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PATAÑJALI'S
Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya
PASPAŚĀHNIKA

Introduction, Text, Translation and Notes

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on. This being the case, maybe, at the beginning already, the *Bhāṣyakāra* wanted to give an indication of the importance he attached to the *Nirukta*.

It may be recalled also that Yāska looked upon his own work as *vyākaraṇasya kārtsnyam*, literally 'the totality of grammar' (*Nirukta* 1.15). He says so in a context dealing with the meaning of Vedic mantras. Without the etymological investigations undertaken by him the mantras cannot be understood. Without an understanding of their meaning the explanation of *svara* 'accent' and *saṃskāra* 'grammatical word-analysis' (which, together, make up grammar) in depth is not possible. Therefore this branch of knowledge (called *nirukta*) is *vyākaraṇasya kārtsnyam*. How to interpret this ?

It may be assumed that Yāska, who deals with the etymology of Vedic words exclusively, is interested in grammar mainly in so far it gives an account of Vedic words. That is to say, for Yāska grammar would to a great extent coincide with Vedic grammar. It is clear that to such a grammar Yāska's etymological investigations would mean a big contribution, because they clarify the meaning of a considerable number of Vedic words which would otherwise be declared *avyutpanna* 'underivable'. Taking this into consideration, we may interpret the phrase *vyākaraṇasya kārtsnyam* to mean, not that the *Nirukta* is the whole of grammar, but, rather, that it serves to make Vedic grammar complete.

4. (*Bhāṣya* : Question)

Now, in *gauḥ* what (is to be considered) the word ?

Kaiyaṭa

One sees that daily communication (proceeds) by means of *abheda* 'non-difference' between the word and the meaning, as in *ayaṃ gauḥ* 'this is a cow' (and) *ayaṃ śuklāḥ* 'this is a white one'.³⁸ Therefore, to determine the nature of the word, he asks 'now' (etc.). That is to say, in the cognition *gauḥ*, among the things which come to our mind, what (exactly) is the word ?³⁹

Note (5)

The intention behind the question will gradually become clear in the sequel of the *Bhāṣyas*.

According to Kaiyaṭa, in daily, naive experience we do not or not clearly distinguish between a word and the thing it stands for. The aim of

38. In daily communication we seem to identify the two. In *ayaṃ gauḥ*, *ayaṃ* refers to the meaning, i. e., the thing-meant, whereas *gauḥ* is the name we give to it. But in the utterance the two are made to look identical.

39. By the 'things' (*vastūni*) which come to our mind, Kaiyaṭa refers to the things which are mentioned in the following *Bhāṣyas* as possible identifications of *śabda*.

the question is to make that distinction, which is essential in grammar, clear from the very outset.

5. (*Bhāṣya* : First tentative answer)

Is it so that what we know as an object possessing a dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs and horns, that this is the word?⁴⁰

Kaiyaṭa

(The author) mentions precisely those things⁴¹ successively with (the words) ‘ Is it so that ’ (etc.). Pronouns which establish the identity of the subject and the predicate take the gender of these in turn.⁴² That is why (*sa* in) *sa śabdaḥ* in mentioned freely in the masculine.

6. (*Bhāṣya* : The first tentative answer rejected)

No, he⁴³ says, (because) this is what we call *dravya* ‘ individual thing ’.⁴⁴

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ‘ No, he says ’ (etc.). We understand that, since it is perceived by a different organ of sense, the *dravya* is not the *śabda* ‘ word ’, but it is (nothing but) a *dravya*. And if instruction in *dravyas* would have been intended, then (the author) would have definitely said *atha dravyānuśāsanam* ‘ now starts the instruction in individual things ’.

Note (6)

The *Bhāṣya* first explains that the thing for which a word like *gauḥ* stands, and which comes to our mind along with all its characteristics, is not the word.

40. *Yat tat* is taken in the sense of *prasiddhi* mentioned by Nāgeśa as the second alternative. In this first alternative *yat tat* simply means *yad*.

In the word *artharūpa* the constituent *rūpa* is considered to be practically redundant.

41. That is, the things which come to our mind, referred to in Kaiyaṭa’s comment on the previous *Bhāṣya*.

42. Usually, in the construction *yad... tad* both pronouns show the same gender, like *yaḥ... saḥ*, *yā... tā*, *yat... tad*, because their reference is identical. But in the *Bhāṣya* the word *yat* is used in the neuter, whereas *sa* (in *sa śabdaḥ*) is used in the masculine. This is an instance of attraction of gender, not uncommon in spoken language. This is what Kaiyaṭa wants to justify by means of his statement. In this connection Nāgeśa quotes a line from Kālidāsa (*Raghuvamśa* 5.54), *śaitanyam hi yat sām prakṛtir jalasya* ‘ for coldness is the nature of water ’. The grammatical point is lost in the translation. Mallinātha here comments : *vidheyapradhānyāt seti strīlīnganirdeśaḥ ’sā* is mentioned in the feminine because prominence is given to the *vidheya* “ predicate ”.

43. The author of the *Mahābhāṣya*.

44. See the note on *dravya* in Abhyankar-Shukla (1975), p. 5, and in *DSG*, s. v. *dravya*.

According to Kaiyata, the *Bhāṣya* introduces a criterion by which we may draw the demarcation line between *śabda* and non-*śabda*, namely, the organ of sense by which they are perceived. A word is perceived by the ear, the non-*śabda*, i.e., the *dravya*, by some other organ.

7. (*Bhāṣya* : Second tentative answer)

Then this which we know as a gesture (or) a movement (or) the winking of the eye, is that the word ?

Kaiyaṭa

Although, by the very same logic,⁴⁵ it has been rejected⁴⁶ that a *guṇa* 'quality', *kriyā* 'action' or *sāmānya* 'general notion' are a word, (the author) after having first raised the question⁴⁷ for the sake of elaborate treatment, rejects it (starting from the words) 'Then this'. And because these⁴⁸ are possible as meanings of the word *go*-, he envisages the objection that they are words. But this is rejected, like before.

Among these, *īṅgita* (means) an action of the body indicating a feeling; *ceṣṭita* (means) a (voluntary) movement of the body; *nimiṣita* (means) an action of the eye.

Nāgeśa

(On) ' because these are possible as meanings of the word *go* '. The reason is that there is a possibility of *abheda* 'non-difference'. On account of the maxim *tadabhinnābhinnasya tadabhinnatvam* ' that (P) which is identical with (Q) which is identical with (R) is (itself) identical with (R) ' we may envisage the objection that these are words. This is the intention (of the author). Or, alternatively, because they can be regarded as parts (of a whole)⁴⁹ in connection with the meaning of the word *go* which consists in a bundle of qualities.⁵⁰

Note (7)

As stated by Kaiyaṭa in his comment on *Bh.* No. 4, daily communication proceeds by assuming non-difference between a word and its meaning. This explains how *go* may be taken to stand for *sāśna* 'dewlap' and the rest. But this is still something different from assuming that *go*- may stand for *īṅgita*, etc., which are not physical parts of a cow. How to explain this ?

45. *Anenaiva nyāyena*. Namely, by not being perceived by the ear.

46. That is to say, rejected in principle.

47. *Codyapūrvaka*. *Codya* is a difficulty put forward for the sake of refutation.

48. Gesture, etc.

49. *Samāhitayā*. A *samāhina* is a part of a whole (*samūha*).

50. Reference is to *Bh.* No. 31 on P. 2.2.6, for which see *TA*, p. 105.

In answer to this question, Nāgeśa refers to a maxim in logic. If *go-* is identical with the thing it stands for, and if the thing it stands for is identical with *īṅgita*, etc., then we may assume that *go* is not different from *īṅgita*, etc. Or, we may say that the meaning of a word consists in a rather fluid collection of qualities and associative features. This also may explain that *īṅgita*, etc. figure as meanings of the word *go-*, and are, therefore, regarded as the word *go*.

8 (*Bhāṣya* : *The second tentative answer rejected*)

No, he says, (because) that is what we call *kriyā* ' action '.

9. (*Bhāṣya* : *Third tentative answer*)

Then this which we know as *śukla* ' white ', *nīla* ' violet ', *kapila* ' brown ' (or) *kapota* ' pigeon-coloured ', is that the word ?⁵¹

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' *śukla* . . . *nīla* . . . ' (etc.). Because of the earlier mention of *dravya* ' individual thing ', here *śukla*, etc. must be regarded as expressing a mere quality.⁵²

10. (*Bhāṣya* : *The third tentative answer rejected*)

No, he says, (because) that is what we call *guṇa* ' quality '.

11. (*Bhāṣya* : *Fourth tentative answer*)

Then this which we know as remaining undifferentiated among the things which are differentiated, as what remains undestroyed among the things which are destroyed, as what is the *sāmānya* ' general notion '⁵³ (in different individuals), is that the word ?

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' which we know as remaining undifferentiated among the things which are differentiated '. By this the identity of the generic notion is stated. But by ' what remains undestroyed among the things which are destroyed ' *nityatva* ' permanence ' (is stated).

51. *Bh.* No. 31 on P. 2.2.6 contains a nearly identical list of adjectives. Only, instead of *kapota*, it reads *kṛṣṇa* ' black '.

52. Kaiyaṭa means to say that here the word *guṇa* does not mean *guṇopasarjana-dravya*, but it stands for *guṇa* pure and simple. That is to say, *śukla*, etc. do not stand for a substance in which the quality mentioned inheres, like a white, etc. cow. For a discussion see *TA*, fn. 132 and Note (94).

53. The word *sāmānya*, which literally stands for that which individuals have in common, may be used in meanings not far removed from those conveyed by two other terms, namely, *ākṛtī* and *jāti*, for which see fn. 294.

(On) *sāmānyabhūtam* 'what is the *sāmānya*'. The great general notion called *sattā* 'being' has been mentioned as the *upamāna* 'standard of comparison' for a specific general notion in the form of *gotva* 'cow-ness', etc.⁵⁴ *Sāmānyabhūtam* (means) *sāmānyam iva* 'like the (great) general notion'.⁵⁵ The word *bhūta* (is used) in the sense of *upamā* 'simile', as in *pitṛbhūta* 'like a father'.⁵⁶

Note (8)

Going by the answer stated in *Bh.* No. 12 we understand that the present *Bhāṣya* uses three different expressions for what amounts to the same, namely, the entity indicated as *ākṛti*. Why the *Bhāṣya* does so is not clear. The words *abhinneṣv abhinnam acchinneṣv acchinnaṁ sāmānyabhūtam* may represent a quotation from a grammatical source in verse.

But to Kaiyaṭa, who follows Bhartṛhari (cf. *MBD*, p. 3, lines 12–13) the three expressions must needs correspond with three different concepts, namely, *sāmānyasya ekatvam* 'the identity of the general notion', *nityatva* and *sattāsāmānya* 'the general notion in the form of being'. Thus the meaning of the *Bhāṣya* is altogether misconstrued.

12. (*Bhāṣya* : The fourth tentative answer rejected)

No, he says, (because) that is what we call *ākṛti* 'generic notion'.⁵⁷

54. Kaiyaṭa is thinking of Bhartṛhari's doctrine of *sattā*. Just to quote two stanzas, *VP* 3.1.33 says *sambandhibhedāt sattāiva bhīdyamānā gavādiṣu | jātir ucyate tasyāṁ sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ* 'it is being which, differentiated according to the differentiation among the things with which it is associated, is called *jāti* 'generic notion' in connection with cows, etc. On that (being) all words are based'. Thus what is *gotva* is nothing but *gosattā* 'being as present in cows'; *VP* 3.3.51 ab, says *etāṁ sattāṁ padārtho hi na kācid ativartate* 'for there is not anything at all which goes beyond that *sattā*'. This line directly echoes the statement in the *Mbh.* II, p. 391, line 7, *na sattāṁ padārtho vyabharati* 'a thing never strays away from *sattā*'. See K. A. Subramania Iyer (1971), p. 26 (note on stanza 33), and p. 105 (note on stanzas 49–51, where the reference to the *Mbh.* is given). For a discussion on *mahāsattā* see the same author (1969), p. 211, 246–47.

Kaiyaṭa's association of *sāmānya* with *sattā* is not based on Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, compare *MDB*, p. 3, lines 13–17.

55. Here *sāmānya* must be interpreted as *mahāsāmānya* 'great general notion' in comparison with which notions like *gotva* can only be described as *sāmānyaviśeṣa* 'a particular general notion'.

56. Literally, 'who has become a father', namely, in comparison with the original father. Kaiyaṭa's interpretation is based on Bhartṛhari. See *MBD*, p. 3, line 13, *bhūtasābda upamāyācē* 'the word *bhūta* expresses comparison'.

According to Nāgeśa, the interpretation of *bhūta* in the sense of *iva* is not compulsory. Compare *pramāṇabhūta* (said of the *ācārya*, *Mbh.* I, p. 39, line 10). The word can only mean 'who is the authority'.

57. According to the *MBD*, p. 3, lines 17–18, *ākṛti* does not mean 'shape' (*saṁsthāna*) here, but *jāti* 'class' only. Kaiyaṭa has no opinion on the matter. Nāgeśa says that *ākṛti* here may mean both, *jāti* and *saṁsthāna*.

13. (*Bhāṣya* : *Question*)

Then what is the word ?

Kaiyaṭa

The *dravya* 'individual thing', etc. having been rejected (as being the word), he asks ' Then what ' (etc.).

14. (*Bhāṣya* : *Answer*)

That from which when uttered we understand objects possessing a dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs and horns.

Kaiyaṭa

(The *siddhāntin*) answers with (the words) ' That from which when uttered ' (etc.). Grammarians hold that the word or sentence, which is different from phonemes, are (the units) expressive (of meaning).⁵⁸ Because when we assume that every single phoneme is expressive (of meaning), it would undesirably follow that there is no point in uttering the second and following phonemes.⁵⁹ But since there would be no point (in doing so, on the assumption that) every single ((phoneme is expressive of meaning, we must not jump to the conclusion that it is the group of phonemes which is expressive of meaning)).⁶⁰ Because in the *utpattipakṣa*, on the one hand, there is no (room for) a simultaneous production (of phonemes).⁶¹ (And) because in the *abhivṛtyakṣa*, on the other hand, there cannot be a group, since the manifestation occurs in succession only.⁶²

58. E. g. *VP*, 1. 74, *pade na varṇā vidyante varṇesv ayayavā na ca / vākyāt padānām atyantam pravibhāgo na kaścana* ' there are no phonemes in the word, nor parts in the phonemes. There is absolutely not any separation of words from the sentence '. From this it is clear that eventually, according to Bhartṛhari, the sentence is the meaning-conveying unit. But, in any case, the phonemes are out. Compare *SN*, p. 170.

59. If the *g* of *gauḥ* already conveys the meaning 'cow', what is the use in pronouncing the second and following sounds ?

60. Apparently, after *anarthakye tu pratyekam* some words are missing in Kaiyaṭa's commentary. They are supplied by Nāgeśa. The translation of the portion supplied by Nāgeśa has been added between (()).

61. And so there cannot be a group. The *utpattipakṣa* is the alternative in which it is assumed that each single phoneme is separately produced by the phonational act of the vocal organs. This is the Naiyāyikas' point of view, as opposed to that of the grammarians. It may be regarded as a particular outcome of the application of a theory of causality to linguistics. The theory of causality referred to is the *asatkāryavāda*, the view held by the Naiyāyikas that an effect is non-existent before it is actually produced. This view entails that the effect is destroyed after its origination. *Utpatti* implies *prāga-bhāva* 'previous non-existence' and *pradhvaṃsābhava* '(subsequent) non-existence in the form of annihilation'. See *SN*, p. 199.

62. The *abhivṛtyakṣa* is the alternative in which it is assumed that the phonemes, which already exist, are merely made manifest, that is perceptible to the liste-

(But) if (we assume that) it is the phonemes collecting together to form one single recollection which are expressive (of meaning), it would undesirably follow that there is no difference, as far as the understanding of meaning is concerned, between *sarah* 'pond' and *rasah* 'taste'. That is why it has been established in the *VP*, in great detail, that it is the *sphoṭa*, which is different from these (phonemes and) which is manifested through *nāda* 'sound', which is expressive (of meaning)⁶³

(On) 'from which when uttered'. That is to say, from which when manifested.

Nāgeśa

(On) 'But since there is no point'. Supply (after) *pratyekam ānarthakye tu* (the words) *samudāyasya vācakatvam upēyam, tat tu na yuktam* 'it is not correct that we must understand that it is the group which is expressive (of meaning)'. Because in this respect there are two ways : either the group which is being produced is expressive (of meaning), or the group which is being manifested is. Out of these two, he criticizes the first with (the words) *utpattipakṣe tu* ' (because) in the *utpattipakṣa*, on the one hand ' (etc.).

Note (9)

The *MBD* (p. 3, line 23–p. 4, line 7) informs us that in Bhartṛhari's days there were at least three different views regarding what is called *śabda*. The first view says *yo vāyam uccāryate kramavān avaraḥ. Kaścid anyāḥ akramaḥ śabdātmā buddhistho viḡāhate. Tasmād arthapratipattiḥ. Kutāḥ. Yathaiivārthāntaranibandhano nārthāntaram pratyāyayati evaṁ svarūpanibandhano notsaḥate pratyāyitum* ' or, (the *śabda*) which is uttered, which shows a sequence (and) which is the lower one, (from that *śabda*) another (*śabda*) which shows no sequence, which is the essence of *śabda*, penetrates (so that it becomes) located in the *buddhi*. From this (latter *śabda*) we understand meaning. Why (is that so) ? (Because,) just as (a word) employed on the basis of one meaning cannot convey another meaning, in the same way, (the lower *śabda*, i.e., the sound-sequence uttered by the speaker) employed on the basis of its own form, cannot convey (anything but that own form)'.

ner's ear, by the phonational act. This is the grammarians' point of view. The theory of causality involved here is the *satkāryavāda*, held by the Sāṃkhyas and others. It says that the effect pre-exists in its cause in a latent state. *Abhivṛyakti* implies the permanence and imperishability of phonemes. See *SN*, p. 199.

63. Bhartṛhari has used the term *sphoṭa* only in the first *Kāṇḍa* of the *VP*. Here the relation between the *sphoṭa* and the *nāda* (or *dhvani*) viewed as that between *vyaṅgya* ' (the item) manifested ' and *vyañjaka* ' (the item) which manifests ' is discussed in nine stanzas, for which see *SN*, p. 29–34. We have to carefully distinguish between Bhartṛhari's views on *sphoṭa* (see *SN*, p. 35–36) and those of later grammarians like Kaiyata (see *SN*, p. 45, 47, 56–61). Compare also K. A. Subramania Iyer (1969), p. 157, 158–160.

Here we note the following points :

- (1) The first and the second sentence of the printed text are read as one sentence in which the word *tasmāt* 'from that (*śabda*)' is supplied to have a correct relative clause construction (*yo . . ayam . . tasmāt . . vigāhate*).
- (2) The expression *buddhistho vigāhate* is taken as a proleptic usage.
- (3) According to the text, which reads *avaraḥ*, a hierarchy is introduced within *śabda*. There is a lower *śabda*. Consequently, there must be a higher *śabda*.
- (4) The lower *śabda* is characterized in three ways :
 - (a) It is uttered.
 - (b) It shows a sequence. This can only be a sequence of phonemes, like in *g-au-ḥ* or *v-r-kṣ-a-ḥ*.
 - (c) It gives rise (*tasmāt*, supplied in the text) to a different *śabda*.
- (5) The higher *śabda* is characterized in four ways :
 - (a) It shows no sequence. So it must be simultaneously present, like in *gauḥ* or *vṛkṣaḥ*.
 - (b) It is the *śabdātman*, the word-form in its pure essence.
 - (c) It is *buddhistha*. That is to say, it is not merely an auditory perception, but a concept in the sense of a unit of knowledge.
 - (d) From it, meaning is understood.
- (6) A question is asked : Why? This is interpreted to mean : Why is meaning understood from the *buddhistha śabda*, and not from the lower *śabda*, that is directly from the sound-sequence? The answer is that, just as a word employed to convey one meaning cannot convey another meaning, so also a sound-sequence can only convey its own form, like *g-au-ḥ* or *v-r-kṣ-a-ḥ*, and nothing else. That is why meaning is not understood directly from the sound-sequence.

On the basis of these points the following scheme can be set up : lower *śabda* (sound-sequence) → higher *śabda* (the unitary perception, which is mental) → meaning. This clearly refers to a speaker-listener relation. It is meant to explain how meaning is understood by a listener from the speaker's utterance. We also note that in this connection the word *śphoṭa* is not used.

The second view does mention the term *śphoṭa*. After an initial portion which is not clear the text says : *evam varṇā vākyañtāreṣu ye kramajānmanāḥ ayugapatkālās te tām padasthām* (read thus, for *padasthā*) *varṇajātīm abhivyañjayanti. Vṛkṣaśabdo vṛkṣatvam. Jāter arthasya pratipattiḥ. Etac*

cārthasvarūpam sphoṭa 'yam eva śabdātmā nityaḥ. Ye tu kramajanmānaḥ ayugapatkāla vyaktayo dhvanyātmānas te iti 'in the same way, the sounds which in different sentences originate in succession (and) which lack simultaneity, manifest that *varṇajāti* "type-phoneme" which is located in the word. (Like) the wordform *v-r-kṣ-a-h* (manifests) *v-r-kṣ-a-tva* 'the type (sound in all phoneme-sequences) *v-r-kṣ-a-h*'. From (this) *jāti* "type (sequence)" we understand meaning. And this thing's (i.e., *jāti*'s) own nature is the *sphoṭa*, (and) it is eternal. But the *vyaktis* "instance (sequences, like *v-r-kṣ-a-h*)", which originate in succession (and) which lack simultaneity, are essentially *dhvani* " sound ".

Here we note the following :

- (1) The fourth sentence of the printed text is read as two sentences : *Etac cārthasvarūpam sphoṭaḥ. Ayam eva śabdātmā nityaḥ*, as required by sense.
- (2) The constituent *artha* in *arthasvarūpam* is taken to refer to the *jāti*. It cannot be taken in the sense of 'meaning', because the *jāti*, i.e., the *sphoṭa*, is the entity from which we understand meaning. It does not have itself the nature of meaning.
- (3) The entity called *varṇas* 'phonemes' is mainly characterised as follows :
 - (a) They show a sequence.
 - (b) They lack simultaneity.
 - (c) They manifest a *varṇajāti* 'type-phoneme'.
 - (d) They are *vyaktis* 'instances, representative of a type'.
 - (e) They are essentially *dhvani* 'sound'.
- (4) The entity called *varṇajāti* 'type-phoneme' is mainly characterised as follow :
 - (a) It is manifested by *varṇas*.
 - (b) From it, we understand meaning.
 - (c) It is the *sphoṭa*.
 - (d) It is eternal.
 - (e) It is the essence of the word-form.
 - (f) It is *padastha*. That is to say, since *varṇas* by themselves are not used in communication, that is, in the speaker-listener situation, but are used in *padas* 'words' they manifest their *jāti* in words. That is why the *varṇajāti* is said to be located in the word.

On the basis of these points the following scheme can be set up :
varṇas (which come in sequences arranged in the form of words) → *varṇajāti* (which is nothing but the *sphoṭa*) → meaning.

Differences with the earlier view are :

- (1) The introduction of an entity called *sphoṭa* which is identified with *varṇajāti* 'type phoneme', in relation to which the *dhvanis* '(speech-) sounds' uttered by the speaker are *vyaktis* 'individual realizations'.
- (2) The determination of the relation between the *sphoṭa* and the *dhvanis* as a *vyāṅgyavyaṇṇjakabhāva*; no such relation is assumed between the lower *śabda* and the higher *śabda*.
- (3) The fact that meaning is understood on the basis of the *varṇajāti* (= *sphoṭa*), and not on the basis of a sequence-less *buddhistha śabda*.

The position taken by the second view tallies with the one mentioned by VP 1.96 (= 1.93, ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer), for which see Note (23), and SN, p. 28, fn. 39, and p. 44-48, and K. A. Subramania Iyer (1969), p. 157-58.

The third view mentioned in the MBD says *dviśaktiḥ śabda ātma-prakāśane 'rthaprakāśane ca samarthah Yathā pradīpaḥ ātmānam prakāśayan nidhyarthān prakāśayati. Yas tv ādhyātmikaḥ indriyākhyah prakāśah sa ātmānam aprakāśayan bāhyartham prakāśayatīti* 'the *śabda* 'word' has two powers: it is capable of revealing itself and of revealing the thing-meant. (Just) like a lamp while revealing itself reveals objects in the form of treasures. But the light called *indriya* 'sense-organ', which is *ādhyātmika* 'located in itself' (only), does not reveal itself, (but) it reveals the outer object'. That is to say, in order to be understood a word must communicate its own phonetic form in the first place, and then also its meaning. In this respect, a word is different from the sense organs. These organs need not be perceived themselves, but they put us into contact with the outside objects. This tallies with VP 1.56, *grāhyatvaṁ grāhakatvaṁ ca dve śaktī tejaso yathā | tathaiiva sarvaśabdānām ete pṛthag avasthite* 'just as light has two powers, (namely) that of being perceived and that of causing to perceive, so also these two (powers) have been separately established for all words'. See SN, p. 41-42; K. A. Subramania Iyer (1969), p. 154-55.

Here we note the following points :

- (1) No mention is made of an entity called *sphoṭa*.
- (2) The *śabda* has two powers: it reveals its own form (that is, it is self-revealing), and it reveals its meaning.

On the basis of these points the following scheme can be set up :
śabda (wordform, which is self-revealed) → meaning.

A difference with the two earlier views is that the last view does not assume an intermediary stage between the (perceived) wordform and meaning.

To sum up : The problem common to all three views is, how to account for the communication of meaning through speech-sounds in the speaker-listener situation.

Bh. No. 14, from which the whole discussion starts, says no more than that, when a word is uttered, meaning is understood.

The first view quoted by the *MBD* says that the speech-sounds uttered come in a sequence which is called *avara śabda*. They produce a *buddhistha śabda* in the listener, which is itself without sequence, and on the basis of which meaning is understood. Thus here between the utterance of the sounds by the speaker and the understanding of meaning by the listener an intermediate stage is introduced.

The second view says that the speech-sounds produced by the speaker reveal or manifest type-phonemes to the listener, in which abstraction is made of individual variations of pronunciation. On the basis of these type-phonemes, which are called *sphoṭa*, and which are revealed in succession, meaning is understood. Here also, between the utterance of the sounds and the understanding of meaning an intermediate stage, namely, the *varṇajāti-sphoṭa*, is introduced.

The third view is, comparatively, a shallow view. It attributes two powers to *śabda*, namely, the power to reveal itself and meaning also. No intermediate stage between the sound-utterance and the understanding of meaning is postulated.

Finally, there is Kaiyaṭa, who in the present *Bhāṣya* finds a reference to *sphoṭa*-theory. His concept of *sphoṭa* is characterized by the following features :

- (1) It is over and above the phonemes.
- (2) It is manifested through *nāda* ' (speech-) sound '.
- (3) It is *vācaka* ' expressive of meaning '.

In conclusion, it may be observed that the *sphoṭa*-concept as developed by Patañjali and Bhartṛhari serves to explain how a wordform, on the basis of distinctive sound-features, is perceived by the listener. In the later *sphoṭa*-doctrine a shift takes place from sound to meaning. Here the *sphoṭa* is conceived as an entity over and above the phonemes, which has the nature of a meaning-conveying unit. Compare further *SN*, p. 11, 36-42, 55-61, 73-84, and K. A. Subramania Iyer (1969), p. 158 (who sums up four features of *sphoṭa*).

In Kaiyaṭa's commentary on the present *Bhāṣya*-passage, the question is about how meaning is conveyed. Separate phonemes cannot convey meaning. Groups of phonemes cannot either. Groups require either a simultaneous presence of phonemes or a succession of phonemes. But there can be no simultaneous presence, because phonemes perish as soon as they are articulated. There can be no succession, because succession requires

continuity, and there can be no question of continuity between what perishes and what is produced anew. To assume that the phonemes are preserved in a single recollection is no help, because in that case we cannot explain why words like *saraḥ* and *rasaḥ*, which are made up of identical phonemes, convey different meanings. The idea is that in recollection the order in which the phonemes are perceived plays no rule. Then how to explain the way in which meaning is conveyed? That is why an entity over and above the phonemes is set up. That entity is called *sphoṭa*. Compare *SN*, p. 178–79.

But the *Bhāṣyakāra* does not say anything about *sphoṭa* here. He merely tells us that a *śabda* is a meaningful entity. When the *śabda gauḥ* is uttered, several things will come to the listener's mind: a generic notion based on generic features, and probably also an action and a colour or colours typical of cows. This yet apart from the phonetic form *g-au-h* itself. Taken as a whole, the view presented by the *Bhāṣya* comes near to the third view on the nature of *śabda* mentioned in the *MBD*: *yena uccāritena* refers to the phonetic aspect, and *yena sampratyayo bhavati* to the meaning-aspect. Compare *SN*, p. 8.

15. (*Bhāṣya* : Alternative answer)

Or rather, *dhvani* 'sound', which has a (well-)known meaning in current speech, is said (to be) *śabda*. For instance, *śabdaṁ kuru* 'make a sound', *mā śabdaṁ kārṣiḥ* 'don't make a sound', *śabdakāryaṁ ayaṁ mānavakaḥ* 'this boy is noisy', so it is said, when one produces sound. Therefore (we may say that it is) *dhvani* 'sound' (which is) *śabda*.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'Or rather' (etc.). The difference between *dhvani* 'sound' and *sphoṭa* has been established elsewhere.⁶⁴ Therefore there is no harm even in their treatment as identical, because the general purport (of the passage) here is that *dravya* 'individual thing', etc. are not the meaning of *śabda*.

(On) 'when one produces sound'. Since the *vidhi* 'injunction'⁶⁵ and the *pratiśedha* 'prohibition'⁶⁶ are concerned with something which is not going on, how can this (expression 'when one produces sound') be connected with the three (examples)?⁶⁷ The answer is that even when somebody produces a sound one may say *śabdaṁ kuru* 'make a sound', when one has

64. According to Nāgeśa, 'elsewhere' means in the *Sāṃgraha*, but also in the *Mbh.* itself, under (*Vt. V* on) P. 1.1.70. In connection with the latter passage see *SN*, p. 13–15.

65. The statement *śabdaṁ kuru*.

66. The statement *mā śabdaṁ kārṣiḥ*.

67. The first statement refers to the past, the second to the future. So how can the *Bhāṣyakāra* say *dhvaniṁ kurvaṇ* which refers to the present?

the fear that he will stop, so that he is prevented from doing so.⁶⁸ In the same way, a person who feels disturbed on hearing sound which he does not like may say *mū śabdaṁ kārṣiḥ* 'don't make a sound'.

Nāgeśa

(On) 'Or rather...whose meaning is popularly known' in the *Bhāṣya*. That is to say, (the word) *śabda* is nothing but a group of sounds in the form of speech-sounds because they are perceived by the auditory organ (and) which is wellknown among the speech-community as conveying meaning. The general purport (of the *Bhāṣya*) is that its status of being conveyer of meaning in common speech is wellknown to him only, to whom something is o.k. without giving thought to it,⁶⁹ (and) that the explanation (given) by grammar is for such a person only.⁷⁰

Note (10)

Although what the *Bhāṣya* means to say is clear, namely, that *śabda* is used in the sense of *dhvani*—or, as the *Bhāṣyakāra* says it, that *dhvani* is *śabda*—, the construction of the first sentence poses a problem.

The *MBD* (p. 5, lines 8–9) very succinctly explains the *Bhāṣya* as : 'dhvani is the known meaning of the word *śabda*. (That is to say), *dhvani* is its meaning'. Here *pratītapadārthaka* is taken as a *kdh. cp.* (*pratītaḥ padārthaḥ* 'a known meaning'). This is not correct. *Pratītapadārthaka* is a *bv. cp.* and this is what we have to keep in mind while construing the first sentence.

If we connect *pratītapadārthaka* with *dhvaniḥ*, as the text of the *Bhāṣya*-statement requires, the following meaning results : 'dhvani which has a (well-)known meaning'. Here *dhvani* can only refer to the word *dhvani*. But in that case the connection with the rest of the statement, (*dhvaniḥ*) *śabda ity ucyate* becomes problematic, because this connection requires *dhvani* in the sense of 'the meaning *dhvani*', and not 'the word *dhvani*'. A way out of this difficulty is to supply either the word *śabdaḥ* (or *śabdaśabdaḥ* 'the word *śabda*') immediately after *loke*, or to supply a second word *dhvani* immediately after the first word *dhvaniḥ*. In the first alternative the text reads *athavā pratītapadārthako loke śabdaḥ. Dhvaniḥ śabda ity ucyate* 'or rather, the word *śabda* has a known meaning in common speech. *Dhvani* "sound" is said (to be) *śabda*'. In the second alternative the text reads *athavā pratītapadārthako loke dhvaniḥ. Dhvaniḥ śabda ity ucyate* 'or rather, (the word) *dhvani* has a known meaning in common speech. *Dhvani* "sound" is said (to be) *śabda*'. Thus in both alternatives two sentences result. Moreover, from the point of view of

68. That is, so that he is prevented from stopping producing sounds.

69. *Avicaritaramaṇīya*, to be interpreted as a *bv. cp.*

70. That is to say, the second definition of *śabda* carries no scientific weight.

textual criticism the single reading *dhvaniḥ* may be easily explained as a case of haplography. According to Filliozat (1975), p. 22, n. 3, the idea of supplying the word *śabdaśabda* goes back to the commentators Īśvarānanda and Annambhaṭṭa.

A simple way of removing the difficulty is, of course, to change the wordorder and read : *athavā pratītapadārthako loke śabdo dhvanir ity ucyate* 'or rather, (the word) *śabda*, which has a known meaning in common speech, is said (to be) *dhvani*'. This solution, which connects *pratītapadārthaka* with *śabda*, has the support of the other two known occurrences in the *Mbh* of the word *pratītapadārthaka* (*Mbh.* I, p. 39, line 25, and p. 323, line 3) where it qualifies *śabda*. However, if this reading, which gives a very clear sense, is adopted, we are at a loss to explain how the present text, which represents the *lectio difficilior*, could have come into being. Therefore this solution is to be rejected.

Still, the question is whether a discussion like the foregoing does justice to the *Bhāṣya*, in particular to its generally accepted colloquial style. In compositions written in this style we shouldn't expect each and every word to stand up to close scrutiny like in the case of *sūtras* or definitions. Allowance should be made for a rather more informal approach. The use of a word both to stand for its form and its meaning in the present *Bhāṣya* may be an instance of precisely that. It is on the basis of these considerations that the translation of the *Bhāṣya* has phrased.

The question was : what is *śabda*? The first answer stated in *Bh.* No. 14 says that *śabda* is a meaningful form. The second answer stated in the present *Bhāṣya* says that *śabda* means *dhvani* 'sound'. Thus the two answers are clearly different. The difference lies in this that in his second answer the *Bhāṣyakāra* has left the question whether *śabda* represents meaningful sound or meaningless sound undecided. Precisely that may have been the *Bhāṣyakāra's* intention of offering his second, preferred definition. The point is that the rules of grammar deal with both, meaningful and non-significative linguistic units (see S. D. JOSHI, "Patañjali's definition of a word—An interpretation", *Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute*. Silver Jubilee Volume, Poona 1966, p. 67, and the examples quoted in the sequel).

To the commentators, Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa, who consider that in his first definition of *śabda* the *Bhāṣyakāra* refers to the *spṛṣṭa* in the sense of an entity over and above the phonemes, which is responsible for conveying meaning, the second definition is rather a foolish affair. As explained by Nāgeśa, it represents the unreflecting attitude of those who use language without bothering to ask how it works, and the only point the *Bhāṣyakāra* wanted to make here is that—apart from conveying meaning—*śabda* also has a phonetic aspect : it consists of a group of sounds. But this is not a point which counts with the learned advocates of the *spṛṣṭa*-doctrine.

Note (21)

P. 3.2.1, *karmany aṇ*, says that the suffix *aN* is added after a verbal base (*dhātoḥ*, continued from P. 3.1.91), when a word representing the grammatical object and functioning as the *upapada* 'accompanying word' (P. 3.1.92) precedes. P. 3.2.3 says that the suffix *Ka* is added after a verbal base which ends in long *ā* and which is not preceded by a preverb, when, etc.

Here P. 3.2.1 is the general rule (*utsarga*), because it contains the general (*sāmānya*, i.e., shared) conditions *dhātoḥ*, *karmani* and *upapade*. P. 3.2.3 is the special rule, because apart from containing the general conditions, it states special (*viśeṣa*, i.e., particular) conditions, namely, *ātaḥ* (the verbal base must end in long *ā*) and *anupasarge* (the verbal base must not be preceded by a preverb). Under these special conditions the suffix *Ka* must be added. Conversely, where the special conditions do not hold, that is, elsewhere, *aN* is added. These 'elsewhere' conditions, which, in fact, consist in particular morphophonemic environments, have not been specified in the general rule, because this would involve *gaurava* 'unwieldiness'. But we have to assume them there on account of the *utsarga-apavāda* relation. This is an ordering relation used by Pāṇini for the arrangement of rules which share general environments.

IV

(SECTION DEALING WITH THE QUESTION WHETHER A WORD
STANDS FOR ĀKṚTI OR DRAVYA)

56. (*Bhāṣya* : Question)

But (the question is,) whether the word-meaning is *ākṛti* 'class' or rather *dravya* 'a (single) thing'²⁹⁴

294. That is to say, whether a word refers to an *ākṛti* or to a *dravya*. Questions of meaning in Sanskrit grammar are questions of reference. 'Meaning' here is the thing-meant.

The controversy mentioned is one of the big issues in Sanskrit grammar. It is associated with the names of Vājapyāyana (exponent of the *ākṛti*-view) and Vyāḍi (exponent of the *dravya*-view) by Kātyāyana, see Note (22). Unfortunately, the issue has been obscured by a confusion of some of the terms used.

The terms in question are *ākṛti*, *dravya*, *jāti* and *vyakti*. Here *ākṛti* originally stands for a perceptible shape or form common to members of a given class or genus. It is generally defined as an *avayavasamsthāna* 'a particular arrangement of parts' by commentators. Apparently, the term is used in an attempt at classification by overall resemblance, which, to some extent, works in the case of things like pots and cows. Sreekrishna SARMA, "The use of *ākṛti* and *jāti* in the *Mahābhāṣya*", *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. XXI, Madras, 1957, p. 59, 60 and 61, renders *ākṛti* as 'structural form'.

Dravya, used in opposition to *ākṛti*, usually stands for a single individual possessing such a structural form which it shares with other individuals (for an altogether different sense of *dravya* see *Bh.* No. 76). *Jāti* stands for the concept of a class or genus. It is, later

57. (*Bhāṣya* : Answer)

He²⁹⁵ says : both. (But) how do you know ? (Because) the *Ācārya* ' teacher ' ²⁹⁶ has stated rules in both ways. Thinking that *ākṛti* ' class ' is the word-meaning he says *jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyām*.²⁹⁷ (On the other hand,) thinking that *dravya* ' a (single) thing ' is the word-meaning, he tackled (the subject of) *ekaśeṣa* ' the retaining of one only ' by (the rule) *sarūpāṇām (ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau)*.²⁹⁸

Kaiyaṭa

Because we cannot manage by having recourse to (just) one of the two views in order to account for the whole of grammar, (the author) has recourse to two views after first introducing a question (namely,) ' But (the question is) whether ' (etc.).

If recourse is had to the *ākṛtipakṣa* ' view according to which the word-meaning is a generic shape ', we cannot justify (the *pb.*) *sakṛdgatau vipra-tiṣedhe (yad bādhitam tad bādhitam eva)* ' in the case of a conflict, when (two rules) become applicable simultaneously, (then a rule) which has been set aside once, is set aside once for all (and there is no possibility of applying it after the other rule has been applied). '²⁹⁹ If, on the other hand, the

on, also used in the sense of an essence-determining quality, which is regarded as constitutive of a class, like *gotva* ' cow-hood ' for all cows, and *śuklatva* ' whiteness ' for all that is white in colour. In addition, this quality (" generic quality ") is thought to be the *pravṛttinimitta* for the use of a word with reference to a particular thing. *Vyakti*, used in opposition to *jāti* ' class ', stands for the single individual manifesting the relevant generic quality.

The terms *jāti*, *ākṛti* and *vyakti* are used in the *Nyāyasūtras*, in the sense of ' class ', ' shape ' and ' individual ' respectively (*Nyāyasūtras* 2.2.59, 66–68, reference in Sreekrishna SARMA, art. quoted, p. 55, n. 2).

Rather early, however, the terms *ākṛti* and *jāti* came to be regarded as synonyms in the sense of *jāti* ' class '. This use is already found in the *Mbh.* In the present *Bhāṣya* this sense for *ākṛti* follows from the illustration offered in the next *Bhāṣya*. On the other hand, the same word *ākṛti* is also used in the sense of ' shape ', in *Bh.* Nos. 76 and 77.

The *jāti-dravya* controversy is mentioned by Bhartṛhari, *VP*, 3.1.2 (and also, in connection with *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*, in *VP* 1.96 (= 1.93, ed. K. A. Subramania IYER), for which see Note (9). In his commentary on this stanza, Helārāja mentions a third view ' according to which the word-meaning is the *dravya* as qualified by the *jāti* (*Vākya-padārya of Bhartṛhari* . . . *Kāṇḍa* III, Part 1. Edited by K. A. Subramania IYER, Poona, 1963, p. 8, lines 5–6).

295. The *Bhāṣyakāra*, who is referred to in the third person singular, as if the work consists of notes taken down by a student.

296. Pāṇini.

297. P.1.2.58. See Note (22).

298. P. 1.2.64. See Note (22) and *BDA*, fn. 617.

299. *PN*, *pb.* 40. The idea is taken from the *MBD* (p. 18, lines 19–20). See also Nāgeśa's discussion in *PN*, Part II, p. 190–94.

vyaktipakṣa ‘view according to which the word-meaning is an individual (object)’ (is adopted), (the *pb.*) *punaḥprasāṅgaviññānāt* (*siddham*) ‘we can manage on the assumption that there is a possibility (for the rule which has been set aside) to apply again (afterwards)’³⁰⁰ does not fit. Therefore, to account for the examples a particular view is accepted in (accordance with) a particular example (where a rule becomes applicable).

This being so, the advocates of the *jātipakṣa* ‘view according to which the word-meaning is a *jāti*’ say that words convey a *jāti* only, because (otherwise) we couldn’t understand the relation (between a word and its meaning), since individuals are innumerable. And it is an established fact that there is a *jāti*, because we experience that we have the notion of one and the same shape with regard to all individuals (belonging to a given class or genus).³⁰¹ This being so, the words *gauḥ* ‘cow’, etc. stand for a *jāti*, which inheres in different individuals. Once this *jāti* has been understood (as the word-meaning), we (also) understand an individual delimited by that (*jāti*), because (the *jāti*) enters into that (individual).

The words *śukla* ‘white (colour)’, etc. stand for a *jāti* which inheres in a quality. But cognition (takes place) with regard to the quality on account of its relation with that (*jāti*), (and) cognition (takes place) with regard to the *dravya* ‘thing’ on account of its relation with the relatum.³⁰²

Proper names also stand for a *jāti* in the form of *ḍiṭṭhatva* ‘ḍiṭṭha-hood’, etc., (the notion of) which is based on the knowledge of something which remains identical, in the form of *sa eva ayam* ‘he is that very same (person)’, although the condition of (the person called) ḍiṭṭha changes from his birth till his death, in youth, adulthood, etc.

In actions also we find a *jāti*, (and) that is expressed by a verbal base. Because an identical idea is present in *paṭhati* ‘he recites’, *paṭhataḥ* ‘the two of them recite’ (and) *paṭhanti* ‘they recite’, we accept a *jāti* (in the case of actions also), which is the base of that (identical idea).

The advocates of the *vyaktipakṣa* ‘view according to which the word-meaning is an individual’ say that the individual only is the meaning expressed. But since *jāti* is resorted to by way of *upalakṣaṇa* ‘accessory determining factor’,³⁰³ there is no occasion for the defect of (having to assume) innumerable relations (between a word and its meaning).³⁰⁴

300. *PN*, *pb.* 39. Apparently, this idea is Kaiyaṭa’s own contribution.

301. To Kaiyaṭa, the *ākṛtipakṣa* and the *jātipakṣa* are simply exchangeable views, just as is the case with the *dravyapakṣa* and the *vyaktipakṣa*.

302. The relatum, in the present context, is the *dravya* in which the quality inheres in which, again, the *jāti* ‘generic feature’ (like *nīlatva* ‘dark-blue-ness’) inheres. Thus the *jāti* is indirectly related to the *dravya*.

303. *Upalakṣaṇa* is a feature, which helps us to determine an object. The *VP* 3.2.3. provides an illustration: *adhruveṇa nimittena devadattagṛhaṁ yathā | gṛhītam* ‘like the house of Devadatta being recognized on account of an impermanent cause (of recognition, in the form of a crow sitting on the house)’.

Note (22)

The question whether a word stands for *ākṛti* or *dravya* is one of the great controversial issues of Sanskrit grammar. The controversy was already known before Kātyāyana who, in this connection, refers to earlier teachers of grammar. *Vt.* XXXV on 1.2.64, the rule dealing with *ekaśeṣa*, says *ākṛtyabhidhānād vaikan vibhaktau vājapyāyanah* 'or (we need not phrase P. 1.2.64, because) Vājapyāyana (thinks that,) since (a word) conveys *ākṛti* " common shape as a generic character ", a single (word will do) before a case ending '. That is to say, since a word stands for an *ākṛti*, there is no possibility of using more than one word to refer to more than one item. Therefore we need not phrase the *ekaśeṣa*-rule. *Vt.* XLV on the same rule says *dravyābhidhānam vyādiḥ* ' Vyādi (thinks that a word conveys) a *dravya* " (single) thing " '. Here Vyādi appears to think more in terms of reference, whereas Vājapyāyana seems to be more concerned with the *pravr̥ttinimitta* ' ground for using (a particular word with reference to a particular thing) '. That *pravr̥ttinimitta* Vājapyāyana finds in the *ākṛti*.

The *Bhāṣyakāra* says that in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* both views are accepted. Reference in this connection is to P. 1.2.58 (*ākṛtipakṣa*) and to P. 1.2.64 (*dravyapakṣa*). Actually, the first rule does not speak of *ākṛti*, but of *jāti*. To the *Bhāṣyakāra*, like to Kaiyaṭa later on, these must have been exchangeable terms. The rule says that, when the meaning *jāti* ' class ' or ' genus ' is to be conveyed, the plural may be used, when reference is to (just) one (entity, in the form of a particular class or genus). An example quoted by the *KV* on P. 1.2.58 is *pūrvavayā brāhmaṇaḥ pratyuttheyaḥ* ' a young brahmin is to be greeted by rising from one's seat '. Instead of this, we may also say *pūrvavayaso brāhmaṇaḥ pratyuttheyāḥ* ' young brahmins are to be greeted by rising from one's seat '. The *jāti*-word here is, obviously, *brāhmaṇa*. Thus, even though reference is to just one particular class, namely, that of the young brahmins, according to P. 1.2.58, the plural may be used, because what is stated with reference to the class holds good for all its members. But since a *jāti* is one entity only, we cannot justify the addition of a plural suffix after a word conveying *jāti*, unless a special rule to that effect is phrased. This rule is P. 1.2.58.

The second rule, P. 1.2.64, says that out of words showing the same form one only is retained before one and the same case ending. The examples

Helārāja on *VP*, 3.1.3 ab (*Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari... Kāṇḍa III*, Part I. Edited by K. A. Subramania IYER. Poona, 1963, p. 10, lines 19-20), where Bhartṛhari says that, according to some, the *jāti* is *śaktiupalakṣaṇam* ' the means of *śakti* " denotative power of words " ', explains the word *upalakṣaṇa* as *upāya* ' means '.

304. This refers back to what was stated earlier by Kaiyaṭa in connection with the *jātipakṣa*. A defect in the *vyātipakṣa* is that, since words are assumed to stand for individual items, we must establish as many relations between words and their meanings as there are individuals to be referred to. But here the *jāti* becomes helpful in deciding the use of a particular word with reference to a particular individual. See further Note (22).

quoted by the *KV* on this rule are *vrkṣaś ca vrkṣaś ca vrkṣau* ‘(in the sense of) *vrkṣaś ca vrkṣaś ca* “(one) tree and (one) tree” (we derive) *vrkṣau* “the two trees”’, and *vrkṣaś ca vrkṣaś ca vrkṣaś ca vrkṣāḥ* ‘(in the sense of) *vrkṣaś ca vrkṣaś ca vrkṣaś ca* “(one) tree and (one) tree and (one) tree (we derive) *vrkṣāḥ* “trees”’. The derivation of the forms *vrkṣau* and *vrkṣāḥ* assumed here clearly shows that, according to the author of the rule, the utterance of a word once only refers to a single item only. Therefore, to refer to two items, the twice utterance of the same word is required, and, to refer to more items, the utterance of the same word as many times as there are things to be referred to is required. This is, of course, theory, because in actual usage such a repetition is not seen. That is why the *ekaśeṣa* rule has been phrased. It says that out of the several repeated words one only is retained. In this way, in the derivation of every case of the dual and plural members the *ekaśeṣa* rule must be applied.

Actually, P. 1.2.64 in the traditional interpretation stated above is based on a misconception, namely, the confusion of lexical (for instance “tree”) and non-lexical categorical (in the present case: grammatical number) meaning. The idea of grammatical number is not conveyed by the repetition of wordstems, but by particular suffixes. Therefore, since the assumption of repetition of lexical stems to account for plural or dual number is unwarranted, the theoretical solution of deletion of one or two (or more) of these repeated stems is futile.

Strictly speaking, the *ekaśeṣa* rule can have scope only where the addition of grammatical number-suffixes cannot explain the desired meaning. This will be clear from the following discussion. Suppose that the scope of the *ekaśeṣa* rule lies in proper names which happen to be homonyms. An instance is the word *rāma*. It may refer to Rāmacandra or to Paraśurāma. Now, since a difference in meaning is involved, reference to the two Rāmas requires the twice mention, that is, the repetition of the lexical stem *rāma*, or what amounts to that. In such a case, the *ekaśeṣa* rule is needed to justify usages like *rāmau āgatau* ‘the two Rāmas have come’. Here, from the number-indicating dual suffix we wouldn’t know anything more than reference to two items, which need not be dissimilar at all, like in the case of two trees. But once reference to two dissimilar items, each of them, in fact, unique, is made, we have to accept *ekaśeṣa* in order to justify usage.

Kaiyaṭa rejects the *dravyapakṣa*, which he calls *vyaktipakṣa*. Words like *gauḥ* ‘cow’ cannot stand for single items, because that would lead to *ānantya* ‘innumerability’ of the semantic relation involved, that is, of the relation between the word used and the item referred to. In fact, each time a word is used with reference to the particular item referred to, a separate meaning relation, that is, a separate convention has to be established. This is not possible. To remove this difficulty, the *vyaktivādin* says that in reference *jāti* acts as an *upalakṣaṇa*. The *jāti* itself does not belong to the area of denotation of the word used, but it is theoretically helpful in deter-

mining reference to individuals, because it helps us to understand all individuals which come under that *jāti*.

According to Kaiyaṭa, the concept of *jāti*, which is at the very basis of our knowledge of identity, and of recognition, is arrived at through *ākṛti*, the perceived common form shared by individuals. *Jāti* inheres in :

- (1) individuals (*dravya*, for instance, as *gotva* 'cow-hood'),
- (2) in qualities (*guṇa*, for instance, as *śuklatva* 'whiteness'),
and
- (3) in actions (*kriyā*).

In the latter case, forms like *paṭhati*, which refer to acts of reciting under which various other supporting activities are subsumed (the example in the *MBD*, p. 18, lines 7-8, is *pacati*) may be considered to convey the *kriyājāti*, the idea of which is expressed by the connected verbal base.

Jāti even inheres in proper names (*sainkhyāśabdās*, for instance, as *ditṭhatva* 'Ditṭha-hood', which is supposed to account for Dīṭṭha's identity in various stages of life).

As regards the question, how the *jāti* is related to that in which it inheres, Kaiyaṭa follows Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views taken from the *MBD*. A *jāti* like *nīlatva* inheres in a quality like *nīla* 'purple' (colour). It is connected with a *dravya*, like a purple thing, through that quality, which itself inheres in the *dravya*. Thus the *jāti* is only indirectly connected with the *dravya*.

To show the extent to which Kaiyaṭa borrows from or summarizes a discussion in the *MBD*, the translation of the passage concerned (*MBD*, p. 17, lines 16-p. 18, line 12) is added here. The *MBD*-passage itself is a commentary on *Bh.* No. 56, in which the question about word-meaning is raised.

The translation is as follows :

"Doubt arises, because there is a difference of opinion among the teachers. According to Vājapyāyana, *ākṛti* (is the word-meaning). But according to Vyādi (it is) *dravya*.

In this respect, some (grammarians) explain that, although (the opinions of Vājapyāyana and Vyādi) have been phrased in a general way (as applying to all words), still, this (question in the *Bhāṣya*) is asked with regard to suitable words (only), with regard to which it is possible (to assume that they stand for) both, *ākṛti* and *dravya* (according to the view adopted). (That is to say,) with regard to (words) like *gauḥ* 'cow', *aśvaḥ* 'horse', etc., but not with regard to (proper names) like *ditṭhaḥ*, etc.

But other (grammarians) say that the word *ākṛti* expresses the highest characteristic (i.e., the generic feature) as much as the entity (*sattva*, characterised by that). (By deriving the word *ākṛti* in the sense of) *ākriyate yena* 'by which (an item) is given shape' (that is,) *paricchidyate yena* 'by which (an item) is delimited' a specific shape (read ; *bhinnākṛtiḥ* for *bhinnakriyā*) is marked off.

Still others say that (to assume *ākṛti* as the word-meaning) is possible with regard to all (words). (What) is conveyed (by words) is *jāti*.

This being so, according to Vājapyāyana, a word stands for *ākṛti* only, not for *dravya*, etc. (for “ etc. ” see the third view mentioned in fn. 294). To explain, the word *nīla* ‘ purple (colour) ’, when (its connection with) another meaning (in the form of a substantive expressing the purple coloured thing) is not taken into account, acquires the nature of *guṇasāmānya* ‘ quality in the abstract ’ (i.e., *nīlatva* “ purple-ness ”). This being so, having acquired its peculiar nature, (then) when expressing the quality (*nīla*), which is the substratum of that (*nīlatva*), it attains the status of what possesses that property (*nīlatva*) (that is, it attains) inherence by means of *nīlatva*, because *nīla* “ purple (colour) ” always goes together (with *nīlatva* “ purple-ness ” which inheres in *nīla*). (That is to say,) it comes to the state of secure union (*ekayogakṣematā*), because there is no separation (of *nīla* and *nīlatva*). Being totally overwhelmed by *ākṛti* (in the form of *nīlatva* the word *nīla*) provides the cognition of a *guṇa* ‘ quality ’ (namely, *nīla* ‘ purple colour ’). Just like a piece of crystal is perceived as having the quality of a particular object (like the red colour of a flower), because it happens to be near to that (object).

This word *nīla*, when it stands for a *dravya* on the other hand, provides the cognition of the *dravya*, which is itself the substratum of that (*nīlatva*), although (the cognition of the *dravya*) is separated (from that of *nīlatva*) by (that of) the quality (*nīla*), on the strength of *samavetasamavāya* ‘ indirect inherence ’, in the form of : this (purple coloured object) is the substratum of the quality (*nīla*), which is the substratum of *nīlatva*, which is (the word’s) own meaning.

Similarly, (an *ākṛti* may form a relation) with a different object also, (like) two pieces of red cloth. A piece of white cloth (put) between two pieces of red cloth is perceived as having the quality (i.e., the red colour) of these two indirectly, on account of *samyuktasamavetasamavāya* ‘ inherence in (something) which inheres in something which is connected ’. (That is to say, *raktatva* “ red-ness ” inheres in the quality *rakta* ‘ red colour ’ which inheres in the red cloth, and we see the white cloth as red through its connection or contact with the pieces of red cloth).

In the same way, this word *gauḥ*, having acquired its own nature in (denoting) *gotva* ‘ cow-hood ’, is used in the sense of a *dravya* (that is, a particular cow), which is the substratum of that (*gotva*).

In the same way, what is manifested (by the word *pacati* ‘ he cooks ’) as the common (idea) which inheres in the single meaning (of ‘ cooking ’) (and) which covers all (*sarvaviṣaya*), together with the actions of *adhiśrayaṇa* ‘ putting on the fire ’, etc. in the abstract which hold good in every single instance (of *adhiśrayaṇa*, etc.) (and) which are subsumed under the word *pacati* ‘ he cooks ’, that is the meaning of the word *pacati*.

(That is to say,) the word *pacati* stands for an *ākṛti*, namely, cooking as such. But a particular instance of cooking cannot take place without the support of several other actions, like *adhiśrayaṇa* or *adhaśrayaṇa* 'taking (the pot) from the fire' etc. These actions, in their turn, each single instance of them, are determined by an *ākṛti* of their own. All these activities are subsumed under the one idea of cooking, expressed by *pacati*. Or to put it slightly differently, the verbal base *pac-* stands for *pāka*, the general idea of cooking. This is the *ākṛti* which inheres in every single act of cooking (*pacatikriyā*) under which various other activities, each of them possessing an *ākṛti* of its own, are subsumed.)

Just like *bhramāṇatva* 'the generic quality of moving about', which covers each single action, is called *bhramaṇa* 'moving about', in the same way, with regard to *ḍiṭṭha* also, what (remains identical) from his birth to his death, that we have in the form of : this is *ḍiṭṭha*, that is *ḍiṭṭha*. Through youth, adulthood and old age the identical cognition (we have) in the form of : he is that very same (person), that is the *ākṛti* which is the meaning of the word (*ḍiṭṭha*)”.

To sum up, at the beginning of his commentary, the author of the *MBD* enumerated four views on the word-meaning conveyed by a word :

- (1) Words stand for *ākṛti* and *dravya*, that is, each separately. But this is only possible for words like *gauḥ* or *aśvaḥ*, not for proper names like *ḍiṭṭha*.
- (2) Words stand for *ākṛti* and *dravya* at the same time. To justify this, we derive the word *ākṛti* in the sense of *ākriyate yena*, that is, *paricchidyate yena*. Thus proper names like *ḍiṭṭha* may be assumed to stand for *ākṛti* also.
- (3) Words stand for *ākṛti* anyway. Here *ākṛti* means *jāti*.
- (4) Words stand for *ākṛti* only, even in the case of proper names. This is Vāṇīyāyana's view, and that is treated in detail.

V

(SECTION DEALING WITH THE *NITYATVA* OR *KĀRYATVA* OF WORD)

58. (*Bhāṣya* : Question)

But (the question is,) whether the word is *nitya* 'permanent'³⁰⁵ or rather *kārya* 'to be produced'.³⁰⁶

305. Or 'eternal', in the sense that we cannot point to a beginning in time at which words came into existence. This is the *Mīmāṃsā* view, for which see G. JHA (1942, second ed., 1964), p. 131, 'The main thesis of the *Mīmāṃsaka*...'. It is opposed to that of the *Naiyāyikas* to whom word, that is, sound, is always produced (by the speech-organs).

In the context of grammar the words *nitya* and *kārya* may be interpreted in a grammatical sense. Here *nitya* may be taken to refer to words insofar as they are a natural

Kaiyata

(On) 'But...whether' (etc.). Doubt arises, because there is a difference of opinion.³⁰⁷ Some say that the word is manifested by sound, consisting of phonemes (and) eternal.³⁰⁸ Others maintain that (the word is the) *padasphoṭa* 'single meaning-conveying unit in the form of a word', which is over and above the phonemes.³⁰⁹ Still others proclaim that (the word is the) *vākyasphoṭa* 'single meaning-conveying unit in the form of a sentence'.³¹⁰ Others, again, tell (us) that the word is nothing but sound, because we do not perceive anything other than sound (and) that, as such, it is *kārya* 'to be produced'.³¹¹

Note (23)

The *MBD* also has commented on the present *Bhāṣya*. Part of this commentary (*MBD*, p. 19, line 22–p. 20, line 16) has been translated as follows :

"Here also there is a difference of opinion. According to those who know the Veda,³¹² (the word) is eternal. According to others, (it is) non-eternal.

Or rather, the sense (of the passage) is like this : External only are those words, like *gauḥ* 'cow', etc. for (those), according to whom, however (the word is) characterised by *ākṛti*.³¹³

Or rather, this (word *gauḥ*, etc.) is a thing to be produced only. This doctrine has been evolved by the *vācikas* 'grammarians'.³¹⁴

datum of language, independently of grammar, that is, insofar as they are not generated by rules of grammar. This in contrast with *kārya*, which may be taken to characterise the generative approach. See *BDA*, Introduction, p. xix–xx, xxiv–xxv. Thus *nitya* comes to mean 'un-generated (by rules of grammar)'.

306. In the context of grammar *kārya* may be taken to mean 'to be generated (by rules of grammar)'.

307. Taken almost literally from the *MBD* (p. 19, lines 21–22) compare *ibid.* (p. 17, lines 16–17).

308. This is the *Mīmāṃsā* view. See *SN*, p. 62–63.

309. This is the view held by a school of grammarians. See *SN*, p. 77–78.

301. This is the view held by another school of grammarians. See *SN*, p. 79.

311. This is the *Nyāya* view. See *SN*, p. 70–71.

312. The *Mīmāṃsakas*.

313. That is, to whom, like *Vājapyāyana*, the word stands for *ākṛti* only. See Note (22).

314. The word *vācika* here is taken as an analogous formation after *śābdika*, to be derived by P.4.4.34. The *KV* on this rule states the derivation of *śābdika* in the sense of *śabdaṃ karoti*, *śābdiko* (i.e.,) *vaiyākaraṇaḥ*. The sense of *vācika* is assumed to be identical with that of *śābdika*.

Some think like this : Those words only, which are *prākṛta* 'original', are eternal. (The word) *prākṛtāḥ* (is derived in the sense of) *prakṛtau bhavāḥ* 'arising from the origin' (pl. nom. masc.).³¹⁵

Others think : *iyam daivī vāk* 'this divine speech' (etc.).³¹⁶ But this speech has become contaminated through the incompetence of men or through laziness.³¹⁷ Just as a boy who learns to say *svasti* 'hail!' pronounces it wrongly.³¹⁸

Or rather, just like a thing in this world happens to exist in two ways, on account of the difference between *dravya* 'instance' and *ākṛti* 'type', so the word also. Regarding these words, (the question is,) whether they represent a *śabdākṛti* 'wordform-type', or rather a *śabdavyakti* 'wordform-instance'. This being so, as regards this (word) *vṛkṣa*, the wordforms *v-ṛ-kṣ-a*, etc., which originate in succession (and) which lack simultaneity, become the causes of the manifestation of an *ākṛti* 'type (sound)', which is without succession, in the form of the wordform-type *vṛkṣa* 'tree', just like *sāsna* 'dewlap', etc. (become the cause of manifestation of *gotva* 'cowhood'. Afterwards, the understanding of meaning (arises) from the wordform-type *vṛkṣa*.³¹⁹ And that (*ākṛti*) is eternal.³²⁰ And due to practice

315. In the *vṛtti* on VP 1.182 (= 1.154, ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer) it is explained that although in olden days (*purākalpa*) speech was free from corrupt forms (*apabhraṃśa*), still, in the course of time, corruption crept in. So much so that the corrupt form came to be considered as the original form. The derivation *prakṛtau bhavam prakṛtam* is stated in the *vṛtti*.

The opinion referred to may be that of Jaina grammarians who wanted to upgrade the status of Ardhamagadhi, their canonical language, as against Sanskrit. Compare M. M. DESHPANDE, *Sociolinguistic attitudes in India. Linguistica Extranea*, Studia 5. Ann Arbor, 1979, p. 13-14, and the references given by V. PITANI, "On the origin of prakṛtam and pāli as language-designations", *Dr. S. K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume*, Banaras, 1957, p.185-86.

316. Here *iyam daivī vāk* is taken as a *pratīka*, namely, of VP 1.182 (= 1.154, ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer), which, actually, reads *daivī vāg...iyam*.

317. The first line of VP.1.182 says that this divine speech (i.e., Sanskrit) has been *vyatikṛṇa* 'contaminated' by *aśaktāḥ abhūdātārah* 'incompetent speakers'. The alternative cause of corruption, *ālasya* 'laziness', is not found mentioned in the stanza, nor in the corresponding *vṛtti*.

318. It is not stated in what the wrong pronunciation consists. Reference is to VP. 1.179 (= 1.151, ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer). Here the text says *ambvambv iti yathā bālāḥ śikṣamāṇo 'pabhṛṣate* 'just as a boy who learns to speak wrongly says *ambu*, *ambu* (for *ambā*, *ambā* "mother, mother!")'. The reading *ambāmbeti* is clearly a corrected reading, which misses the point. Compare fn. 822.

319. Reference is to VP. 1.96 (= 1.93, ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer). The stanza says that the *jāti* 'type (-sound)', which is manifested by several *vyaktis* 'instances (of utterance)' is traditionally said to be the *sphoṭa*, and that by some (grammarians) the *vyaktis* themselves are conceived as *dhvani* 'sound'. Thus, according to this view recorded by Bhartrhari, individual utterances, with all their individual variations, of sound-sequences like *v-ṛ-kṣ-a* are nothing but the representatives of a common sound-form *vṛkṣa* which is known to the listener. Compare SN, p. 23, 32, 35, 40, and 51.

320. The *vṛtti* on VP.1.96 states that some teach the eternity of words on the basis of the eternity of the *ākṛti* (= *jāti*).

that *ākṛti* is understood by any man through several individual instances of (a succession of) phonemes (as in *v-r-kṣ-a*).

Or, (according to those) who from the mere outline in a painting understand that this (represents) a man, not an elephant, in that view the word is eternal.³²¹

Moreover, in this connection, this has been stated (namely,) *ubhayataḥ sphoṭamātrāṇi pratinirdīśyate. Rāśrutir laśrutir bhavatīti* ' in both cases (of *r* and *l*), the mere *sphoṭa* is referred to. (This amounts to saying) that the (common) *l*-sound comes in the place of the (common) *r*-sound '.³²²

Even according to (him) who (accepts) *śabdavyakti* ' (the view that words represent) a wordform-instance ' the word is eternal. But that (word) is manifested through sounds. Just like the eye, etc. are the specific manifestors with regard to colour, etc. and follow the increase and decrease of colour (etc.), (and) just like reflections in mirrors, etc. are seen as long, round, big and otherwise, in the same way, words also differ on account of the difference in sounds.³²³ Just like the moon, which is one, is seen as more than one in the water, due to the difference in waves, and just as a shadow differs due to the difference in lamps, and just as there is a difference

321. Reference is probably to *VP*.1.92 (= 1.89, ed. K. A. Subramania IYER). The stanza says that from a wrong perception (the example in the *vṛtti* is mistaking a tree for an elephant), seeing a general shape only, we are led to seeing things as they are. The point of the statement we find in 1.93 (= 1.90). Here the text says that when a sentence is being manifested (through sounds in succession), we first have the impression that the sentence comes in parts (i.e., phoneme after phoneme). But this impression is wrong, because, as the *vṛtti* explains, the sentence is an indivisible entity.

322. *Mbh.* I, p. 26, lines 1-2. The passage refers to P.8.2.18. The *KV* on this rule explains that the *r* here represents a *śrutisāmānya* ' a common sound (-element) '. The same holds for the *l*. The idea is that *rāśruti* includes both the consonant *r* and the vowel *r̥*, and that *laśruti* includes both the consonant *l* and the vowel *l̥*. The common element in the sounds concerned is called *sphoṭa* (*mātra*) by the *Bhāṣyakāra*. Compare *SN*, p. 15-16.

323. Reference is to *VP*. 1.102 (= 1.99, ed. K. A. Subramania IYER). The stanza says that the object manifested follows the differences in the manifestors, and that this is evident from the reflection which differs according to the reflecting media, like oil or water, etc.

The *vṛtti* explains that the stanza is the answer to a *pūrvapakṣa*, which is reconstrued from the stanza. The assumed *pūrvapakṣa* states, with the help of examples, that changes in the manifestors do not show in the things manifested. Therefore it cannot be maintained that the word (*śabda*, i.e., the wordform) is a manifested entity.

Against this, the stanza, with the help of other examples (like a *cānaśastra* " Chinese dagger " in which a face is proportionally reduced, and concave and convex mirrors which distort a face), points out that the object manifested does follow the difference of manifestors. Actually, one can think of innumerable examples, the *vṛtti* says.

The similarity between this part of the *MBD*-passage and the *vṛtti*-passage has been noted by K. A. Subramania IYER, *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari* with the *Vṛtti*. Chapter I, English Translation, Poona, 1963, p. 96. The *vṛtti* has only cut on the number of examples offered in the *MBD* here.

in reflection due to the difference in mirrors. Therefore *vyaktiśabdā* 'word-forms (taken to represent) instances (only) ', which are manifested by specific sounds (and) which follow *hrāsa* 'shortening' and *vṛddhi* of sounds, are also eternal. ³²⁴

59. (*Bhāṣya* : Answer)

This (subject) has been mainly examined in the *Samgraha*³²⁵ (namely, whether the word is) *nitya* or *kārya*. There the defects (in both views) have been pointed out (and also the respective) merits. There, however, the final conclusion is this : irrespective of whether (the word is) *nitya* or *kārya*, in both (views) a body of rules³²⁶ has to be devised.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *Samgraha*. (The word is used) in the sense of a particular book.

Nāgeśa

It is wellknown that the *Samgraha* is a work composed by Vyāḍi, counting 100,000 stanzas.³²⁷

(On) ' in both (views) in the *Bhāṣya*. And thus the investigation is futile. This is what (the author) means to say. The purport (of the passage is) that, in order to have the knowledge of the correctness (of words), in both (views) grammar is necessary.

VI

(SECTION DEALING WITH ASSUMPTIONS OF GRAMMAR)

60. (*Bhāṣya* : Introduction to *Vt. III*)

But in which way has this body of rules been devised by the revered Teacher Pāṇini ?³²⁸

324. How can words be *nitya* in the *śabdavyaktipakṣa* ? The explanation may be that although words uttered by different people each time appear to be different, these differences are *aupādhika* 'associative, i.e., non-essential, features'. That is to say, the seemingly different realization of the phonemes involved are irrelevant from the point of view of the phoneme, which is one only. What is one, is *nitya*, like *ākāśa* 'space'. Compare *SN*, p. 83-84, where Nāgeśa's *vyaktisphoṭavāda* is discussed.

325. The lost work of Vyāḍi, a grammarian usually situated in the time between Pāṇini and Kātyāyana (who mentions him as the exponent of the *dravyapakṣa*, in *Vr.* XLV on P. 1.2.64). The work (or parts of it) was still known to the commentator on the first *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, but it was apparently lost already in Kaiyaṭa's days.

326. *Lakṣaṇam*. Compare *Bh.* No. 52.

327. According to the *MBD*, p. 20, lines 4-5, the *Samgraha* contained 14,000 *vastus* ' topics ', which seems to be a remarkable number. Nāgeśa's statement may be taken to imply that the *MBD* was not known to him.

328. This is the first reference to Pāṇini by name in the *Mbh.*

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'But in which way' (etc.). The question is, whether the Teacher himself is the inventor of words, meanings and the relations (between them), or (merely) the reproducer.³²⁹

Nāgeśa

(On) *śabdārthasambandhānām* 'of words, meanings and the relations (between them)'. This is a *dvandva* cp. (to be derived in the sense of) *śabdāś ca arthāś ca sambandhāś ca* 'words and meanings and the relations (between them)'.³³⁰ And thus the purport (of the passage is) that the point of the question lies in this, whether grammar generates relations (of words) with particular meanings through generating new words, or whether (grammar merely) informs us of words, meanings and the relations (between them) which have already been established (by the speech-community).

Note (24)

The question raised in *Bh.* No. 53 *v* as about the method to be adopted by grammar. The question in the present *Bhāṣya*, to which *Vt.* III is supposed to give the answer, concerns the assumptions of grammar with regard to language, especially, words and their meanings.

III. (*Vārttika*, first part : Assumption that the relation between word and meaning is *siddha*)

When (it is assumed that) the relation between a word and (its) meaning has already been (established on account of the usage of people).³³¹

61. (*Bhāṣya* : Explanation)³³²

When (it is assumed that) the word, (its) meaning and (their) relation is *siddha*.³³³

329. The contrast is between *sraṣṭṛ* and *smartṛ*.

330. This analysis follows the *Bhāṣyakāra*'s analysis of the word *śabdārthasambandhe* in *Vt.* III.

331. The word *lokataḥ*, which forms the second part of *Vt.* III, is read here already, to make the sense of the first part clear. The word 'meaning' as the translation of the word *artha* should be understood throughout as the thing-meant, like pots and cows.

How this part-*Vt.* can be turned into a complete sentence by supplying the words *śāstraṁ pravṛttam* 'grammar starts' is stated by Kaiyaṭa on *Bh.* No. 83.

The word *śabdārthasambandhe* can be analysed in two ways :

(1) As stated by Nāgeśa in connection with *Bh.* No. 60. When derived in this way, the cp. is a *samāhāradvandva* (*śabdāś ca arthāś ca sambandhāś ca. Teṣāṁ samāhārah, śabdārthasambandham. Tasmin.*).

(2) As a genitive *tp.* (*śabdaś ca arthaś ca, śabdārthau. Tayoḥ sambandhaḥ śabdārthasambandhaḥ. Tasmin.*)

The *Bhāṣyakāra* opts for (1). In the translation (2) is adopted. One reason that Kātyāyana never uses a *samāhāradvandva*.

332. The more correct title of the *Bhāṣya* would be : Reinterpretation. Read in this connection *ATA*, Introduction, p. ii (sub 1.2).

333. The word *siddha* is left untranslated here, in view of the *Bhāṣyakāra*'s later interpretation.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ‘ when . . . established ’. Among these (three), the word which is characterised as *jātiṣphoṭa* ‘ a single meaning-conveying unit (conveying) *jāti* ’ or as *vyaktiṣphoṭa* ‘ a single meaning-conveying unit (conveying) *vyakti* ’ is *nitya* ‘ permanent ’.³³⁴ Even for those who hold that the word is *kārya* ‘ to be produced ’ (the word is *nitya*, on account of the *pravāhanityatā* ‘ permanence in the form of a continuous flow ’.³³⁵ Meaning also, which is characterised by *jāti*, possesses eternity. Even in the *dravyapakṣa*³³⁶ words are *nitya*, because they (ultimately) express the *brahma*—reality which is delimited by unreal *upādhis* ‘ superimposed features ’,³³⁷ or on account of the *pravāhanityatā*. The relation (between words and their meanings) also possesses an eternal character, because it has no beginning, (that is) on account of the *vyavahāraparamparā* ‘ the (supposedly) unbroken tradition of (language used in) daily communication ’.

62. (*Bhāṣya* : Question)

Now what is the meaning of the word *siddha* (here) ?³³⁸

Kaiyaṭa

We see that the word *siddha* (is used) in the sense of *nitya* ‘ permanent ’ and of *anitya* ‘ non-permanent ’. Therefore (the *Bhāṣyakāra*) asks ‘ Now ’ (etc.).

63. (*Bhāṣya* : Answer)

The word *siddha* is a synonym of *nitya* ‘ permanent ’. How do you know? (Because) it is used to refer to things which are *kūṭastha* ‘ unchangeable ’ and *avicālin* ‘ immovable ’. For instance, *siddhā dyauḥ* ‘ the sky has been firmly established ’ *siddhā pṛthivī* ‘ the earth has been firmly established ’ (and) *siddham ākāśam* ‘ space has been firmly established ’.

334. Kaiyaṭa already takes it for granted that the word *siddha* in the *Vt.* means *nitya*. For the view mentioned see *SN*, p. 46–49, 81–84.

335. One of the forms of *nityatā*, namely, flow- or stream-like continuity, which has no beginning to which we can point, and which, therefore, is eternal. Compare K. A. Subramania Iyer (1969), p 74.

336. See Note (22).

337. Straight from Helārāja on *VP*, 3.1.2 (see *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari* . . . *Kāṇḍa* III, Part 1. Edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer, Poona, 1963, p. 9, lines 18–19, *tattadupādhyāvaccinnanāṁ vā brahma dravyaśabdavācyaṁ sarvaśabdānāṁ viśaya iti vakṣyate eva* ‘ or, *brahma* which is delimited by different *upādhis* “ superimposed features ” (and) expressed by words standing for a *dravya* ” (single) thing ” is the (denotative) domain of all words, thus it is definitely stated ’).

338. The *MBD*, p. 22, lines 5–6, says that the question is not of the etymological meaning (*avayavārtha* ‘ meaning of the constituents ’), but of the *laukika* ‘ conventional meaning (*samudāyārtha* ‘ meaning of the whole ’).

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'a synonym of *nitya*'. (*Nityaparyāyavācī* means) *nityalak-ṣaṇasyārthasya paryāyeṇa vācakaḥ* 'expressive in turn of a meaning characterized as *nitya*'. That is to say, the same meaning is sometimes expressed by the word *nitya*, sometimes by the word *siddha*.³⁴⁰

Kūṭastheṣu (means) *avināśiṣu* 'imperishable' (pl. loc. masc.).³⁴¹

Avicāliṣu (means) *deśantaraprāptirahiteṣu* 'which do not reach a different place' (pl. loc. masc.).³⁴²

Nāgeśa

(On) *kūṭastheṣu*. *Kūṭam* (means) *ayoghanaḥ* 'iron hammer'. (*Kūṭastheṣu* means) *kūṭam tadvat tiṣṭhanti ye teṣu* 'which are like an iron hammer', pl. loc. masc. That is to say, *svayam anaṣṭeṣu* 'which themselves remain undestroyed' (pl. loc. masc.), although what comes into contact (with them) is destroyed. (Objection.) But then the iron hammer would be considered to be *nitya* 'permanent'. (Answer:) That is why (the author) says *avicāliṣu*. The illustrations in the *Bhāṣya* by means of sky, earth, etc. have been given with the intention of *vyāvahārikanityatva* 'permanence from the point of view of our daily dealings in life'.³⁴³ The Teacher³⁴⁴ accepts the *vyāvahāranityata* of *ākāśa* 'space' also. And thus (that word *siddha*) is mentioned there, which is expressive of *nityatva* 'permanence' only, because it (is a word) taken in its conventional sense.³⁴⁵ This is what (the author) means to say.

64. (*Bhāṣya* : *Objection*)

But, sir, isn't it a fact that (the word *siddha*) is used to refer to (things) which are *kārya* 'to be produced' also?³⁴⁶ For instance, *siddha odanaḥ* 'the rice has been prepared', *siddhaḥ sūpaḥ* 'the soup has been prepared' (and) *siddhā yavāgūḥ* 'the gruel has been

339. The *MBD*, p. 22, line 23, observes that the *ārhatas* (Jainas) and the *Mīmāṃsikas* do not believe in the final dissolution of the world. Thus, in their view, the word *siddha* here refers to absolute (not merely relative) eternity.

340. Literally from the *MBD* (p. 22, lines 7-8).

341. The *MBD*, p. 22, lines 15-16, explains that the word *kūṭastha* is used in connection with that which does not change. For instance, *kūṭasthām rāśīm kuru* 'keep this heap as it is'.

342. Almost literally from the *MBD* (p. 22, lines 16-17).

343. That is, *nityatva* in a limited, relative sense, and not from the point of view of ultimate, absolute reality (*paramārthataḥ*). The reason is that from the latter point of view everything is *anitya*. See also fn. 440.

344. Patañjali.

345. See fn. 338.

346. *Nanu ca bhoḥ* is the polite standard expression used ironically to refute a statement by the *siddhāntin*, often by reminding him of something.

prepared'. Since (the word *siddha*) is used to refer to (things) which are to be produced also, why (assume) mention of (the word *siddha*) there³⁴⁷ as a synonym of *nitya* 'permanent', but not (mention of that word *siddha*) which (is used) in the sense of *kārya* 'to be produced'?

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'But' (etc.). That is to say, from the word *siddha* we understand also the meaning *kriyāniṣpanna* 'produced by means of an action'.³⁴⁸

65. (Bhāṣya : Answer)

In the *Samgraha*,³⁴⁹ to begin with, we think, mention is (of the word *siddha*) as a synonym of *nitya* 'permanent', because it (is used) as an antonym of *kārya* 'to be produced'. Precisely that (mention we find) here also.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'In the *Samgraha*, to begin with' (etc.). Because an investigation is conducted into two views, namely, whether the word is *kārya* 'to be produced', or rather *siddha*.³⁵⁰ There it is a fact that the word *siddha* conveys a meaning which is the opposite of *kārya*, because (the context) requires so.³⁵¹ Since we have to do with the same science as that,³⁵² it is appropriate (to assume that the word *siddha* conveys meaning) in the same way here also.

66 (Bhāṣya : Another answer)

Or rather, there are restrictions which consist of single words. For instance, *abbhakṣaḥ* 'one who lives on water', *vāyubhakṣaḥ* 'one who lives on wind'. We understand (by implication): *apa eva bhakṣayati* 'he lives on water only', *vāyum eva bhakṣayati* 'he lives on wind only'.

In the same way, here also (we implicitly understand the word *siddha* as) *siddha eva* 'effected only', not (as) *sādhyā* '(still) to be effected'.

347. In *Vt.* III.

348. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 23, lines 2-3).

349. See fn. 325.

350. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 23, lines 15-16).

351. *Sāmarthyāt*. Literally, 'on the strength', namely, of the fact that two opposite views are discussed there.

352. That is, as the one treated in the *Samgraha*, namely, grammar.

353. Taken almost literally from the *MBD* (p. 23, lines 19-20).

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'Or rather' (etc.). When the word *eva* 'only' is used (explicitly), because we need the word *eva* in its function of *dyotaka* 'indicative' (of restriction),³⁵⁴ then (we have) a restriction which consists of two words. But when restriction is implied on account of *sāmarthyā*, without (the use of the) *dyotaka* (word *eva*), that (restriction) is said to be *ekapada* 'consisting of one word'.³⁵⁵

This being so, the *śruti*-passage regarding *abbhakṣa* 'living on water' which says *sarva evāpo bhakṣayanti* 'all, without exception, live on water',³⁵⁶ on the strength (of its being stated),³⁵⁷ makes us understand a restriction in the form of *apa eva* (*bhakṣayati*) '(he lives) on water only'.³⁵⁸

Here also³⁵⁹ a restriction is implied, in the form of *siddha eva* 'effected only', because the word *siddha* has been mentioned (and) because there is no other alternative apart from (that of) *nitya* 'eternal' or *anitya* 'non-eternal'.³⁶⁰

354. Normally *dyotakatva* is opposed to *vācakatva*, see fn. 16. But in the present passage it is opposed to *sāmarthyā*, for which compare *ATA*, fn. 586. Kaiyaṭa means to say that, if we want to indicate restriction explicitly, we have to use the word *eva*, which is *dyotaka*.

355. In the case of *sāmarthyā*, we make the assumption of restriction, which has not been indicated by means of the word *eva* in the sentence. Therefore *dyotakatva* is different from *sāmarthyā*. Accordingly, a difference is made between *ekapada-avadhāraṇa*, where the word *eva* is not used and restriction is assumed on account of *sāmarthyā*, and *dvipada-avadhāraṇa*, where the word *eva* is used and restriction is indicated. Thus *abbhakṣa* in the sense of 'living on water only', where the restriction 'only' is implied, is an instance of *ekapada-avadhāraṇa*, whereas *abbhakṣa eva* 'living on water only', where the restriction 'only' has been mentioned, is an instance of *dvipada-avadhāraṇa*.

The discussion is taken from the *MBD* (p. 24, line 23–p. 25, line 2).

356. References for *abbhakṣa* are given by K. Ch. CHATTERJI (1972), p. 62.

357. *Sāmarthyāt*. That is, because otherwise there would be no point in making the statement.

358. The passage is taken almost literally from the *MBD* (p. 25, lines 2–3).

The *śruti* says : everybody lives on water. Then what is the point in saying again that somebody lives on water ? The only way to make the latter statement meaningful is to assume that it conveys an implied sense, namely, that somebody lives on water only. That is to say, we have to assume a restrictive sense (*niyama*).

359. In *Vt. III*.

360. The discussion is taken from the *MBD* (p. 25, lines 5–9). Here the example *abhirūpāya kanyā dātavyā* 'the daughter should be given to the most deserving one' (*Bh. No. 5* on P.1.4.42, see *KARA*, p. 140) is quoted in line 7.

We have only one alternative : words are *nitya* or *anitya*. Both possibilities are accepted. In the context of this alternative the word *siddha* is used. But the word *siddha* is not required, because it merely repeats what is already known, namely, that a word is either *nitya* or *kārya*. Therefore the word *siddha* is *vyartha* 'redundant'. To render the use of this word meaningful, it is assumed that it conveys the meaning of *niyama* 'restriction', in the form of *siddha eva*. *Siddha eva* can only be said of things which are always there. Therefore *kārya* things, which are characterized by *prāgabhāva* or *pradhvaṁsābhāva*, are out.

But things which are *kārya* 'to be produced' (and) which (therefore) are in the condition of *prāg* (*-abhāva*) ' antecedent (non-existence) ' or of *pradhvaṃsa* (*-abhāva*) ' subsequent (non-existence) ' ³⁶¹ lack the status of (something which is) *siddha* ' effected '. Therefore those things cannot be (said to be) *siddha eva* ' effected only ' . ³⁶²

67. (*Bhāṣya* : Still another answer)

Or rather, we must consider (that) here ³⁶³ deletion of the first constituent (has taken place) . ³⁶⁴ (That is to say, from) *atyanta-siddhaḥ* ' effected once for all ' (we derive) *siddhaḥ* . ³⁶⁵ (Like) for instance, (from) *devadattaḥ* (we derive) *dattaḥ* (or, from) *satya-bhāmā* (we derive) *bhāmā* . ³⁶⁶

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' Or rather ' (etc.) . (Objection :) But, once the word *devadatta* has been assigned (to somebody) as a name, how can part (of that name) be used ? Because this (part) has not been assigned (to somebody) as a name. Moreover, it is not correct (to assume that) a whole becomes *vācaka* ' meaning-conveying ', when it is being remembered on account of a part. ³⁶⁷ The reason is that what is being understood cannot be *pratyāyaka* ' a conveyor of meaning ', (whereas) what is being uttered only can be *vācaka* ' meaning-conveying ' . ³⁶⁸ (Answer :) (If this is) so, then (we will say that),

361. For the four kinds of *abhāva* accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas see S. N. DASGUPTA, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1922, p. 359–360. *Prāgabhāva* means the non-existence of a thing before its coming into being, and *pradhvaṃsābhāva* means the non-existence of a thing in the form of its annihilation.

362. See fn. 360.

363. In the word *siddha* in *Vt.* III.

364. By part of a *śloka-vārttika* (*apratyaye tathaiveṣṭaḥ*, supply : *lopaḥ pūrvapadasya*) quoted in the *Bhāṣya* on P.5.3.83 (*Mbh.* II, p. 425, line 9). The statement says that deletion of the *pūrvapada* is also desired, when the suffix concerned is not added. The *RV* on P.5.3.83 quotes the statement in a different version, as *vināpi pratyayena pūrvottarapadayor vibhāṣā lopo vaktavyaḥ* ' deletion must be prescribed optionally of the *pūrvapada* or the *uttarapada* even without (the addition of) the suffix '. The examples are *deva* or *datta* for *devadatta*. The statement quoted in the *Mbh.*, however, only allows *datta*.

365. Thus *siddha* is interpreted to mean ' what is always there ', that is, in the sense of *nitya*.

366. Instances of the shortening of names and of pet names in general are given by K. Ch. CHATTERJI, (1972), p. 62–64. It may be noted that, according to the *KV* on P.3.3.174, the name *devadatta* does not simply mean ' given by God ', as assumed by Chatterji, *ibid.*, p. 63, but *devā enaṃ deyaśuḥ* ' may the gods give him ', namely, in answer to a woman's prayer for a son.

The *MBD*, p. 23, lines 21–22, observes with regard to the present *Bhāṣya* that it has been phrased without reference to another book, like the *Saṃgraha* in the case of *Bh.* No. 65.

367. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 24, lines 18–19).

368. Taken from the *MBD* (P. 24, line 19). The idea is that once the name *Deva-datta* has been given to a person, the name *Datta* won't work to refer to the same person

at the time when (names) are assigned (to persons), names³⁶⁹ which will be used later on (and) which are similar in part (to the full name) have been already assigned (to the persons concerned). But deletion is declared, so that (mere) sounds (by way of names) should not be regarded as correct.³⁷⁰

Here also, since there is no difference as regards *niṣpannatva* 'the fact of being there' between what is *nitya* 'eternal' and what is *anitya* 'non-eternal',³⁷¹ the statement of (the word) *siddha* makes us understand *prakarṣa* 'a higher degree' in the form of *atyantasiddha* 'effected once for all'.³⁷²

68. (*Bhāṣya* : Still another answer)

Or rather, we will explain that mention is of (the word *siddha*) as a synonym of *nitya* 'permanent' on the basis of (the *pb.*) *vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattir, na hi saṁdehād alakṣaṇam* 'the understanding of something particular (among two or more possibilities should be decided) on the basis of *vyākhyāna* "reasoned explanation". For (a rule should) not (be regarded as) a bad rule (simply) because of doubt (regarding its meaning).³⁷³

To remove this difficulty, it is suggested that by hearing the name Datta we are reminded of the name Devadatta, which is the full name. But the suggestion is rejected. The reason is that, if A (Datta) is used to convey B (the name Devadatta), then B cannot convey, i.e., cannot be used to refer to C (the person called Devadatta), at the same time. Compare VP 3.3.26.

The argument comes from the *Bhāṣya* on P.1.1.69 (*Mbh.* I, p. 178, lines 2-4). According to P.1.1.69, the phoneme *a* stands for 18 varieties. Among these varieties, the phoneme *a* is also understood (*pratīyamāna*). But we are not to assume that this *a* again stands for 18 varieties. What is *pratīyamāna* cannot be *pratyāyaka* at the same time. In another context, however, the *a* may be *pratyāyaka*, namely, when it is employed in its own form.

369. That is, at the time of the naming ceremony. See *MBD*, p. 24, line 20.

370. Taken from the *MBD*, p. 24, lines 23-25. The examples are *jye* for *jyeṣṭhā* and *khā* for *viśākhā*. Compare also VP.2. 361-363.

371. The argument is taken from the *MBD* (p. 25, lines 3-7).

372. Compare the argument in *Bh.* No. 4 on P.1.4.29 (*KARA*, p. 29). Thus the mention of the word *siddha* is considered to carry emphasis.

373. *PN*, *pb.* 1. Kielhorn renders the word *vyākhyāna* as 'interpretation'. So does P. THIEME, "The interpretation of the learned", *Dr. S. K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume*, Banaras, 1957, p. 54, and *passim*. The *PN*, Part II, p. 2, n. 1, quotes a stanza which enumerates six means of *vyākhyāna*. Among them are *ākṣepa* 'objection' and *saṁādhāna* 'answer', which clearly refer to the procedure adopted in a *bhāṣya*, in particular the *Mahābhāṣya*, and which is intended to arrive at a definite conclusion regarding a doubtful point by means of argument and counter-argument. This constitutes the hard, logical core of the process of interpretation or explanation.

An *alakṣaṇa* is not a non-definition (as assumed by Thieme, art. quoted, p. 53, in his translation of *pb.* 1), but a rule which, for some reason or other, does not convey what it should convey.

The idea of the *pb.* is that doubt leaves us with alternatives : either this or that, or perhaps something else still, and that, on the basis of *vyākhyāna*, the several possibilities or options should be limited to one.

Kaiyaṭa

Or the *nityatva* 'eternal nature' of words, etc. has been established on the basis of reasoning.³⁷⁴ With that intention (the *Bhāṣyakāra*) says 'Or rather' (etc.). Because (we do) not (assume that a rule has) the status of bad rule simply because of doubt, since subsequently (we determine its meaning) on the basis of a conclusion arrived at with the help of some other means (of cognition).³⁷⁵

Nāgeśa

But an explanation without arguments is not appropriate, because it leaves room for the opposite (position) also. With that intention (Kaiyaṭa) says 'or... on the basis of reasoning'. On the basis of *vyādhavyavahāra* 'the usage of elderly people' it has been established in the *Samgraha*, etc. that words, meanings, and their relation are eternal.³⁷⁶ From this explanation (we understand that) the word *siddha* conveys precisely that (*nityatva* 'status of being eternal').³⁷⁷

Note (25)

The point of the quotation in the *Bhāṣya* has been explained by P. Thieme (art. quoted in fn. 373, p. 54) as follows: 'In distinguishing '*vyākhyāna*' from the procedures he has tried first... Patañjali... means to say: Since it is an established fact that *siddha* may be used in the sense of "eternal" and in that of "made ready..." and, hence, there may arise a doubt... as to the sense in which Kātyāyana used the word in his first vārttika, we have to look at the context of the whole first vārttika... and to ascertain from the fact that it yields a consistent sense, only if we take *siddha* in the sense of *nitya*...'. According to Thieme (ibid., p. 53) the *pb.* states a principle followed by any modern philologist, namely, that in interpreting a text our basic assumption is that the author means to make sensible statements and to be consistent with himself. Our endeavour therefore

374. Kaiyaṭa in his comment on *Bh.* No. 44 on *Śivasūtra* 6 (NSP ed., p. 145) accepts two ways of establishing meaning (compare Thieme, art. quoted, p. 58–59). He says *nyāyād āgamād vā śabdaśaktir anusāryā* 'the force (i.e., the specific meaning) of a word should be found out on the basis of reasoning or on that of *āgama*'. Here Nāgeśa explains *āgama* as *upadeśaparaṇiparā* 'the (supposedly) unbroken tradition of teaching'.

375. Any *pramāṇa* in the technical sense of the word. Kaiyaṭa's comment has been translated (its first part misconstrued) by Thieme, art. quoted, p. 56, n. 6.

376. This is probably a tradition known to Nāgeśa. The *vyādhavyavahāra* is referred to by Kaiyaṭa in his comment on *Bh.* No. 61 (*vyavahāraparaṇiparā* 'the (supposedly) unbroken tradition of (language used in) daily communication'. For the *Samgraha* see fn. 325.

377. Nāgeśa's comment has been translated (with wrong assumptions) by Thieme art. quoted, p. 56 (continued on p. 57), n. 6. The wrong assumptions are detailed on p. 57, n. 7.

must be to construct and understand his sentences in such a way that they yield sense and consistency. This, as Thieme says, is the principle applied by Patañjali in interpreting Pāṇini and Kātyāyana. Rather unfortunately, the application of the principle doesn't stop Patañjali from re-interpreting the statements of the earlier authors, when he sees fit to.

To return to the *Bhāṣya* : It is subject to doubt whether *siddha* means *nitya* or *kārya*. The *pb.* quoted says that for that reason alone we should not reject *Vt.* III (or the part-*Vārttika* discussed so far). Rather we should try to remove the doubt with the help of reasoning. As explained by Nāgeśa who appeals to the authority of the *Samgraha*, the reasoning is based on *ṛddhavyavahāra*. In the usage of the elder generation, which goes back to still earlier generations, and so on to the hoary past, we see that the word *siddha* is used in the sense of *nitya*. Therefore we may confidently assume that the word *siddha* in *Vt.* III also stands for *nitya*. Another way of reasoning to arrive at the same result will be stated in the *Mbh.* in connection with the word *lokataḥ* in the same *Vt.*

69. (*Bhāṣya* : *Objection*)

But what is the use of this (word *siddha*) which needs (so much) explanation ? Why hasn't the word *nitya* itself been mentioned in a loud voice,³⁷⁸ which being mentioned, leaves no room for doubt.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' which needs (so much) explanation '. That is to say, which is to be explained with an effort.

70. (*Bhāṣya* : *Answer*)

For the sake of auspiciousness.³⁷⁹ (That is to say,) the Teacher desirous of good fortune uses the word *siddha* at the beginning of the great stream of his treatise for the sake of good luck. Because treatises which start with an auspicious word spread (wide and far) and breed heroes and long-living people, and (the word *siddha* is also used) so that people who read (this work) may obtain their objectives.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ' desirous of good fortune '. The attainment of a desired objective which is not censured (by people), (that is) *maṅgala*.³⁸⁰ The Teacher whose purpose is that, (is called) *māṅgalika*.³⁸¹

378. That is, confidently. The idea is that when we state something we are not certain about we speak *upāṇśu* ' in a low voice '.

379. In the *NSP* ed. (Bombay, 1951, p. 61) this statement is printed as a *Vt.*

380. The *MBD*, p. 25, line 13, explains that *maṅgala* means *nirupakruṣṭābhimatār-thasiddhiḥ*, which is exactly what Kaiyaṭa says in different words.

(On) ' spread (wide and far) '. (Namely,) due to the absence of a break in study.³⁸²

(On) ' breed heroes '. Because the students (of grammar) are never defeated by others.

(On) ' breed . . . long-living people '. Because, if one performs the things (stated) in a *śāstra* ' authoritative treatise ', *dharma* ' religious merit ' increases. Therefore the span of life (also) increases.

(On) ' obtain their objectives '. Their success lies in the completion of their study only.³⁸³

71. (*Bhāṣya* : Answer continued)

As a matter of fact, this word *nitya* is not necessarily used to refer to things which are *kūṭastha* ' unchangeable ' and *avicālin* ' immovable '.³⁸⁴ Then (to) what ? It is also used in the sense of *ābhikṣṇya* ' frequent repetition '.³⁸⁵ For instance, *nityaprahasitah* ' one who always laughs ', *nityaprajāpitah* ' one who always chatters '.³⁸⁶ Since it is used in the sense of *ābhikṣṇya* also, here also meaning should (be decided) on the basis of this (statement) only, namely *vyākhyānato viśeṣapratipattir, na hi saṁdehād alakṣaṇam* ' the understanding of a particular thing (among two or more possibilities should be decided) by *vyākhyāna* " reasoned explanation " '. For (a rule should) not (be regarded as) a bad rule (simply) because of doubt (regarding its meaning) '.³⁸⁷

But the Teacher³⁸⁸ considers like this : the word *siddha* shall be used at the beginning, for the sake of good luck, and also I shall be able to explain it as a synonym of *nitya* ' permanent '.³⁸⁹ Therefore the word *siddha* only has been mentioned, not the word *nitya*.

Kaiyata

(On) ' not necessarily '. And therefore only those words would be explained (in grammar) which are used frequently (by people) from cowherds to women, (but) not words which are rarely used.³⁹⁰

381. The word is derived with the suffix *ṬHañ* (-- *ika*, P.7.3.50) in the sense of *prayojana* ' purpose ' by P.5.1.109. The *MBD*, p. 25, line 15, explains it as *maṅgalam prayuñkte* ' he aims at *maṅgala* '.

382. That is to say, they continue to be studied.

383. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 25, line 18).

384. Reference is to *Bh.* No. 63.

385. Note that in the examples the constituent *nitya* functions as an adverb.

386. ' Always ' means ' very frequently '.

387. Reference is to *Bh.* No. 68. Thus we have to come to a decision about whether *nitya* means *kūṭastha/avicālin*, or whether it stands for *ābhikṣṇya*, that is, for something which happens frequently. The decision is to be reached on the basis of *vyākhyāna*.

388. *Kātyāyana*.

389. This is, in fact, the answer to the question raised in *Bh.* No. 69.

390. Taken literally from the *MBD* (p. 25, lines 21–22). If *siddha* means *nitya* and if *nitya* means ' frequently ', then *Vt. III* (*siddhe śabdārthasambandhe*) would imply that grammar deals only with those words which are used frequently in language.

The word *nitya*, which is used to convey the sense of *ābhīkṣṇya* 'frequent repetition', is also used without a verb.³⁹¹ Like in *āścaryam anitye* ' (the word) *āścarya* (is used) in the sense of *anitya* "unusual",³⁹² or in *nityavīpsayoh* ' (a word is repeated) to convey the sense of "always" or of " (logical) distribution ".³⁹³

Note (26)

The argument of the *Bhāṣya* is that even if the word *siddha* in *Vt. III* is taken in the sense of *nitya*, we are still in doubt about its meaning, because apart from 'permanent' *nitya* may mean 'frequently' also. As pointed out by the author of the *MBD*, followed by Kaiyaṭa, this latter meaning has an undesired consequence. But, since we are in doubt anyway, why not use the word *siddha*, as the *Vt.* does? *Siddha* has the advantage of being an auspicious word, and on the basis of *vyākhyāna* we will explain that *siddha* means *nitya*.

72. (*Bhāṣya* : Question)

Now, with which meaning (of the word *siddha*) in mind is the following constituent analysis made, namely, *siddhe śabde arthe sambandhe ca* 'when the word, the meaning and (their) relation are *siddha*'?

Note (27)

The *MBD* (p. 26, lines 1-3) has a short note here, which says that question is raised with regard to that meaning which is conveyed by a word (read *śabdena* for *śabde*). That is to say, with which idea about the thing-meant has the constituent analysis stated been given?

73. (*Bhāṣya* : Answer)

He³⁹⁴ says: The *ākṛti*.³⁹⁵ Why (is) that (so)? Because the *ākṛti* is *nitya* 'permanent',³⁹⁶ (whereas) the *dravya* 'individual thing' is *anitya* 'non-permanent'.

391. This refers to the *MBD* (p. 25, lines 20 and 23). If *nitya* 'frequently' is an adverb, it requires a verb. But in *Vt. III* the word *nitye* (that is, *siddhe*) cannot be an adverb. To show that *nitya* conveys the meaning of *ābhīkṣṇya* even in the absence of a verb Kaiyaṭa quotes examples.

392. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 25, line 22). The example is P.6.1.147, where the word *āścarya* is mentioned as a *nipātana* (with the added *āgama sūṭ*) in the sense of *anitya* 'unusual'.

393. P.8.1.4.

394. It is not clear whether Patañjali here refers to the author of his source, or whether a later redactor of the *Mahābhāṣya* refers to Patañjali. Compare *Bh.* Nos. 6, 8, 10 and 12.

395. It is not clear what is meant by *ākṛti* here, the general shape common to individuals belonging to the same genus or class, or the *jāti*. Therefore the word has been left without translation.

396. Or, 'eternal'.

Note (28)

The *MBD* (p. 26, lines 3–14) comments on the present *Bhāṣya* as follows : ‘ A word detached from (its) connection with other meanings³⁹⁷ acquires its essential nature in the *jāti*³⁹⁸ only, among (the categories) *jāti*, *guṇa* “ quality ”, *kriyā* “ action ” and *yadṛcchāśabda* “ proper name ”.³⁹⁹ But *dravyas* “ individual things ”, etc. are expressed through *tādrūpyāpādana* “ particularization ”.⁴⁰⁰ Like (in *gaur vāhīkaḥ* “ the Vāhika is (stupid like) an ox ” (the meaning) *vāhīka* (is particularized) by the word *go*.⁴⁰¹

An individual thing which moves⁴⁰² (is particularized) by a proper name. This being so, an individual object which comes into contact with an action, in the form of *gām ānaya* “ fetch the cow ” is particularized by a form of movement.⁴⁰³

In the same way, (in the expression) *śuklā gauḥ* “ the white cow ” (a particular object is referred to). (Because) *gotva* “ cow-hood ” together with⁴⁰⁴ *śuklatva* “ white-ness ” is understood on account of *samavetasamayāya* “ indirect inherence ”⁴⁰⁵ in one and the same object.⁴⁰⁶ (In the expression) *eko brāhmaṇaḥ* “ one single (a particular) brahmin is referred to, because *brāhmaṇatva* “ brahmin-hood ” (is understood) together with *ekatva* “ single-ness ”.

Every word expresses an *ākṛti*.⁴⁰⁷ But we cannot assume that this (*ākṛti*) becomes operative at the same time with regard to the cognition of *tattva* “ identity ” and *anyatva* “ otherness ”.⁴⁰⁸ Like (it is not correct to

397. Like words listed in a dictionary or *kośa*.

398. For the meanings of *jāti* see fn. 294. Since later on the relation of *samavāya* ‘inherence’ is mentioned in connection with *gotva* and *śuklatva*, the term *jāti* here is probably to be taken in the sense of ‘ class-feature ’ or ‘ generic feature ’.

399. Reference is to the enumeration given by Patañjali in his *Bhāṣya* on *Vt. 1* on *Śivasūtra 2* (*Mbh. I*, p. 19, line 20). Here Patañjali says that words are used in four ways, namely, to express the four categories summed up. For the inclusion of *yadṛcchāśabdas* here see Filliozat (1975), p. 192, n. 2.

400. Literally, through bringing about *tādrūpya* ‘ having this (or that) form ’.

401. “ Is particularized ” means : is expressed through the process called particularization. The expression *gaur vāhīkaḥ* is always used with reference to a particular person although *go* and *vāhīka*, by themselves, are class-names.

402. That is, which is connected with an action.

403. That is, by a particular action, namely, fetching.

404. That is, as particularized by.

405. Literally, inherence in what inheres.

406. Namely, the cow.

407. In his comment (on the *Bhāṣya* which speaks of *ākṛti*) the author of the *MBD* does not clearly distinguish between *ākṛti* and *jāti*, since he first deals with *jāti* and then shifts to the term *ākṛti*.

408. For the argument involved see *VP. 3.1.92–94* and 98, and the explanations added in K. A. Subramania Iyer (1971), p. 57–58 and p. 60.

hold that) the same person is Yajñadatta and different from Yajñadatta. But having noticed here in Mathurā (read *mathurāyām* for *madhurāyām*) a weak boy of light-brown colour and in Pāṭaliputra a stout one, of dark colour, the *astitva* “existence” (of the *ākṛti*) is decided on the basis of recognition, in this way : the object noticed by me as connected with *balatva* “boy-ness”, etc. is the same as the one (noticed as) connected with *nīlatva* “dark-coloured-ness”, etc.⁴⁰⁹ And recognition of what has not been noticed before does not occur. Certainly, a thing is noticed earlier, since it is recognized (later).

Among those who hold that for all (things), without exception, there is a separate *jāti*, there is no difference of opinion as regards the *nityatva* ‘permanence’ (of words, etc.). With this intention, this is stated.

(On) ‘ Because the *ākṛti* is *nitya*’. But that (*ākṛti*) is manifested by many *dravyas* ‘individual beings’ which are *anitya* ‘non-permanent’. This is the great contribution⁴¹⁰ of the *dravyas*.⁴¹¹

Here we note the following points :

- (1) Words stand for an *ākṛti* or *jāti* in the first place, and are used to refer to individuals through a process called *tādrūpyāpādāna*. This process consists in particularizing the *ākṛti* or *jāti* by connecting the word expressing it with words which express a *guṇa*, *kriyā* or *saṃjñā* ‘proper name’.
- (2) Identification in recognition is only possible on the assumption that some things must have remained identical in changing circumstances. This proves the existence of *ākṛti* (or *jāti*).
- (3) The illustration used to prove the existence of the *ākṛti* contains the expression *iha . . . mathurāyām* ‘here in Mathurā’. The reading *mathurāyām* is almost certainly the correct one, because this is the place-name which in the *Mbh.* is connected with Pāṭaliputra. The illustration itself is not found in the *Mbh.*, so chances are that it is not a quotation, but an

409. Thus the object which I noticed in Mathurā as :

- (1) a boy,
- (2) somewhat sickly,
- (3) of light-brown colour, is recognized by me later on and in a different place as that very same object, although the features (2) and (3) have changed.

This can only be explained, if there is something which remains identical. That entity which remains the same, even when change takes place in some respects, and which makes recognition possible, is the *ākṛti*. In the present passage, *ākṛti* may be taken in the sense of an identical general appearance or shape.

410. *Vyāpāra*, literally, ‘activity’ or ‘function’.

411. That is, only when *dravyas* are perceived, we can have the cognition of a *jāti ākṛti*.

instance taken from daily life by the author. This being so, the suggestion may be ventured that the author of the *MBD* lived in Mathurā.

74. (*Bhāṣya* : Question)

But if the word-meaning is a *dravya* ' individual thing ' , how do we form the constituent analysis ?

Note (29)

The *MBD* (p. 26, line 16–p. 27, line 1) comments on the present *Bhāṣya* as follows : ' The *dravya* " individual thing " only is expressed (by a word).⁴¹² *Gotva* " cow-hood ", etc., which are not expressed (but which) are *upādhis* " limiting factors " of (the denotation of) a word, (function as) the *pravṛttinimitta* " ground for using (a particular word in a particular meaning) ".⁴¹³ Like a *svastika*, etc. are not expressive of Devadatta's house, but function as its *upalakṣaṇa* " external feature (helpful in identifying an object) ".⁴¹⁴

And because the *dravya* is seen to be destructible, alternatively, the following constituent analysis is to be formed for this (expression under discussion), namely, *siddhe śabde arthasāmbandhe ca* " when the word and the relation with (its) meaning is permanent ".⁴¹⁵ (In the sense of) *arthena saṁbandhaḥ* " the relation with (its) meaning " (we derive) *arthasāmbandhaḥ*, sg. loc. (*arthasāmbandhe*) *nitye* " when the relation with (its) meaning is permanent ".⁴¹⁶

In this way, there is no mention of *artha* " meaning " for its own sake⁴¹⁷ in the paraphrase.⁴¹⁸ Then (as) what (has *artha* been mentioned) ? As the *upalakṣaṇa* " distinguishing feature " of *saṁbandha* " relation ". Like (the word) *nUM* has been mentioned to serve as the *upalakṣaṇa* of *anu-*

412. That is, by means of words we always refer to individual beings. See Note (22).

413. " In a particular meaning " means : with reference to a particular thing-meant.

414. Here by *upalakṣaṇa* a feature is meant which does not form part of the general denotation (reference) of the word, which is *dravya*, but which is helpful in determining the referent.

415. Read *athavā dravyasya ca vināśadarśanāt tatraiṣa vighrahaḥ kartavyaḥ* for *dravyasya ca vināśadarśanāt*. *Athavā tatraiṣa vighrahaḥ kartavyaḥ*, which does not make sense. The idea is that since a *dravya* is destructible, we cannot say *siddhe* (= *nitye*) *arthe* ' since meaning (i.e., the thing-meant) is permanent '. Therefore the constituent analysis is to be phrased as stated.

416. Read *arthena saṁbandhaḥ, arthasāmbandhaḥ, tasmin, nitye*. Here *tasmin* is indicative of the use of the sg. loc. (in *arthasāmbandhe*), whereas *nitye* renders *siddhe*, which is part of the text.

417. That is, as an independent word.

418. *Vākya*. That is, the *laukikavighrahavākya*.

svāra.⁴¹⁹ If (the statement) in phrased in this way, namely, as *siddhe śabde saṁbandhe ca* “ since the word and the relation is permanent ”, the following would also be implied, namely *śabdasya yaḥ svayākṛtyā saṁbandhaḥ, tasmin, nitye* “ the relation which a word has with its own *ākṛti*, (that *saṁbandha*), sg. loc. (*saṁbandhe*) *nitye* “ when (that) relation is permanent ”.⁴²⁰ But when mention is (made) of (the word) *artha* (as part of the cp. *arthasaṁbandha*) we understand (relation with) the *abhidheya* “ thing-meant ”.⁴²¹

(Objection :) But how could there be a permanent relation with meaning (i.e. a thing-meant) which is not permanent ? The answer is : like (in the case of) *samavāya* “ inherence ”. (That is to say,) like (the relation of) inherence is permanent, when it concerns permanent things, (and also) permanent, when it concerns permanent and non-permanent things, and (purely) non-permanent things.⁴²² In the same way, it could be here also.

Or rather, (it is not *samavāya*, but) *asūnyatā* “ non-emptiness ”, which (is the relation which) a word has with (its) meaning at all times. (That is to say,) a wordform which is completely penetrated by meaning at all times.⁴²³ Taking into account *yogyatā* ‘ fitness ’ in that respect, by way of a property of the word, (the author) has made this statement ’.⁴²⁴

419. Reference is to P.8.4.2. The *SK* on this rule says *numgrahaṇam anusvāropa-lakṣaṇārtham*, the very statement of the *MBD*. The idea is that the word *nUM* here does not mean the augment *nUM*, but the *anusvāra* which replaces *n*, by P. 8.3.24. An example quoted by the *Tattvabodhinī* on the *SK* in question is *br̥ṇhaṇam*.

420. Suppose the text just reads *siddhe śabde saṁbandhe ca*. Then, since *saṁbandha* without qualification is *nitya*, it would imply that the relation between a word and the *ākṛti* also is *nitya*. See fn. 421.

421. If the word *artha* is separately mentioned in the *vigraha* (as *siddhe arthe*), it would mean that the thing-meant is *nitya*. But, clearly things (and things-meant) are *anitya*. Therefore *artha* cannot be separately mentioned. On the other hand, mention of the word *artha* cannot be altogether omitted for the reason mentioned in fn. 420, and also because in that case we cannot prove that the relation with meaning (i. e., the thing-meant) is *nitya*, even if the meaning itself is *anitya*. Therefore, the correct *vigraha* can only be *śabde arthasaṁbandhe ca siddhe*. Here it is specified that the relation which a word has with its meaning is permanent. Now the question is, how a *nitya* relation with an *anitya* thing can be assumed.

422. The *samavāya*-relation (for an enumeration see Helārāja on *VP*. 3.3.8, ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer, 1963, p. 131, line 6) may hold between *nitya* things, like *ākāśa* and *dhvani* (= *śabda*), or between one *nitya* and one *anitya* thing, like *jāti* and *dravya*, or between two *anitya* things, like a pot and a cloth which are in contact (*saṁyoga*). The relation of *saṁyoga* inheres in both through *samavāya*.

423. The text says *aviśṭam evārtharūpeṇa śabdārūpam*. And therefore the word-form is never empty, i.e., devoid of meaning.

424. Read *śabdadharmatvena* for *śabdadharmena*. Reference is to *VP*. 3.3.31. Here, after having rejected *samavāya* as the relation between a word and its meaning, Bhartṛhari introduces the relation which he calls *yogyatā*. Thus words are assumed to be permanently fit to convey meanings, i. e., to refer to things-meant. There is no moment at which they are not.

Here we note the following points :

- (1) If *dravya* is accepted as the word-meaning, that is, if words are considered to refer to individual things only, the only function to be assigned to the *ākṛti* can be that of *pravṛtti-nimitta*. That is to say, the *ākṛti* does not form part of the reference of the word, but only helps to determine that reference.
- (2) The *dravya* = *artha* = thing-meant is impermanent. It cannot be called *siddha*. Therefore the constituent analysis of the cp. *śabdārthasambandhe* must be such that the constituent *artha* is not separately connected with *siddha*. This is achieved by taking *arthasambandha* as an instrumental tp. cp., in which *artha* functions as an *upalakṣaṇa* of *sambandha*.
- (3) As regards the nature of the permanent relation which holds between a word and its meaning, two views are proposed :
 - (i) it is like the *samavāya*-relation,
 - (ii) it is the *yogyatā*-relation. The latter view is preferred in accordance with the discussion in *VP*, 3.3.8-31.

75. (*Bhāṣya* : Answer)

As *siddhe śabde arthasambandhe ca* ' when the word and the relation with (its) meaning is *siddha* " permanent " '.⁴²⁵ (That is,) when (items) which possess meaning have a permanent relation with meanings.⁴²⁶

Kaiyaṭa

(On) *arthasambandhe*. Because in the *dravyapakṣa* ' view according to which words stand for individual objects only ' the individual object is not permanent, the word *artha* ' meaning ' has been mentioned as a qualifier of *sambandha* ' relation '. When (it is asked), how can the relation (with *artha*) be permanent, if the *artha* ' thing-meant ' is not permanent, (we answer that this) relation is characterized as *yogyatā* " fitness ".⁴²⁷ And there is nothing wrong in (assuming that) the word is permanent, because the word functions as the *āśraya* ' substratum ' of that (*yogyatā*).⁴²⁸

The *VP*. 3.3.29 says *anādir arthaiḥ śabdānām sambandho yogyatā...* " the relation of words with (their) meanings (i.e., the things-meant) is *yogyatā*, which has no beginning ". Here one aspect of the meaning of *nitya* is emphasized, namely, *anādītya* " having no (traceable) beginning ". In *samavāya* another aspect is stressed, namely, that of unchangeability.

425. The point of this *vigraha* has been explained in the *MBD*-passage translated in Note (29), and in the points noted here, sub (2).

426. That is, things-meant.

427. See fn. 424.

428. Thus the relation between a word and *yogyatā* is conceived as *āśrayāśrayibhāva*, that is, a kind of contact. Accordingly, the relation between a word and its meaning is construed as follows :

- (1) A word is related to the thing-meant by *yogyatā*. and
- (2) The *yogyatā* is related to the word as the *āśrayin* to the *āśraya*.

76. (*Bhāṣya* : *Alternative answer dealing with dravya*)

Or rather, this constituent analysis *siddhe śabde arthe sambandhe ca* 'when the word, the meaning and (their) relation is permanent'⁴²⁹ is appropriate when the word-meaning is *dravya*⁴³⁰ only. Because the *dravya* is permanent, (but) the *ākṛti* 'shape' is not.

How do you know? Because in daily life we see like this: clay connected with some shape becomes a lump. By destroying the shape of the lump, *ghaṭikās* 'small-size water-vessels' (of a particular shape) are made. By destroying the shape of the *ghaṭikās kuṇḍikās* 'small-size pots' (of different shapes) are made.

Similarly, gold connected with some shape becomes a lump. By destroying the shape of the lump, *rucakas* 'neck-laces' are made. By destroying the shape of the *rucakas, kṛtakas* 'bracelets' are made. By destroying the shape of the *kṛtakas* (ornaments in the shape of) *svastikas* are made. The lump of gold, restored again (to its original shape), connected with a different shape, becomes a pair of earrings⁴³¹ having the colour of the glowing embers of Khadira wood.

The *ākṛti* 'shape' becomes each time different, but the *dravya* 'matter' remains identical. On the destruction of *ākṛti*, the *dravya* only remains.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'Because the *dravya* is permanent'. That is to say, the meaning of the word *dravya* (here) is the *brahmatattva* 'brahman-essence' delimited by unreal *upādhis* 'imposed' limiting factors'.⁴³²

(On) *ākṛti*. (It means) *saṁsthānam* 'shape'. And in the *brahma-darśana* 'view according to which all things are identical with the *brahman*'⁴³³

429. First stated in *Bh.* No. 72, and declared correct in the *ākṛtipakṣa* in *Bh.* No. 73.

430. From the examples it will be clear that here the word *dravya* has a rather different meaning from the one used so far.

431. The example of the gold fashioned into the different, non-permanent forms of *rucakas* and of *kuṇḍalas* re-appears, but with a different point, in *VP.* 3.2.4 and 15.

432. Reference is probably to *VP.* 3.2.16 (the *parā prakṛti*, i.e., the *brahman*, is the meaning (*vācya*) of all words. Compare further Helārāja on *VP.* 3.2.1, where he says that *dravya* may be *pāramārthika* 'relating to absolute reality' (i.e., *dravya* = *brahmatattva*) or *saṁvyāvahārika* 'relating to the dealings of daily life' (i.e., *dravya* = an individual thing). Here the *brahmatattva* is the divine stuff (*dravya*) which, for reasons unknown, takes on different forms which we, in delusion, believe to be the world, including ourselves.

The *MBD* (p. 27, lines 4-5), in elucidation of the passage *dravyaṁ hi nityam*, says that the element earth (i.e., clay) is *nitya*; that the real thing (*satya*) in this element is *vikalpa* 'concept'; that the real thing in *vikalpa* is *jñāna* 'knowledge'; that the real thing in *jñāna* is *om* (for which see *VP.* 1.9-10, and the *vṛtti* on that); and that *om* is *brahman*

433. I.e., *advaitavedānta*.

a *jāti* 'genus' like *gotva* 'cow-hood' is impermanent, because it is also unreal. (This is so,) on the basis of the *śruti*-statement (which says) *ātmai-vedam sarvam* 'all this is the *ātman* only'.⁴³⁴

Note (30)

So far, the *ākṛti-dravya* contrast has been used in the context of a discussion on word-meaning. Here *ākṛti* may be taken to stand for the class and *dravya* for the particular. The present *Bhāṣya* shows that it is used with a different meaning of the word *dravya* in a different context also. It is assumed that this context was originally provided by a discussion on causation in early Sāṃkhya known to Patañjali. See further Note (31).

The examples illustrate the product-material relation, which is itself a causal relation. Here the *dravya* taken in the sense of 'material' or 'matter' is *nitya*, whereas the *ākṛti* (= *ākāra*) 'shape' is *anitya*. Shapes come and go, but the material, like clay or gold, remains.

77. (*Bhāṣya* : Alternative answer)

Also when the word-meaning is the *ākṛti*, this constituent analysis is appropriate, namely, *siddhe śabde arthe sambandhe ca* 'when the word, the meaning and (their) relation is permanent'.⁴³⁵

But you said : *ākṛtir anityā* 'the *ākṛti* is not permanent'.⁴³⁶

This is not correct. The *ākṛti* is *nitya* 'permanent'.

How (is that possible)?

By considering that, when (the *ākṛti* 'shape') has come to an end in some cases, it has not come to an end in all cases.⁴³⁷ (That is to say, because) it is perceived to reside (still) in other *dravyas* 'individual things'.⁴³⁸

Kaiyata

(On) 'when . . . has come to an end in some cases . . . not'. That is to say, (*uparata* 'come to an end' means) *anabhivyakta* 'not manifested'.⁴³⁹

434. *Chāndogya Up.* 7.25.2 (*Ānandaśramasaṃskṛtagranthāvaliḥ*, No. 14, Poona. 1934, p. 432).

435. See *Bh.* No. 72.

436. In *Bh.* No. 76.

437. The argument is, of course, fallacious. If the *ākṛti* comes to an end in some instances, the possibility of its impermanence has been proved. Therefore it cannot be said to be *nitya*. See fn. 439.

438. Here the *Bhāṣyakāra* returns to the earlier meaning of *dravya*.

439. Kaiyata's difficulty is that it is contradictory to say that the *ākṛti* has come to end in some instances, but goes on existing in other instances. Therefore he explains *uparata* as *anabhivyakta* 'not manifested' (but still present in a latent form). Here Kaiyata follows the author of the *MBD* (p. 27, lines 14-19). The argument is that when saying that the *ākṛti* is destroyed (and is produced again), the *Bhāṣyakāra* does not speak in terms of *utpatti* 'origination' and *vināśa* 'destruction', but in terms of *āvirbhāva* 'manifestation' and *tirobhāva* 'hiding'.

Because our dealings in ordinary life are not according to *advaita* (-doctrine). In our daily dealings the *ākṛti* 'shape' functions as the cause of our *parāmarśa* 'cognition' of one and the same appearance. Therefore it is permanent.⁴⁴⁰

Nāgeśa

(*Nanu paramārthadṛṣṭyā*). But from the point of view of ultimate reality everything is *anitya* 'non-permanent'. That is why (Kaiyaṭa) says ' (not) according to *advaita* (-doctrine) '.

(On) ' is permanent '. (Kaiyaṭa) means to say that the *ākṛti* is also permanent on account of its fixed character, etc., because as long as the time of our dealings in daily life lasts, we experience the cognition of one and the same shape everywhere.⁴⁴¹

78. (*Bhāṣya* : Alternative answer dealing with *nityatva*)

Or rather, the definition of *nitya* ' permanent ' is not like this : *nitya* is that which is *dhruva* ' fixed ', *kūṭastha* ' unchangeable ', *avicālin* ' immovable ', *an-apāya-upajana-vikārin* ' not subject to decrease, increase or change ', *anutpatti* ' without origination ', *avṛddhi* ' without growth ' (and) *avyayayogin* ' not connected with decay '. (Because) that also is *nitya* in which the *tattva* is not destroyed.⁴⁴²

But what is the *tattva* ? *Tattva* is *tadbhāva* ' the essential character of that '.⁴⁴³ In the *ākṛti* ' shape ' also the essential character is not destroyed.⁴⁴⁴

440. Kaiyaṭa wants to point out that there the *Bhāṣyakāra* does not speak from the point of view of ultimate, absolute reality, because in that case all is *anitya*, including *ākṛti*. In saying that the *ākṛti* is *nitya*, the *Bhāṣyakāra* takes into account the *vyāvahārika* point of view (compare fn. 343).

441. Nāgeśa says that, according to Kaiyaṭa, in view of its role in cognition, that is, in recognition, in *vyavahāra*, a limited *nityatva* must be attributed to *ākṛti*, namely, a *nityatva* which lasts as long as *vyavahāra* itself.

442. Helārāja, in his commentary on *VP*. 3.2.11, quotes this sentence from the *Bhāṣya*. The commentary refers to *Bh.* No. 77, and says that just as gold, which is the real thing, remains after the destruction of the neck-laces, etc., so also the *brahman*, which is the real thing and which is *nitya* in the absolute sense of the word, remains after the destruction, at the time of *pralaya*, of the whole of endless *vikāras* ' changes '.

The sentence quoted from the *Mbh.* is translated by K. A. Subramania Iyer (1971), p. 70, as ' That also is eternal which does not lose its identity '. The translation of *tattva* adopted here is probably based on the *MBD*. See further Note (31).

443. Reference is to P. 5.1.119, which prescribes the suffix *tva* in the sense of *tasya bhāvaḥ*. Thus *tattva* in its etymological sense means ' the state of being that ', like *aśvatva* ' the state of being a horse ', that is, the horse-state.

Paṭāñjali, in his *Bhāṣya* on *Vt.* IV on P. 5.1.119 (*Mbh.* Vol. II, p. 366, lines 23–26) says *athavā yasya guṇāntareṣv api prādurbhavatsu tattvam na vihanyate tad dravyam. Kiñ pūnas tattvam. Tadbhāvas tattvam. Tad yathā. Āmalakādīnāṃ phalānāṃ raktādayaḥ pītādayaś ca guṇāḥ prādurbhavanti āmalakaṃ badaram ity eva bhavati. Anvartanāṃ khalv api nirvacanam. Guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam iti* ' or rather, that of which the *tattva* is not des-

Kaiyaṭa

(On) 'Or rather' (etc.) Although, really speaking, it is *anitya* 'non-permanent'⁴⁴⁵ the permanence of the *jāti* 'genus'⁴⁴⁶ is established by having recourse to *vyavahāra* 'our dealings in daily life'.⁴⁴⁷

And *anityatā* 'non-permanence' is threefold :

- (1) *sāmsargānityatā* 'non-permanence due to contact', like the appearance of the colour of something else in a crystal, on account of the hiding of its own colour, when lac, etc. has been placed near it, but when the substance placed near has been removed, (the crystal re-) appears with its own colour, so there is no (question of) *pariṇāma* 'transformation',
- (2) *pariṇāmānityatā* 'impermanence due to transformation',⁴⁴⁸ like the appearance of red colour in a *badara* fruit, when the black colour has disappeared, and
- (3) *pradhvaṃsānityatā* 'impermanence due to destruction', (that is,) complete annihilation.⁴⁴⁹

In order to make us understand *nityatā* 'permanence' by way of rejecting that three-fold non-permanence, (the author) says *dhruvam*, etc. Here the *sāmsargānityatā* is rejected by (the words) *dhruva* (and) *kūṭastha*, the *pariṇāmānityatā* by (the word) *avicālin*, (and) the *pradhvaṃsānityatā* by (the words) *anapāya*, etc.

troyed even when different qualities become manifest, is the *dravya*. But what is the *tattva* ? The *tattva* is the essential character of that (whatever we refer to). For instance, in fruits like the *āmalaka* qualities like red (and) yellow become manifest, (but, still, the thing, we call *āmalaka* (or) *badara* only is there. Certainly, this is also a meaningful explanation, namely, a *dravya* is a *guṇasamūdrāva* "a grouping together of qualities". Here the *tattva* is seen as that which remains identical even when appearances change, the essential character of a thing which is the condition for our knowledge of identity.

444. And therefore the *ākṛti* may be considered *nitya*. The words *ākṛtāv api* may be interpreted in at least three ways, namely,

- (1) *ākṛtāv api padārthe* 'also when the word-meaning is the *ākṛti*' (see the opening words of *Bh.* No. 77),
- (2) *ākṛtāv api viḥanyamānāyām* 'even when the *ākṛti* is destroyed' (see the argument in *Bh.* No. 76), and
- (3) *ākṛtāv api* 'in the *ākṛti* also (just like in the *dravya* in the sense of 'material')

Here (3) is adopted, because it gives us the precise meaning, as explained in Note (31), and because it relieves us of the necessity to supply words.

445. Here Kaiyaṭa speaks from the point of view of ultimate reality. Compare fn. 440.

446. Thus Kaiyaṭa identifies the *ākṛti* with *jāti*.

447. More specifically, *vyavahāra* here means the non-philosophic way of expression used in daily communication. Compare fn. 441.

448. *Pariṇāma* also means 'ripening'.

449. The threefold division of *anityatā* is taken straight from the *MBD* (p. 28, lines 2-6). Here, instead of *pradhvaṃsānityatā* the term *vastuvinaśānityatā* 'non-permanence due to the destruction of a thing' is used.

Nāgeśa

Now (the author) in the *Bhāṣya* speaks of the *nityatva* ' permanence ' of the *ākṛti* ' shape ' , which has the form of a particular arrangement of parts (and) which manifests the *jāti* ' generic notion ' ,⁴⁵⁰ even though the origination and destruction (of the *ākṛti*) happen every time in between as long as the *vyavahāra* ' our dealings in daily life ' lasts, in a different way by (saying) ' Or rather ' (etc.).

In the definition (the word) *dhruva* itself is explained as *kūṭastha* ' unchangeable ' .⁴⁵¹ *Vicāla* (means) the taking on of another form. like milk takes on the form of curds, etc. Thereby the *pariṇāmānityatā* is rejected. Since *utpatti* ' origination ' results in *sattā* ' existence ' , the two modifications of being in the form of *janma* ' origination ' and *sattā* ' existence ' have been rejected. The third (modification of being) , in the form of *vrddhi* ' growth ' (has been rejected) by (the word) *avrddhi*. The fourth (namely,) *pariṇāma* ' transformation ' (has been rejected) by (the word) *anupajana*. The fifth (namely,) *apacaya* ' decay ' (has been rejected) by (the word) *anapāya*. The sixth (namely,) *vināśa* ' destruction ' (has been rejected) by (the word) *avyaya*.

This *nityatva*⁴⁵² concerns both the *brahman* and the things-meant which remain in one and the same form as long as *vyavahāra* ' our dealings in daily life ' lasts. (But) this is not the only meaning of the word *nitya*, because we speak of *nityatva* ' permanence ' ⁴⁵³ also of a thing which is not like that,⁴⁵⁴ in the case of non-interruption of continuity.⁴⁵⁵ That is why (the author) in the *Bhāṣya* says ' that also '.

(On) ' with regard to which the *tattva* ' (etc.). That is to say, that (thing) with regard to which, even when it has been destroyed, the *dharma* ' basic character ' residing in that, is not destroyed. This refers to the *pravāhanityatā* ' permanence in the form of a continuous flow ' .⁴⁵⁶ Even if destruction of that (*ākṛti* ' shape ' takes place), its *dharma* ' basic character ' is not destroyed, because the continuous flow which is the substratum (of the *ākṛti*) is not interrupted. This is what (the author) means to say.

450. Thus Nāgeśa says that the *ākṛti* ' shape ' consists in a particular arrangement of parts, and that it is that feature on the basis of which we form the concept of *jāti* ' class (or genus) '. The latter is what is meant by *jātivyañjaka*. In this respect Nāgeśa differs from Kaiyaṭa (see fn. 446).

451. Nāgeśa says so, because he wants to connect the enumeration of characteristics in the definition in *Bh.* No. 78 with the *bhāvavikāras* mentioned in *Nirukta* 1.2 as an opinion of Vārṣṇyaṇi. Here the *bhāvavikāras* are stated as *jāyate* ' originates ', *asti* ' exists ', *vipariṇamate* ' changes ', *vardhate* ' grows ', *apakṣīyate* ' decays ' and *vinaśyati* ' perishes '. It is difficult to connect the word *dhruva* with any of these *bhāvavikāras*.

452. Characterized by *kūṭasthatva*, etc.

453. *Nityatvavyavahārāt*. For the sense of *vyavahāra* here see fn. 447.

454. That is, not a thing which remains in one and the same form throughout *vyavahāra*.

455. *Pravāhāviccheda*.

456. Compare fn. 335.

Note (31)

The question is still of the constituent analysis of *Vt. III* (first part) *siddhe śabdārthasambandhe*. *Bh.* No. 77 says that we can have the analysis *siddhe śabde arthe sambandhe ca*, even if the *artha* is assumed to be the *ākṛti* in the sense of 'shape'. But *Bh.* No. 76 has shown by means of examples that the *ākṛti* is destructible. So it cannot be *siddha*, i.e., *nitya*. This is the difficulty.

The answer provided by *Bh.* No. 77 is that, even if shapes are destroyed somewhere, they will remain in existence elsewhere. So shapes are always there. There is not a single moment at which we can say that there are no shapes. That is why the *ākṛti* may be said to be *nitya* 'permanent'. It always continues somewhere.

Bh. No. 78 tries to improve on this answer, which is felt to be unsatisfactory, because *nityatva* implies *kūṭasthatva* 'unchangeability', etc. We will change the definition of the concept *nityatva*. We don't say that *nitya* thing are characterised by *kūṭasthatva*, etc., namely, of their form, but that they are characterised by the continuity of their *tattva*. The question is, what does *tattva* mean?

The author of the *MBD*, commenting on the passage 'Or rather, the definition of *nitya* . . . is not like this' (etc.), after having introduced the threefold division of *anīyatā*, refers to Sāṃkhya. He says (p. 28, lines 8–10) that the old definition has an undesired consequence, namely, the *anīyatā* of the *pradhāna* (i.e., the *prakṛti*, the principle of matter out of which the world evolves). The author characterizes this *pradhāna* as *vikāradharmin* 'the possessor of the property *vikāra* "change"'. As the author of the *MBD* sees it, the undesired consequence is prevented by the new definition. He then quotes (by way of *pratīka*) the *Mbh.* text in a slightly different reading from the Kielhorn version (*Mbh.* I, p. 7, line 22) as *idam api nitya-lakṣaṇam yasmins tattvaṁ na vihanīyate* 'this also is a definition of *nitya* (namely,) in which the *tattva* is not destroyed'. After this, the words *tan nityam* '(in which...) that is *nitya*' are supplied to complete the relative clause construction. This is commented on as follows: '(That is to say, whether the *ākṛti* is destroyed or not) there is an equal cause of the notion (of identity) in the form of *sa eva ayam* "this is he/it". (Here) *sa eva ayam* (refers to) the *ātman* "essential character". And the *ātmavastu* "essential character – entity" of a thing (read *vastunaḥ* for *vastunāḥ*) is indestructible, like *ghaṭatva* "pot-ness", etc.'. The argument amounts to this: the *ākṛti* 'shape' is *nitya*, because its *tattva* "essential character" is indestructible. In his comment on the next *Bhāṣya*, the author of the *MBD* (p. 28, lines 15–16) specifies that the *nīyatā* meant here is either the one assumed by Sāṃkhya for the *pradhāna*, etc., or the one assumed by the *kṣaṇikatvavādins* in the form of uninterrupted origination.

Kaiyaṭa does not comment on the word *tattva*. He explains the *nīyatva* of the *ākṛti* by identifying the latter with the *jāti* and attributing a

limited *nityatva* to it, from the Vedānta point of view. Nāgeśa does comment on the term *tattva*, which he renders as *dharma*. By *dharma* he understands the basic character of a thing which makes it what it is, and which is indestructible. Since this *dharma* (= *tattva*) is indestructible, the *ākṛti* cannot be totally annihilated either. Therefore it is *nitya*. The *nityatva* is described as *pravāhanityatā*, a flow-like continuity in which we find the change and destruction of shapes, but which, at the same time, provides the basis for the emergence of new shapes and forms which have retained something in common with the old shapes, namely, their basic character.

As stated earlier (Note (30)), the discussion started in *Bh.* No. 76 (and ending with *Bh.* No. 78) originally belongs to a non-linguistic context known to the *Bhāṣyakāra*. This context must have been provided by a discussion on causation, because the product-material relation is a variation of the cause-effect relation. The question is, which theory of causation provides the framework for the opinions stated in *Bh.* Nos. 76-78 ?

Actually, as explained by the author of the *MBD*, two theories may be considered here, the Sāṃkhya theory and that of the Buddhist *kṣaṇikatvavādin*s. Both theories have been briefly discussed in *KARA*, Note (72).

According to the *pariṇāmavāda*, that which does not exist cannot come into existence, and that which exists cannot pass out of existence. Therefore it is assumed that the effect lies hidden in the cause, in a latent, seed-like state. What we call coming into being is nothing but the manifestation of what was hidden, and what we call destruction is nothing but the concealment of what was manifest. Thus the difference between a cause and an effect is that between a thing in its latent, potential state, and the same thing in its manifest, actualized state.

This theory, if it forms the framework for *Bh.* Nos. 76-78, can be applied in two ways. It may serve to show the *nityatva* of the cause (or the material cause), but also to show the *nityatva* of the effect (or the product). The first way is applied in *Bh.* No. 76, the second in *Bh.* No. 78. Here the *ākṛti* (of the pots and the gold bangles, etc.) may be considered to be an effect. Since it may be considered to be an effect, it is *nitya*.

According to the *kṣaṇikatvavāda* 'theory of momentariness' (= *kṣaṇa-bhaṅgavāda*) as adopted by the *viññānavādin*s, what we call a 'thing' comes into being as the effect of its predecessor 'thing', it lasts for a moment only and passes out of existence the next moment as the cause of its successor 'thing'. The rapidity of the cause-effect succession gives us the impression of the continued existence of the 'thing'. In fact, what we call 'things' are mere mental concepts, in the continuous flow of the consciousness which we call mind. In this way also, the *nityatva* whether of the material or the form that is, the impression of continuity we have with regard to both, can be explained.

Thus the discussion on *ākṛti* and *dravya* and their *nityatva* may be divided into two parts. The first part (specifically *Bh.* Nos. 73–75) is based on Mīmāṃsā doctrines which because of their connection with the Veda may be regarded as the older ones. In the second part (*Bh.* Nos. 76–78) the *Bhāṣyakāra*, changing the meaning of the word *dravya*, presumably brings in a philosophical doctrine (the *satkāryavāda* as taught by Sāṃkhya, or a doctrine developed in the Buddhist *viññānavāda*) from elsewhere, because he thought that this doctrine might be helpful to throw light on the topic of discussion, namely, the *nityatva* of word-meaning. This is the type of procedure which must have earned the *Mahābhāṣya* the name of *sarveśāṃ nyāya-bījānām nibandhanam* ‘a composition of all seeds of reasonings’ (*VP.* 2.482 cd, see *ANA*, Introduction, p, xxxii, fn. 222).

79. (*Bhāṣya* : Futility of the discussion)

Or rather, what use do we derive from (saying) that this is *nitya* ‘permanent’ (and) that is *anitya* ‘non-permanent’? By considering that what (ever) is *nitya* is the word-meaning, the following constituent analysis is made : *siddhe śabde arthe sambandhe ca* ‘when the word, the meaning and (their) relation is permanent’.

Kaiyaṭa

(On) ‘what (ever) is *nitya*’. The meaning of a word is what appears in the mind.⁴⁵⁷ Whenever a word is uttered, the mind subsequently assumes the shape of the thing-meant. In this way, meaning is *nitya* ‘permanent’ due to the *pravāhanityatva* ‘permanence in the form of a continuous flow’.⁴⁵⁸

Nāgeśa

(On) ‘what (ever) is *nitya*’. That is to say, what (ever) is *nitya* ‘permanent’ among the *vyakti* ‘individual thing’, *jāti* ‘generic notion’ and *ākṛti* ‘common (i.e., generic) shape’.

(Objection :) But how can there be *nityatva* ‘permanence’ of a hare’s horn, etc., because they have no *svarūpa* ‘form of their own’? (Answer :)

457. Here Kaiyaṭa seems to refer to the *ālayaviññāna* doctrine of the *viññānavādins*. According to this school of thought, things have no existence apart from our cognition. They are, in fact, nothing but mental constructs. See S. N. DASGUPTA, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1922, p.146, ‘There is nothing which may be called external, but all is the imaginary creation of the mind...which has been accustomed to create imaginary appearances from beginningless time’, and *ibid* p. 148–49, ‘In reality there is nothing which is produced or destroyed, it is only our constructive imagination that builds up things as perceived...and ourselves as perceivers. It is simply a convention (*vyavahāra*) to speak of things as known. Whatever we designate by speech is mere speech- construction...’

458. This is consistent with the assumption that Kaiyaṭa here refers to the *ālayaviññāna* doctrine, because, according to this doctrine, the consciousness called *ālaya-viññāna* is a beginningless and endless stream of constructs. See fn. 457.

That is why (Kaiyaṭa) says ' what appears in the mind '. In the *śābdabodha*⁴⁵⁹ ' cognition arising from words ' the content is not an external object, but a mental object.⁴⁶⁰ And that is *pravāhanīya* ' permanent by way of a continuous flow '. This is what (Kaiyaṭa) means to say. And this has been discussed at length in the *Mañjūṣā*.⁴⁶¹

80. (*Bhāṣya : Introduction to Vt. III, second part*)

But how do you know that the word, (its) meaning, and (their) relation is *siddha* ' permanent ' ?

Note (32)

The logical sequence of *Vt. III*, first part, and the *Bhāṣya* with the ideal explanation would be as follows :

- (1) *Vt. III*, first part.
- (2) *Bh.* No. 61+, which explains what the *Vt.* means to say : ' when the relation between a word and its meaning has been established '.
- (3) *Bh.* No. 62+, which by way of introduction to *Vt. III*, second part, asks : ' but how do you know that (this relation has been established) '.
- (4) *Vt. III*, second part, namely, *lokataḥ* ' on account of (the usage of) people '.

Instead of *Bh.* Nos. 61+–62+, however, what we have is the sequence of *Bh.* Nos. 61–80. In this sequence the attempt is made to introduce the *Mīmāṃsā* doctrine of the *nityatva* of the word. This has two important consequences, namely, in the first place, the reinterpretation of the word *siddha* in the *Vt.*, and in the second place, the necessity of such a constituent analysis for the word *śabdārthasambandhe* in the *Vt.* that it becomes possible to connect the constituent *śabda* directly with *siddhe*. This is only possible by assuming a *dvandva* cp. construction here.

The question is, why did the *Bhāṣyakāra* take so much trouble ? The answer may be found in what L. Sarup (1920), Introduction to the *Nirukta*, p. 70, called anti-Vedic scepticism. Attacks on the position of the Veda,

459. The term *śābdabodha* is explained by the *Nyāyakośa* as *śabdāṅg jñeyamāno bodhaḥ* ' a cognition arising from a word ' (*Nyāyakośa* or Dictionary of Technical Terms of Indian Philosophy by MM. Bh. JHALAKIKAR. Revised and re-edited by MM. V. S. ABHYANKAR. *Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series*, No. XLIX, Poona, 1928, p. 873, s.v. *śābdabodhaḥ*). A *śābdabodha* arises, whether the thing-meant is a product of fantasy or not. As a cognition it has a purely mental existence.

460. I.e. *bauddha*.

461. See the *Vaiyākaraṇa-Siddhānta-Laghu-Mañjūṣā* of *Nāgēśabhaṭṭa* up to the end of the *tātparyā nirūpaṇa*. With the commentary *Ratnaprabhā* and Notes by Pr. Sabhāpati SHARMA Upādhyāya. *The Kashi Sanskrit Series* 163, Varanasi, 1973, p. 203–367.

with which the doctrine of the *nityatva* of the word is mainly concerned, have been known from early days. The names of Kautsa and of Gautama, the Buddha, are wellknown in this respect (see L. Sarup, *op. cit.*, Introduction to the *Nirukta*, p. 71-78). It may be assumed that in the *Bhāṣyakāra*'s days (that is, if we identify him with Patañjali, somewhere between 85 B.C. and 250 A.D.) the impact of Buddhist doctrines had increased to such an extent that a defence of the orthodox position regarding the Veda seemed urgent, even if it meant the re-interpretation of a *Vt.* and adding a sequence of *Bhāṣyas* containing seven alternative and not too convincing answers to the question how *siddha* can mean *nitya*. In this connection it may be noted that the *Nirukta* also mentions an opinion on the *nityatva* of words, or rather of speech. It is the opinion of Audumbarāyaṇa who says (*Nirukta* 1.1) that speech (*vacana*) is *indriyanitya*. L. Sarup in his edition of the *Nirukta* (translation, p. 6) renders the latter word as ' permanent in the organs only ', and provides several references (translation, p. 6, fn. 3).

III. (*Vārttika*, Second part : The relation between word and meaning / thing-meant is established by usage)⁴⁶².

On account of (the usage of) the people.

81. (*Bhāṣya* : Explanation)

Because, in daily life, having brought to mind different things⁴⁶³ (people) use words. They do not put in an effort to make these (words). On the other hand, they do put in an effort to make things which are *kārya* ' to be produced ' .⁴⁶⁴ For instance, one who needs a pot for some purpose,⁴⁶⁵ goes to the house of a potter and says : ' You make a pot. I need a pot for some purpose ' .⁴⁶⁶ (But)

462. Here the NSP ed. is followed, which takes *lokataḥ* as a separate (part-) *Vārttika*. This appears to be correct, because the *Bhāṣyakāra*, by his question in *Bh.* No. 80 shows that *lokataḥ* is to be connected with *Vt.* III, first part, as the reason for a statement. The Kielhorn ed. (*Mbh.* I, p. 7, line 26) takes *lokataḥ* here as part of the *Bhāṣya*, and starts the following *Vārttika*—like statement (*ibid.*, p. 8, line 5) with another word *lokataḥ*.

How the present part-*Vārttika* may be turned into a complete sentence by supplying the word *jñāyate* ' it is known ' is shown by Kaiyaṭa on *Bh.* No. 83.

463. *Artha* in the sense of thing-meant, see fn. 331.

464. *Tāvat* is taken here as a particle indicating emphasis (" do " in ' do use '). A *kārya-bhāva* here is a technical product, like a pot.

465. *Ghaṭena kāryaṁ kariṣyan* literally means ' one who wants to do a job by means of a pot ' . That is, one who needs a pot for something. The expression *kāryam* + the future of *kṛ-* + instrumental occurs in *Mbh.* p. 7, line 29, *kāryam etena kariṣvāmī*.

466. Here the MBD (p. 29, lines 2-4) has the following beautiful reflection to offer (if, at least the interpretation of *śārikṛīḍāvat* is correct, but compare *ibid.* lines 5-6, (*śukasārikākrīḍāvat*) : ' Thus, if words were produced for purposes of daily life by (grammarians) from Pāṇini onwards, like the play (-ful sound-imitations) of a Maina bird, then an uneducated person would treat able grammarians as his servants ' . That is to say, any illiterate would instruct Pāṇini and his worthy successors like so many Maina birds to produce words at command.

one who wants to use words does not go to the house of a grammarian and say : ' You make words. I want to use them '. (On the contrary,) having brought to mind (a thing), without further ado,⁴⁶⁷ he uses words.

Kaiyata

(On) ' On account of (the usage of) the people '. People behave in one way with regard to things which are *kārya* ' to be produced ' (but) in a different way with regard to things which are *nitya* ' permanent '. And communication by means of words⁴⁶⁸ is based on training in the beginning-less (unbroken) tradition of the usage of the older generation.⁴⁶⁹ That is why words, etc. are *nitya* ' permanent '.⁴⁷⁰ But pots are brought from somewhere else by people who want to use them for some purpose, and they are seen to be liable to origination and destruction. Words, etc. are not like that.

(On) *tāvatv evārtham* ' having brought to mind different things, without further ado '. That is to say, having pictured in their mind the thing (intended).⁴⁷¹

Nāgeśa

(On) ' (That is why) words are *nitya* '. That is to say, they are not produced by grammar.

(On) *tāvaty eva* ' without further ado '. That is to say, not having gone to the house of a grammarian at all.

Note (33)

In the present (part-) *Vārttika* the answer to the question put in *Bh.* No. 60 is stated. The question was about the assumptions of grammar with regard to language. *Vt.* III, as a whole, says that the relation between a word and its meaning, in the sense of the thing-meant, is established by the people who use the language, i.e., by the speech-community. The *Bhāṣya* explains that grammar does not produce words like a potter his clay products. The words are already there, ready for use. What grammar does is something different. See *VIBHA*, Introduction, sub 1.1.2, and S. D. Joshi and J. A. F. Roodbergen, " The structure of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* in Historical Perspective " in : *Proceedings of the International Seminar on Studies in the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini*, University of Poona, Pune, 1983, sub 1.1.

467. *Tāvaty eva*. For a different explanation see Kaiyata and Nāgeśa.

468. *Śabdavyavahārah*, analysed as *śabdasya vyavahārah*.

469. *Anādivyḍḍhavyavahāraparāṇparā*. Compare Kaiyata on *Bh.* No. 61.

470. And not *kārya*. Compare fn. 343.

471. Taken from the *MBD* (p. 29, line 5), *buddhau sanīkṣya* ' having viewed in his mind '.