualifier and qualified (**viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ*)?

And why would that not be the case?

Because (*yasmāt*) the excluded object (**apohyam*) of general and particular terms (**sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdānām*) is different (*bhinnam*).¹⁹⁴

inherence in the word 'tree' of such particular universals as qualityness, wordness, treewordness, and so on, is not in conflict."

Dignāga's point is that the word's being a quality (*guṇatā*) of ether (cf. VSū II 1.5; PBh § 61) is irrelevant to its semantic properties. This is also emphasized by Bhartṛhari's commentator Vṛṣabhadeva at VPT 52,23: *guṇatvaṃ tv anabhidhāyakaṃ pratītam eva rūpādiṣv api samavāyāt*. "But qualityness is understood not to denote because it also inheres in colour, etc."

¹⁹² See Appendix 8.

¹⁹³ The reading *ḥes bya ba bsdū ba'i tshigs su bcaḍ pa'o* V 116,3 indicating that PS V 12–13 are *saṅgrahaśloka*s is dubious because these verses introduce topics that have not been dealt with in any of the preceding paragraphs. The purpose of a *saṅgrahaśloka* is to summarize the discussion of topics that have been addressed previously, and this is, to the best of my knowledge, how they are used by Dignāga in other sections of PSV. The introduction of the term in V therefore contradicts its use in PSV in general, and thus corroborates its omission in K, which I have decided to follow. In addition, Mallavādin quotes the verses immediately after citing PSV V 34–35 §§ 47–48 (cf. NCV 652–653), and Simhasūri merely restricts himself to explaining that Dignāga indicates the purpose of the preceding exposition in two *śloka*s (cf. NCV 653,15: *āha cety etam arthaṃ ślokadvayena darśayati*), thus connecting them to PSV V 34–35, without even hinting at their being *saṅgrahaśloka*s. The introductory *āha* *ca* seems to indicate that Dignāga quotes them from another treatise (presumably the *Sāmānyaparikṣāvyaśa*) to corroborate his conclusion at PS V 11d because, as indicated above, they presuppose some of the fundamental theoretical issues of the *apoha* theory, which he will address at PSV V 34f.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. PST Ms B 208b1–2: *apohyabhedena sāhacaryād arthabhedam darśayati. eṣa hetuḥ: ye bhinnārthā na te samānādhikaraṇā nāpi viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhūtāḥ, ghaṭa-paṭādiśabdavat. tathā ca nīlotpalādayaḥ śabdāḥ*. "He shows that difference of referent is due to its concomitance with difference of excluded referent. The reason is as follows: [Words] whose referents are different are neither co-referential nor related as qualifier and qualified, like words such as 'pot' or 'cloth.' And expressions like 'blue lotus' are the same."

Uddyotakara's criticism of Dignāga's view at NV 334,6–12 sheds more light on

§ 37. The qualifier-qualified relation (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvam*) has already been explained above on the grounds that it is not self-dependent (*asvātantryāt*).³²⁸ [25ab]

For the impossibility of the qualifier-qualified relation (**viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvāsambhavaḥ*) has already been explained if the general property possessor is denoted (*tadvadabhidhāne*). Thus co-reference and qualifier-qualified relation are only justified when exclusion of other referents is the referent of the word, but not otherwise.

§ 38. Now (*tatra*)

the denotable objects of general terms, particular [general] terms, and synonyms are not excluded (*na sāmānyabhedaparyāyavācyaṇut*), although they are different.³²⁹ [25cd]

For even though [the referents'] being different is the same (*tulye 'pi hi anyatve*), the word does not exclude the referents of general terms, particular [general] terms, and synonyms.

How can this be?

Because they are not in conflict (*avirodhāt*).³³⁰ In the first place (*tāvat*),

³²⁸ Cf. PS V 4a above with PSV ad loc.; PST Ms B 217b4–5: “*tadvato nāsvatantratvād*” (4a) *ity atra hy etadbhedatvam uktam. atadbhedatve ca yathā sāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ na sambhavati, tathā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo 'pi. bhedena hi sāmānyam viśeṣyate, nābhedena.*

³²⁹ According to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignāga is now introducing an exception to the general rule of exclusion formulated at the beginning of the *apoha* chapter, so as to avoid the conclusion that the general rule also applies to the referents of general terms, particular terms, and synonyms, cf. PST Ms B 217b5–7: *śabdasya pravṛttinivṛttiyarthatvād anvaavyatirekacodanāyā vyahārāṅgatā, na⁽¹⁾ tv anyathā iti darśayitum pūrvaṁ kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena śabdo bhāṣata* (cf. PS V 1cd above) *ity uktam. tasyedānim anyatve 'pityādināpavādam āha. yad utsrṣtam “anyāpohena bhāṣata” (PS V 1d above) iti tat sāmānyaviśeṣaparyāyāśabdārthaparihāreṇeti.*

⁽¹⁾ *na em.* (cf. *ma yin T*) : om. Ms

³³⁰ Since the property of being other is the cause of exclusion, not being in conflict, i.e., not being other, explains why the referents of general terms, particular terms, and synonyms are not excluded, cf. PST Ms B 217b7–218a1: *anyatvaṁ cāpohe nimittam. avirodhād iti anapohyatāyām hetuḥ. yā⁽¹⁾ hy aviruddhā na te parasparebhyo druhyanti nāpohanti, yathā rūpādayo dravye. NCV 637,15–16: anyatve sāmānyabhedaparyāyāśabdānām arthaṁ vṛkṣaśrutir nāpohate pṛthivīśiṃśapātarvādīśabdānām*

the excluded object (*apohyam*) of a synonym is the same because [synonyms] are not applied simultaneously (*yugapad aprayogāt*).³³¹ And it is not justified that it rejects its own referent (*na ca svārthapratikṣepo yuktaḥ*).³³² A particular [general] term,³³³ moreover, approves (*anumodate*) that the general term³³⁴ has excluded another referent³³⁵ (*arthāntaram vyudastam*) for the sake of its own particulars³³⁶ (*svabhedeṣu*) because they are in need of it (*arthitvāt*).³³⁷ For just as (*yathā hi*) a *śiṃśapā* [tree]

avirodhāt, virodhāc ca paṭādīn apohata iti. "The word 'tree' does not exclude the referent of a general term, a particular term, and a synonym although they are different because terms like 'earth,' '*śiṃśapā*,' and '*taru* (tree)' are not in conflict; and it excludes cloth, etc. because of conflict."

ŚVT 69,27-70,1 on ŚV Apoha° 148: *atra bhikṣuṇā vṛkṣaḥ śiṃśapeti sāmānādhikarāṇyaṃ darśayatoktam: vṛkṣas tarur iti paryāyānām ca parasparam anapohyātvam. anyatve 'pi na sāmānyabhedaparyāyavācīnām avirodhāt – iti.* "While illustrating co-reference such as '*śiṃśapā* is a tree' the monk explains: Synonyms like '*vṛkṣa*' and '*taru*' do not have excluded referents one another because general terms, particular terms, and synonyms are not in conflict, although they are different."

Cf. NR 429,32: *yad api sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdānām śiṃśapāvṛkṣādīnām paryāyānām ca taruvṛkṣādīnām avirodhenānapohakatvam uktam: anyatve 'pi na sāmānyabhedaparyāyavācīnā <m avirodhād> (2) iti.*

(1) *yā* em. : *yo* Ms

(2) So probably read: om. NR.

³³¹ Cf. PST Ms B 218a2-3: *ekena tasyārthasya kṛtakatvān na dvitīyaḥ prasajyate. sati ca sāmānye yatra dvitīyasyāprayogaḥ, tayoṛ ekārthatā yathā <taruvṛkṣa>yoh (1).* "Since the referent is dealt with by a single [synonym] a second one is not required; and when a second one is not applied as they have the same capability, the two of them have the same reference, like [the synonyms] '*taru*' and '*vṛkṣa*.'"

(1) *yathā taruvṛkṣa°* em. : *yasthā [prasth?]ayoḥ* Ms (*dper na bye brag dag bzin no T*, which is incomprehensible in the context; the translator may have had difficulties interpreting the Sanskrit Ms; the proposed em. is based on the examples mentioned at NR 429,32 q.v. n. 330 above).

³³² Another reason for non-exclusion according to Jinendrabuddhi, cf. PST Ms B 218a4: *anapohyatāyām hetvantaram āha.*

³³³ For instance the word '*śiṃśapā*.'

³³⁴ That is, the term 'tree' (*vṛkṣa*).

³³⁵ Such as pot, etc. (*ghaṭādi*).

³³⁶ That is *śiṃśapā* and the rest, cf. PST Ms B 218a5-6: *sāmānyāśabdasya vṛkṣaśabdasya yat svavṛkṣatvasāmānyam tasya bhedaḥ svabhedaḥ śiṃśapādayaḥ.*

³³⁷ Cf. PST Ms B 218a6: *arthī (1) hi śiṃśapāśabdo ghaṭādivyudāseṇa.* "For the word '*śiṃśapā*' is in need of the exclusion of pot, etc."

(1) *arthī* em. : *arthā* Ms

is not a *palāśa* [tree], and so on,³³⁸ it is not a pot, and so on, either.³³⁹ Thereby (*etena*) it is also explained why it does not reject the referent of a general term's general term (*sāmānyasāmānyaśabdārthāpratikṣepa uktaḥ*).³⁴⁰ Similarly, why would a general term (*sāmānyaśabdaḥ*) not tolerate that its own referent³⁴¹ is being restricted to the intended referent³⁴² (*abhiprete viṣaye vyavasthāpyamānam*) by a particular [general] term or a particular [general] term's particular [general] term?³⁴³ Thus,

³³⁸ Cf. *śiṅ śa pa ni pa la śa la sogs pa V : śiṅ śa pa ni pa la sogs pa K*.

³³⁹ Cf. PST Ms B 218a6–218b1: *etena ghaṭādyapohenārthitvād ekārthakāritām udbhāyayan bhedaśabdaḥ sāmānyaśabdena na virudhyata iti darśayati. tathā hi palāśādirūpaḥ śiṃśapāśabdasyārtho na bhavātīti. tasya palāśādayo 'pohyāḥ. tathā ghaṭādirūpo 'pi na bhavātīti. ghaṭādayo 'py apohyāḥ. te ca vṛkṣaśabdenāpohyante. "Thereby, arguing that they have the same purpose because they are in need of the exclusion of pot, and so on, he shows that a particular term is not in conflict with a general term. That is, the referent of the word 'śiṃśapā' does not have the form of *palāśa*, etc. Thus its excluded referents are *palāśa*, etc. In the same way it does not have the form of pot, etc. Thus its excluded referents are also pot, etc. And these are excluded by the word 'tree.'"*

³⁴⁰ Cf. PST Ms B 218b1–3: *svasya sāmānyasya vṛkṣatvasya yat sāmānyam pāṛthivatvaṃ tacchabdaḥ pāṛthivaśabdaḥ sāmānyasāmānyaśabdaḥ. tena yat vyudasyam apāṛthivādi* ⁽¹⁾ *tac cīṃśapāśabdo 'numanyate 'rthitvāt. yathā hi śiṃśapā na palāśaḥ, evam* ⁽²⁾ *nāpāṛthivādy* ⁽³⁾ *api, evam āvṛtyā adravyasyāsataś ca dravyasacchabādābhyāṃ nīrā-kriyamānasyārthitvād abhyanumodanaṃ yojyaṃ. "The word 'earthen' denoting the general property earthenness that is the general property of its own general property, is a general term's general term. The word 'śiṃśapā' approves that non-earthen things, and so on, are to be excluded by it because it is in need of it. For just as a śiṃśapā [tree] is not a palāśa [tree], so it is not not [something] earthen, and so on, either. Thus the approval is to be applied by recursion because it needs that non-substances and non-existent things are excluded by the words 'substance' and 'existent.'"*

⁽¹⁾ *apāṛthivādi* em. : *apādi* Ms

⁽²⁾ *palāśaḥ, ev°* em. : *palāśaś cev°* Ms

⁽³⁾ Cf. *chu las ma gyur pa ṅid la sogs T = āpāditvādi*; the translator of T evidently read *āpāditvādi*. However, it makes no sense in the context.

³⁴¹ That is, for instance, the word 'existent' and its own referent existence, cf. PST Ms B 218b3–4: *sāmānyaśabdo 'pi sadādiḥ. svārthaṃ sattādikam*.

³⁴² That is, e.g., a substance as defined by a property, and so on, cf. PST Ms B 218b4: *guṇādīvyavacchinne* ⁽¹⁾ *dravyāḍau*.

⁽¹⁾ *vyavacchinne* em. (cf. *rnam par bcad pa'i T*) : *vyavasthinne* Ms

³⁴³ A particular term is a term like 'substance,' and a particular term's particular term comprises in descending order terms like 'earthen,' 'tree,' 'śiṃśapā,' and so on, cf. PST Ms B 218b5: *viśeṣaśabdena dravyādinā, viśeṣaviśeṣaśabdena vā*

since they are not in conflict (**avirodhāt*), the exclusion of the referent of a general term, and so on, is not justified (**na sāmānyādisabdārthāpoho yuktaḥ*).³⁴⁴ And an aggregate³⁴⁵ (*samūhaḥ*) denotes a separate referent (*arthāntaravācakaḥ*) in the same way.³⁴⁶ And thus it is justified, in the manner explained previously (*yathoktaṃ prāk*)³⁴⁷ that a general term and a particular [general] term, whether they are two³⁴⁸ or

pārthivavṛkṣasāṃśapāsābdādīnā.

³⁴⁴ Cf. PST Ms B 218b5–6: *arthī hi svaviśayāvasthānena*⁽¹⁾ *nirviśayasya svārthasyā-nupapatteḥ. anenābhiṣṭārthasampādanād viśeśasabdāḥ sāmānyasābdasyopakāri, tataś ca sāmānyasābdas tena na virudhyata iti darśayati.* “For [the general term] is in need of being confined to its proper domain since it is not justified if its proper referent is without domain. Since the intended referent is realized by means of it [viz. the general term], the particular term is assisting the general term; and therefore he points out that the general term is not in conflict with it.”

⁽¹⁾ *svaviśayāva°* em. (cf. *raṇ gi yul la gnas pas T*) : *sasvasviśayāva°* Ms

³⁴⁵ Although Dignāga does not explain the linguistic implications of the term *samūha*, it is clear from Jinendrabuddhi and Sīmhasūri’s explanations in PST and NCV, respectively, that *samūha* in the present context denotes any given string consisting of 1. two speech units such as stem (*prakṛti*) and affix (*pratyaya*), 2. two speech units constituting a compound (*samāsa*), 3. two speech units (i.e., syntactical words) constituting a sentence (*vākya*), and 4. a sentence consisting of more than two syntactical words. According to Dignāga’s theory, the sentence is the principal speech unit, cf. PSV V 46 § 61.

³⁴⁶ Cf. PST Ms B 218b6–7: *avirodhād apratikṣepe guṇotkarṣaṃ darśayati. athavā parasparārthāpratikṣepe hetvantaram āha. parasparārthāpratikṣepe hi svārthaviśiṣṭasyārthasya vācakatvam upapadyate, nānyathā.*

³⁴⁷ Jinendrabuddhi quotes PS V 15ac explaining that while it shows that the words ‘*nīla*’ and ‘*utpala*’ each separately are without referent in terms of the referent of their aggregate, it also explains that the aggregate denotes a separate referent (*arthāntara*), cf. PST Ms B 219b1: *samudāyārthena pratyekam ānarthakyaṃ nilotpalaśabdāyor darśayatā samudāyasyārthāntarābhidhāyitvam uktam.*

³⁴⁸ Jinendrabuddhi quotes as an example of a string consisting of stem and affix the syntactical word *vṛkṣam* (PST Ms B 219a1: *dvayor iti yathā vṛkṣam iti prakṛtipratyayoḥ*), which he analyses at PST Ms B 219a1–3 as a combination of the denotation of the nominal stem *vṛkṣa* and the affix *am* denoting the direct object (*karma*): *atra hi prātipadikaṃ svārthe vṛkṣasāmānye vartamānaṃ karmādivibhaktiyarthān na pratikṣipati. am ity api pratyayaḥ karmasāmānye ’vasthito vṛkṣādīn prātipadikārthān nāpohate. evaṃ parasparārthāpratikṣepe tayor yaḥ samūho vṛkṣam iti so ’vayavārthaviśiṣṭasyārthasya*⁽¹⁾ *vācaka upapannaḥ.* “For in this case the nominal stem^(a) does not reject the referent of the direct object case affix, and so on, while being applied to the general property ‘treeness.’ And the affix *am* which is restricted to the general property of being a direct object does not exclude the

many³⁴⁹ (*dvayor bahūnām vā*), denote a separate referent that is qualified by these (*tadviśiṣṭārthāntaravācakatvam*), while being applied to the general property which is their own referent.

§ 39. It is, moreover, explained that

a³⁵⁰ particular [term] is not rejected (*nojhitah*) by its own

referents of nominal stems like 'tree,' etc.; thus, in that there is no mutual rejection of their referents, it is justified that the aggregate of the two viz. *vrkṣa + am* denotes a referent that is qualified by the referents of the [two] constituents."

Jinendrabuddhi continues extending the analysis to the compound *nilotpala* at PST Ms B 219a3-6: *tathā nilotpalam*⁽²⁾ *iti nilotpalaśabdayoḥ samāśapadayoḥ samāsārthavācakatvam anyonyārthāvyudāse sati yuyjata iti yojyam. tathā hi nilaśabdasya nilaviśeṣān anutpalādīn*⁽³⁾ *apratikṣipata*⁽⁴⁾ *utpalānutpalavṛttir arthaḥ. utpalaśabdasāpy utpalaviśeṣān anilādīn*⁽⁵⁾ *apratikṣipato*⁽⁶⁾ *nīlānīlavṛttiḥ. samudāyas*⁽⁷⁾ *tv avayavārthābhyām viśiṣṭaḥ*. "It is to be construed thus: In the same way as it is justified that the words 'blue' and 'lotus' viz. the two compounded words of the expression 'blue lotus' express a compounded referent in that they do not exclude one another's referent. That is, although the word 'blue' is not rejecting particulars of blue such as non-lotuses, and so on, it has a referent that occurs among lotuses as well as non-lotuses. And although the word 'lotus' too is not rejecting particulars of lotus such as [those that are] non-blue, it [has a referent that] occurs among blue as well as non-blue things. The compound, however, is qualified by the referents of the two constitutive parts."

^(a) For the definition of *prātipadikam*, cf. A I 2.45: *arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam*. The first triplet (*prathamā*) serves the purpose of denoting the referent of a mere nominal stem (*prātipadikārtha[mātra]*), cf. A II 2.46.

⁽¹⁾ 'vayavā° em. (cf. *yan lag gi T*) : *pacā° Ms*

⁽²⁾ *nīlot° em. : lot° Ms*

⁽³⁾ *anutpalā° em. : utpalā° Ms*

⁽⁴⁾ *apratikṣipata em. : pratikṣipataḥ Ms*

⁽⁵⁾ *oṣeṣānn anī Ms*

⁽⁶⁾ *apratikṣipato em. : pratikṣipate Ms*

⁽⁷⁾ *samudāyas em. : samudāyasya Ms*

³⁴⁹ The commentator mentions as an example of the combination of more than two terms the example *rājapuruṣa abhīrūpamān āgaccheti*:⁽¹⁾ "let the handsome prince come." (PST Ms B 219a7), cf. NCV 647,18-20 which develops more fully the implications of Dignāga's concise statement: *devadatta tiṣṭhati, devadatto gehe tiṣṭhati, devadatta gām abhyāja śuklām ityādidvitricatuhpañcādīpadasamūhānām vākārthavācakatvam*.

⁽¹⁾ *āgaccheti conj. (< āgaccha + iti, cf. śog ces pa T) : apeti Ms*

³⁵⁰ Jinendrabuddhi explains that since general and particular terms are not in conflict, Dignāga formulates this verse with reference to the fact that a general term

§ 47. Again, why does the first-mentioned problem⁴¹⁰ not follow [absurdly] if the word's denoting its own referent is through exclusion of other referents?

Because (**yasmāt*)⁴¹¹

the word's connection is feasible⁴¹² (*sambandhasaukaryam*) and there is no ambiguity⁴¹³ (*vyabhicāritā*) as it is not observed (*adr̥ṣṭeḥ*) [to apply] to the referent of other words⁴¹⁴ and is also (*api*) observed (*darśanāt*) [to apply] to a member⁴¹⁵

caikam evākṣyaśva ity evamprakāraṃ padam. VPV II 259,16–17 (ad VP II 268): tathā vāyur vāyuh, aśvo 'śvaḥ, tena tena, iti nāmākhyātānām tulyarūpatve viśayāntarasyāsaṃsparśān na gaṇamukhyavyavahāro 'sti; cf. VPV II 304,12 (ad VP II 405).

⁴¹⁰ Dignāga's opponent asks why the consequences – *anabhidhāna* and *vyabhicāra* – that follow from the first theory, the so-called *bhedapakṣa* introduced and explained at PSV V 2ab, do not apply to the *apoha* theory; cf. NCV 728,20: *bhedapakṣe paraṃ praty uktayor ānanyā(d) anukativyabhicāradoṣayor "adr̥ṣṭer anyasābdārthe" (PSV V 34a) ityādināpyaparihrtatvāt*; PST Ms B 226a1: *śabdārdhāntaravyavacchedena yathoktasya svārthasyābhidhāyaka ity asmin pakṣe caturṣu pakṣeṣu pūrvam ya uktā doṣāḥ teṣāṃ katham abhāvah?* Cf. NCV 650,10–651,1: *bhedajātitatsambandhatadvatpakṣagatā doṣāḥ tavāpi ānanyavyabhicārādāyaḥ katham na syuḥ?*

⁴¹¹ Cf. *gaṇ gi phyir K* : 'di ltaṛ V.

⁴¹² See Appendix 10.

⁴¹³ Cf. the related formulation of Kumārila's solution to the problems of infinity and ambiguity at TV ad III 1.12 where he rejects Dignāga's two arguments against the possibility of denoting the particulars by claiming that although entities are infinite, the relation of the word to the thing it denotes is feasible and that there will be no ambiguity if one takes a single among them as indicative [of the residence in it of the general property].⁽¹⁾ cf. loc. cit. p. 39,16ff: *nanu vyaktinām ānanyavyabhicārābhyām anabhidhānam uktam. naiśa doṣaḥ: ānanye 'pi hi bhāvānām ekaṃ kṛtvopalakṣaṇam. śabdaḥ sukarasambandhaḥ na ca vyabhicariṣyati.*

⁽¹⁾ Kumārila assumes by implication that the universal resides identically in each particular and therefore justifies the application of a general term to each instance.

⁴¹⁴ Cf. PST Ms B 226a2: *śabdārthagrahaṇam vipakṣopalakṣaṇam. vipakṣe 'darśanād ity arthaḥ.* "The use of 'referent of the word' is an implicit indication of the *vipakṣa*. The meaning is this: because of not being observed to apply to the *vipakṣa*;" cf. n.s. 224 of the text edition and 420 below.

⁴¹⁵ The locative is used to introduce the reference of any given term as in Sanskrit grammatical literature in which *x* (loc.) generally means "to denote *x*" or "applies to *x*," cf. n. 419 below on the use of *vṛtti*.

(aṃśe) of its own referent.⁴¹⁶ [34]

For (hi) joint presence and joint absence (*anvayavyatirekau*) are a means (*dvāram*) to the word's denoting its referent.⁴¹⁷ And these two are its application⁴¹⁸ to what is similar and its non-application

⁴¹⁶ Cf. NCV 652,8–9: *atrocyate tvayā: adṛṣṭer anyāśabdārthe svārthasyāṃśe 'pi darśa-nāt, anyāpohenārthābhīdhānasiddhir iti vākyaśeṣaḥ*; op. cit. 728,20–21: “*adṛṣṭer anyāśabdārthe*” *ityādināpy aparihṛtatvāt*.

Jinendrabuddhi deviates completely from the theoretical framework of Dignāga's *apoha* theory by claiming that the *svārtha* is the aggregate of persons as possessed of intention (*vivakṣāvātpuruṣasamūha*), the term 'part' (*aṃśa*) denoting a single such person, cf. PŚT Ms B 226a2–4: *svo 'rtho 'sminn iti svārthaḥ. kaḥ punar asau? vivakṣāvātpuruṣasamūhaḥ. tasyāṃśo 'vayavaḥ vivakṣāvān puruṣaḥ. aṃśe 'piti ca vivakṣavata iyaṃ⁽¹⁾ saṅkhyā*. This interpretation is indebted to Dharmakīrtian and post-Dharmakīrtian philosophy according to which one infers a speaker's *vivakṣā* from the words he is using, cf. n. 9 above (= Appendix 5). In spite of this deviation from Dignāga's doctrine the subsequent presentation reproduces fairly accurately the underlying rationale of Dignāga's theory of induction: Jinendrabuddhi states that although the members of the own referent of the word as explained above are infinite, nevertheless the word indicates its referent because it is observed to denote a single instance; to which Jinendrabuddhi adds that the use of *api* indicates that it is observed to denote several instances as well⁽²⁾; and he concludes his exposition by explaining that Dignāga uses the word 'member' because the pervasion of the *sapakṣa* [i.e., everything similar to the indicated referent] is without [all] the members in the case of the act of indicating; for the word indicates even though it does not pervade (the *sapakṣa*), cf. PŚT Ms B 226a3–4: *etad uktam bhavati: yady api yathoktasya svārthasyāṅgānām ānantyam, tathāpi tatraikatrāpi darśanād iti. apīśabdo 'nekatrāpīti dyotayati. sapakṣavyāpṭeḥ pratyāyanāyām anāṃśatvād aṃśa-grahaṇam. avyāpake 'pi hi gamakaḥ*.

⁽¹⁾ *ḥṣavata iyaṃ* em. : *ḥṣiteyaṃ* Ms

⁽²⁾ Jinendrabuddhi alludes to the well-known use of *api* after numerals to indicate the notion of totality, cf. Renou 1961: 517 § 382.

⁴¹⁷ Joint presence and joint absence are a means (*dvāram*) in the sense that the word has the property of an indicator and as such it indicates by virtue of its connection, which is established through joint presence and joint absence, cf. PŚT Ms B 226a5–6: *dvāram upāyaḥ. śabdasya līngatvāt tasya cānvayavyatirekalakṣaṇa-sambandhabalena gamakatvāt*. Dignāga's view of joint presence and absence differs from the traditional view of the Sanskrit grammarians by its emphasis on the impossibility of *anvaya* for every single item to which a term refers as opposed to joint absence *vyatireka*.

For an analysis of the procedure of induction through *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in the context of the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, cf. Cardona 1980.

⁴¹⁸ For the implications of the use of (*a*)*drṣṭi*/(*a*)*darśana* and *vṛtti* in the context of Sanskrit grammatical literature, cf. the references in Renou 1957: s.vv. *drṣ-* and

to what is dissimilar.⁴¹⁹ In this case, however (*tu*), application to all

vṛt. Dignāga's use of these terms is ambiguous because it is open to a localistic interpretation as in the case of the canon of the *trairūpya*, which is concerned with the occurrence of the indicator at the indicated and the *sapakṣa* and its absolute non-occurrence at the *vipakṣa*. Although Dignāga undoubtedly assumes that the logical indicator and the verbal indicator are homologous in the sense that they are subject to identical constraints, it is hard to believe that he would have described verbal usage in terms of the occurrence of the verbal sign at the referent(s) it denotes and its absolute non-occurrence at dissimilar referents. The use of *vṛtti* with the locative like that of (*a*)*drṣṭi*/(*a*)*darśana* rather reflects the common usage in traditional Indian semantics of introducing the locative in order to indicate the denotation of any given term, and this is in perfect agreement with Dignāga's description in § 66 below of teaching the denotation by pointing at the referent. However, Dignāga's critics evidently interpreted his formulation in a localistic sense as appears from Kumārila's criticism at ŚV Śabda° 86, where he addresses the second member of the *trairūpya*, namely the *sapakṣānvaya*: *yatra dhūma 'sti tatrāgner astitvenānvayaḥ sphuṭaḥ. na tv evaṃ yatra śabda 'sti tatrārtho 'stīti niścayaḥ*. "It is obvious that wherever there is smoke, there it is continually accompanied by the existence of fire. However, an ascertainment like 'the referent is wherever the word is' is not in the same way obvious." Some Buddhists apparently attempted to reinterpret joint presence in terms of joint presence of verbal cognition (*śabdajñāna*) and cognition of the referent (*arthajñāna*), cf. Uṃveka's introductory remarks to ŚV Śabda° 89 (368,21–22): *kaścid āha: vināpy śabdasvarūpa-syārthasvarūpeṇānvayaṃ śabdajñānasyārthajñānenānvayayo bhaviṣyati. yatra yatra gośabdajñānaṃ tatra tatra gojñānam iti*.

⁴¹⁹ Cf. Siṃhasūri's exegesis at NCV 652,9–11 explaining the homology between the logical and verbal indicator: *anumānānumeyasambandho hy abhidhānābhidheya-sambandhaḥ. tatra yathā dhūmasyaikadeśe darśanād agner anagnau cādarśanād anagnivyudāśenāgnipratitis tathānvayavyatirekāv arthābhidhāne dvāram*. "For the connection between signifier and signified is an inference-inferendum connection. Just as fire in this case is cognized through exclusion of non-fire because smoke is observed at some place where there is fire and because it is not observed at non-fire, joint presence and joint absence are a means to denoting the referent." Jinendrabuddhi also connects induction by means of joint presence and joint absence to Dignāga's view of the purpose of the second and third member of the canon of *trairūpya*, cf. PST Ms B 226a6: *anvayavyatirekarūpopavarṇanam: tattulya eva vṛttis tadatulye 'vṛttir eva liṅgasyeti. etat svarūpam anvayavyatirekayoḥ*. "The description of the form of joint presence and joint absence is [as follows]: the indicator's occurrence at what is similar exclusively, and its absolute non-occurrence at what is dissimilar. This is the essential nature of joint presence and joint absence;" cf. Dignāga's definition at PSV II 5cd (q.v. n. 9 above) of the three criteria any valid indicator must fulfil.

YD alludes to Dignāga's description of induction by means of joint presence and joint absence at 100,13–16: *na, anvayavyatirekābhyām adhigamaheturvāt. yathā kṛtakatvādir dharmo 'nityādau*⁽¹⁾ *viśaye drṣṭaḥ tadabhāve cādrṣṭa ity anitye 'rthe*

that is similar is by necessity not statable with regard to any [referent] whatever⁴²⁰ (*kvacit*) because stating it is impossible (*ākhyānāsambhavāt*) as the referent is infinite (*arthasyānantye*).⁴²¹

nīśayam ādadhāty evaṃ śabda 'pi svārthe dṛṣṭo 'nyatra cātajjātiye⁽²⁾ *na dṛṣṭaḥ pratipattihetur bhavati. tasmād anumānād abhinna evāyam iti.* "No, [āgama, i.e., verbal communication, is not something different] because it is a cause of cognition through joint presence and joint absence. Just as a general property like being produced is observed at an object that is impermanent, but not observed at its absence, and thus instills certainty about the referent as impermanent, the word too becomes a cause of cognition, when it has been observed to apply to its own referent and not observed to apply to something else that is not of the same kind. Therefore it is not at all distinct from inference."

⁽¹⁾ *nītyādau* em. : ed. *anītyatvādau*; however, according to Dignāgan epistemology general properties do not occur at other general properties as in Vaiśeṣika ontology, but only as mediated through the objects/referents in which they occur.

⁽²⁾ So read with A; ed. *anyatra tajjātiye*.

⁴²⁰ The adverbial complement *kvacit* is here syntactically equivalent to *kasmimścit*. There is no doubt that *kvacit* is to be construed with the preceding negation *na*. Jinendrabuddhi, however, interprets *kvacit* as if it constitutes a separate clause, syntactically independent of the preceding clause, cf. PST Ms B 226a7f: *yadṛcchā-śabdānām sambhavati sarvatra darśanam tadviśayasyaikatvād iti. ataḥ "kvacid" ity āha.* "It is possible to observe arbitrary terms [denoting] every [referent] because their referent is singular. Therefore he says 'to any [referent] whatever.'"

This interpretation is evidently motivated by the view that arbitrary terms (= proper nouns) denote a single referent and that the problem of the particulars being infinite therefore does not apply to the referents of proper nouns. It may have been motivated by the exposition of an (old?) *Ṭikā* on PS which both Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri quote, cf. below n.s 422–423.

Elsewhere Siṃhasūri cites a passage (from the *Ṭikā*) in which it is argued that it is impossible to state the joint presence (*anvaya*) of parts like being one-eyed and dwarfish, and so on, with respect to the aggregate of attributes that constitute the object denoted by the proper name *ḍiṭṭha*, consequently one might draw the conclusion that joint absence (*vyatireka*) like joint presence is impossible too, cf. NCV 706,13–15: *tvayānvayavyatirekāv arthānumāne dvāram ity uktvā guṇa-samudāye ḍiṭṭhākhye 'rthe kāṇakuṇṭḍāyavayānvayānabhidhānād anvayāsambhavaṃ niruktīkṛtyānvayāsambhavād vyatirekāśambhavam āśaṅkyoktaṃ syād etad vyatirekasyāsambhava iti.* NCV 652,12–15, q.v. below n. 421.

For Dignāga's analysis of proper nouns with the background of the *apoha* theory, cf. PS V 50a.

⁴²¹ Cf. NCV 652,12–15: *na hi sambhavo 'sti vṛkṣaśabdasya sarvavṛkṣeṣu darśane, nāpi sarvatra liṅgi sarvaliṅgasya sambhavo 'gnidhūmādivat. yady api kvacid asti ḍiṭṭhādiṣu sambhavas tathāpi na taddvāreṇānumānam, sarvātmanāpratīteḥ. guṇasamudāyo hi ḍiṭṭhākhyo 'rthaḥ, na ca sarve kāṇakuṇṭḍāyo ḍiṭṭhaśabdād gamyate. evam anvayadvāreṇānumānāsambhavaḥ.* "For it is not possible to observe

On the other hand,⁴²² stating its non-application to what is dissimilar is possible, even though it is infinite⁴²³ (*atulye saty apy ānantye*),

that the word 'tree' denotes all trees, nor is it possible to observe every indicator at every indicated, in the same way as it is not possible to observe every smoke at every fire. Even though it is possible at some such as *dittha*, nevertheless there is no inference by means of that because it is not cognized *in toto*. For the referent that is termed '*dittha*' is an aggregate of attributes, and they, e.g., his being one-eyed, dwarfish, and so on, are not all of them understood from the word '*dittha*.' Thus inference by means of joint presence is impossible;" NCV 675,20–21: *yat svā-rthasyāṁśe* 'pi *darśanād gamakatvaṁ samarthayatoktaṁ: na sarvatra liṅgini liṅgaṁ sambhavati*; cf. NCV 678,13–14: *bhrāntavacanam etad: "sarvatra liṅginy adarśanān na dr̥ṣṭavat pratipattiḥ;*" for the epistemological implications of the term *dr̥ṣṭavat*, cf. PS II 15 with PSV ad loc. n. 13 above.

Siṃhasūri's explanation at NCV 652,12–15 appears to be an almost *verbatim* reproduction of the passage of the (old?) *Ṭikā* on PSV, cf. NCV 662,11,14: *vṛkṣaśābdasyāvṛkṣetyādi yāvad darśane nāsti sambhavaḥ, nāpi sarvatra liṅginitiyādi ... yady api kvacid ityādi sa eva ṭikāgrantho yāvad anumānāsambhava iti*; cf. NCV 716,18–19: *guṇasamudāyamātrasya kānakūṭāder darśanāsambhavaḥ, saty api darśane sarvathānumānāsambhavaḥ sarvaparakāreṇādr̥ṣṭatvāt*. "It is impossible to observe the mere aggregate of attributes such as being one-eyed, dwarfish, etc.; even though they are observed, it is impossible to infer them *in toto* because [the aggregate] has not been observed in every possible way."

⁴²² Since Siṃhasūri introduces his exegesis of this phrase at NCV 652,16 by stating *syād etad vyatirekasyāpy asambhavaḥ*, it is highly likely that this sentence and the following exegesis is indebted to the *Ṭikā* he was using because the remaining part of his explanation is identified by Siṃhasūri at NCV 662,10,14 as quoted by Mallavādin from the *Ṭikā*. Siṃhasūri repeats the sentence at NCV 706,15 immediately after addressing the impossibility of *anvaya* as applied to any referent of proper nouns, cf. above n. 421. It is obvious that Jinendrabuddhi made use of the same source because his introductory remark is similar, cf. PST Ms B 226b1: *syād etad atulyānām ānantyād vyatirekākhyānasyāpi sarvatrasambhava iti*.

⁴²³ Cf. Siṃhasūri's lucid exposition of Dignāga's standpoint at NCV 707,8–10: *anvaya-gatadoṣabhāvaṁ⁽¹⁾ vyatirekagataṁ guṇaṁ ca darśayati granthaḥ: "atulye saty apy ānantye"⁽²⁾ ityādi. tato 'nyasyābhāvamātraṁ sāmānyato vyatirecanīyaṁ tadbhedarūpāny asamspr̥ṣṭā śabdena liṅgena vā. tasmād adoṣa iti parihāraḥ*. "The text (*granthaḥ*) shows that joint presence is problematic and joint absence preferable, namely 'non-occurrence at what is dissimilar, even though it is infinite,' and so forth. Therefore the mere non-existence of other [referents] is to be excluded in a general way (*sāmānyato*) by the word or the logical indicator without [its] being in contact⁽³⁾ with the forms of its particulars [i.e., the particulars constituting the excluded other referents]⁽⁴⁾. Therefore there is no problem. Such is [Dignāga's] rebuttal."

⁽¹⁾ So read : ed. °ābhāvam.

⁽²⁾ For this citation, cf. n. 224 of the text edition.

through mere non-observation⁴²⁴ (*adarśanamātreṇa*);

⁽³⁾ No speech unit is in direct touch with its referent beyond the fact that it denotes it as excluded from its non-referents, irrespective of the Individual features of the non-referents; the idea that speech is not in direct touch with reality but transcends it due of its generalizing representation of things, is also expressed in a well-known verse ascribed to Dignāga viz. *vikalpayonayaḥ śabdah*, etc, for which cf. n. 530 below.

⁽⁴⁾ For this, cf. the exposition of the theoretically crucial § 60.

⁴²⁴ Dignāga's introduction of *adarśanamātra* to justify *vyatireka* – *anyāpoha* is equivalent to mere joint absence (*vyatirekamātra*, cf. n. 13 = Appendix 6) – reflects the treatment of *lopa* in Sanskrit grammatical literature, cf. Patañjali's explanation of vārtt 2 (on A I 1.60: *adarśanam loṇaḥ*) at MBh I 158.10f: *sarvasyādarśanasya lopasaṃjñā prāpnoti. kim kāraṇam? sarvasyānyatrādrṣṭatvāt. sarvo hi śabdaḥ yo yasya prayogaviśayaḥ sa tato 'nyatra na drṣyate*. Cf. n. 419 above and the related statement at PSV V 1.

Jinendrabuddhi explains *vyatireka* as characterized by non-existence, cf. PST Ms B 226b2–4: *teṣāṃ ānantye saty apī svārthābhāve śruter abhāvalakṣaṇo vyatirekaḥ śakyate darśayitum adarśanasyābhāvamātratvāt. śabdārthayor hi kāryakāraṇabhāve siddhe kāraṇasyārthasyābhāve tatkāryaṃ śabdaḥ na bhavātīti. etāvatādarśanam pratyāyitaṃ bhavati. tatrāśrayādarśanam⁽¹⁾ aprayojanam, vināpi tena vyatirekaniścayāt. na hi kāraṇābhāve kāryasambhava iti. ato vyatirekasyāpi sukaram ākhyānam*. “Even though there is an infinity of these [referents] it is possible to show joint absence, which is characterized by non-existence when the word's own referent does not exist because non-observation is nothing but non-existence. For in that it is recognized that word and referent are related as cause and effect, the effect of the referent namely the word does not exist when its cause viz. the referent does not exist. That much explains non-observation. In this context non-observation of the substrate has no purpose because joint absence is ascertained even without it. For there is no possibility of an effect when there is no cause. Therefore it is also feasible to tell the joint absense [of the word and its referent].”

On the subject of *adarśanamātra*, Siṃhasūri limits himself to explaining that non-observation is nothing but absense of observation, cf. NCV 652,17: *adarśanam hi darśanābhāvamātram*. Kumāṛila mentions, ŚV Anumāna° 131cd–132ab, Dignāga's view that it is feasible to establish the connection through non-observation as it relates to the dissimilar without exception and connects non-observation and joint absence *vyatireka*: *aśeṣāpekṣitatvāc ca saukaryāc cāpy adarśanāt, sādhanē yady apīṣṭo 'tra vyatireko 'numāṃ prati*; cf. the criticism of *adarśanamātra* Apoha° 75: *na cādarśanamātreṇa tābhyāṃ pratyāyanam bhavet / sarvatraiva hy adṛṣṭatvāt pratyāyyam nāvaśiṣyate //*

Dignāga's view that mere non-observation of the word's application to dissimilar instances establishes the connection between the word and its referent is reflected in his alleged pupil Īśvarasena's theory of *upalambhābhāvamātram*, cf. Steinkellner 1966; cf. HB II 154 foll.. Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi* breaks with the Dignāgan tradition.

Cf. Dharmakīrti's implicit criticism of Dignāga's view of *adarśanamātra* as the

and just therefore⁴²⁵ (*ata eva ca*) it has been explained that [the

principal means of establishing *apoha* at PV III Pratyakṣapariśeṣa 172a-c: *anyatrādrṣṭyapekṣatvāt kvacit taddrṣṭyapekṣaṇāt śrutau sambadhyate 'poha*. This criticism, which treats observation and non-observation as equipollent, is implicit in the clause *anyatrādrṣṭyapekṣatvāt*, for which Dignāga would have *sarvatra* for *anyatra*, i.e., in the *atulya in toto*; v. PVBh 264,30 foll. ad loc. cit.: *śabdasya hy anyatra vijātiye 'drṣṭatvāt*⁽²⁾, *kvacit tu tajjātiye darśanād apoha eva saṅketa iti jñāyate*; note especially the following reference to Dignāga's view loc. op. cit. p. 265,23: *anye tu punah sarvato vijātiyād vyāvṛttim, kvacid vidheye vṛttim apekṣata iti vyatireke tātparyam*⁽³⁾ *anvaye tu neti, vyatireka eva prādhānyena pratyāyate*. "Others, on the other hand, claim that [a word] depends on exclusion from all dissimilar instances, and on its application to some thing to be shown. Thus the reference is to joint absence, but not to joint presence. Therefore (*iti*) joint absence is understood as the primary thing." A similar statement is quoted in Jñānaśrimitra's *Aphaprakaraṇa* 207,10–11: *tathā hi vijātiye sarvatrādrṣṭyapekṣatvāt, kvacit tu apekṣaṇātmajātiye śrutau sambadhyate 'poha iti śāstram*. The *śāstra* to which Jñānaśrimitra refers is, as one can see, the above-mentioned passage from Dharmakīrti's PV III 172. However – and this is remarkable – it breaks completely with Dharmakīrti's view by substituting *sarvatra* for *anyatra*, thus apparently returning to Dignāga's original justification of *apoha* by stating that *apoha* depends on non-observation of the referent in all (*sarvatra*) of the domain of the dissimilar and dependence on some instance (*kvacit*) of the referent in the domain of the referent. Cf. Dignāga's use of *sarvatra* at PSV II 13 quoted n. 187 above (= Appendix 7), q.v.

For a discussion of the theoretical implications of Dignāga's view of *adarśana-mātra*, cf. Pind 1999.

⁽¹⁾ *adarśanaṃ* em. : *adarśanaṃ* Ms (cf. *mthoṇ ba T*). The em. is required by the context as the argument otherwise would seem incomprehensible.

⁽²⁾ *'drṣṭatvāt* em. : *drṣṭatvāt* PVBh

⁽³⁾ *vyatireke tātparyam* em. : *vyatirekitātparyam* PVBh

⁴²⁵ Cf. NCV 652,17–18: *yasmād darśanasya sarvatrāsambhavaḥ. saty api darśane sarvathānumānāsambhavaḥ*. "Because observation to denote all [that is similar to it] is impossible. Even if it were observed [to denote all that is similar to it], inference *in toto* is impossible." Jinendrabuddhi must have used the same source as Simhasūri, as appears from the parallel explanation at PST Ms B 226b4: *yasmād darśanasya tattulye sarvatrāsambhavo 'tattulye tu sambhavo 'darśanasya*. "Because observation to denote all that is similar to it is impossible, whereas non-observation to denote all that is dissimilar to it is possible." Dignāga also mentions at PSV III 45 the impossibility of observing the indicated at all that is similar. Both versions deviate from each other, cf. K (Kitagawa 1973: 508b7–11): *'di rigs pa yaṅ yin te / gaṅ rigs mi mthun pa thams cad las ldog pa'i phyir daṅ / de'i sgo nas bsgrub bya thams cad la rtogs par byed pa'i phyir ro // 'di ni bsgrub bya daṅ rigs mthun pa / thams cad la gdon mi za bar yod pa ma yin la / thams cad la 'dzin pa srid pa ma yin žiṅ*. – V (Kitagawa 1973: 508a7–12): *gaṅ rigs mi mthun mtha' dag las log pa de'i sgo nas bsgrub bya la šes pa 'jug par byed pa de dag ni rigs kyi / 'dir gor ma chags par mthun phyogs mtha' dag la yod pa'o žes pa ni ma yin žiṅ / thams cad la yod par 'dzin pa yaṅ mi srid do //*

word's] denoting its own referent (*svārthābhīdhanam*) is an inference from [its own referent's] exclusion from these⁴²⁶ [other referents]

"And this is justified because [the indicator] is excluded from all that is dissimilar and because it indicates every probandum by means of that (**taddvāreṇa*). For it is necessarily not the case that it is found at all that is similar to the probandum, it being impossible to apprehend its existence at all [that is similar to the probandum]."

⁴²⁶ The compound *tadvyavacchedānumāna* is syntactically equivalent to *tato vyavacchedānumāna*, cf. NCV paraphrasing the (old?) *Ṭikā* (cf. n.s 421–423 above) 752,21–22: *yatraivādarśanam uktam vṛkṣābhāve 'vṛkṣe, tato vyavacchedānumānam 'avṛkṣo na bhavati' iti. evaṃ ca kṛtvā vṛkṣaśabdād dravyatvādyanumānam upapannam bhavati*. "Only with regard to which non-observation is stated i.e. with regard to the absence of a tree which is a non-tree, the inference from its exclusion from this [non-tree] is 'it is not a non-tree;' and on such grounds the inference of substance-ness, and so on, from the word 'tree' is justified." Thus, the inferential component of Dignāga's *apoha* theory presupposes that it is possible to draw valid inferences from negative evidence based upon non-observation.

Jinendrabuddhi's gloss at PST Ms B 226b5 is syntactically ambiguous: *yatrādarśanam svārthābhāve tadvyavacchedānam anumānam*. "The inference is of exclusions of/from that to which it is not observed to apply when its own referent is absent."

It is evident that the inference to which Dignāga refers amounts to the judgement that e.g. the referent of the word "tree" is not a non-tree, which means that no entity that is not a tree occurs in the locus of the referent tree. From this follows that the relation between the referents of the words "tree" and "non-tree" is one of privative opposition between any given tree and any given non-tree, the latter qualifying the former by its absence from its locus. This constitutes Dignāga's solution to the problem of the universal: The reference of a word does not depend upon the presence of a universal inhering in the referent as its cause of application, but rather upon the fact that any given tree is not primarily qualified by its individual characteristics, but rather, it is universally qualified by the non-existence in its locus of things that are not trees, the relation between the referents being one of privative opposition between two types of objects, namely trees and non-trees. This is the reason why Dignāga emphasizes the predominant role of joint absence (*vyatireka*) in the process of exclusion. For Dignāga's view of terms like 'non-tree,' whose purpose is to denote as non-existing the single (*eka*) general property (*sāmānyadharma*) that distinguishes non-trees from trees, cf. the important paragraph PSV V 43b below.

For the qualifying role of negation or exclusion as equivalent to the non-existence or absence (*abhāva*) of other things from the locus of the referent, cf. n. 466 below, and Jinendrabuddhi's remarks on the predominance (*prādhānya*) of *vyatireka* (cf. n.s 13 (= Appendix 6), 188, and 426 above, n. 428 below) over *anvaya* at PST Ms B 226b5–6: *etena yady apy anvayavyatirekayor ubhayor apy anumitāv āṅgatvam, tathāpi vyatirekasya prādhānyāt tadvāreṇaiva gamakatvam iti darśayati*. "Thereby he shows that even though both joint presence as well as joint absence are factors with regard to inference, nevertheless, since joint absence is predominant, it is

(*tadvyavacchedānumānam*), from its not being observed [to apply] to other [referents] than its own relata⁴²⁷ (*svasambandhibhyo 'nyatrā-*

only by means of that [the word] indicates."

- ⁴²⁷ The technical term *svasambandhin* denotes any of the general properties that together define an entity. Thus the referent tree is defined by the general properties treeness, substanceness, earthenness, etc. Not all of these properties are connected to the word 'tree' in terms of being invariably connected with it. The word 'tree' is only invariably connected to the general property treeness. The other relata, however, are inferable from the word 'tree' because they form a hierarchy of properties, whose logical characteristics are determined by their position in the hierarchy, which is defined in terms of the extension of the terms that constitute it; cf. the explanation at NCV 652,18–20: *svasambandhibhya iti. yatra dṛṣṭaḥ so 'tra sambandhī abhipretah, na tv avinābhāvitvasambandhena. anyatrādarśanād iti abhidheyābhāve 'darśanāt, anyathā hi vṛkṣaśābdasya tasmin vastuni prthivīdravyādyābhāve 'pi darśanam vaktavyam syāt.* "Than its own relata: The thing to which it is observed to apply is in this context considered a relatum, but not due to a connection in terms of being invariably concomitant. Because of not being observed to apply to other [referents]: Because of not being observed to apply when the denoted is not present. For otherwise observation of the word 'tree' to apply to this object (*vastu*) would have to be stated even in the absence of earth and substance, etc."

In his exegesis Śiṃhasūri appears to reproduce more or less *verbatim* an old *Ṭikā* on PSV on the concept of *svasambandhin*, which Mallavādīn evidently combined with extracts from Dignāga's PSV, cf. NCV 718,15–16: "*ata eva cedam*" *ityādi etatpakṣasaṃśrayadarśanārtham bhāṣyagrantham āha "svasambandhibhyo 'nyatrādarśanād" ityādi. asya vyākhyā ṭikāgrantho "yatra dṛṣṭa" ityādi yāvad "avṛkṣo 'nagnir vā na bhavati"ti gatārthaḥ. evaṃ ca kṛtvetyādi yāvad upapannam bhavati;* the explanation at NCV 718,16–22 is probably a paraphrase, if not a *verbatim* reproduction, of the corresponding exposition of the *Ṭikā*: *anekāvinābhāvinām prthivīdravyatvādīnām vṛkṣaśābdād dhūmāc cānubandhinām anumānam yujyate taddarśanasparśanena, vṛkṣatvāt prthivī dravyam sac ca dhūmatvāc ca vṛkṣavad agnivac ceti. itarathā tv ityādi. atyantavyatireke sambandhitvābhāve 'nubandhinām dravyādīnām apy anyatvād atulye vipakṣa eva vṛtter apakṣadharmatvānaikāntikatvaviruddhatvānumānābhāvadoṣāḥ syuḥ. anubandhinām dravyādīnām tyāge tadavinābhāvino vṛkṣasya svārthasyāśambhava eveti ca doṣaḥ. tataḥ pratyāyya-pratyāyanayor anupapattiḥ. tasmāt svasambandhyābhāvetyādy uktopasaṃhāraḥ, sambandhino 'rthāntarasya bhāve darśanāt sambandhina eva bhāvābhāve 'darśanāc cānumānasyābhipretasya siddhir iti.* "The inference of the invariable concomitants such as earthenness, substanceness, and so on, from the word 'tree' and the concomitants⁽¹⁾ from smoke is justified due to their observation or touch: from treeness, earth, substance, and 'existent,' and from smokeness in the same way as tree and fire. Otherwise, however, etc.: If they were completely disconnected, i.e., if they did not have the property of being a relatum, then, because of the occurrence of the adjuncts viz. substance, and so on, in what is dissimilar viz. the *vipakṣa*, as also they are different, there would be the faults of not being inference viz. not being a property of the probandum, being ambiguous, and being contradictory; and if the

darśanāt). If, however,⁴²⁸ the inference was by means of joint presence (*anvayadvāreṇa*), the word 'tree' should not give rise to doubt (*saṁśayaḥ*) appearing as *śiṁśapā*, etc. (*śiṁśapādyābhāsaḥ*), about one and the same entity (*ekasmiṁ vastuni*). Yet, in the same way as there is doubt about it, there will also be doubt appearing as earthenness and substanceness, etc. However, since the word 'tree' is not observed to denote what is non-earthen, and so on, the inference is only by means of joint absence (*vyatirekamukhenaiva*).

Moreover it is explained that (**āha ca*)

'treeness,' 'earthen,' 'substance,' 'existent,' and 'knowable' are [each] a cause of doubt, in reverse order (*pratilomyataḥ*), about four, three, two, and one [properties]. In opposite order (*anyathā*) they serve the purpose of ascertainment (*nīścaye*).⁴²⁹ [35]

concomitants viz. substance, and so on, are taken away, there would be the problem that its own referent tree that has these as its concomitants were impossible. Therefore indicated and indication are not justified. This is recapitulated in the words beginning: *Therefore, if the relata do not exist*: Because of observing a relatum viz. another thing at an entity and because of not observing the same relatum when the entity does not exist the meant inference is realized."

(¹) For the term *anubandhin*, cf. PS II 18–19, q.v. n. 374 above.

⁴²⁸ Cf. PST Ms B 226b6–227a2: *caśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ*. Śiṁhasūri's explanation of the passage beginning *anvayadvāreṇa cānumāne* is related to the corresponding passage of Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms B 226b6–227a1–2 quoted above n. 225 of the text edition, cf. NCV 652,23–653,12: *anvayadvāreṇa cānumāne 'yaṁ doṣaḥ: yasmād anugamo 'sti vṛkṣaśabdasyārthādisahitasya śiṁśapādiṣu, tasmāt kevalenāpy anumānam prāpnoti. atha bahuṣu palāśādiṣv api dṛṣṭa iti saṁśayo bhavati. evaṁ sati vṛkṣārthe pārthivatvadravyārthasattārthāḥ⁽¹⁾ santi teṣu vṛkṣaśabdasya samānatvāt saṁśayaḥ syāt, nīścayas tu dṛṣṭaḥ śābdāt*. "If, however, the inference were by means of joint presence the problem is as follows: Since there is joint presence of the word 'tree' accompanied by the referent, and so on, with *śiṁśapā*, and so on, it follows [absurdly] that the inference is through that alone. But it is also observed to denote the *palāśa*, etc. Thus there is doubt. In those circumstances there would be doubt about the referent of earthenness, substance[ness?], and existence that are found in the referent tree because the word 'tree' is the same with regards to these. However, it is observed that the word causes ascertainment explicitly."

(¹) One would expect the reading *dravyatvārtha* instead of *dravyārtha*.

⁴²⁹ See Appendix 11.

This is an inserted verse⁴³⁰ (*ity antaraślokaḥ).

⁴³⁰ Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of the *antaraśloka* at PST Ms B 227a2–6: *vyatirekamukhenaiva pratyāyanam ity etat sambandhayitum antaraślokaṃ āha. jñeyaśabdāḥ saddravyapārthivavṛkṣatveṣu caturṣu saṃśayahetuḥ, yataḥ sa tadabhāve 'pi drṣṭaḥ. evam⁽¹⁾ uttaratrāpi vākyam: sacchabdo dravyapārthivavṛkṣatveṣu triṣu, dravyaśabdāḥ pārthivavṛkṣatvayor dvayor, pārthivaśabdāḥ ekasmin vṛkṣatve, niścaye 'nyatheti nimittam iti vartate. anyathety ānulomyena vṛkṣaśabdāḥ pārthivadravyasajjñeyatveṣu caturṣu niścayahetuḥ. tathā hi sa tatra ca drṣṭaḥ, tadabhāve ca na drṣṭaḥ⁽²⁾. evam uttaratrāpi vākyam: pārthivaśabdādāyo 'py evam ekaikahānyā⁽³⁾ dravyatvādiṣu niścayahetavo jñeyāḥ. yadi ca drṣṭavad vidhinā pratyāyanam syād yathākrameṇa catustriḍvyekārthaniścayaḥ. tathā prātilomyenāpi ta<t?> syāj jñeyaśabdādīnām sattvādiṣu darśanāt. yatas tadabhāve 'pi drṣṭatvāt saṃśayaḥ, tasmād vyatirekadvāreṇaiva gamakatvam iti.* "In order to bring it into connection with the idea that the indication is only through joint absence he formulates an inserted *śloka*. The word 'knowable' is a cause of doubt about four viz. existence, substance-ness, earthenness, and treeness since it is also observed where they are absent. The same is to be formulated with regard to those that follow: the word 'existent' [is a cause of doubt] about three viz. substanceness, earthenness, and treeness, the word 'substance' about two viz. earthenness and treeness, and the word 'earthen' about one viz. treeness. In the statement *otherwise [they are a cause]* of the word 'cause' is to be supplied from what precedes. *Otherwise*, i.e., the word 'substance' is a cause of doubt about four viz. earthenness, substanceness, existence, and knowability. That is, it is, on the one hand, observed when they are present, and, on the other hand, not observed when they are absent. The same is to be formulated with regard to those that follow: Also the words 'earthen,' and so on, are in the same way to be considered causes of ascertainment about substanceness, and so on, by deducting one after another⁽⁴⁾. But if the indication were in an affirmative form in the way [the referent] has been observed [previously] there would be about four, three, two, and one referent in direct order. This would also be the case in reverse order because the words 'knowable,' and so on, are observed to apply when existence, etc. is present. Since there is doubt because they are also observed where these are absent, the property of indicating is only through joint absence."

Cf. also NCV 653,12–14: *vṛkṣaśabdo 'vṛkṣanivṛtṭyaikārthako 'pārthivavyāvṛtṭyāpi svārthe vartate, tathā hi vṛkṣapārthivadravyasacchabdā ānulomyena tridvyekārthaniścayahetavaḥ. evam arthāntaravyudāsenārthāntarābhīdhānam upapannam.* "The word 'tree' which has a single referent by means of preclusion of non-trees also applies to its own referent through exclusion of non-earthen things. That is, the words 'tree,' 'earthen,' 'substance,' and 'existent,' are in direct order causes of ascertainment of three, two and one referent, [respectively]. Thus, the denotation of some referents (*arthāntara*) is by means of exclusion of other referents (*arthāntara*)."

Similarly ŚVT 72,20–25 who interprets the verse in the light of Dignāga's rejection of *vidhi* as it necessarily is a cause of doubt: *yat punaḥ parapakṣe vidhimukhena śabde pravartamāne sarvātmakārthagrahaṇam prāpnoti, tataś ca yathānulomyena vṛkṣapārthivadravyasajjñeyaśabdebhyaś catustriḍvyekaniścayo bhavati, tathā*

'colour' is necessarily⁴⁹⁴ to be observed (*anugantavyaḥ*) as denoting blue and yellow, and so on, even though they are entirely different because it is current usage⁴⁹⁵ in the world (*loke rūḍheḥ*), but not to denote taste, etc. Therefore, what is to be determined, namely the exclusion of other [referents] is restricted.

§ 54. And if⁴⁹⁶ the word denotes its referent without dependence upon preclusion of other referents, then (**tarhi*)

its validity (*siddhiḥ*) [for denoting its referent] would only be by means of joint presence (*anvayād eva*), [38c]

but the word's [validity]⁴⁹⁷ for denoting its referent (*arthābhīdhāne*) would not be by means of joint presence and joint absence (*anvayavyatirekābhyām*), and this is maintained.⁴⁹⁸ Yet, since the denotation fulfills its purpose⁴⁹⁹ by means of restriction of either [term] or both [terms

If it is asserted that the cause is the difference of power (*śaktibhedah*), also in this case [the question arises]: What is the reason why it only occurs in a certain thing and not in all? Thus this is not an answer [to our criticism]."

(¹) *kasmimśo* em. (cf. 'ga' žig kho na la T) : kacid Ms

⁴⁹⁴ That is, because it is not justified that visibility is the cause with regard to the connection with colourness, cf. PST Ms B 231a4: *yasmāc cākṣuṣatvasya rūpatvayogaṃ prati hetutvaṃ na yujyate*.

⁴⁹⁵ Current usage is based upon general properties that only exist conventionally, cf. PST Ms B 231a5: *rūḍheś ca nimittaṃ saṃvṛtisad eva sāmānyam, na tu dravyasad ity abhiprāyaḥ*. "The opinion is that the cause of current usage is a general property that only exists conventionally, but not as something that exists substantially."

⁴⁹⁶ The purpose of this paragraph is to address once again the thesis that the word denotes its own referent by means of exclusion of other referents, cf. PST Ms B 231a5–6: *punar arthāntaravyāvṛttidvāreṇa śabdaḥ svārthaṃ pratyāyayatīty etad darśayitum*⁽¹⁾ *āha: yadi cetyādi*.

(¹) *darśayitum* em. : *dra(?)yīti /} tum* Ms

⁴⁹⁷ It is not possible to construe this sentence unless one assumes that the grammatical subject is *siddhiḥ* that is to be supplied from 38c.

⁴⁹⁸ Cf. PSV V 34 at § 47 above.

⁴⁹⁹ Cf. the statement at PV IV 192a = PVI II 11a: *vyavacchedaphalaṃ vākyaṃ*, which belongs in the context of the logical properties of restriction and thus by implication the semantic function of the restrictive particle *eva*, cf. Steinkellner 1979: 33 n. 66, and n.s 497–498 below. Dhammapāla's statement at *Udānaṭṭhakathā* 12,23ff (= *Itivuttakaṭṭhakathā* I 23,22ff): *sabbāni hi vakyāni evakārattasahitāni yeva avadhāraṇaphalattā*, evidently belongs in the same context; see Pind 1997: 523ff;

of a statement],⁵⁰⁰ the denotation of the referent is also by means of joint absence, like, for instance, “[the technical term] *karman* denotes what the agent (*kartuḥ*) most wants to obtain (*īpsitatamam*) [by his action]⁵⁰¹ [A I 4.49].”

cf. also the related discussion of restriction as a concomitant property of verbal discourse at PVSV 61,16ff: *śabdaṃ hi prayujjānaḥ sarvo 'nvayavyatirekau nāti-vartate, tasya pravṛttinivṛttiyarthatvāt. yadi hy ayaṃ na kasyacit kutaścin niva-rtayet pravartayed vā buddhiṃ yathābhūtānujñānāt sarvavyavahāreṣu na kimcid vyāharet, vyāhārasyādvadhāraṇanāntariyakatvāt: yathā ghaṭeṇa udakam ānayeti, yadi ghaṭeṇa añjalīnā vā udakānayanam yathākathamcid abhimatam syāt, udakam ānayety eva vaktavyam syāt, na ghaṭeneti.* It is interesting in the present context that *Mādhvāntavibhāga* uses the *avadhāraṇa* eva to illustrate how the denotation of a particular term is taught to the exclusion of other referents, cf. op. cit. 97,14–15: *yasmin vastuni saṅketasamstavānupraviṣṭayā buddhyā sarveṣāṃ laukikānāṃ darśanatulyatā⁽¹⁾ bhavati: prthivy eveyam nāgñiḥ, rūpam evedam na śabda ityevamādī.*

⁽¹⁾ For this view, cf. VP III 3.55 and n. 311 (= Appendix 9).

⁵⁰⁰ The concept of *anyatarobhayādvadhāraṇa* belongs in the context of subject-predicate sentences like “x(+ *avadhāraṇa*) is y(+ *avadhāraṇa*),” the resultant cognition being said to depend upon whether the scope of the predicate or the subject, or both, is restricted by implicit *avadhāraṇas*. For the use of the term *anyatarobhayādvadhāraṇa*, cf. Dignāga’s criticism of the Naiyāyika definition of *pratijñā* at NSū I 1.33: *sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā* as entailing absurdities when interpreted by means of *avadhāraṇas*. His criticism is addressed at length at NV 514,14ff: *ubhayādvadhāraṇaprāptāv anyatārādvadhāraṇe ca doṣaḥ. yadi sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñeti pratijñālakṣaṇam, tataḥ pūrvottare dve avadhāraṇe na kalpyete*, etc; cf. PSV III 4cd (Kitagawa 1973: 473,11ff): *pūrvādvadhāraṇam vyartham anīṣṭam itaratra tu* (qu. PVBh 560,4; 562,28). For the role of *avadhāraṇas* in discourse, cf. Dharmakīrti’s statement at PVSV 61,19–20: *vyāhārasyādvadhāraṇanāntariyakatvāt.*

⁵⁰¹ Cf. PST Ms B 231a7–231b2: *kartur eva nākartuḥ. kartṛśabdō 'kartāraṃ vyavacchin-dan īpsitatamaṃ svārthe na sambadhnāti. evam īpsitatamam eva nānīpsitatamam. īpsitatamaśabdō 'py anīpsitatamaṃ⁽¹⁾ vyudasya⁽²⁾ na kartṛśabdārthaṃ svārthena yojayati. evam ubhayādvadhāraṇena viśiṣṭārthanīcayād abhidhānasāphalyam. anyatārādvadhāraṇena yathā satsu megheṣu vṛṣṭir bhavātīti. satsv eva nāsatsu, na tu bhavaty eveti.* “The agent only, not the non-agent. The word agent does not connect ‘most wants to obtain’ to its own referent while excluding non-agent. In the same way ‘most wants to obtain’ only, not ‘not most wants to obtain.’ The expression ‘most wants to obtain’ too does not connect the referent of the word agent with its own referent by excluding “not most wants to obtain.” Thus the denotation fulfills its purpose because of ascertaining its specific referent by means of a restriction of both terms. By means of restriction of either term [means], for instance, ‘there is rain when clouds are found,’ i.e., only when they are found, not when they are not found, but not ‘there is only [rain].’” Jinendrabuddhi then continues explaining the implications of lack of restriction at PST Ms B 231b2–4: *tad*

§ 55. It is certainly the case (*nanu ca*) that if the word's referent is merely exclusion of other [referents], it would only (*eva*) denote its referent by means of joint absence (*vyatirekāt*).

Such would be the case (*syād etad evam*) if joint presence was not maintained. However,

[the word's] concomitance (*vyāpti) is not claimed to be with a principal (mukhyena) [38d]

entity⁵⁰² (*bhāvena*). For (*hi*) it has been stated that "it is impossible that a general property (*jātiḥ*) occurs in entities, whether it is separate (**vyatiriktā*) or not separate (**avyatiriktā*) [from its substrata]."⁵⁰³

arthāntaranivṛtṭyanapekṣatāyām śabdasya na prāpnotīti. tathā hi yady akartur anīpsitatamaḥ⁽³⁾ *karma, kartrśabdoccāraṇam apārthakam syāt. tathā yady anīpsitatamaḥ api karma, īpsitatamaḥ ity abhidhānam niṣphalaṃ syāt. tasmād arthāntaranivṛttidvāreṇa śabdo 'rtham gamayatīty abhyupeyam.* "This does not obtain when the word is not dependent upon negation of other referents. That is, if *karman* is what a non-agent does not most want to obtain, the articulation of the word *karman* would be purposeless. Thus, if *karman* is also what [the agent] does not most want to obtain, the expression 'most wants to obtain' would not fulfil its purpose. Therefore the word indicates its referent by means of negation of other referents." There is no indication in the grammatical literature that Pāṇini's definition of the *karmakāraka* was interpreted by means of *avadhāraṇas* in the way Dignāga's formulation suggests, and the quotation as well as the interpretation may well have been motivated by a wish to extend the use of *avadhāraṇas* to the Pāṇinian *sūtra*, since the Naiyāyika definition of *pratijñā* as *sādhyanirdeśaḥ*, involves the introduction of a *kṛtya* affix which, according to the Pāṇinian derivational system, denotes *karma*, and thus involves the Pāṇinian definition, cf. Jinendrabuddhi's remarks PST Ms B 113b6 ad PSV III 3cd: *karmaṇi cāyam kṛtyapratyayaḥ. tena na karmābhidhāyinā sādhyaśabdenāsādhyaśyākṣepaḥ: kartur īpsitatamaḥ hi karma; Uddyotakara quotes A I 4.49 at NV 516,13f in his rebuttal of Dignāga's objections and explains: karmanirdeśaḥ cāyam sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñeti.*

⁽¹⁾ *nānīpsitatamaḥ. īpsitatamaśabdo em. (śin tu thob par 'dod pa min pa ni ma yin, śin tu thob par 'dod pa'i sgra T) : nānīpsitatamaśabdo Ms*

⁽²⁾ *vyudasya em. : (rnam par bsal nas T) : vudasya Ms*

⁽³⁾ *anī° em. : apti° Ms*

⁵⁰² That is, concomitance with a real general property that is assumed to be the principal referent denoted by the word, cf. PST Ms B 231b6: *vastusatsāmānyākhyena*⁽¹⁾ *śabdasyānvayo neṣyate.* "The word's joint presence is not claimed to be with a so-called substantially existent general property."

⁽¹⁾ *vastusat° em. : vastusattā° Ms*

⁵⁰³ See Appendix 12.

But if the referent is qualified by the exclusion of other referents⁵⁰⁴ (*arthāntarāpohaviśiṣṭe 'rthe*) without the general property,⁵⁰⁵ the word's joint presence and joint absence do not have different referents in accordance with the [statement at PS V 34a:] "since it is not observed [to apply] to the referent of other words."

§ 56. Someone, however, objects⁵⁰⁶ that if⁵⁰⁷ everything manifest like a cow is a modification that is due to something non-existent (*gavādi vyaktam sarvam asato vikārah*), it follows [absurdly] that [everything manifest] has an existent nature (*prayuktam asataḥ sadātmakatvam*) that is due to something non-existent because of the [absurd] consequence of its being the nature of everything (*sārvātmyaprasaṅgāt*).⁵⁰⁸ Regarding this (**tatra*) [we ask you],

wherewith is existence (*sattvam*) connected,⁵⁰⁹ according to

⁵⁰⁴ Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation of this crucial term is indebted to the view that a verbal utterance indicates the speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*), and that which is qualified by exclusion of other referents is in fact the person who is qualified by *vivakṣā* because he is the substrate (*āśraya*) of the referent of the word, cf. PST Ms B 232a1: *vivakṣāvati puruṣe. sa hi śabdārthasāśraya iti tadviśiṣṭa ucyate*. For the interpretation of *śabda* as indicating *vivakṣā*, cf. n. 9. above (= Appendix 5). For the implications of the expression 'qualified by exclusion of other referents,' cf. the remarks under n. 465 above.

⁵⁰⁵ That is without a substantially real (*vastusatī*) general property (*jātiḥ*), cf. PST Ms B 231b7–232a1: *vinā hi jātyā vastusatyeti yāvat*.

⁵⁰⁶ See Appendix 13.

⁵⁰⁷ Cf. PST Ms B 232b2: *yadīśabdo hy abhyupagamam paridīpayati*.

⁵⁰⁸ As it appears from Jinendrabuddhi's reproduction of Mādhava's objection, Dignāga quotes it in a slightly abbreviated form, cf. PST Ms B 232a6: *etasmīn pūrvapakṣe sāṅkhyenoktam "yadi vyaktam sarvam asato vikārah sādhyate, evam sati sārva-tmyaprasaṅgāt prayuktam asataḥ sadātmakatvam."*

Jinendrabuddhi explains the argument at PST Ms B 232a6–232b1: *sarvavikāra-svarūpatā sārva-tmyam, vikārasvarūpadarśanāc ca prakṛtes tatsvarūpānumānam⁽¹⁾. tathā hi kṣīravikārā dadhyādayas tadātmakāḥ. tadātmakaprakṛtaya eva sārva-tmakā vikārāḥ. tataḥ prakṛter api sārva-tmakatvam. sārva-tmakatvāc ca sattvaprasaṅgaḥ⁽²⁾. nāsat sārva-tmakam upadyate. tataś ca siddhasādhanaṃ asatpūrvakā bheda itī*.

⁽¹⁾ °ānumā° em. : °āmā° Ms

⁽²⁾ °aḥ em. : °ā Ms

⁵⁰⁹ The question relates to the fact that the answer to Dignāga's objection is inconsistent with the opponent's own assumption, cf. PST Ms B 232b2: *nābhyupagamenottaram sambadhyata ity arthaḥ*.

§ 59. Nor is the claim justified that no cognition occurs at all (*pratyaya-vṛttir eva nāstī*),⁵³⁶

because exclusion is [in the form of a single] common [property]⁵³⁷ (*sāmānyena nirākṛteḥ*). [43b]

If, moreover, it is not separate from the substrate, even so the problem is similar to that of the particular because, when it is not separate from the particulars, it is infinite in the exact same way as these. Thus the [absurd] consequence that there is no first cognition only concerns one who upholds the doctrine of general properties."

⁽¹⁾ *darśanam* em. : *adarśanam* Ms

⁽²⁾ *āyās* (gen. sg. f. qualifying an implicit *jāteḥ* in construction with *ānantyāt*)

⁵³⁶ Jinendrabuddhi quotes Dignāga's source at PST Ms B 234b6-235a1: "*pratyaya-vṛttir⁽¹⁾ eva nāstī. kasmāt? vyudasyātmāntarānantyāt. na hi sarvātmāntarābhāvadarśanam astīti.*" *etad uktaṃ bhavati: yadi sarvātmāntarānām apohena pratyayaḥ, teṣāṃ agavarthānām ānantyād adarśanam gobhedavat. tataś ca na tadapohena⁽²⁾ gopratyayas, tadvad eveti.* "There is no cognition occurs at all. Why? Because of the infinity of the nature of the other things that are to be excluded. For there is no observation of the non-existence of all the things that are different."

What is meant is this: If the cognition is through exclusion of the nature of all things that are different there is no observation of these because the referents that are non-cows are infinite in the same way as the particular cows. And therefore the cognition 'cow' is not due to the exclusion of these infinite particulars, in the exact same way."

This objection resurfaces in the discussion at ŚV Apoha° 58, where Kumārila addresses the question of how to define the excluded (*apohya*) if it is claimed that it consists of everything that is defined as non-x as opposed to x. For if it consists of each single non-x the problem of the excluded referent's being infinite arises: *sarvāpoho yadiṣyeta, sa vaktavyaḥ katham punaḥ, yadi pratyekarūpeṇa nāpohyānantyato bhavet.* "If exclusion of all [non-cows by the word 'cow'] is asserted, it is to be explained in what way [all non-cows are excluded]. If [they are excluded] in the form of each single [non-cow], there can be no [exclusion of all non-cows] because of the infinity of the excluded." Kumārila's discussion ŚV Apoha° 58 through 72 is primarily concerned with the views that Dignāga propounds in PSV V 43d.

⁽¹⁾ *vṛttir* em. : *vṛddhir* Ms

⁽²⁾ *tadapo*° em. : *tadāpo*° Ms

⁵³⁷ PST Ms B 235a2: *avṛkṣo⁽¹⁾ na bhavatīty evaṃ sāmānyarūpeṇa nirākaraṇāt.* "Because exclusion is in a general form such as, 'it is not a non-tree;'" cf. ŚV Apoha° 63cd: *yadi sāmānyarūpeṇa te 'pohyante, na vastutā⁽²⁾.* "If [all non-cows] are excluded in a general the form [i.e. in the general form of being non-cows, this general form] is not a real object."

⁽¹⁾ *avṛkṣo* em. : *avṛkṣye* Ms

⁽²⁾ Cf. Śākarikā introducing ŚV loc. cit.: *yadi tu pratyekasamudāyaparihāreṇa agorūpeṇa sarvasādhāraṇenāpohyata ity ucyate; tathā sati tasya tvaṇmatena vastutvaṃ*

For the [word] (*saḥ*) does not exclude a different general property (*anyām jātim*) for each individual substance⁵³⁸ (*pratidravyam*), but rather (*kiṃ tarhi*) with the intention of denoting the things to be excluded⁵³⁹ (*vyavacchedyavivakṣayā*) by means of a single common property (*ekena sāmānyadharmena*).⁵⁴⁰ And on this point it has been explained

nāstīty avasturūpeṇāpohyatvam aṅgīkṛtaṃ syāt. "Suppose, however, it is explained that [the excluded] is excluded through exclusion of the aggregate of each single [thing to be excluded] having the form of non-cow which is common to all [the things to be excluded]; this being the case, the property of being a thing to be excluded would be due to the form of an unreal object as (*itī*) the thing to be excluded does not, on your theory, have the property of being a real object."

- ⁵³⁸ Cf. PŚT Ms B 235a2-3: *na*⁽¹⁾ *yasmāt so vṛkṣaśabdo 'nyām ghaṭatvādikām*⁽²⁾ *jātim pratidravyam apohate ghaṭo na bhavatyī evam.* "Because the word 'tree' does not exclude a different general property like potness for each substance such as 'it is not a pot.'" Dignāga's statement presupposes an objection according to which the word 'tree,' for instance, should exclude every single different general property for every single substance, which entails that each thing is qualified by innumerable exclusions corresponding to the innumerable general properties that define it. Not surprisingly one finds the same objection at ŚV Apoha° 59: *bhinnaṭvāc cāpy apohyānām bhinno 'pohaḥ prasajyate, tatraikasmin bhavet piṇḍe 'nantajātisamanvayaḥ.* "And because the excluded things are different it follows [absurdly] that the exclusion is different. In that case there would be a continuous connection of innumerable general properties to one particular entity."

⁽¹⁾ The awkward position of the negation *na* is motivated by the paraphrase, *yasmāt* being intended as a gloss on *hi*.

⁽²⁾ *ghaṭatvā°* em. : *ghaṭā°* (cf. *bum pa la sogs pa T*) Ms

- ⁵³⁹ An example of *vyavacchedavivakṣā* is found in a Sanskrit fragment from Dignāga's no longer extant *Hetumukham* quoted at TSP 385,11-12: *ajñeyam kalpitam kṛtvā tadvyavacchedena jñeye 'numānam.* "By positing what is not knowable as imagined the inference of what is knowable is [performed] by means of exclusion of that."

- ⁵⁴⁰ According to Jinendrabuddhi's explanation Dignāga must have dealt more fully with the crucial concept of *ekadharma* in another treatise, cf. PŚT Ms B 235a3-5: *ekena sāmānyadharmena vyavacchedyasya yā vivakṣā, tayā hetubhūṭayāpohate. kena kāreṇāpohate? prakaraṇāntaranirdeśāt*⁽¹⁾ *tenaiva sāmānyadharmaneti vijñāyate. etad uktaṃ bhavati: sāmānyadharmena vyavacchedyavivakṣayā prāpitābhedarūpeṇa*⁽²⁾ *vṛkṣo na bhavatyī. evam ghaṭādīn vyavacchedyān apohata itī. tato 'siddham ānantyam avṛkṣādeḥ sāmānyarūpasyābhinnatvāt.* "The intention of denoting the excluded by a single general property – i.e. with that (intention) as cause. Whereby does it exclude? According to the description in another treatise one understands that it excludes by means of this only namely by means of the [single] general property. This means: by a general property whose identical form is obtained through the intention of denoting the excluded at the thought 'it is not a tree.' In this way a word excludes objects to be excluded (*vyavacchedyān*) like pots and so on. Therefore infinity [of the things to be excluded] is not established

(*uktaṃ cātra*) that the inference [of the referent] is from mere non-observation [of the word's application] to what belongs to the class of dissimilar things (*vijātiye 'darśanamātreṇānumānam*).⁵⁴¹ However, this problem⁵⁴² concerns only you (*tavaiva*): If [the word] were to apply by universally pervading [the referents] pertaining to its own class of similar things (*svajātiyavyāptyā varteta*), the pervaded⁵⁴³ would be infinite

because the form of the general property of non-trees, and so on, is one and the same."

In other words, a negated term like non-tree (*avṛkṣa*) presupposes an observation statement like "x is not a tree (= non-tree)." The negated term non-tree denotes in a general way (*sāmānyena*) all things that are not trees. It is thus clear that the term *avṛkṣa* is secondary and derived from the primary term *vṛkṣa* with the sole intention of denoting all objects to be excluded (*vyavacchedyavivakṣā*) by their shared general property (*sāmānyadharmā*), the so-called single property (*ekadharmā*), namely that of not being trees whereby they form an aggregate (*samudāya*) of non-trees that is to be excluded. Kumārila addresses the content of PSV V 43b in ŚV Apoha° 61ff: *samudāyātmanā nāpi bhaved eṣām apohyatā, samudāyo hi naikena vinā dharmena jāyate*. He refers twice to the concept of *ekadharmā* "single property" in his criticism of the *apoha* thesis without connecting it to Dignāga's concept of *apohyavivakṣā*, which emphasizes the secondary and derivative character of the negated term. Cf. ŚV ibid. 72: *apohyān api cāsvādīn ekadharmānvayād ṛte, na nirūpayitum śaktis tatrāpoho na sidhyati*. TS 932 and TSP 367,11–15; TS 1049–1050 and TSP 404,17–21.

(1) °*taranirdeśāt* em. : °*tarānirdeśās* Ms

(2) °*rūpeṇa* em. : °*rūpāna* Ms

⁵⁴¹ Jinendrabuddhi refers in his explanation at PST Ms B 235a6–7 to the pivotal justification of exclusion at PSV V 34: *adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārtha* (PS V 34a) *ity atroktam vijātiye adarśanamātreṇānumānam iti*, and continues explaining: *yo hi yatra <na>⁽¹⁾ dṛṣṭaḥ, sa tam apohate. vṛkṣaśabdaś ca svārthābhāve vijātiye na dṛṣṭaḥ. kāraṇābhāve kāryābhāvāt. ataḥ saty apy ānantye 'numitir upapadyate*. "For [the word] excludes that to which it is not observed to apply. And the word 'tree' is not observed to apply to what is dissimilar i.e. where its own referent is not found because where the cause is not found, [there] the effect is not found. Therefore the result of inference is justified, even though [that which is dissimilar] is infinite."

(1) *na* em., cf. *ma mthoṇ ba T* : om. Ms

⁵⁴² That is, the problem that no cognition occurs, cf. PST Ms B 235a7: *pratyayasamvṛttyabhāvadoṣaḥ*; cf. the discussion above PSV 43b.

⁵⁴³ Cf. PST Ms B 235a7–235b1: *yasya hi vidhinā pratyāyanam tasyānvayaḥ pradhānam iti sakalasvajātiyavyāptyā śabdena vartitavyam, etac ca na sambhavati, sajātiyānām ānantyāt, tadavyatirekāc ca jāter iti*. "For joint presence is the primary thing according to someone who is of the opinion that [the word] indicates in an affirmative form. Thus the word is to apply by pervading all the referents that pertain to the kind that is proper to it, and this is not possible because of the infinity of the

(*vyāpyasyānantyam). Therefore, like in the statement “it is a non-horse because it is horned” (*viṣāṇitvād anaśva iti), the inference is from its exclusion from this [namely a horse] (*tadvyavacchedānumānam*)⁵⁴⁴ because of not observing the general property of being horned in a horse (*aśve viṣāṇitvādarśanena*), but the white horses, etc. (**karkādīn*) are not excluded each separately (*pratyekam*), nor is every single cow, etc. (**ekaikagavādīn*)⁵⁴⁵ apprehended.⁵⁴⁶ Also you maintain the theory that cognitions are based upon exclusion and continuous application⁵⁴⁷

things belonging to the same class and because the general property is not separated from these.”

⁵⁴⁴ Cf. the exegesis of the term *tadvyavacchedānumāna* at PSV V 34.

⁵⁴⁵ Cf. PST Ms B 235b1–3: *viṣāṇitvam aśvād vyāvartamānam anaśvatvaṃ gamayati. tac ca vastusatsāmānyavādibhir api na kiñcid anaśvatvaṃ nāma sāmānyam vastusat pratijñātam. ye 'pi te 'naśvā gavādayaḥ, tān api viṣāṇitvaṃ na pratyekam vyāpnoti; ye 'pi tadvijātiyā aśvāḥ, tān api naiva pratyekam apohate.* “The being horned, as it is excluded from a horse, indicates not being a horse. And concerning this not even those who accept the theory that general properties are real objects claim that not being a horse is a general property that is a real object. Neither does hornedness pervade non-horses such as cows each singly, nor does it exclude horses that are dissimilar from these each singly.”

Dignāga addresses a similar problem in the only surviving Sanskrit fragment from his *Dvādaśaśatikā*: *yathāha Dvādaśaśatikāyām: yady apy uktam “aprasaktasya kimarthaṃ pratiśedhaḥ” iti ? naivaitat pratiśedhamātram ucyate, kin tu tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo 'rthāntaranivṛttyā loke gamyate yathā viṣāṇitvād anaśva iti* (qu. NCV II 548,24–25). “As he claims in the *Dvādaśaśatikā*: Even though it is objected: What purpose does the negation of what is not applicable [e.g., the term *anaśva*] serve? [we answer that] it is not mere negation that is expressed, but rather a certain part of the referent in question is inferred in ordinary language (*loke*) through exclusion of other referents like, for instance, in the inference: it is a non-horse because it is horned.”

⁵⁴⁶ *re re 'dzin pa K : so so la yaṅ 'jug pa ma yin no V.* Since the passage describes to two types of cognitions, I have concluded that K is preferable to V. 'jug pa translates Sanskrit *anuvṛtti* occurring in the immediately following sentence.

⁵⁴⁷ Cf. PST Ms B 235b3–4: *atha ca tato yathā vipakṣavyāvṛttibuddhir bhavati sāmānyena vijātiyatiraskārād aśvo na bhavatīti, anuvṛttibuddhiś cāsvavyāvṛtteṣu gavādiṣu sāmānyākāreṇānaśva iti, tathātra nyāyaḥ*⁽¹⁾. *śabdo 'pi hi liṅgam. ato*⁽²⁾ *gāvādiśabdād api gavādiṣu anuvṛttibuddhir agavādiṣu ca vyāvṛttibuddhir bhavati.* “And therefore: Just as there is a cognition in terms of exclusion from the *vipakṣa* because of separating it in a general way from dissimilar things viz. [the cognition] ‘it is not a horse,’ as well as a cognition in terms of continuous application in a general form viz. ‘non-horse’ with regard to cows, and so on, as excluded from horses, so is the principle in this context. For also the word is an indicator. Therefore the word

(*vyāvṛtṭyanuvṛttibuddhimatam); and the principle (*nyāyaḥ*) in this treatise (*ātra*) is the same (*tathā*).

§ 60. The notion of identity and difference (*ekānekatvakalpanā*) is not justified on the assumption (*upetya*) of non-existence of the nature of other things since (*hi*) it is concerned with an entity.⁵⁴⁸ [44a-c]

For (*hi*) it is justified to conceive of the identity and difference of a thing whose nature is existent (**sadātman*), but not on the assumption of non-existence of the nature of other things (**ātmāntarābhāvam*

'cow,' and so on, causes a cognition in terms of continuous application with regard to cows, and so on, and a cognition in terms of exclusion with regard to non-cows, etc."

Cf. the use of terms *anuvṛtṭipratyaya* and *vyāvṛtṭipratyaya* in Praśastapāda's PBh § 7 and § 361ff; the term *vyāvṛtṭibuddhi* occurs op. cit. § 369. Siṃhasūri quotes a related passage from an unknown Vaiśeṣika treatise at NCV 29,22-23: *yathoktam: anuvṛtṭipratyayakāraṇaṃ sāmānyam, vyāvṛtṭibuddhihetur viśeṣa iti*.

⁽¹⁾ *ātra nyāyaḥ* em. (cf. *de l'tar 'dir rigs pa ste T*): *ā dravyādayaḥ* Ms

⁽²⁾ *tags dan ldan pa las T* reading *lingam ato* Ms as *lingamato* sic!

⁵⁴⁸ This interesting paragraph continues addressing the question about what constitutes the excluded referents of a negative term like non-cow if the referents of the positive term cow are defined as identically the same because of non-existence of non-cows in cows. Dignāga responds to an argument by Mādhava, which Jinendrabuddhi quotes at PST Ms B 235b5-236a1: "*yady ātmāntarābhāvadārśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati, ekaś cātāmāntarābhāvaḥ, tataḥ sarvātmāntareṣv eka-pratyayaprasaṅgaḥ. sarvam ekarūpeṇa pratyayena pratiyeta viśeṣaṇasyaikatvāt. yathā śuklatvaviśeṣaṇasyābhinnatvāt kumudādayo 'bhinnākāreṇa pratyayena pratiyante, śuklaṃ kumudaṃ kundaṃ śaṅkhaṃ ceti. atha naika ātmāntarābhāvaḥ, tataḥ pratyātmaṃ pratyayanānāvaprasaṅgaḥ śabdavṛtṭinimitṭasya bhinnatvāt, śukla-madhurasurabhiśītaṃ kaṇḍam iti yathā. na caitad ubhayam iṣyata iti abhyupeta-hānam*" *iti*. "If the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things and the non-existence of the nature of other things is one, the [absurd] consequence is that there is one cognition about the nature of all the other things. Everything would be cognized by a cognition that has the same form because of the unity of the attribute, just as the white lotus, and so on, is cognized through a notion that has the same form because of the unity of the attribute whiteness as in the statement 'the lotus is white, the jasmine is (white), and the mother of pearl is (white)'. If, on the other hand, non-existence of the nature of other things is not the same, then the [absurd] consequence is that there is difference of notion for each thing because the cause of application of the word is different as in the statement 'sugar is white, sweet, fragrant, and cool.' And both [consequences] are unwanted. Therefore (*iti*) you give up what you have assumed."

Intuition⁵⁹⁷ (**pratibhā*), however,⁵⁹⁸ is sensation (**pratyakṣam*) as it is self-awareness⁵⁹⁹ (**svasaṃvedanam*). Consequently it does not transgress [the domain of] this [namely sensation].

§ 64. If, in the first place, it is justified, in the case of words having a cause of application (*naimittikeṣu*),⁶⁰⁰ that they denote their referents (*arthābhīdhānam*) through exclusion of other referents (*anyāpohena*), how then [is it justified] in the case of those that are arbitrary (*yādṛcchikeṣu*)?⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁷ Cf. *spobs pa K : rtogs pa V*.

⁵⁹⁸ Cf. *nī* (= Sanskrit *tu*, cf. PS V 49a, q.v. above) *V : yañ K*.

⁵⁹⁹ Cf. *rig pa yin pas K : rañ rig yin pa'i phyir V*.

⁶⁰⁰ That is, words denoting a general property, a quality, an action, or a substance, cf. PST Ms B 238b2: *naimittikā jātiḡuṇakriyādravyaśabdāḥ*. This classification corresponds to the semantic conditions mentioned at PSV I 3d: *jātiśabdeṣu jātyā gaur iti. ḡuṇaśabdeṣu ḡuṇena śukla iti. kriyāśabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka iti. dravyaśabdeṣu dravyeṇa daṇḡi viśāṇīti*; cf. Hattori 1968: 83 n. 1.27. Prominent Sanskrit grammarians like Bhartṛhari did not accept this classification. Bhartṛhari, for instance, explains terms like *pācaka* and *daṇḡin* as *kṛt* and *taddhita* derivatives, respectively, whose cause of application (*pravṛttinimitta*) is a syntactical relation (*sambandha*) that is expressible by means of the abstract affixes *tvatalau*; this view is mentioned by Dignāga who writes: *atra kecid āhuḡ - sambandhaviśiṣṡa iti*.⁽¹⁾ For the idea of *sambandha* as *pravṛttinimitta*, cf. PSV V 9ab § 15 above with n. 131 ad loc.

⁽¹⁾ Cf. *Kāśīkāvr̥tti* IV 105,30: *kecit tu kriyākārasambandham kriyāśabdānām pravṛttinimittam icchanti*. Like Dignāga, Jinendrabuddhi probably has Bhartṛhari's view in mind.

⁶⁰¹ According to the theory to which Dignāga's opponent alludes, arbitrary terms are characterized by being applied to a single (*eka*) not common (*asādhāraṇa*) entities (*vastu*) (Cf. PST Ms B 238b3: *yādṛcchikeṣu tv ekavastūpanipātiṣu katham?*). Consequently the semantic conditions of such terms differ from those of words whose causes of application (*pravṛttinimitta*) are general properties, qualities, or actions that are supposed to reside in their substrata⁽¹⁾. Since Dignāga's *apoha* theory presupposes the existence of general properties, although not as real entities, but as defined by exclusion of other referents – equivalent to the absence from the locus of the referent of its complement – the question arises whether proper nouns are subsumed under the general *apoha* theory, cf. PST Ms B 238b3–4: *na hi teṣām sāmānyam abhidheyam samasty anekādhāratvāt sāmānyasya. etena yādṛcchikeṣu sāmānyārthānabhidhānād abhyupetaḡanam*. "For their denotable object is not the general property because the general property has a multitude of substrata. Therefore, since the general property as referent is not denoted in the case of arbitrary terms you abandon your thesis."

Dignāga describes very briefly at PSV I 3d the characteristic of proper nouns as

[It is] also [justified] in the case of arbitrary terms because their referents are without distinction⁶⁰² (*arthābhedaḥ), [50a]

For (*hi*) an arbitrary term like the word 'dīṭṭha,' which denotes an aggregate (*samudāyavācī*),⁶⁰³ denotes the members of the aggregate

that of qualifying a referent by means of a name: *yadṛcchāśabdeṣu hi nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate dīṭṭheti*; Jinendrabuddhi explains at PST I 38,4 that proper nouns are not dependent upon such causes of application as general properties, cf. Ms B loc. cit.: *anapekṣitajātyādīpravṛttinimittā yadṛcchāśabdāḥ*; NCV 60,5-6: *nimittanirapekṣaṃ nāma yadṛcchikam 'dīṭṭho,' 'dāvitṭha' ityādī*.

Yuktidīpikā is the only non-Buddhist source that alludes to Dignāga's view of the cause of application of arbitrary terms, cf. YD 100,17-20, q.v. below n. 603 below.

⁽¹⁾ Cf., e.g., Patañjali's statement at MBh I 19,20: *catuṣṭayī śabdānām pravṛttiḥ: jātiśabdā guṇaśabdāḥ kriyāśabdā yadṛcchāśabdāḥ caturthāḥ*. The view that arbitrary terms are without cause of application can be traced to the debate at MBh II 367,18ff (ad A V 1.119), where Patañjali discusses the problem of what accounts for the introduction of the *bhāvapratyaya tā* or *tva* after arbitrary terms like 'dīṭṭha,' when there is no subsisting property (*vartin*) dīṭṭhaness in persons like dīṭṭha: *dīṭṭhādiṣu tarhi vartyabhāvāt vṛttir na prāpnoti: dīṭṭhatvam, dīṭṭhatā*; Kaiyaṭa explains that proper names are not dependent upon a cause of application inherent in the object because they apply according to a persons wish, cf. MBhP V 348,17-18: *dīṭṭhādayo yadṛcchāśabdā arthagatam na kimcit pravṛttinimittam apekṣyante, puruṣecchāvaśena pravartanāt*; cf. PVSVT 419,18-19 (ad PVS V 115,19-20): *bāhyam nimittam antareṇa śabdaprayogecchā yadṛcchā. tasyām bhāvād yadṛcchikāḥ. teṣu devadattādīṣu vyaktiṣu*.

⁶⁰² Arbitrary terms like *dīṭṭha* denote referents that consist of an aggregate of separate properties. Consequently such referents are plural like the referents of general terms and thus comparable to those of general terms, cf. PST Ms B 238b4: *dīṭṭhādīnām anekatvaṃ darśayan, tatṛāpi sāmānyam astīti pratipādayati*.

⁶⁰³ A word like 'dīṭṭha' denotes an aggregate of qualities like being blind on one eye or being dwarfish, cf. PST Ms B 238b4-6: *kāṇakuṇṭhādiguṇasamudāyavācī yadṛcchiko dīṭṭhādiśabdāḥ*. The same examples are mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi and Siṃhasūri in their explanations of PSV V 34, v. above n.s 421-422 where the relevant texts are quoted and translated. YD relates Dignāga's view at 100,17-20: *candrādiṣv idānim asādhāraṇaviśayeṣu kā pratipattiḥ syād iti. āha: avayavāpekṣatvāt. candraśabdo hy anekeṣv avayaveṣu vartate jātīdravyaguṇakriyāsu ca. tathā dīṭṭhādiśabdāḥ. tasmād evaṃjātīyakānām api cānumānād abhedāḥ*. "Now, what sort of cognition would there be with regard to the [word] 'moon,' and so on, whose referent is not common? He explains: because it depends upon parts. For the word 'moon' refers to many parts as well as to general property, substance, quality, and action. The same does the word 'dīṭṭha'. Therefore, for [words] belonging to this class there is no difference from inference either." Jinendrabuddhi mentions the question concerning the semantic conditions of application of terms like 'sun' at PST Ms B 239b4-5: *ye tarhy ete sūryādayaḥ śabdāḥ ekavyaktyupanipātinaḥ, te*

(**samudāyinaḥ*) without distinction⁶⁰⁴ (*abhedenāha*).

What then is the difference between a general term and an aggregate term?⁶⁰⁵

[There is] none whatsoever!⁶⁰⁶

According to acknowledged usage⁶⁰⁷ (*prasiddhivaśāt*) a general term in

katham sāmānyavacanāḥ. tatrāpi sūryādīnām avasthābhedenā bhedād anekatvam astīty adōṣaḥ. "How then do words like 'sun,' which apply to a single particular, denote a general property. Also in this case the sun, and so on, is plural because of internal distinction due to difference of state. Consequently (*iti*) there is no problem;" cf. PVSVT 419,21f (ad PVSU 115,19f): *atha devadattaśabdo 'py avasthābhedenā jātīvācaka iṣyate*; a similar discussion is related at TSP 453,14–18 (ad TS 1225): *ye 'py ete dīthādayaḥ śabdā yadṛcchaśabdatvena pratīṭhā, te 'pi janmanaḥ prabhṛtyāmarāṇakṣaṇād anuvartamānāḥ pratikṣaṇabhedabhinnam asādhāraṇabhedena vastu gamayitum aśaktāḥ kālaprakāśamaryādāvaccinnavastusamavetām jātīm abhidheyatvenopādādate.* "Also words like 'dītha' that are known as proper nouns depend upon a general property inherent in the referent delimited by the bounds of timespan as their denotable object, being incapable of making a referent that is differentiated by differences every moment known by means of a non-common difference, as they apply to it continually from birth to the moment of death."

⁶⁰⁴ That is, in a general form without distinguishing between the many parts that constitute the aggregate, which is also the property of the so-called aggregate terms (*samudāyaśabda*), cf. PST Ms B 238b5–6: *tasya samudāyasya ye 'vayavāḥ kṣaṇakūṭādayaḥ, tān abhedena sāmānyenāha. tato yathā vṛkṣaśabdāḥ śiṃśapādīn viśeṣān abhedenābhidadhat sāmānyavācī tathā samudāyaśabdo 'pi dīthāśabdāḥ.* "The parts of the aggregate are the [properties of] being blind on one eye and being dwarfish, and so on. It denotes these without distinction, i.e., in a general form. Therefore, just as the word 'tree,' while denoting without distinction particulars like *śiṃśapā*, denotes the general property, in the same way also an aggregate term like 'dītha.'"

⁶⁰⁵ That is, if both terms denote a general property, cf. PST Ms B 238b6: *yady ubhāv api sāmānyavācīnau.*

⁶⁰⁶ Jinendrabuddhi qualifies this statement at PST Ms B 238b7 with the subsequent exposition in mind: *etāvātā leśena nāsty eva viśeṣa ity abhiprāyaḥ, na tu sarvathā nāsty eveti. anyathāyaṃ jātīśabdo 'yaṃ samudāyaśabda iti bhedo na syāt.* "Thus the opinion is that because it is such a minor point, there really is no difference, but it is not the case that there is no [difference] at all. Otherwise there would be no distinction, like when one says 'this is a general term,' 'this is an aggregate term.'"

⁶⁰⁷ Jinendrabuddhi explains Dignāga's statement with reference to a similar exposition in *Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyaśa*, cf. PST Ms B 238b7–239a2: *nanu cāvayaveṣu mukhyopacaritavṛttitvena viśeṣo bhavati. jātīśabdasya hi pratyekam avayaveṣu mukhyā vṛttih samudāyaśabdasya tūpacaritā. yathoktaṃ Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyaśe: ayaṃ tu jātīsamudāyaśabdāyor viśeṣaḥ prasiddhivaśāḥ⁽¹⁾ jātīśabdāḥ pratyekam api*

some cases (*kvacit*) is transferred to each single (*pratyekam*) part (*avayaveṣu*), as, for instance, in the statement “one should not eat the village swine”⁶⁰⁸ (*abhakṣyo grāmyasūkara iti*). In other cases (*kvacit*) it [applies] directly (*mukhyaḥ*) [to the parts]. It is, for example, said that

without reference to number, quantity, and material shape the denoting [word] (*vācakaḥ*) applies to water, or the like,⁶⁰⁹ whether a [single] drop or a multitude [of drops].⁶¹⁰ (VP II 156)

In certain cases (**kvacit*) it does not refer to a part (**avayave*)⁶¹¹ [of a referent]. For instance,

the word which applies to [a referent] that is qualified by mate-

samudāyīṣu vartate, samudāyaśabdas tu pratyekaṃ samudāyīṣupacaryata iti. “Certainly the difference is due to direct and transferred application to the parts. For the application of a general term to each of the parts is direct, whereas that of an aggregate term is transferred. As it is explained in *Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyaśa*: ‘This, however, is the difference between general and aggregate terms: according to acknowledged usage a general term, on the one hand, applies to each member of the aggregate, whereas an aggregate term is transferred to each member of the aggregate.’”

(¹) em. : *prasiddha*° Ms

⁶⁰⁸ Cf. PST Ms B 239a2–3: *sūkaravyaktyavayaveṣv api sūkakaraśabda upacārāt pravartate. tadyathā hy “abhakṣyo grāmyasūkara”⁽¹⁾ ity ukte, avayavā api na bhakṣyante.* “The word ‘swine’ is also applied in a transferred sense to the parts of the individual swine. For when, for instance, it is said that one should not eat the village swine, parts of it are not to be eaten either.”

Bhartrhari mentions the same example at VPV II 224,16–17 with reference to the parts of a swine: *abhakṣyo grāmyasūkara iti. atra bhakṣyatikriyā tathābhūtam eva sādhana(bhūtaṃ dravyāvayavam apekṣate) ... avayave ca samudāye ca samudāyaśabdapravṛttir iti.*

(¹) Cf. MBh I 5,16–17: *abhakṣyo grāmyasūkara ity ukte gamyata etad āraṇyo bhakṣya iti.*

⁶⁰⁹ Cf. PST Ms B 239a3–4: *ādiśabdena prthivyā diparigrahaḥ.*

⁶¹⁰ Cf. PST Ms B 239a4–6: *saṅkhyādyanapekṣatvenāvayaveṣu mukhyavṛttitvaṃ darśayati. saṅkhyādisāpekṣyatve kārṣāpāyajanacaturaśrādiśabdavad ekadeśavṛttitvaṃ na syāt. tatra saṅkhyānapekṣo bindumuṣṭikādisaṅkhyānapekṣatvāḍ⁽¹⁾ ekasminn api hi bindau⁽²⁾ vartate. anekasminn api salilaśabdaḥ. pramāṇanirapekṣo nābhīyūrujānumātratvādyanapekṣaṇāt.*

(¹) *muṣṭikā* em. (cf. T 219,9: *khyor pa gaṇ*) : *mukā*° Ms

(²) *au* em. : *or* Ms

⁶¹¹ *yan lag la K : yan lag ’ba’ žig la V* (“a part alone”).

rial shape, colour, and parts, is not recognized to apply to [each single] component [of these]. (VP II 155)

When [applied] to [a referent] that is qualified by material shape (**saṁsthānaviśiṣṭa*) [the terms] 'circular' (**vṛtta*), 'spherical' (*parimaṇḍala*), 'oblong' (*dirgha*), and 'quadrangular' (*caturaśra*), and in the same way 'fist' (*muṣṭi*), 'knot' (*granthi*), 'wreath' (**mālā*), and 'ear-ring' (*kuṇḍalaka*) do not denote the parts.⁶¹² When [applied] to [a referent] that is qualified by colour (*varṇaviśiṣṭe*): [The terms] 'speckled' (*citraḥ*) and 'variegated' (*kalmāśaḥ*), and so on,⁶¹³ [do not denote the parts]. When [applied] to [a referent] that is qualified by parts (*avayavaviśiṣṭe*): [The terms] 'hundred' (*śatam*), 'thousand' (*sahasram*), 'prastha',⁶¹⁴ 'droṇa',⁶¹⁵ 'month' (*māsa*), 'year' (*saṁvatsara*), and 'weight' (*tuḷā*) do not apply to the parts.⁶¹⁶ And in some cases an aggregate term (*samudāyaśabdah*) comprises each single [part]⁶¹⁷ (*pratyekaṁ parisamāpyate*), as, for instance, [in the statement]: "The village came back" (*grāma āgataḥ*).⁶¹⁸ In some

⁶¹² Cf. VPV II 223,5–6: *saṁsthānaviśiṣṭopakramah parimaṇḍalo dirghaś caturaśra iti tadavayavo nābhidhiyate. tathā muṣṭigranthi(ktala? read mālā?)kuṇḍalakādāyah śabdās tadavayaveṣu na prayujyante.*

⁶¹³ Cf. VPV II 223,7–8: *varṇaśabdānām citraḥ kalmāśaḥ sārāṅga iti tadavayaveṣv apravṛttih*: "Words denoting colour such as 'speckled,' 'variegated,' 'dappled' do not apply to their parts;" Cf. PST Ms B 239a7: *nīle rakte vā citrāvayave na vartante*: "They do not refer to a part of the speckled whether it is blue or red."

⁶¹⁴ The Tibetan translations *bre* V 148,7 : *bre phyed* (= *ardhaprastha/droṇa*) K 149,7 are ambiguous since *bre* is used to render both Sanskrit *prastha* and *droṇa*, cf. the dictionary by Tshe riñ dbaṅ rgyal s.v. In view of the fact that Dignāga quotes the examples in the order of the VPV II 223,7–8 (q.v. n. 613 above), it is reasonable to assume that he is doing the same in this case too.

⁶¹⁵ Cf. *bre gaṇ* K 149,7 : *khal* (= *kharī*) V 148,7.

⁶¹⁶ Cf. VPV II 223,7–8: *avayavaśabdena śatam sahasram prastho droṇo māsaḥ saṁvatsaraḥ (ityādayo grhyante?)*. PST Ms B 239a6–7: *niyatāvayavaviśiṣṭaṁ samudāyam abhidadhataḥ śatādīśabdā avayave na vartante*. "Words like 'a hundred' that denote an aggregate qualified by fixed parts do not apply to a part."

⁶¹⁷ Cf. PST Ms B 239a7–239b1: *pratyekaṁ avayave mukhyaḥ prayujyata ity arthaḥ. mukhya ity etat kutaḥ? uttaratropacarita iti vacanāt*. "The meaning is that it applies directly to each part. What is the reason for [using] the expression 'directly.' Because of the expression 'transferred' in what follows."

⁶¹⁸ Cf. *grōṇ 'oṇs* V : *'gro* K; PST Ms B 239b1–2: *grāmaśabdo grhakṣetravāṭapuruṣādīsamudāyavācakas*⁽¹⁾ *tadekadeṣeṣu puruṣeṣu vartate*. "The word 'village' that denotes the collection of houses, fields, enclosure, people, and so on, refers to parts

cases it is transferred (*upacaritaḥ*) [to each single part], like [VSū V 2.18]: “The action of the *ātman* is explained by the action of the body” (*kāyakarmaṇātmakārma vyākhyātam*).⁶¹⁹ In some cases it does not refer to the parts [of the aggregate], as for instance, [the words] ‘troop’ (*yūtham*), and ‘forest’⁶²⁰ (*vanam*).⁶²¹

§ 65. Now how could the cognition of a referent (*arthapratītiḥ*) from a

of these viz. the people;” MBh I 59,20–22: *grāmaśabdo 'yaṃ bahvarthaḥ. asty eva sālāsamudāye vartate, tadyathā: grāmo dagdha iti. asti vātaparikṣepe vartate, tadyathā: grāmāṃ praviṣṭa iti. asti manuṣyeṣu vartate, tadyathā: grāmo gataḥ, grāma āgata iti.* “The word ‘village’ has many referents. It happens that it refers to the collection of houses, for instance: ‘The village burned down.’ It happens that it refers to the enclosure and surroundings (i.e. the arable land), for instance: ‘He entered the village.’ It happens that it refers to the people, for instance: ‘The village went away, the village came back.’”

⁽¹⁾ There is no word in this definition that matches *lam* T.

⁶¹⁹ Dignāga quotes as an example of this usage VSū V 2.18. Jinendrabuddhi explains it at PST Ms B 239b2 as follows: *atra kāyaśabdaḥ karacaranādisamudāye vartamānas tadavayava eva upacaryate.* “In the present case the word body while applying to the aggregate of hands and feet, and so on, is transferred to a part of it.” Cf. Candrānanda’s exegesis at VSūV 43,3–4 in which *kāya* stands for *hasta*: *lātmaśabdena vāyuh, yathātmamaṃyogaprayatnābhyāṃ haste karma tathātmavāyusaṃyogāt prayatnāc ca prāṇāyāmakarma.*

⁶²⁰ Cf. *khyu žes bya ba dan nags žes bya ba V: kho bo cag žes bya ba K*; MBh I 239,24–25: *ekārthā samudāyā bhavanti tadyathā yūtham śatam vanam iti*; ibid. 426,21.

⁶²¹ Jinendrabuddhi attempts to clarify the actual difference between words belonging to the class of general terms and those belonging to the class of aggregate terms in the following passage at PST Ms B 239b2–4, quoting a brief definition from Dignāga’s *Sāmānyaparikṣāvyāsa*: *Sāmānyaparikṣāvyāse tu avayaveṣūpacarītavṛttitvaṃ bhūyastvena drṣṭam iti jātiśabdāt samudāyaśabdasya viśeṣaṇatvenoktam. dīnmatradarśanam caitat. ayaṃ punar atra sphuṭo viśeṣo jātisamudāyaśabdasya: samudāyaśabda ekasamudāyāntarvartino⁽¹⁾ vijātiyān sajātiyāṃś cābhedanāha. jātiśabdas tu tatsamānājātiyān eva samudāyān asamudāyāṃś ceti.* “In *Sāmānyaparikṣāvyāsa*, however, the difference of an aggregate term from a general term is said to be that ‘its application as transferred to the components is observed to be preponderant.’ This view is just a hint. This, however, is the obvious difference between a general term and an aggregate term, namely: the aggregate term denotes without distinction the [properties] belonging to similar as well as dissimilar things that reside in a single aggregate, whereas a general term [denotes] aggregates and non-aggregates that are of the same kind.”

⁽¹⁾ *āntarvartino* em. : *āṃtataḥ (?) jātino* Ms

word whose connection has not been told (**akṛtasambandhaśabdāt*)⁶²² be an inference about it like, for instance, from [the statement] 'this is a jack-fruit tree' (*ayaṃ paṇasa iti*)?⁶²³

In that case there is no cognition of the referent from the word 'jack-fruit tree.'

Why?

Because [it's] referent is shown (arthadarśanāt*) (?) by someone to whom [its connection] is known (*pratītena*).⁶²⁴ [50b]**

Since the [word's] referent is established⁶²⁵ (**arthasiddhatvāt*) by an acknowledged authority (**vṛddhena*) to whom the connection is known (**pratītasambandhena*)⁶²⁶ by means of the demonstrative pronoun

⁶²² Jinendrabuddhi interprets the term *akṛtasambandha* as referring to a person who does not know the connection of a word to its referent, cf. PST Ms B 239b5: *akṛtasambandha iti sambandhānabhijñāḥ pratipattā*⁽¹⁾. This interpretation is possible, but it makes no sense in the context and may be due to carelessness. Jinendrabuddhi may not always have compared his explanations to the original he commented upon.

⁽¹⁾ °pattā em. : °pattāḥ Ms

⁶²³ Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at PST Ms B 239b6: *akṛtasambandhaśabdajā yā pratītir na sānumāṇaṃ, tadyathā yasya mlecchaśabdajāḥ saṃśayaḥ. tathāvidhā sambandhakāle 'ayaṃ paṇasa iti atrāpi pratī<tir i>ti*. "The cognition that originates from a word whose connection to [its referent] has not been told is not inference, like the doubt that originates from the words of a non-Sanskrit speaker. At the time of [teaching] the connection through the statement 'this is a jack-fruit tree,' the cognition is also in that case of the same kind."

⁶²⁴ Cf. PST Ms B 239b7: *pratītasambandhenety arthaḥ*. For a different translation of 50b, cf. note [310] note 2. above.

⁶²⁵ Cf. *don grub pa'i phyir K* : om. V.

⁶²⁶ It is not possible to decide with absolute certainty what the original Sanskrit version of the first sentence of PSV V 50 might have been: KV are syntactically confused and both versions omit crucial words. The term *grags pa rñin pa* V : om. K, corresponds probably to Sanskrit *vṛddha*. This term is commonly used in descriptions of how children learn the connection between a word and the referent from the discourse of grown ups (*vṛddhavyavahāra*, cf. ŚBh 46,7); cf., for instance, the explanation at ŚBh 46,2-4: *vṛddhānāṃ svārthena vyavahāramānāṃ upaśṛṇvanto bālāḥ pratyakṣam arthaṃ pratipadyamānā drśyante*. See also Kumārila's related discussion at ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 138ff. Raja 1963: 26ff. I assume that 'brel pa bstan pas K : 'brel pas rab tu rtogs pa V correspond to Sanskrit *pratītasambandhena*, cf. the use of *pratītena* at PS V 50b.

'this'⁶²⁷ (*ayaṃśabdena*) and ostentation⁶²⁸ (**hastasamjñāyā*),⁶²⁹ there is no cognition of the referent (**arthapratītiḥ*) due to the word 'jack-fruit tree,' but rather, it is the name [of the referent] that is taught (*saṃjñāvyutpattīḥ*).⁶³⁰ The co-reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇyam*) of this [namely the

⁶²⁷ At this point Jinendrabuddhi addresses the question of the denotation of the demonstrative pronoun, cf. PST Ms B 239b7–240a2: *nanu cāyaṃśabdo 'py āsanna-pratyakṣavastusāmānyavacanah, kutas'*⁽¹⁾ *tena panasārthasiddhiḥ? naiṣa doṣaḥ. yathā pratītasambandho vṛkṣaśabdaḥ sāmānyavacano 'pi yadā purovartini palāśādaḥ prajuyate 'yam vṛkṣaś chidyatām iti, tadā vṛkṣaviśeṣa eva vartate. tathāyaṃśabdo'*⁽²⁾ *'pi.* "Certainly, also the demonstrative pronoun 'this' denotes the general property of a proximate perceptible object, so how can it establish the referent 'jack-fruit tree?' This is not a problem! In the same way as the word 'tree' whose relation is known: When it is applied, although it denotes the general property, to the present *palāśa*, and so on, as in [the statement] 'this tree is to be cut down,' it is used to denote a particular tree only, so also the demonstrative pronoun 'this.'"

⁽¹⁾ *kutas* em. : *tatas* Ms

⁽²⁾ *śabdo* em. : *śbdo* Ms

⁶²⁸ Cf. *lag pa'i brda'* V : *lag brda'i*. For Dignāga's use of *hastasamjñā*, cf. ŚV Śabda' 20: *hastasamjñādayao ye 'ye pi yadarthapratipādane bhavyeḥ kṛtasāṅketās te na liṅgam iti sthitaḥ*. Sambandhākṣepa 139; PVSV 134,9.

⁶²⁹ I assume that the introduction of the particle 'am after *yan lag brda'* V (om. K) reproduces Sanskrit *ca*.

⁶³⁰ Cf. PST Ms B 240a2: *panasaśabdena tatra saṃjñāvyutpattimātram kriyata ity arthaḥ*. In the case of *saṃjñāvyutpatti* the relation between any given word and the thing it denotes is taught by pointing at a prototypical instance of the referent and thus presupposes a visible referent. Consequently there is no inference in the case of *saṃjñāvyutpatti*. Dignāga addresses briefly the implications of *saṃjñāvyutpatti* at PSV II 5: *śābdam api tu <asādhāraṇena viśayena> sambandhābhāve <dvidhānumānam parikṣyeta> dṛṣṭārtham adṛṣṭārtham <ca>. <tatra> dṛṣṭārthe saṃjñāvyutpattīḥ. adṛṣṭārthe 'rthavikalpamātram, na viśiṣṭārthapratītiḥ*. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 62b5: *śābdam api tv ityādi. sambandhābhāva iti*. 62b6–7: *dṛṣṭārtham ... adṛṣṭārtham*. 62b7: *dṛṣṭārthe saṃjñāvyutpattīḥ. adṛṣṭārthe 'rthavikalpamātram* (qu. PVSV 37,26); 63a5: *na viśiṣṭārthapratītiḥ*.

The two Tibetan versions translate this crucial passage as follows:

K (Kitagawa 1973: 454b8f = P 111a1–3): *sgra las byuñ ba yañ 'brel pa med par thun moñ ma yin pa'i yul mthoñ ba dan ma mthoñ ba las rjes su dpag pa rnam pa gñis su brtag par bya'o // de la mthoñ ba'i don la miñ bstan pa'o // ma mthoñ ba'i don la rnam pa rtog pa tsam yin gyi / don gyi khyad par rtogs pa ma yin no //*

V (Kitagawa 1973: 454a5f = P 29b4–6): *sgra yañ yul thun moñ ma yin pa dan 'brel ba yod pa ma yin pas rnam pa gñis ka rjes su dpag pa brtag par bya ste / mthoñ ba'i don dan ma mthoñ ba'i don no // de la mthoñ ba'i don la ni mi gsal bar byed pa'o // ma mthoñ ba'i don la ni rnam par rtog pa tsam 'ba' žig ste / don gyi bye brag rtogs par byed pa ni ma yin no //*

"However, when there is no connection [of any given word] with an individual referent, it should also be investigated whether verbal cognition is inference in two ways, namely (1) as having a visible referent and (2) as having an invisible referent. Now, with regard to the one having a visible referent, it is teaching a name [and thus it is not inference]. With regard to the one having an invisible referent, it is nothing but representation of the referent. There is no cognition of a distinct referent [and thus it is not inference either]."⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at PST Ms B 62b5–63a4 is deeply indebted to Dharmakīrti's PVSV 37,24ff; text lifted from PVSV is printed in roman: "*sambandhābhāve*" *iti saṅketakāle. śabdārthasambandhābhijñā hi saṅketakālānubhūtārthasāmānyam eva pratipādyate śabdāt, na svalakṣaṇam, tasya pūrvam adṛṣṭatvātprayogakāle viśeṣaviśayatvāśaṅkā na bhavaty eva. saṅketakāle tu pratyakṣam svalakṣaṇam iti, sambhavati tadviśayatvāśaṅkā. ataḥ "sambandhābhava" ity āha. "drṣṭārtham" yatrārthaḥ pratyakṣeṇa drṣyate. "adṛṣṭārtham" viparyayāt. "drṣṭārthe sañjñāvyutpattir" iti. yathāyaṁ paṇasa iti. atra sambandhavyutpattir eva bhavati, nānumānam, arthasya pratyakṣatvāt. adṛṣṭārthe svargādāv arthavikalpamātram iti. na hi svargādīśabdāḥ svargādīnām saṅketakāle 'nyadā vā svalakṣaṇam buddhāv arpanti, anātindriyatvaprasaṅgāt (cf. PVSV 37,24–25). kevalam tatpratipādanābhiprāyaḥ prayuktāḥ. śrotary apratibhāsamānatatsvabhāvam arthabimbam arpayanti (cf. PVSV 37–25–27): asti kaścit surādhivāsa viśeṣa ity evamādikam. naivam svalakṣaṇam pratipannam bhavati pratipāditam vā: svargādīśravaṇe tadanubhāvinām iva pratibhāsābheda-prasaṅgāt. apratipadyamāno 'pi ca tatsvabhāvam tathābhūta eva vikalpapratibimbe tadadhyavasāyī samtuṣyati, tathābhūtātvād eva śabdārthapratipatteḥ (cf. PVSV 37,27–38,5). atra ca sambandhābhāva iti etan nāpekṣyate, kiṁ tu drṣṭārtheṣv eva. tatra hi drṣṭatvād viśeṣaśya, tasyaiva vācyatāśaṅketā. tatas tannivṛttyartham uktam sañjñāvyutpattir iti. "When there is no connection' that is, at the time when the language convention is taught (saṅketakāle). For the one who knows the connection of a word to its referent understands from a word merely the general property of the referent he experienced at the time when the language convention was taught, but not the individual because it has not been observed previously. At the time when the language convention is put into practice doubt about whether a particular is the object does not exist at all. However, because (iti) the individual is visible at the time of teaching the convention, doubt about whether it is its [i.e. the words] object is possible. Therefore he says 'when there is no connection.' 'Having a visible referent' means 'when the referent is observed by sensation.' 'Having an invisible referent' means in the diametrically opposite case. 'With regard to the one having a visible referent, it is teaching a name,' like, for instance: 'this is a paṇasa.' In that case it is nothing but teaching the relation, but it is not inference because the referent is visible. 'With regard to the one having an invisible referent' like heaven 'it is a mere representation of the referent.' For words like heaven do not at the time when the language convention is taught or on other occasions convey the particular to the mind because the [absurd] consequence is that it would not transcend the senses. They are merely used with intentions of teaching about them. They convey to the listener a mental picture of the referent whose essential nature is not clear [to him] in words like 'it is a particular kind of dwelling place for gods and so on.' A particular is not understood or explained in this way because the [absurd] consequence is that there would be no difference of mental picture from hearing [words] like 'heaven' in those who in a way would experience it directly. Although [the listener] does not understand its essential nature he takes pleasure in a representation*

word 'jack-fruit tree'], whose purpose is that of [teaching] a name,⁶³¹ with the demonstrative pronoun 'this' is just⁶³² for the purpose of showing the connection (*sambandhapradarśanārthaṃ tu*),⁶³³ on the assumption

picture of exactly this nature, identifying it as that [namely a particular] because the cognition of the referent of a word is precisely of this nature. And in this context the expression 'when there is no connection' has no relation to that, but rather to visible referents only. Since a particular among these is observed, one would expect it to be the denotable object. Therefore it is said: 'Teaching a name' in order to exclude this."

⁶³¹ Cf. PST Ms B 240a2f.: *sañjñārtho yasya sa tathocyate*.

⁶³² Cf. PST Ms B 240a2: *tuśabdo 'vadhārañārthaḥ*.

⁶³³ Cf. PST Ms B 240a3: *yad etad ayaṃśabdena panasārthena panasāśabdasya sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ tat sambandhapradarśanārthaṃ*. "The co-reference of the word 'panasa' with the demonstrative pronoun 'this' whose referent is the *panasa* has the purpose of showing the connection."

Umveka elaborates on the issue at ŚVT (Umveka) 371,12–14 (on Śabda° 102): *ayaṃ panasa iti vā prayujyamāne vācyavācakaśaṇasambandhāvagatiḥ. na ca sa eva panasāśabdavācyaḥ, ayamiti prasiddhārthapadasāmānādhikaraṇyāvaseyatvāt*. "Or, when one makes use of the statement 'this is a jack-fruit tree' one understands the connection that is characterized as one of the denotable object with the denoting term. And it [viz. the connection] is not only denotable by the word 'jack-fruit tree' because it is to be ascertained by the co-reference of the syntactical word whose referent is well known with [the demonstrative pronoun] 'this'."⁽¹⁾

Jinendrabuddhi continues the discussion of the role of co-reference in establishing the connection at PST Ms B 240a 3–5: *nanu caikatrābhidheye śabdayor vṛttiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam. tadā cānirjñātasambandhatvād eva nāsti panasāśabdasārthaḥ⁽²⁾, tat kutaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ? saṅketayitrā sañjñātvena panasārthavṛtteḥ⁽³⁾, tadā⁽⁴⁾ ayaṃśabdasyārthe sa niyuktaḥ, tatas tatra tasya vṛttir ity ādoṣaḥ. ayam atrārthaḥ: sañjñāsañjñīsambandhavyutpattimātrārtha eva tadā panasāśabdasyāyaṃśabdaviśaye panase sañjñārthena niyoga iti*. "Co-reference is certainly the application of two words to a single denotable object. And at this point (*tadā*) the word 'panasa' has no referent because its relation [to the referent it denotes] is not known, so how could there be co-reference? Because the person who teaches the conventional denotation applies it [viz. the word 'panasa'] to the referent *panasa* as its name, it is at this point applied to the referent of the demonstrative pronoun 'this,' therefore its application to this is not a problem. The meaning in the present case is this: At this point the application of the word 'panasa' that has the purpose of being a name of the *panasa* that is the referent of the demonstrative pronoun 'this' has merely the purpose of teaching the relation between the name and the thing named."

For Dharmakīrti's view of *pradarśana* in relation to *vyutpatti*, cf. the discussion at PV I 117ff with PVSV ad loc.

⁽¹⁾ Dignāga's view on the role of the demonstrative pronoun for establishing the relation between the vocal sign and its referent is closely related to Bhartṛhari's

(*iti kṛtvā*) that [the connection] is the denotable object of both [terms].⁶³⁴ And since the word 'jack-fruit tree' does not have this [namely the jack-fruit tree] as its referent, its purpose is that of [teaching] a name.⁶³⁵

view, cf. the quotation from the *Saṅgraha* at VPV I 101,3: so 'yam *iti vyapadeśena sambandhopayogasya śakyatvāt*; VPV 105,3–4; VPV I 126,4–5: so 'yam *iti sañjñinā śakyavacchedalakṣaṇaḥ sambandho niyamyate*; VP II 128.

(2) °śabdasyārthaḥ em. (cf. *T sgra'i don*) : °asya Ms

(3) *panasārtha°* em. (cf. *pa na sa'i don T*) : *palāsārtha°* Ms

(4) *tadā* em. : *tadāpīs°* Ms

⁶³⁴ Cf. PST Ms B 240a5–6: *kathaṃ punas tena sambandhaḥ śakyate pradarśayitum, yāvataḥ nāsyā tatra kiñcit pravṛttinimittam vastusat bhavadbhir iṣyata ity āha: "ubhayaḥ abhidheya itī kṛtvā" iti. panasāyamaśabdāyora dvayora apy abhidhānārhaḥ,⁽¹⁾ tābhyāṃ vā śakyo 'bhidhātum ity arthaḥ. etad uktaṃ bhavati: śabdānām icchā-mātravṛttitvāt sarva evārthā yogyāḥ. tasmād vināpy anyena pravṛttinimittena śakyate sambandho darśayitum iti.* "But how, moreover, is it possible to show the relation with it [viz. the jack-fruit tree], insofar as you claim that it [viz. the word 'jack-fruit tree'] has no real cause of application whatsoever in it [viz. jack-fruit tree]? He answers: 'On the assumption that [the connection] is the denotable object of both.' The meaning is that both the word 'jack-fruit tree' and the demonstrative pronoun 'this' are capable of denoting it [viz. the connection], or, that it can be denoted by both of them. What is meant is this: Since words apply by the mere wish, all referents are fit [as referents]. Therefore it is possible to show the connection even without something else as cause of application."

(1) °as em. : °aṃ Ms

⁶³⁵ Cf. PST Ms B 240a7–240b1: *tena panasenānarthavattvāt panasasabdaḥ sañjñāvyutpattiprayojana ity arthaḥ.* "The meaning is this: Since it does not have a referent because of the jack-fruit tree, the word 'jack-fruit tree' has the purpose of teaching the name."

Jinendrabuddhi's explanation is concise to the point of being obscure. The underlying intention is that until the connection between the name (*sañjñā*) 'panasa' and its referent is established, the term *per se* has no referent and only denotes its own form (*svarūpa*). Its sole purpose is that of being a name whose relation to its referent has to be taught by pointing to a prototypical instance of it, and the use of the demonstrative pronoun "this" as mentioned by Dignāga.

Cf. Bhartṛhari's explanation at VPV ad VP I 66a–b: *prāk sañjñinābhisambandhāt sañjñā rūpapādārthikā, saṣṭhyāś ca prathamāyāś ca nimittatvāya kalpate. ... yāvata sañjñinā tu sañjñā na sambaddhā tāvaṇ na sañjñipadārthiketi.* "Before [its] connection with the thing named, the name has [its own] form as referent and is fit for being the cause [of application] of the sixth triplet or the first triplet."

Cf. VPṬ (*Paddhati*) 125,22 ad loc.: *sañjñāsañjñīsambandhavyutpattikāle 'ayam panasah' iti. na hi sañjñāyāś tadā so 'rthaḥ.* "Like at the time of teaching the connection between a name and the thing named in the words 'this is a jack-fruit tree.' For this is not the referent of the name at that time."