

INTRODUCTION

THE SPHOṬA THEORY

The theory of the *sphoṭa* is one of the most important theories dealing with the central problem of semantics, general linguistics and philosophy of language. It is claimed that the origin¹ of this theory goes back to Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*² which mentions the name of Sphoṭāyana. Nāgeśa mentions in his *Sphoṭavāda*³ that the grammarian Sphoṭāyana has first propounded the theory of *sphoṭa*. However, we do not know for certain who was the first propounder of the *sphoṭa* doctrine, irrespective of the fact that Pāṇini himself mentions the name of Sphoṭāyana. The specific mention of the name of Sphoṭāyana neither sufficiently indicates that Pāṇini knew anything similar to the *sphoṭa* theory as developed by Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya*, nor does it point out that this doctrine originally belonged to the sage

1. Some scholars believe that the indirect reference to the theory of *sphoṭa* is found in the view of Audumbarāyaṇa quoted by Yāska in his *Nirukta* 1.1. Audumbarāyaṇa holds that the classification of words into four categories is impossible, because there is no separate existence of words apart from the sound-units that follow each other in quick succession. The school of Audumbarāyaṇa represents the germs of the *sphoṭa* doctrine which was developed later on by Bhartṛhari. See J. BROUGH, "Audumbarāyaṇa's theory of language", *BSOAS*, XIV, pt. I.
2. VI. i. 123: अवङ् स्फोटायनस्य । See also *Padamañjarī* under Pāṇ VI.i.123: स्फोटायनः स्फोटप्रतिपादनपरो वैयाकरणाचार्यः ।
3. *Sphoṭavāda*, p. 12:
वैयाकरणनागेशः स्फोटायनऋषेर्मतम् ।
परिष्कृत्योक्तवांस्तत्र प्रीयतां जगदीश्वरः ॥

Sphoṭāyana. At best, the word may mean a remote descendant of *Sphoṭa*.⁴

When we come to Patañjali⁵ we find the first reference to the theory of *sphoṭa*. The *sphoṭa* theory was fully developed by Bhartṛhari and the later grammarians; but some of the notions underlying this theory are found in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*. Therefore, I propose here to put together some of the ideas of Patañjali on *dhvani*, *sphoṭa* and *śabda*.

Patañjali's views on the nature of phonemes:

The search for the ultimate differentiating constituents of language can be traced back to Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*. In the *Pratyāhārāhnikā*⁶ of his *Mahābhāṣya*, Patañjali discusses the function of phonemes. First of all he raises the question whether the phonemes are meaning-bearing units or not. As a *prima-facie* argument, he puts forth the view that the phonemes are the smallest significant units in the language. Phonemes may be

4. IV. i. 99: नडादिभ्यः फक् ।

5. *Mbh.*, Vol. 1, p. 181: एवं तर्हि स्फोटः शब्दो ध्वनिः शब्दगुणः ।

ध्वनिः स्फोटश्च शब्दानां ध्वनिस्तु खलु लक्ष्यते ।

अल्पो महाश्च केषांचिदुभयं तत्स्वभावतः ॥

See also *ibid.*, p. 26: अथवोभयतः स्फोटमात्रं निर्दिश्यते । रश्नुतेलंश्चु-
तिर्भवतीति ।

6. *Ibid.*, p. 30:

वर्णव्यत्यये चार्थान्तरगमनान्मन्यामहेऽर्थवन्तो वर्णा इति । कूपः सूपः यूप
इति । .. वर्णानुपलब्धौ चानर्थगतेर्मन्यामहेऽर्थवन्तो वर्णा इति । वृक्षः
ऋक्षः । काण्डीरः आण्डीरः । ... संघातार्थवत्त्वाच्च मन्यामहेऽर्थवन्तो वर्णा
इति । येषां संघाता अर्थवन्तोऽवयवा अपि तेषामर्थवन्तः । येषां पुनरवयवा
अनर्थकाः समुदाया अपि तेषामनर्थकाः । ...

regarded as meaningful units, because the minimally distinctive words /ku:pə/ 'well', /su:pə/ 'soup', /yu:pə/ 'sacrificial post' convey different information. Since these words are distinguished from one another by their initial single phonemes only, the difference in meaning should correspond to the different phonemes in the initial position of these words. Accordingly, phonemes are meaningful, because a particular meaning is not apprehended in the absence of a particular phoneme. Thus he logically proves that, since the whole unit is meaningful, its parts (phonemes) must be meaningful. The whole derives its character from the constituents which make up the whole. Patañjali furnishes an instance to support this. If a blind person cannot see, a conclave of hundred blind persons too cannot see; if a person is endowed with sight, a collection of such hundred persons would also be endowed with such a faculty. Therefore, since the whole is meaningful, its parts also must be meaningful.

Patañjali's⁷ final answer to this question is that the verbal roots, stems, suffixes and particles consisting of a single phoneme are regarded as meaning-bearing units. But if a word consists of more than one phoneme, meaning is not apprehended from each phoneme separately. Patañjali no doubt admits that the words *hūpa*, *sūpa* and *yūpa* are distinguished from one another by their initial single phoneme; nevertheless, the meaning is

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32: अनर्थकास्तु वर्णाः । कुतः प्रतिवर्णमर्थानुपलब्धेः । न हि प्रतिवर्णमर्था उपलभ्यन्ते । ... वर्णव्यत्ययापायोपजनविकारेष्वर्थदशानामन्यामहेऽनर्थका वर्णा इति । ... संघातान्तराण्येवैतान्येवंजातीयकान्यर्थान्तरेषु वर्तन्ते । कूपः सूपः यूप इति । यदि हि वर्णव्यत्ययकृतमर्थान्तरगमनं स्याद् भूयिष्ठः कूपार्थः सूपा स्यात् ... । इदं खल्वपि भवता वर्णानामर्थवत्तां ब्रुवता साधीयोऽनर्थकत्वं द्योतितम् । यो हि मन्यते यः कूपे कूपार्थः स ककारस्य यः सूपा सूपार्थः स सकारस्य यो यूपे यूपार्थः स यकारस्येत्यूप-शब्दस्तस्यानर्थकः स्यात् ।

neither cognized through the distinctive phonemes /k/ /s/ and /y/ in /ku:pə/ /su:pə/ and /yu:pə/ respectively, nor is it conveyed by the identical segment /u:pə/.

Patañjali maintains that the significance of phonemes lies in differentiating one word from another; but, according to him, the differentiating unit is not necessarily the significant unit. His view is that the isolated phonemes are not directly connected with meaning. As far as the meaning is concerned, the words are indivisible into phonemes. Therefore, Patañjali thinks that it is necessary to postulate a single entity (*saṃghāta*) as the meaning-bearing unit. To put it differently, the word as a whole, unconnected with the isolated phonemes, conveys meaning. The whole has its purposive activity which cannot necessarily be correlated to its parts. The whole⁸ should be looked upon as a unit different from its parts, from the standpoint of function or purpose and should not be necessarily considered as belonging to the collection of parts. Patañjali presents an analogy to prove his theory: The parts of a chariot, when disconnected from a structural whole, are incapable of moving, while a chariot as a whole is capable of doing so.

It is interesting to note here that Patañjali keeps the two levels of the language apart. Accordingly, the function of the language at the sound level is to differentiate one significant unit from another. The function of the language at the word level is to signify meaning. The later grammarians identify the significative level of the language with the *sphoṭa* concept. They hold the view that the *sphoṭa* is the single meaning-bearing entity—either word or sentence. Patañjali does not identify

8. *Ibid.*, p. 220: इमे पुनर्वर्णा अत्यन्तायैवानर्थकाः । यथा तर्हि रथाङ्गानि विहृतानि प्रत्येकं व्रजिक्रियां प्रत्यसमर्थानि भवन्ति तत्समुदायश्च रथः समर्थ एवमेषां वर्णानां समुदाया अर्थवन्तोऽवयवा अनर्थका इति ॥

sphoṭa with the meaning-bearing nature of language. When Patañjali says: '*saṁghāta* is one and indivisible', he means to say that it cannot be divided into phonemes as far as the meaning is to be conveyed. In other words, a word undivided into phonemes conveys meaning. When the later grammarians say, 'the word is indivisible', they mean that it cannot be divided into a sequence of either morphemes or phonemes. In their opinion the theory of the *akṣhaṇḍapadasphoṭa*: 'indivisible word-sphoṭa' abolishes the hierarchy of linguistic units and reduces them to a single indivisible unit.

Patañjali's views on the identification and isolation of morphemes:

The problem of isolation of the morphemes is also discussed by Kātyāyana and Patañjali.⁹ In his commentary on the rules I. ii.45 and I.iii.1, Patañjali presents the procedure for the identification and isolation of the morphemes. For this purpose he furnishes the two sets of pairs *pacali* and *paṭhali*, *vr̥kṣaḥ* and *vr̥kṣau*.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 219: अर्थवत्ता नोपपद्यते वृक्षशब्दस्य । किं कारणम् । केवलेन अवचनात् । न केवलेन वृक्षशब्देनार्थो गम्यते । केन तर्हि । सप्रत्ययकेन ।... सिद्धमेतत् । कथम् । अन्वयाद्व्यतिरेकाच्च । कोऽसावन्वयो व्यतिरेको वा । इह वृक्ष इत्युक्ते कश्चिच्छब्दः श्रूयते । वृक्षशब्दोऽकारान्तः सकारश्च प्रत्ययः । अर्थोऽपि कश्चिद् गम्यते मूलस्कन्धफलपलाशवानेकत्वं च । वृक्षावित्युक्ते कश्चिच्छब्दो हीयते कश्चिदुपजायते कश्चिदन्वयी । सकारो हीयत औकार उपजायते वृक्षशब्दोऽकारान्तोऽन्वयी । अर्थोऽपि कश्चिद्धीयते कश्चिदुपजायते कश्चिदन्वयी । एकत्वं हीयते द्वित्वमुपजायते मूलस्कन्धफलपलाशवानन्वयी । ते मन्यामहे यः शब्दो हीयते तस्यासावर्थो योऽर्थो हीयते यः शब्द उपजायते तस्यासावर्थो योऽर्थ उपजायते यः शब्दोऽन्वयी तस्यासावर्थो योऽर्थोऽन्वयी । See also *ibid.*, p. 255.

Forms	Meaning
1. (pacati)	He cooks (softening, agent, singularity).
2. (paṭhati)	He reads (reading, agent, singularity).
3. (vṛkṣaḥ)	A tree (an object bearing roots, branches, fruits and leaves; singularity).
4. (vṛkṣau)	Two trees (an object, bearing roots, branches, fruits and leaves; duality).

In the first pair, the comparison of items 1 and 2 reveals one contrast in expression: /pac-/ : /paṭh-/, and one in meaning: 'softening': 'reading'. In the second pair, the comparison of items 3 and 4 reveals one contrast in expression /-ḥ/ : /-au/, and one in meaning, 'singularity': 'duality'. The first pair constitutes one common phonetic element *-ati*, and common meaning 'doer of action' and 'singularity'. The second pair constitutes the common phonetic element *vṛkṣa-*, with the common meaning 'tree'. Patañjali states the two principles which would determine the isolation and identification of morphemes:

- (i) The common meaning should correspond to the common phonetic element, and
- (ii) The difference in meaning should correspond to the difference in phonetic element.

The first is called *anvaya* (agreement) and the second is called *vyatireka* (contrast). For the identification of morphemes, he gives the principle of *anvaya* (agreement in phonetic shape and meaning). Further, his statements suggest that the process, by which isolation and identification of morphemes can be accomplished, is the comparison of different forms which are constituted by recurring partials and distinct phonetic elements having a common and different meaning respectively.

In the passage of the *Mahābhāṣya* (Vol. 1, pp. 30-31) which has been already referred to in the earlier section, Patañjali considers phonemes to be the smallest differentiating units, but when they are isolated from the finished word, they have no meaning.

In the passage under discussion he shows that, although the finished word is used for the purposes of communication, it will be possible to assign some meaning to the suffix and stem by the process of contrast and agreement. Thus, while phonemes cannot be correlated directly with the meaning denoted by the finished form, morphemes can be said to have a direct connection with the meaning conveyed by the finished form. This view of Patañjali is analogous to the theory of the *varṇasphoṭa* developed by later grammarians. Since, according to them, the term *sphoṭa* necessarily refers to the significant unit, they tried to interpret the term *varṇasphoṭa* to mean the smallest meaningful units like stems, roots and suffixes. Originally the term stands for the smallest differentiating units rather than meaningful ones. To Patañjali the term *sphoṭa* need not necessarily involve consideration of meaning. He has used the term *sphoṭa* (probably "heard sound") strictly to point out its relation with *dhvani* ("spoken sound"). Another noteworthy point in Patañjali's discussion is that he does not abandon the hierarchy of linguistic units and reduce them to single indivisible units. Subsequently, the upholders of the theories of *aḥaṇḍapadasphoṭa*: 'indivisible word-*sphoṭa*' and *aḥaṇḍavākya-sphoṭa*: 'indivisible sentence-*sphoṭa*' maintain that the listener is not concerned with the hierarchical structure of language at the time of communication. Patañjali has not said anything similar to this. But his argument has been that the significative unit cannot be dissolved into the smallest constituents of language i.e. phonemes. It deserves to be noted in this connection that, while discussing the meaning-bearing aspect of grammatical units, Patañjali has never used

the term *sphoṭa*, which has become the subject of hair-splitting discussion in the galaxy of later grammarians.

Patañjali's views on the nature of śabda (word):

The introductory chapter of the *Mahābhāṣya* deals with the definition of *śabda*. Patañjali¹⁰ furnishes us with two alternative definitions of the term *śabda*. The first definition tells us that the term *śabda*: 'word' stands for a meaningful segment. According to the second definition, any meaningful or meaningless sound is designated as *śabda*. Patañjali says, when the word *gauḥ* is uttered, the following concepts come before the listener's mind: 'the individual cow having a dewlap, a tail, a hump, hooves and horns, her action, her colour, her form, besides the phonetic shape *g-au-h*'. Accordingly, it becomes difficult to ascertain what exactly is denoted by the term 'word'. Patañjali finally says: 'that is word which, when uttered, brings us the knowledge of the object possessing a dewlap, a tail, a hump, hooves and horns'. He knows the two-sidedness of word. One side represents 'sound' and the other 'content'. When a word is uttered, its sound is heard and its meaning is apprehended. Therefore, he defines word as a 'meaningful sound'.

Then he proceeds to contrast this sense of *śabda* with another sense of *śabda*, which is accepted by a layman. He says that

10. *Ibid.*, p. 1: अथ गौरियत्र कः शब्दः । किं यत्तत्सास्नालाङ्गूलककुद-
खुरविषाभ्यर्थरूपं स शब्दः । नेयाह द्रव्यं नाम तत् । ... कस्तर्हि शब्दः ।
येनोच्चारितेन सास्नालाङ्गूलककुदखुरविषाणिनां संप्रत्ययो भवति स शब्दः ।
अथवा प्रतीतपदार्थको लोके ध्वनिः शब्द इत्युच्यते । तद्यथा । शब्दं कुरु ।
शब्दं मा कार्षीः । शब्दकार्यं माणवक इति ध्वनिं कुर्वन्नेवमुच्यते । तस्माद्
ध्वनिः शब्दः ।

dhvani: 'sound' is a popular¹¹ term, and sound is designated as *śabda*: 'word.' According to the second definition, any phonetic sequence is considered to be a word which need not necessarily convey any meaning. This definition points out that the name 'word' is given to the articulate sound.

The purpose behind Patañjali's reading the alternative definition lies in the fact that the grammatical rules operate with two kinds of words. Some rules operate with meaningful segments, while the rules of euphonic combination etc. take into account purely the sound elements. Thus, in the modern terminology, the first definition lays emphasis on the morphemic character of a word, whereas the second emphasises the phonetic character of word. According to the commentators¹² of the *Mahābhāṣya*, the first definition refers to the *sphoṭa* word, while in the second definition, the *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* aspects are regarded as non-different. The commentators try to read in Patañjali's statement the theories developed later on the *sphoṭa* word. This makes

11. The commentators on the *Mahābhāṣya* interpret the word *pratītapadārthaḥ* in the second definition differently. According to them, the sound, which conveys a sense, is called a word. They maintain that both the definitions refer to the meaning-conveyor sound. But in such interpretation, the contrast between the two alternative definitions is not clearly brought out. Moreover, my interpretation is supported by the comparative study of the word *pratītapadārthaḥ* which is used thrice by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya*. For details, see S. D. JOSHI, "A definition of a word, an Interpretation", *BDCRI*, Vol. XXV, pp. 65-70.
12. *Pradīpa* on the *Mahābhāṣya* (quoted in the footnote number 10): अथवेति । अन्यत्र ध्वनिस्फोटयोर्भेदो व्यवस्थापितत्वादिहाभेदेन व्यवहारेऽपि न दोषः, 'द्रव्यादयो न शब्दशब्दवाच्या' इत्यत्र तात्पर्यात् ।

them think that the first definition refers to the meaningful word i.e. *sphoṭa* word. Patañjali has never used the term *sphoṭa*¹³ to refer to a single indivisible meaning-bearing unit. The term *sphoṭa* as used by Patañjali always stands for the structure of expression which may or may not have meaning. The idea that the meaning-bearing word is the *sphoṭa* is not implicitly or explicitly stated by Patañjali, although such a concept has occurred to later theorists.

Patañjali¹⁴ makes another important statement about the nature of *śabda*. He says *śabda* is what is perceived by the auditory organs, grasped through intellect, revealed by the sounds pertaining to the region of the sky. By these three phrases, Patañjali gives an adequate description of the process of communication. Firstly, sound is revealed by the articulatory process; secondly, it is received by the listener's ear and finally the auditory perception of the sound is translated into thought. It is a characteristic feature of Indian thinkers, that language, according to them, is primarily to be looked upon as an auditory system. It is used to communicate our thoughts to listeners, and accordingly, the perception of sounds by the listener's ear plays a very important role in the process of communication. By the term *buddhinirgrāhyaḥ*: 'grasped by the intellect', Patañjali indicates that word is a mental or psychical entity. The phrase *prayogeṇa abhijvalitaḥ*: 'revealed by the sounds' refers to the *sphoṭa* aspect of word. The term *śrotopalabdhiḥ*: 'perceived auditorily' stands for the sound which passes from the speaker to the listener. Patañjali points out that *śabda*, in its *sphoṭa* aspect, represents the auditory image of sound revealed by the

13. K. KUNJUNNI RAJA, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, p. 103.

14. *Mbh.* Vol. 1, p. 18: श्रोत्रोपलब्धिर्बुद्धिनिर्ग्राह्यः प्रयोगेणाभिज्वलितः
आकाशदेशः शब्द एकं च पुनराकाशम् ।

articulatory movements. Thus, he has used the term *śabda* in different contexts to represent different aspects of words. The first definition emphasises the significative aspect of word, the second the articulatory aspect and the third statement speaks of the word as the sound-image auditorily perceived. The term *śabda* stands as a common name for these three aspects.

Patañjali's views on the succession of phonemes:

It has been already pointed out that Patañjali postulates a single entity (*saṃghāta*) as the meaning-bearing unit. He contends that the word as a whole, unconnected with the isolation of phonemes, conveys meaning. That is to say, the whole denotes a meaning without reference to its parts (phonemes). This view appears to run on parallel lines with the view maintained by the later grammarians who assume that the *sphoṭa* word is an indivisible meaning-bearing unit. They express the view that the meaning apprehended from a word cannot be derived from individual phonemes taken singly, because in that case remaining phonemes would be meaningless. It cannot be derived either from a combination of phonemes because one cannot account for the simultaneity of phonemes which are liable to destruction as soon as they are uttered. The later grammarians say that there cannot be the combination of what is non-existent with what is existent. Thus, the *sphoṭavādin* maintains that the sequence of phonemes is an impossibility. Since the unitary perception of word cannot be explained with reference to the sequence of phonemes, they postulate a single indivisible entity *sphoṭa* as a meaning-conveyer word. However, Patañjali's reason for accepting the whole as a single entity does not stem forth from the unaccountability of the sequence of phonemes.

Patañjali¹⁵ on the rule 1.4.109 argues that the vocal organs do not produce the phonemes simultaneously. The simultaneity of phonemes is impossible on account of their transient character. Accordingly, there cannot be a single moment which may comprise of all the phonemes uttered together. As a solution of this problem, Patañjali says, the unity of words exists only in our mind. In this conceptual word we have the notion of succession of phonemes. The sequence of phonemes is to be understood as a mental one. In other words, although phonemes cannot be uttered together at a single moment, their conceptual simultaneity can exist in the mind of the speaker and the listener. In short, Patañjali does not find any difficulty in maintaining the notion of sequence of phonemes which, as a whole, conveys meaning. The simultaneous cognition of phonemes that exists in the mind explains the unitary notion of word which conveys meaning. But this quality of meaning-bearing nature belongs to the whole, and cannot necessarily be correlated with its parts separately. To put it differently, the conceptual sequence of phonemes can be viewed in its entirety as a single unit which he calls by the term *saṃghāta*. Consequently, Patañjali admits the three propositions: (i) *saṃghāta* is divisible into phonemes structurally, (ii) the sequence of phonemes can exist in our

15. *Ibid.*, p. 356: पौर्वापर्यमकालव्यपेक्षं संहिता चेत्पूर्वापराभावात्संहितासंज्ञा न प्राप्नोति । न हि वर्णानां पौर्वापर्यमस्ति । किं कारणम् । .. एकैक-वर्णवर्तिनी वाक् । न द्वौ युगपदुच्चारयति । गौरिति यावद् गकारे वाग्वर्तते नौकारे न विसर्जनीये । यावदौकारे न गकारे न विसर्जनीये । यावद् विसर्जनीये न गकारे नौकारे । उच्चरितप्रध्वंसित्वात् । उच्चरितप्रध्वंसिनः खल्वपि वर्णाः । उच्चरितः प्रध्वस्तः । अथापरः प्रयुज्यते न वर्णो वर्णस्य सहायः । एवं तर्हि बुद्धिविषयमेव शब्दानां पौर्वापर्यम् । इह य एष मनुष्यः प्रेक्षापूर्वकारी भवति स पश्यत्यस्मिन्नर्थेऽयं शब्दः प्रयोक्तव्योऽस्मिन्तावच्छब्देऽयं तावद्वर्णस्ततोऽयं ततोऽयम् ।

mind and it forms the *saṁghāta*, and (iii) the meaning-bearing nature of *saṁghāta* cannot be assigned individually to each phoneme.

This is, however, not admitted by the later grammarians. Unaccountability of the succession of phonemes is the main argument that is used by them to establish the entity of *sphoṭa*. From Patañjali's point of view, the phonemes as differentiating units are structurally parts of the *saṁghāta*, although they are bereft of the significative function of *saṁghāta*. The later grammarians assume that the *sphoṭa* word is revealed through the phonemes, but it has no structural connection either with the isolated phonemes or with a series thereof.

Patañjali's views on sphoṭa and dhvani:

Patañjali,¹⁶ while explaining the rules 1.1.70 and 8. 2. 18, directly refers to the word *sphoṭa*. Here he describes the relation

16. *Ibid.*, p. 181: सिद्धमेतत् । कथम् अवस्थिता वर्णा द्रुतमध्यमविलम्बितासु ।
किंकृतस्तर्हि वृत्तिविशेषः । वक्तुश्चिराच्चिरवचनाद्वृत्तयो विशिष्यन्ते । वक्ता
कश्चिदाश्वभिधायी भवति । आशु वर्णानभिधत्ते । कश्चिच्चिरेण कश्चि-
च्चिरतरेण । तद् यथा । तमेवाध्वानं कश्चिदाशु गच्छति कश्चित् चिरेण
गच्छति कश्चिच्चिरतरेण गच्छति । रथिक आशु गच्छति आश्विकश्चिरेण
पदानिश्चिरतरेण । विषम उपन्यासः । अधिकरणमत्राध्वा व्रजतिक्रियायाः ।
तत्रायुक्तमधिकरणस्य वृद्धिह्लासो स्याताम् । एवं तर्हि स्फोटः शब्दो ध्वनिः
शब्दगुणः । कथम् । भेर्याघातवत् । तद्यथा भेर्याघातः । भेरीमाहृत्य
कश्चिद्विशति पदानि गच्छति कश्चित् त्रिशत् कश्चित् चत्वारिंशत् ।
स्फोटश्च तावानेव भवति ध्वनिकृता वृद्धिः ।

ध्वनिः स्फोटश्च शब्दानां ध्वनिस्तु खलु लक्ष्यते ।

अल्पो महाश्च केषांचिदुभयं तत्स्वभावतः ॥

The meaning of the passage is not clear. According to Kaiyaṭa the passage means: 'when a drum is struck, (while

(No. 16 Foot Note Contd. on page 14)

(No. 16 Foot Note Contd. from page 13)

hearing the sound of it) one travels twenty feet, another thirty feet, and still another forty feet'. Nāgeśa interprets Kaiyaṭa to mean, 'when a drum is struck, (while hearing the reverberation of it) one (drum-beater) travels twenty feet, another thirty feet, and still another forty feet'. Accordingly, Nāgeśa interprets the passage to mean that the sound produced by the drum and stick remains of the same duration but increase and decrease in the steps is caused by the reverberation of sound, because it differs from drum to drum. To put it differently, although the initial sound is the same in all cases, still reverberation causes difference in it. That is to say, reverberation of sound lasts for a shorter or a longer period in the case of different drums and it causes the repeated perception of the original sound. The term *sphoṭa* stands for the initial sound (*prākṛta-dhvani*) of the drum while the term *dhvani* stands for the reverberation of initial sound. This reverberation is called *dhvani*, and it is responsible for the increase or decrease in lengths. See Prof. IYER's Article, "Bhartṛhari on *dhvani*", *ABORI*, Vol. XLVI, p. 50. Also Prof. BROUGH, "Theories of general linguistics", *TPS*, 1951, p. 35. BROUGH understands the passage to mean 'when a drum is struck, one drum-beat travels twenty feet, another thirty feet, (still) another forty feet'. The *sphoṭa* (beating) remains the same, but increase in steps is caused by the sound (produced by beatings). If we follow Nāgeśa's interpretation, 'increase and decrease in steps' might have its cause in fast or slow walking of different persons. Accordingly, Patañjali's statement *dhvaniḥkṛtā vṛddhiḥ*: 'increase is caused by sound (i.e. *dhvani* = reverberation)' would not solely be justified, because even if the duration of reverberation remains the same, difference in steps can be justified by slow or fast walking of different persons. Context permits only BROUGH's interpretation, although it cannot be strictly supported by grammar. Grammatically the subject of *āhatya*: 'having beaten the drum' and that of *gacchati* must be the same.

between the two aspects of word: *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*. According to him, the *sphoṭa* aspect of word, which is suddenly revealed to the listener's ear, is quite different from *dhvani* which refers to the distinctive or non-distinctive sound-elements uttered by the different speakers in varied tones, pitches etc. From Patañjali's statements, it seems to me that the term *sphoṭa* refers to the *constant element* in the auditory image of the varied articulated sounds, whereas the term *dhvani* refers to the *physical articulated sound* which is associated with length, tempos and various peculiarities of the individual speaker. The speech-properties belonging to the individual speakers are regarded as non-distinctive from the point of view of the perception of the *sphoṭa*. Patañjali says that phonemes are fixed (*avasthitāḥ varṇāḥ*) and tempos or intonation depend on the speech-habits of the speaker. The distinction between the *sphoṭa* aspect and *dhvani* aspect of a word is analogous to the distinction between the phonematic and the phonetic patterns of word. Patañjali, while explaining the rule 1.1.70, says that the nature of phonemes is not affected by a rapid, medium or a slow mode of pronunciation. Here he brings in, in order to explain these aspects, the analogy of the drum-beat. When a drummer strikes his drum, the *dhvani* (i.e. the drum-beat) may last long, so as to travel twenty, thirty or even forty steps, but *sphoṭa* remains precisely the same; the increase and decrease in the steps is caused by the difference in the duration of *dhvani*.

In another context, Patañjali¹⁷ has used the term *sphoṭa* to denote the phonetic species of the phonetically different sounds. Accordingly, he interprets the rule *ḥṛpo ro laḥ* (VIII.ii.18) to mean that the *ra-sphoṭa* (i.e. phonetic species of *r*-sounds) is replaced by the *la-sphoṭa* (i.e. phonetic species of *l*-sounds).

17. *Ibid.*, p. 26: अथवोभयतः स्फोटमात्रं निर्दिश्यते । रश्चतेलं श्रुतिर्भवतीति ।

Thus, we substitute *l*-sound for *r*-sound (*karpate*=*kalpate*), and the vocalic *l̥* for the vocalic *r̥*, because in the rule the phoneme *r* refers only to phonetic species of *r*-sounds. Here it should be noted that, according to Patañjali, the two sounds, consonantal *r* and the *r*-element in the vocalic *r̥*, which may not be phonemically distinguishable, belong to the single *sphoṭa*. In the example quoted earlier, also, the difference in duration caused by the rapid, medium and slow pronunciation of the speakers is non-phonemic.

Yet, which of these phonetic variations of particular sounds are regarded as non-discriminating in the *sphoṭa* (phonemic) perception of sounds, is not clearly brought out by Patañjali. He does not furnish the necessary conditions under which two sounds are regarded as distinctive and under which they are not. For the non-distinctiveness of phonetically different sounds, he states one condition: 'If a sound is uttered in rapid, medium and slow modes of pronunciation, its *sphoṭa* perception remains the same'.

Briefly stated, Patañjali's opinion is that the term *sphoṭa* is somewhat analogous either to the phonematic pattern of sounds or the phonetic species of sounds. Kaiyaṭa,¹⁸ the famous commentator on the *Mahābhāṣya*, in fact, agrees with the latter view. Patañjali's notion of *sphoṭa* cannot be reduced precisely to modern linguistic terminology. Nor could we simplify his procedure.

It emerges from this, that Patañjali in all probability might have approached the problem of phonemics by a different method which is presented in different conditions. It can only

18. *Pradīpa on Mbh. under Śivasūtras* ' 3-4: जातिस्फोट इत्यर्थः । ततश्चान्तर्भूतानन्तर्भूतरेफलकारव्यङ्ग्य सामान्यं स्थान्यादेशभावेनाश्रीयते ।

be said that, according to Patañjali, the term *dhvani* refers to the articulate sound which differs in phonetic value with reference to the variation in the utterance of different speakers. The term *sphoṭa*, on the other hand, stands for a type sound whose limits of non-distinctiveness are not precisely defined.

While commenting on the rule 1.1.1. Kātyāyana says: 'if the sound *t* is not added to the vowel *ā*, *ā* will not represent all its varieties with different accents and qualities etc., because the qualities render the phonemes distinctive'. Patañjali exemplifies this by saying that in the Vedic recitation, if a pupil utters a vowel with different accents, the instructor slaps him on his face for the mispronunciation. This shows that accents are distinctive.

But in the descriptive system of Pāṇinian grammar, the accent, nasalization etc. do not render the vowel distinctive as far as the application of this system is concerned. The procedure, followed by the descriptive system of grammar, purely takes into account the phonological behaviour of phonemes for the application of grammatical rules. All the different phonemic entities *ā*, *ā'*, *ā̃*, *ā̃'*, *ā̃̄*, *ā̃̄'* fall into a single class *āt*, where the *t* indicates the non-distinctiveness of the members in the class. The descriptive procedure of Pāṇini does not examine the types of contrasts which exist in the language, but examines whether the distinctive feature is significant for grammatical analysis or not.

With regard to the phonemic system of language the grammarians admitted the phonetic difference in the varieties of vowels and consonants. But for the grammatical description of language all of them are not necessarily relevant. Thus, the task of specifying the distinctive and non-distinctive features of phonemes is intended as a mere technical aid for describing a

language. With this in my mind, I made the statement that Patañjali has approached the problems of phonemics by a different method. The term *sphoṭa* is not used by Patañjali primarily with reference to the non-distinctiveness of phonemes that exists in the language system, but it is restricted to the same class of varied spoken sounds, whose distinctiveness may not be grasped by the listener. This is suggested by his phrase *ra-śrutir la-śrutir bhavati*. In other words, according to Patañjali, the distinction between the consonantal *r* and the *r*-element in the vocalic *ṛ* is not perceived auditorily and it is not relevant for grammatical analysis.

Thus the following points emerge out of the *Bhāṣya* discussion:

- i) Patañjali's conception of the indivisibility of wholes is quite different from the later-developed notion of the indivisibility of the *sphoṭa* word. He assumes that a *saṃghāta* is endowed with proper meaning, and it can be dissolved into smaller semantic units in the form of stem and suffixes. These semantic units can be further divided into ultimate differentiating constituents i.e. phonemes, which are the ultimate constituents of language. The phonemes are not necessarily endowed with a proper meaning. While establishing the meaningfulness of *saṃghāta* and non-meaning-bearing nature of phonemes, he has not relied for support on the *sphoṭa theory*.
- ii) Patañjali distinguishes between the three different approaches from which speech-utterance may be studied: (1) *arthasaṃpratyāyakaḥ śabdaḥ*: 'meaningful word', (2) *dhvani*: 'articulate sound' and (3) *sphoṭaśabdaḥ*: 'an auditory impression of sounds grasped through intellect'. The first is essentially the same as the morpheme or morphemic-sequence. The second is the articulate sound which gives rise to the impression of the *sphoṭa* in the listener's mind. The abstract sound-image which

disregards the furtive elements in the phonetic features of sounds is called *sphoṭa*.

iii) Patañjali is consistent in maintaining the terminological distinction between the *dhvani* and the *sphoṭa* aspects of words. According to him, the phoneme (*varṇa*)¹⁹ is the *sphoṭa* which remains the same in all the different modes of utterances. The term *dhvani*²⁰ is used to denote speech-sound, which is associated with all distinctions in the modes of utterances and individual peculiarities. It manifests the *sphoṭa*. The difference in the speeds of utterance does not affect the *sphoṭa*, but it is felt to be associated with it, due to the difference in the sounds which manifest the *sphoṭa*.

iv) The word *śabda*²¹, as used by Patañjali, may stand either for *dhvani* or *sphoṭa* on the one hand, or for the meaning-bearing word (*saṃghāta*) on the other. While his term *śabda* is common to all these three, the terms *dhvani*, *sphoṭa* and the meaningful *saṃghāta* are not interchangeable. His term *sphoṭa* stands in much more intimate relation with the term *dhvani* than with the *arthasaṃpratyāyakaśabda*. There seems to be no natural inherent

19. I have used the term phoneme for the *varṇa* or *sphoṭa* in its loose sense. Exactly there is no parallel term in western linguistics for the *sphoṭa* or *varṇa* notions of the old Vaiyākaraṇas.

20. Nāgeśa has interpreted the *Bhāṣya* - passage somewhat differently. To him *sphoṭa* is the original sound and *dhvani* is a kind of reverberation of the original sound. The original sound (*sphoṭa*) is perceived in shorter or longer time owing to the differences in its reverberations. This explanation is based on the *prākṛtadhvani* and *vaiṣṭadhvani* concepts developed by Bhartṛhari and his commentators. This distinction is nowhere mentioned by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya*. See Prof. IYER's article, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

21. See footnotes 5-10.

relation between the *sphoṭa* and the meaningful *saṁghāta*. The significant unit, when revealed to the listener's ear, may be referred to by the term *sphoṭa* not because it is significant, but because it is auditorily perceived, and it is revealed by the spoken sounds.

We are not sure to which degree Patañjali's conception of *sphoṭa* or *varṇa* is similar to the modern conception of phoneme or the phonemic pattern. He states that the *r*-element in the vocalic *r* and consonantal *r* are not distinguished in the *sphoṭa* aspect of word. He also states that the slow and fast pronunciations do not render the phoneme distinctive. All these are stray hints. They do not sufficiently indicate under what conditions two phonetically distinctive sounds are united under the same *varṇa* or *sphoṭa*. From his statements it is only implied that Patañjali's conception of *sphoṭa* or *varṇa* is somewhat similar to the conception of modern phoneme or phonemic pattern of word. But Patañjali never shows implicitly or explicitly any relation between the *sphoṭa* and the single indivisible meaning-bearing word, as it is maintained by the later grammarians.

Bhartṛhari's views on dhvani and sphoṭa:

When we come to Bhartṛhari, we find that he presents the various views on the nature of *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* in the words *kecit* and *apare* etc. He holds the view that the *sphoṭa*²² is manifested by the sound which is produced by the conjunction of the vocal organs with the points of articulation. In one of the

22. *VP*, 1.97:

ग्रहणग्राह्योः सिद्धा योग्यता नियता यथा ।

अप्यङ्गव्यञ्जकभावेन तथैव स्फोटनादयोः ॥

*kārikās*²³. he says that *sphoṭa* is devoid of temporal distinctions. The *sphoṭa* is not short,²³ long or prolated. This distinction belongs in reality to the manifesting sounds, but it is falsely attributed to the manifested *sphoṭa* with which sounds are perceived as identical. Arguing on the same line, he states that the *sphoṭa* does not involve the differences in the speed of utterance (*vr̥ttibheda*). The sound spoken by the speaker and heard by the listener, is associated with the various differences in intonation, tempos, pitch etc., but the manifested sound is devoid of all these qualities.

While commenting on the verses²³ 75-77 of the first *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākya-padīya*, Harivṛṣabha²⁴ says that the sound is of two kinds: primary (*prākṛtadhvani*) and secondary (*vaiṣṛtadhvani*)²⁵. That sound is primary which causes the perception of the *sphoṭa* and without which the form of the *sphoṭa* remains

23. *Ibid.*, 1.75-77:

स्फोटस्याभिन्नकालस्य ध्वनिकालानुपातिनः ।
ग्रहणोपाधिभेदेन वृत्तिभेदं प्रचक्षते ॥
स्वभावभेदान्नित्यत्वे ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतादिषु ।
प्राकृतस्य ध्वनेः कालः शब्दस्येत्युपचर्यते ॥
शब्दस्योर्ध्वमभिव्यक्तेर्वृत्तिभेदं तु वैकृताः ।
ध्वनयः समुपोहन्ते स्फोटात्मा तैर्न भिद्यते ॥

24. Harivṛṣabha's *Vṛtti* on *VP*. 1.76 (quoted by IYER, *op. cit.*, p. 52): ध्वनिस्फोटयोः पृथक्त्वेनानुपलम्भात् स्फोटं तस्य ध्वनेः प्रकृतिभिश्च मन्यन्ते । तत्र भवः प्राकृतः तदुत्तरकालभावी तस्माद्विलक्षण एवोपलभ्यते इति विकारापत्तिरिव स्फोटस्य इति वैकृत उच्यते ।

25. I take the explanation of these terms from IYER, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54.

unmanifested.²⁶ However, the secondary sound is regarded as the cause of the continuity of the perception of the already manifested *sphoṭa*. The perception of the *sphoṭa* does not disappear with the primary sound at once. It continues to be perceived again and again, uninterruptedly for a longer duration of time. It lasts for a short time in a quick speech, a little longer in the medium speech and still longer in a slow speech. But this continued perception of the *sphoṭa* cannot be explained unless we assume that the manifesting sounds also continue in the succeeding moments. These sounds which become the cause of difference in the speed of utterance are called secondary sounds. However, the difference in duration associated with the secondary sounds is not even falsely attributed to the *sphoṭa*, because the secondary sound is produced after the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. Although the secondary sounds do not manifest the *sphoṭa*, these (sounds) become the cause of continued perception of the *sphoṭa* already manifested by the primary sounds. In short, the distinction between *prākṛtadhvani* and *vaikṛtadhvani*, drawn by Harivṛṣabha, may be shown as follows:

The primary sound is produced by the conjunction and disjunction of the organs with the points of articulation, and it causes the perception of the *sphoṭa* and of the secondary sound. The *sphoṭa* is wrongly perceived as identical with the primary sound. Accordingly, the properties of primary sound such as length, pitch etc. are wrongly felt to be associated with the manifested *sphoṭa* which, in reality, is free from such a distinction. The secondary sounds which originate from the primary sounds are produced after the manifestation

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53: तत्र प्राकृतो नाम येन विना स्फोटरूपमनभिव्यक्तं न परिच्छिद्यते वैकृतस्तु येनाभिव्यक्तं स्फोटरूप पुनः पुनरविच्छेदेन प्रचिततर कालमुपलभ्यते ।

of *sphoṭa*. They cause continuity of the perception of the *sphoṭa* through the provision of continued reverberation²⁷ of primary sounds. The secondary sounds, while causing the continuity in the perception of the *sphoṭa*, are associated with the differences in speeds—slow, medium and rapid—of utterance. The difference in the speed of utterance means greater or smaller number of repeated cognitions of the *sphoṭa*. The length of the time of continued cognition of *sphoṭa* solely depends on the speed of utterance with which secondary sound is associated.²⁸ The difference in the mode of utterance of the secondary sound does not affect in any way the nature of the *sphoṭa* which is already manifested by the primary sound. In other words, the secondary sounds are not considered as identical with the already manifested *sphoṭa*, and, accordingly, the properties of the secondary sounds are not superimposed on the *sphoṭa*.²⁹

It emerges from this discussion that the listener's ability to receive auditory impression of *sphoṭa* is unaffected by changes in the frequency of the speaker's voice. Speech remains

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27. Helārāja (on verse 64, *Kālasamuddeśa*, TSS., CXVI) interprets the term *Vaiṣṇavadhvani* to mean the secondary sounds, which are echos or reverberations of the primary sounds of the first moments. He reads: प्राकृतध्वनिभिरभिव्यक्ते शब्दतत्त्वेऽनुरणनरूपा ये पश्चात्कालभाविनो ध्वनयः संतानेन वर्तन्ते श्रोत्रान्तराल इव स्थिताः शीघ्रसंतानावर्तनात् ते श्रोत्रदेशमनुप्राप्ताः शब्दप्रचयग्रहणहेतुतां श्रोत्रगुणात्प्रतिपद्यमानाः द्रुतादिभेदवृत्तिं रचयन्ति । (Quoted by IYER, *op. cit.*, p. 58.)
28. See note 26.
29. *Vṛtti* on *VP*. 1.77 (quoted by IYER) *op. cit.*, p. 53: तस्मादुपलक्षितव्यतिरेकेण वैकृतेन ध्वनिना संसृज्यमानोऽपि स्फोटात्मा ताद्रूप्यस्यानध्वारोपात्तास्त्रे ह्रस्वादिवत्कालभेदव्यवहारं नावतरति ।

intelligible to a listener even if it is transmitted at twice the rate of normal talking. Similarly, even if it is slowed down, it does not make any significant change from the point of the listener's ability to discriminate words (*sphoṭa*). The variability involved in the perception of speech-sound uttered at a rapid or slow rate does not affect in any way the quality of the primary articulate sound.

However, in the case of length we observe some significant contrast in the articulatory position of the organs. In Sanskrit, as in many languages, two speech-units may be distinctively different, because a certain articulatory position is held longer in one of the speech-units than in the other. Since the time-distinction is associated with the articulatory positions of sound producing organs, length is recognised as a part of the phonetic system of language.³⁰ But speed involves the manner of moving the vocal organs from one position to another at a faster rate. Accordingly, it is not considered to be a part of the phonetic system of language. In other words, difference in speed is regarded as non-distinctive pattern of speech, and it is held as a secondary sound. But length of time is associated with the position of the articulatory organs in as much as it is regarded as associated with a primary sound.

Bhartrhari refers to the distinction between the primary sound and the secondary sound in his commentary³¹ on the *Mahābhāṣya*

30. *Ibid.*, p. 53. ध्वनिना संसृष्टं स्फोटस्य स्वरूपम् उपलभ्यते यस्मात्तस्मात् ध्वनेः स्थितिकालः स्फोटोपलब्धिरूपः परिवर्तते । (See also Helārāja, quoted by IYER, *op. cit.*, p. 58): ततश्च ते (वैकृतध्वनयः) शब्द-तत्त्वाद् बहिर्भूतां न भिन्वन्ति ।

31. *Mahābhāṣyadīpiṭhā*, ABORI, Vol. XLIV, p. 49: एवमर्थमेव शब्दानां नित्यत्वमभ्युपगम्यते । तस्य नित्यस्य पुनर्योऽभिगच्छज्जकास्ते च

on the first *Śivasūtra*. He says that the sound produced by the contact of articulatory organs is designated as primary sound. And that which is produced by such a sound (by holding the same articulatory position³²) is also to be known as the primary sound. The primary sound, which continues also in succeeding movements, is responsible for the distinction in vowels. When the succeeding primary sound is produced, the activity of the articulatory organs is not considered to have ceased. These primary sounds manifest the *sphoṭa*, and these are perceived as identical with it. The sound which comes from another sound (after the cessation of activity of the articulatory organs) is called secondary sound, which arises from the previous sounds. It does not affect the quality of vowels (it only causes difference in speed). The distinction between the primary and secondary sounds as brought out by Bhartṛhari remains essentially the same as that pointed in Harivṛṣabha's commentary on the *Vākyapadīya*, because, in both the texts, the primary sounds are regarded as distinctive, whereas secondary sounds are not. Nevertheless, Bhartṛhari's passage seems somewhat obscure and does not clearly bring out the distinction between the second kind of primary sounds and secondary sounds.

केचित्प्राकृताः केचिद्वैकृताः । यश्च करणसंनिपातादुत्पद्यते यश्च तस्मात् तो प्राकृतो । ताभ्यां विशेषोपलब्धिः । यस्तु ध्वनितो ध्वनिरुत्पद्यते स वैकृतः । ततो विशेषाभावात् । केवलं तु स एवम् उपलब्धो वैकृत इति एष विशेषः । यदि शब्दान्तराभावात् भिन्नकालत्वं द्रुतमध्यमविलम्बितास्वपि भिन्न-कालत्वम् । अथ दीर्घप्लुतेषु पुनः पुनः करणाभिघातः तद् द्रुतादिषु एष (अ?) सति कालस्यास्याद्वाह्यत्वे (?) दुरुपपादं करणाभिघातस्या-नुपरमादिति ।

32. The portion appearing in the brackets is supplied by me to make the sense of the passage clear.

Bhartṛhari, in his commentary³³ on the *Mahābhāṣya* under the *Śivasūtras* 3-4, also mentions the two alternative views regarding the nature of primary and secondary sounds. According to the first view, the primary sound reveals the nature of *sphoṭa*, while the secondary sound causes distinction not in a single phonemic unit taken by itself, but only in the whole unit combined out of two or more units. The second view maintains that, according to some, *sphoṭa* is produced by the contacts and separations of the articulatory organs, while (the secondary sound is) a kind of reverberation which arises from the (primary) sounds.

Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* records the three different views³⁴ regarding the nature of the relation between *dhvani* and *sphoṭa*. He says that some are of the opinion that *dhvani* is perceived as identical with *sphoṭa*. The commentators explain

33. *Mahābhāṣyadīpiḥā*, *op. cit.*, p. 76: अध्वनिकः स्फोट इत्युक्तं भवति । ननु च ध्वनिम् अन्तरेण स्फोटस्योपलब्धिरेव नास्ति । एवं तर्हि य एवासी आद्यो ध्वनिः रूपमात्रस्य प्रतिपादकस्तावानेव आश्रीयते । यस्त्वसौ विशेषस्य प्रतिपादकः यः समुदायस्थो यः स्वतन्त्र इति नासावाश्रीयते । ... अथवा कार्यवद् बुद्धिं कृत्वा इदमुच्यते । तत्र कार्यपक्षे स्फोट एव संयोगाद्विभागात्संयोगविभागाभ्यामुत्पद्यते । यत्त्वनुरणनं तत् शब्दत एव ।

34. *VP*. 1.81:

स्फोटरूपाविभागेन ध्वनेर्ग्रहणमिष्यते ।

कैश्चिद् ध्वनिरसंवेद्यः स्वतन्त्रोऽन्यैः प्रकल्पितः ॥

Puṇyarāja under *VP*. 1.81: यथा जपाकुसुमरूपानुषक्तमेव स्फटिकादीनां ग्रहणं तथा ध्वनिरूपानुषक्त एव स्फोटस्तदविभागेनोपलभ्यते इति केषांचिन्मतम् । It will be interesting to note here that K. A. S. IYER points out in his introduction (p. ix) to the translation of the *Vākyapadīya* (Deccan College, 1966) that the commentary on Kāṇḍa 1, published at Benares, is not a commentary of Puṇyarāja.

this by means of the analogy of the *japā*-flower. The redness in the crystal appears to be real, when it is placed next to the *japā*-flower. The same is true with regard to the *sphoṭa* which is not distinctly perceived from the *dhvani*. Thus the length and other peculiarities of sound are wrongly attributed to *sphoṭa*.

His second view regarding the nature of relation between the *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* maintains that the sounds, although they are not cognisable by themselves, cause the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. The commentators explain this by the analogy of senses. The senses³⁵, without themselves being perceived, cause the perception of the objects. In the same way the *sphoṭa* is perceived through the sound which is itself imperceptible.

His third view on the relation between *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* points out that the perception of *sphoṭa* is not identical with the perception of sound. Sometimes we perceive the *dhvanis* without perceiving the *sphoṭa*,³⁶ just as we perceive the light without seeing the flame.

Bhartṛhari also records three different views on the nature of *sphoṭa*. He says that, according to some, the term *sphoṭa* stands for the initial articulated sounds produced by the various degrees of contacts of the articulatory organs with the points of articulation. The sound belonging to the first moment, according to this view, is the *sphoṭa*, while the sound resulting from the *sphoṭa* and belonging to the succeeding moments, are called *śabdajāḥ śabdāḥ* (sounds produced by sounds). The succeeding sounds (*dhvanayah*) are regarded as a chain of repetition of

35. *Vṛtti* on *VP*. 1.81 (quoted by IYER, *op. cit.*, p. 59): केषांचित्तु यथेन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियगुणाश्च असंवेद्यस्वरूपा एव विषयोपलब्धिहेतवः तथाय ध्वनिरगृह्यमाणरूपः शब्दग्रहे निमित्तं भवति ।

36. *Ibid.*, p. 59: दृष्टा केवलस्य ध्वनेः स्फोटरूपानवधारणे दूरादुपलब्धिः ।

the first sound (*sphoṭa*)³⁷. These sounds, moving like waves, become weaker and weaker as they spread farther and farther from the *sphoṭa* word.

In another view suggested by Bhartṛhari,³⁸ both the *dhvani* and the *sphoṭa* are said to be produced simultaneously. This is explained by the analogy of the flame and the light. The flame and the light are produced at the same moment. However, from a distance we see the light without seeing the flame. In the same manner, from a distance we may hear the sound and not the *sphoṭa*. According to this theory, there is no interval between the perception of the *sphoṭa* and that of *dhvani*. But these two aspects of a word are kept apart from each other, just as the initial sound of a bell and its reverberations are regarded as quite distinct from each other. These two views mentioned above suggest that the *sphoṭa* is regarded as a transitory sound rather than the eternal entity.

In accordance with the third view³⁹, the *sphoṭa* represents the universal nature of individual *dhvanis*. It is the individual that helps the manifestation of the universal. The varied individual sounds are called *dhvanis*, and the class-nature of these sounds is considered to be the *sphoṭa*.

37. K. A. S. IYER, "Who are *anityasphoṭavādins*", *POC*, 1935, pp. 258 ff.

38. *VP*. 1.103 and 104:

अल्पे महति वा शब्दे स्फोटकालो न भिद्यते ।

परस्तु शब्दसंतानः प्रचयाप्रचयात्मकः ॥

दूरात्प्रभेदो दीपस्य ध्वनिमात्रं तु लक्ष्यते ।

घण्टादीनां च शब्देषु व्यक्तो भेदः स दृश्यते ॥

See also note 34.

39. *VP*. 1.93: अनेकव्यक्त्यभिव्यङ्ग्या जातिः स्फोट इति स्मृता ।

कैश्चिद् व्यक्तय एवास्या ध्वनिस्त्वेन प्रकल्पिताः ॥

Bhartṛhari has used the term *sphoṭa* only nine times in the *Vākyapadīya* and that too occurs in the first *Kāṇḍa* of it. Like Patañjali, Bhartṛhari has also invariably used the term *sphoṭa* in its relation with the *dhvani*. Without referring to the *dhvanis*, he has nowhere used the term *sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari has nowhere clearly stated in his *Vākyapadīya* that '*sphoṭa* is over and above the sounds, it is indivisible and without any inner sequence, and it is a meaning-bearing unit of the language.' It is now necessary to translate⁴⁰ the nine verses of the *Vākyapadīya*, where the term *sphoṭa* occurs, in order that the moot question whether *sphoṭa* is or is not a meaning-bearing unit may be examined.

*VP.1.49*⁴¹

Just as a reflection (of the object) appearing elsewhere (as in waters) assumes its (water's) properties, owing (to its association) with the movement of it (water), similar is the relation between *sphoṭa* and *nāda* (sound).

Notes⁴²: The reflection of the moon in the waters appears to be associated with the properties of water such as agitation, etc. However, in reality, reflection by itself is free from (or without) such properties. Similarly the *sphoṭa* appears to have varied properties of sounds which differ in length and various modes of utterances.

40. I have made use of Prof. K. A. S. IYER's and Miss M. BIARDEAU's translations of the *Vākyapadīya*, *Kāṇḍa-I*. (Deccan College, 1966 and Paris, 1964, respectively) wherever necessary.

41. प्रतिबिम्बं यथान्यत्र स्थितं तोयक्रियावशात् ।
तत्प्रवृत्तिमिवान्वेति स धर्मः स्फोटनादयोः ॥

42. Notes are based on the commentaries of Puṇyarāja and Harivṛṣabha (quoted by IYER in his article, *ABORI*, op. cit.).

VP.1.75⁴³

The difference in duration (which gets introduced in the auditory perception) of the *sphoṭa* which does not involve the temporal distinction, but which appears to assume the duration of (succeeding) sounds— is explained by the difference in conditions which delimit the (continued) perception (of the *sphoṭa* through the secondary sounds).

Notes: The difference in various modes of pronunciation as rapid, medium and slow belongs in reality to the secondary sounds which are responsible for the continued cognition of the *sphoṭa*. Nevertheless, they are felt to be associated with the *sphoṭa*, although it is without time-distinction, because the act of repeated perception of the *sphoṭa* is wrongly conceived as mixed up with the differences in the modes of pronunciation of the secondary sounds.

VP.1.77⁴⁴

The secondary sounds, after the manifestation of a word, give rise to the difference in the speed of utterance, but the *sphoṭa* in its essence is not rendered distinctive by them.

Notes: The primary sound causes the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. Accordingly, the properties of the primary sounds are falsely attributed to the manifested *sphoṭa*. Therefore the *sphoṭa* of the articulated sound *a* ap-

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43. स्फोटस्याभिन्नकालस्य ध्वनिकालानुपातिनः ।
ग्रहणोपाधिभेदेन वृत्तिभेदं प्रचक्षते ॥
44. शब्दस्योर्ध्वमभिव्यक्तेर्वृत्तिभेदं तु वैकृताः ।
ध्वनयः समुपोहन्ते स्फोटात्मा तैर्न भिद्यते ॥

pears to be different from that of *ā*. After the manifestation of *sphoṭa*, the sounds which also continue in the succeeding moments are called secondary sounds. These keep up the continuity in the perception of the already manifested *sphoṭa*. The *sphoṭa* continues to be perceived as long as the secondary sound lasts. The difference in rapid or slow mode of pronunciation of the secondary sound does not in any way affect the nature of the *sphoṭa* which is already manifested by the primary sounds. The secondary sounds are not considered identical with the *sphoṭa*. Accordingly, variabilities in the secondary sound do not make any significant change in the perception of the *sphoṭa*. Therefore the properties of the secondary sounds are not attributed to the *sphoṭa*. In other words, difference in speed is regarded as the non-distinctive pattern of speech, and thus, it is a secondary feature.

VP.1.81⁴⁵

According to some, the sound is perceived as identical with the *sphoṭa*. Some hold that the sound is not perceptible at all, while others suppose that (sound is perceived) as an independent entity.

Notes: There are three different views on the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* word. The sound which is closely bound up with the *sphoṭa* is not perceived separately, like the colour which is not separately perceived from the object. But for others, the sound, without getting itself perceived, causes the perception of the *sphoṭa*, as

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45. स्फोटरूपाविभागेन ध्वनेर्ग्रहणमिष्यते ।
कैश्चिद् ध्वनिरसंवेद्यः स्वतन्त्रोऽन्यैः प्रकल्पितः ॥

the sense-organs and their qualities which, being themselves unperceived, cause the perception of objects. While, according to some others, sound is also perceived without giving rise to the apprehension of the form of *sphoṭa*. In other words, the perception of sound is not regarded as identical with the perception of the *sphoṭa*.

VP.1.93⁴⁶

Some believe that the *sphoṭa* (stands for) the universal (concept) which is manifestable by many (i.e. varied) individual (sounds), and corresponding individual (instances) are what one imagines to be sounds (*dhvanis*).

Notes:— The varied individual sounds are called *dhvanis*, whereas the universal nature of these varied individual sounds is considered to be the *sphoṭa*.

VP.1.97⁴⁷

Just as there is a fixed eternal relation between a thing which enables one to perceive (i.e. sense-organs) and the thing to be perceived (i.e. objects), similar is the relation of manifest and manifested between the sounds and the *sphoṭa*.

Notes: The colour inherent in the sense of vision, being itself an imperceptible entity, is regarded as the cause of the manifestation of external colour of objects. In the same manner, the sounds which are themselves

46. अनेकव्यक्त्यभिव्यङ्ग्या जातिः स्फोट इति स्मृता ।
कैश्चिद् व्यक्तय एवास्या ध्वनित्वेन प्रकल्पिताः ॥

47. ग्रहणग्राह्ययोः सिद्धा नियता योग्यता यथा ।
व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावेन तथैव स्फोटनादयोः ॥

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imperceptible entities, become the causes of the manifestation of external objects. The opponent's idea was that the manifesting sounds exist in the vocal organs, whereas the *sphoṭa* word exists in ether (*ākāśa*). The reply given to this is that there is the fixed eternal relation between the manifesting and manifested. There can be a causal relation between the two things belonging to the different regions, and the effect may bear a different quality not found in its cause.

*VP.1.102*⁴⁸

Others say that whatever is produced by the conjunction and disjunction with the points of articulation is the *sphoṭa*; while the sounds originated from the (initial) sounds are the *dhvanis*.

Notes: According to the view mentioned in this verse, *sphoṭa* is the first sound and it is transitory. It results from the conjunction and disjunction of the organs with the points of articulation. On the other hand, the sounds which originate from the first sound and spread in all directions, carrying reflection of the first sound, are the *dhvanis*.

*VP.1.103*⁴⁹

Whether the sound (appears) small or large (in duration), it does not make (any) difference in the duration of the *sphoṭa*. But the series of sounds (which follows it) is subject to increase or decrease (in duration).

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48. यः संयोगविभागाभ्यां करणैरुपजन्यते ।
स स्फोटः शब्दजाः शब्दा ध्वनयोज्ज्वैरुदाहृताः ।
49. अल्पे महति वा शब्दे स्फोटकालो न भिद्यते ।
परस्तु शब्दसंतानः प्रचयाप्रचयात्मकः ॥

F. 4

Notes: The increase and the decrease in duration of sounds are not regarded as the properties that reside in the original sound. However, the sound produced by striking the stick against the drum causes uninterrupted succession of sounds. This succession of sounds is subject to the increase or decrease in duration.

VP.1.106⁵⁰

Even after the organs have ceased to vibrate, other sounds, also originate from the *sphoṭa*, like the series of flames (which streams forth) from other flames.

Notes: When the vibrations follow one another without interruption, the sound produced by the contact of organs with the points of articulation does not disappear without producing a series of sounds. Even if the activity of sound-producing organs has ceased, the primary sound gives rise to the secondary sound. Since the articulatory position no longer exists, the variability produced by the secondary features of sounds in the speed of utterance does not affect in any way the quality of the articulatory sounds and that of the *sphoṭa* manifested thereby. The origination of the secondary sounds has the same nature of continuity as that of flames proceeding from burning fuel. Just as the series of flames causes the manifestation of object, so the continuity of secondary sounds helps the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* for a longer duration of time. Difference in speed is regarded as the non-distinctive pattern of speech and thus, it is a secondary feature.

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50. अनवस्थितकम्पेऽपि करणे ध्वनयोऽपि ते ।
स्फोटादेवोपजायन्ते ज्वाला ज्वालान्तरादिव ॥

It may be seen from the foregoing translation that Bhartṛhari's statements on the nature of *sphoṭa* do not support the view that 'the real word is *sphoṭa*, it is indivisible and without any inner sequence, and it is meaning-conveyer unit'. What we get from Bhartṛhari's statement is that the *sphoṭa* is manifested by the sounds produced by the articulatory organs. That the *sphoṭa* is indivisible and it is a meaning-conveyer word, is nowhere stated clearly by Bhartṛhari.

He has used the words *avibhāga* and *abhinnakāla*⁵¹ while describing the relation between the *dhvani* and *sphoṭa*. The phrases do not intend to maintain the indivisibility of the *sphoṭa* as understood by the later grammarians. This will be clear from the context in which these words are used by him. The context suggests that the manifested *sphoṭa* is free from the temporal distinction even if the manifesting sounds are endowed with it. The temporal distinctions pertaining to primary and secondary sounds are wrongly ascribed to the nature of *sphoṭa*. The later grammarians, probably on the basis of these statements, lay emphasis on the indivisible nature of the *sphoṭa*. They also quote another statement of Bhartṛhari to support their theories of *akṣhaṇḍapadasphoṭa*: 'indivisible word as a meaning-bearing unit' and *akṣhaṇḍavākya-sphoṭa*: 'indivisible sentence as a meaning-bearing unit'. Bhartṛhari says in his *Vākya-padīya*:⁵² 'There are no phonemes in a word and there are no words in a sentence'. Viewed from the theory of language-communication, Bhartṛhari speaks of indivisibility of speech-unit. According to him, the meaningful speech-unit cannot be correlated to the plurality of

51. *VP.* 1.75, 1.81:

52. *VP.* 1. 73: पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा न च ।

वाक्यात्पदानामत्यन्तं प्रविवेको न कश्चन ॥

phonemes. To put it differently, Bhartṛhari⁵³ maintains that meaning-bearing units, viz. *pada* or *vākya*, cannot be divided into smaller significant units. Like Patañjali, Bhartṛhari also holds the view that the meaning is neither cognised through the phonemes /k/, /s/ and /y/ in /ku:pə/, /su:pə/ and /yu:pə/, nor is it conveyed by the identical segment *ūpa*. Therefore, like Patañjali, Bhartṛhari too holds the opinion that the word as a whole unconnected with the isolated phonemes conveys meaning. However, the term indivisibility (*akhaṇḍatva*) employed by later grammarians assumes a different significance. What follows in the next paragraphs represents the later grammarians' view on the nature of *sphoṭa*.

The later grammarians⁵⁴ contend that each phoneme cannot convey any meaning, because in that case we might comprehend some meaning from individual phonemes constituting a word. Since a phoneme, taken as a single unit, has no meaning, a collection of phonemes (that is, taken as a whole) also has no

53. VP. 2.169: न कूपसूपयूपानामन्वयोऽर्थस्य दृश्यते ।

अतोऽर्थान्तरवाचित्वं संघातस्यैव गम्यते ॥

54. *Pradīpa* on the introductory passage of *Mbh.*, (Haryana-Sahitya Samsthana, edn., p. 7): वैयाकरणा वर्णव्यतिरिक्तस्य पदस्य वाक्यस्य वा वाचकत्वमिच्छन्ति. वर्णानां प्रत्येकं वाचकत्वे द्वितीयादिवर्णोच्चारणानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् । आनर्थक्ये तु प्रत्येकमुत्पत्तिपक्षे यौगपद्येन उत्पत्त्यभावात्, अभिव्यक्तिपक्षे तु क्रमेणैवाभिव्यक्त्या समुदायाभावादेकस्मृत्युपाख्यानं वाचकत्वे 'सरो' 'रस' इत्यादावर्थप्रतिपत्त्यविशेषप्रसङ्गात्-द्व्यतिरिक्तः स्फोटो नादाभिव्यङ्ग्यो वाचको विस्तरेण वाक्यपदीये व्यवस्थापितः ॥

It will be interesting to note that Kaiyaṭa's commentary which derives its authority from Bhartṛhari's pronouncements, considerably differs here from the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* of Bhartṛhari.

meaning. Furthermore, it is impossible to maintain a collection of phonemes, since these are transient. In the word *gauḥ*, when *au* is uttered, *g* disappears. It is impossible to maintain a combination of what is non-existent with what is existent. It is of no use to say that the collective remembrance of all phonemes in a single memory-impression conveys meaning, because in that case we will not be able to distinguish between the words like *nadī*, *dīna*, *rāja* and *jarā* which are constituted by the same phonemes. Therefore, the grammarians assume that the *sphoṭa* is indivisible into phonemes and their sequences. It is only manifested by the articulatory sound and is considered as a meaning-bearing unit.

It will be interesting to note here that the later grammarians' idea of indivisibility seems to claim that the semantic units cannot be divided into smaller distinctive units i.e. phonemes. They say, the *sphoṭa*: 'meaningful unit' is over and above the phonemes and is without any inner sequence. However, Bhartṛhari's idea of indivisibility of *pada* and *vākya* is something else. He means to say that the significative level of language cannot be divided into smallest units i.e. phonemes, because phonemes have no correlation with meaning which is denoted by *saṁghāta*: 'whole'. He does not maintain that *pada* cannot be structurally divided into smaller differentiating units. Bhartṛhari's explanation suggested here is based on my own understanding and interpretation of the *Vākyapadīya*, but of course, I may have misunderstood him.

It seems to me that Bhartṛhari does not favour the view that the *sphoṭa* is the indivisible and meaningful unit. He states three different views on the nature of *sphoṭa*. He points out that (i) according to some, *sphoṭa*⁵⁵ is cognised as identical with sound; (ii) according to another view, *sphoṭa* stands for articulate

55. *VP.*, 1.81.

sounds produced by the contacts of the different vocal organs with the points of articulation; and (iii) according to the third view, *sphoṭa* represents the universal⁵⁶ sound, whereas the term *dhvani* refers to the individual sound. Thus, according to Bhartṛhari, if the *sphoṭa* is a sound or a type sound or for that matter, even a phoneme manifested by sound, it cannot be obviously the denoter. It is inconsistent to say that the *sphoṭa* is the sound auditorily perceived in the time-series-pattern and at the same time indivisible and meaningful. The later grammarians⁵⁷ maintain that when the speaker utters a sound, not only are phonemes heard and cognised by listeners, but also the indivisible entity in the form of the *sphoṭa* word. Thus, according to them, in the cognition of the word *gauḥ* the phonemes appear as a part of the word while the cognition of the *padasphoṭa* appears to be partless. This appears to be paradoxical. Nowhere has Bhartṛhari mentioned the view that three sounds *g*, *au* and *ḥ* in the word *gauḥ* reveal the three phonemes to the listener and also the indivisible *sphoṭa* entity *gauḥ*. He⁵⁸ says that each sound reveals the phonemes

56. *Ibid.*, 1.93:

57. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, pp. 589-90: तथा च वाचकत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या तदेवेदं वाक्यं सोऽय गकार इति प्रतीत्या च स्फोटोऽखण्डः सिध्यति । एतेन गौरित्यादौ गकारौकारादिविसर्गव्यतिरेकेण स्फोटाननुभवाच्छ्रूयमाणवर्णानामेव वाचकत्वमस्तु इत्यपास्तम् ।

58. *VP*. 1.84:

नादेराहितबीजायामन्त्येन ध्वनिना सह ।

आवृत्तिपरिपाकायां बुद्धौ शब्दोऽवधार्यते ॥

The later commentators, however, say *śabda* is perceived as a single unit. See *Mahābhāṣyapradīpoddyota*, *op. cit.*, p. 11:

इदमेकं पदमेकं वाक्यमिति प्रत्ययः स्फोटसत्त्वे तदेकत्वे च प्रमाणम् ।

(*sphoṭa*) and when the last sound accompanied by the impressions of the previous sounds is perceived, the word is grasped in the mind.

Thus, according to Bhartṛhari, the listener may perceive each phoneme, but he cannot perceive the word as a whole. Only the perception of the phonemes gives rise to the mental image of a single whole. The later grammarians, on the other hand, contend that they perceive the word as a single unit. This realisation is, according to them, based on the common experience of the unitariness of a word or a sentence in the form 'this is one word or one sentence'. However, according to Bhartṛhari, the unitariness of a word or a sentence is purely conceptual.

I get the impression that—unless, of course, I am mistaken—all this confusion has arisen in the mind of the later grammarians, because they identify Patañjali's and Bhartṛhari's conception of *śabda* with the concept of *sphoṭa*. All the statements of Patañjali and Bhartṛhari regarding the nature of *śabda* are interpreted in the light of the *sphoṭa* doctrine. I feel that Bhartṛhari's conception of *sphoṭa* can only be interpreted on a careful analysis of his statements with regard to the *sphoṭa*. The later interpretation of *sphoṭa* departs from the line of thought associated with the *vākyapadīya*. To support my statement, I present two or three instances to show how Bhartṛhari's statements on *śabda* are utilised by the later grammarians to establish their new interpretation of *sphoṭa*.

(i) Bhartṛhari while discussing the nature of *śabda* makes the statement about the nature of word.⁵⁹ He says that gram-

59. *VP*. 1.44: द्वावुपादानशब्देषु शब्दौ शब्दविदो विदुः ।

एको निमित्तं शब्दानामपरोऽर्थे प्रयुज्यते ॥

cf. also R. JAKOBSON, *Fundamentals of Language*, Netherlands, 1956, pp. 2-4, and 24.

marians recognise two kinds of words. Of these two, one is said to be the cause of articulate sound, while the other is associated with meaning. Hence, Bhartṛhari says that the linguistic utterance can be analysed into two different levels: sound or differentiating level and semantic or significative level. On the basis of this statement, the later grammarians contend that, out of these two levels, the significative level of linguistic utterance is regarded as *sphoṭa*. The linguistic utterance which is directly related to the meaning is the *sphoṭa*. Accordingly, it cannot be divided into smaller constituents, because in conformance with the established opinion, *sphoṭa* is the single partless utterance. In the context of meaningful speech-unit, Bhartṛhari has never used the term *sphoṭa*. He has strictly reserved it for indicating the distinctive function of language possibly from the point of auditory perception of sounds that reached the listener's ears⁶⁰. Bhartṛhari's statements clearly point out that any sound, revealed to the listener's ear through the process of articulation, is the *sphoṭa*, which need not necessarily involve the notion of meaning. In other words, he has used the term *sphoṭa* in the context of distinctive function of language. On the other hand, the later grammarians use the term *sphoṭa* with reference to the significative aspect of language. They have made use of Bhartṛhari's verse to establish their favourite doctrine of meaning-bearing nature⁶¹ of *sphoṭa*, assuming that the significative aspect of *śabda* is the *sphoṭa*. It seems to me that their assumption does not have the support of Bhartṛhari.

In the same manner, Bhartṛhari has never said that *sphoṭa* is self-revealing. His statement points out that just as a light,

60. *VP.*, 1.81, 97.

61. *Sphoṭavāda*, *op. cit.*, p. 9: तत्र स्फुटत्यर्थोऽस्मादिति स्फोटः, वाचक इति यावत् । एवं च वर्णस्फोटादिपदानां वर्णदियो वाचका इत्यर्थः ।

while revealing itself,⁶² reveals others as well, the *śabda* is likewise self-revealing, i.e. a word fully cognised reveals the object to be cognised. This self-revealing character of word, has been applied to the *sphoṭa* by the later grammarians to propound the metaphysical concept of the *śabdādvaita*.

It is erroneous to hold that *sphoṭa* reveals itself. Actually, Bhartṛhari⁶³ has only said that *sphoṭa* gets manifested through the articulate sound. On the other hand, one can say that *śabda* is a self-revealing entity, because *śabda*, as a single unit, cannot be revealed by sounds. The later grammarians⁶⁴ have gone so far as to identify *sphoṭa* with the vedāntic *Brahman*. It is interesting to note that the doctrine of *sphoṭa* developed by Bhartṛhari becomes subsequently merged in the *śabdādvaita*

62. *VP.* 1.55: ग्राह्यत्वं ग्राहकत्वं च द्वे शक्ती तेजसो यथा ।

तथैव सर्वशब्दानामेते पृथगवस्थिते ॥

See also *ibid.*, 1.83. Actually, according to Bhartṛhari, the term *grāhyatva* refers to the form of a word cognised through the sounds, while the term *grāhakatva* stands for the meaning-conveying nature of a word. The later grammarians, however, identify these concepts with the nature of *svaparaprahāśakatva* of the *Brahman*.

63. *Ibid.*, 1.97:

ग्रहणग्राह्ययोः सिद्धा योग्यता नियता यथा ।

व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावेन तथैव स्फोटनादयोः ॥

64. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, *op. cit.*, p. 606:

इत्थं निष्कृष्यमाणं यच्छब्दतत्त्वं निरञ्जनम् ।

ब्रह्मैवेत्यक्षरं प्राहुस्तस्मै पूर्णत्मिने नमः ॥

ब्रह्मैवेत्यनेन “अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयंज्योतिः”, “तमेव भान्तम् अनुभाति सर्वम्”, “तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति” इति श्रुतिसिद्धं स्वपरप्रकाशकत्वं सूचयन्स्फुटरथोऽस्मादिति स्फोट इति यौगिकं स्फोटशब्दाभिधेयत्वं सूचयति ।

philosophy of Bhartṛhari, as understood by the later grammarians.

(ii) In the first chapter of the *Vākyapadiya*, Bhartṛhari⁶⁵ deals with the metaphysical and semantic problems side by side. He states that the eternal word is the supreme reality; it is transcendental and devoid of all qualities. *Śabdabrahman* is the originator of *śabdaprapañca* as well as *arthaprapañca*. It is existence in its essence. From this *śabdabrahman* the whole universe evolves. It does not change nor does it cease. Both the denoter (*vācaḥ*) and the denoted (*vācya*, i.e. supreme existence) should not be looked upon as two different realities⁶⁶. But these are the two aspects of the one ultimate reality and, therefore, it is identical with them in essence. The whole phenomenon of material existence is only an appearance (*vivarta*) of the *śabdabrahman*.

It may be that Bhartṛhari was a staunch believer in the Advaitic concept of the *Brahman*. Accordingly, he tried to link grammar with *Advaita*. In fact, later grammarians have taken the trouble to identify Bhartṛhari's *sphoṭa* doctrine with the *śabdādvaita* concept. How far *sphoṭa* is one with *śabdabrahman* is a matter which has to be continuously reexamined in the light

65. *VP.*, 1.1 and 2:

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।
 विवर्तते ऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥
 एकमेव यदाम्नातं भिन्नं शक्तिव्यपाश्रयात् ।
 अपृथक्त्वे ऽपि शक्तिभ्यः पृथक्त्वेनेव वर्तते ॥

See also *ibid.*, 1.13, 1.23-30 etc.

66. *Ibid.*, 2.31: अर्थभागैस्तथा तेषामान्तरोऽर्थः प्रकाश्यते ।
 एकस्यैवात्मनो भेदौ शब्दार्थावपृथक् स्थितौ ॥

not only of the so-called metaphysical implications involved in the *vākya-padīya*, but also of the linguistic principles enunciated by Bhartṛhari. The metaphysical aspect of word-doctrine has been wrongly attributed to the doctrine of *sphoṭa*. The higher reality of the *śabdabrahman* is confused with the lower reality of *sphoṭa*. The identity between *śabda* and the *Brahman* conceived by the later grammarians is based on the misunderstanding of the real nature of *sphoṭa*. This ultimately leads to the misunderstanding of the modern Sanskritists that the *sphoṭa* doctrine is 'mysterious'⁶⁷. The importance of the *sphoṭa* theory, from the point of linguistic interpretation, has been overlooked and neglected by the later commentators. It will be interesting to note here that Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita in his *Śabdaḥaustubha*⁶⁸ anticipates that the linguistic theory of *sphoṭa* has no direct connection with the metaphysical doctrine of *śabdabrahman*. He states that Bhartṛhari, dealing with the nature of linguistic utterance, incidentally discusses the illusory creation of world. It is also interesting to note that Śaṅkara⁶⁹ criticizes the doctrine of *sphoṭa* and spares the doctrine of the *śabdabrahman* which generally agrees with his philosophical thinking. By identifying the doctrine of *śabda* with *sphoṭa* the later grammarians have subjected the theory of *sphoṭa* to a great deal of unnecessary mystification and, as a result, the importance of this theory from the point of linguistic interpretation has been side-tracked.

67. J. BROUGH, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42.

68. *Śabdaḥaustubha*, Chokhamba Sanskrit Series, p. 10:

वराटिकान्वेषणाय प्रवृत्तश्चिन्तामणिं लब्धवान् इति वासिष्ठरामायणोक्ता-
भाणकन्यायेन शब्दविचाराय प्रवृत्तः सन् प्रसङ्गादद्वैत औपनिषदे ब्रह्मण्यपि
व्युत्पाद्यतामित्यभिप्रायेण भगवान् भर्तृहरिर्विवर्तवादादिकम् अपि प्रसङ्गाद्
व्युदपादयत् ।

69. *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya* under 1.3.28.

The later grammarians classify the *sphoṭa* into eight varieties⁷⁰. The fundamental principle underlying this classification is meaningfulness and indivisibility. At the first level, *sphoṭa* is basically divided into three categories: *varṇasphoṭa*, *padasphoṭa* and *vākya-sphoṭa*. The *varṇasphoṭa* theory maintains that roots, stems and suffixes are the smallest meaning-vehicles in the language. They cannot be further divided into smaller meaningful units. On the other hand, the theories on the *padasphoṭa* and *vākya-sphoṭa* maintain that meaning is understood by a listener from a word or a sentence as a whole. The theories of *aḥaṇḍapadasphoṭa*: 'word as an indivisible meaningful unit' and *aḥaṇḍavākya-sphoṭa*: 'sentence as an indivisible meaningful unit' maintain that word or sentence as a unique entity conveys meaning. The theory of *jāti-sphoṭa* maintains that the universal nature of speech-unit is denotative, whereas the *vyakti-sphoṭa* theory denies the plurality of indivisible speech-units.

The later grammarians claim that Bhartṛhari himself has developed these theories. To prove this they quote the following statements of Bhartṛhari:

(1) 'There are no phonemes in the word and no words in the sentences'. This⁷¹ verse is quoted by the later grammarians to prove the indivisibility of the word-*sphoṭa*. Similarly, to support their theories on the *jāti-sphoṭa* and *vyakti-sphoṭa* they refer to the following verse:

(ii) Some believe that *sphoṭa*⁷² (stands for) the universal (concept) which is manifestable by many (i.e. varied) individual

70. This has been fully explained in the section "on the classification of *sphoṭa*".

71. See note 52.

72. See note 39.

(sounds), and corresponding individual (instances) are what one imagines to be sounds (*dhvanis*).

The first statement suggests that it is the sentence that communicates the meaning to the listener. Viewed from the theory of language communication, the primary unit of language is sentence and not the words or phonemes. Bhartṛhari's theory of indivisibility of words and sentence denies that words and sentences are constructions of smaller constituents. The listener hears the sentence as undivided linguistic utterance and does not identify the sentence-elements like words, stems, suffixes, phonemes etc.

One should not ignore the important fact that, while describing the nature of *vākya* and *pada* in the second and third *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari has never used the term *sphoṭa*. The later grammarians interpret the term *sphoṭa* to mean indivisible meaning-bearing speech-unit, and find it convenient to quote Bhartṛhari's statements which deal with the indivisibility of meaningful speech-unit, to support their views on the *akhaṇḍatva* and *arthavattva* of *sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari's analysis of language 'breaks down' into two broad levels: (1) *śabda* or morphemic level involving both simple and complex meaningful units. His final view is that the sentence is a meaningful unit which cannot be dissolved into ultimate constituents: morphemes and phonemes. (2) The second level is phonemic or distinctive. According to him, it has two different aspects: (i) *sphoṭa* or auditorily grasped speech-unit which is heard but not necessarily understood, and (ii) sound which reveals the *sphoṭa*. The analysis of later grammarians also 'breaks down' into two levels (1) *sphoṭa* or significative level and (2) sound or distinctive level. The difference between the view of Bhartṛhari and that of later grammarians lies in the fact that what is *śabda* level of Bhartṛhari becomes the

sphoṭa level of later grammarians. Bhartṛhari's discussion on the nature of *sphoṭa* is free from the significative aspect of language, and he tries to explain the nature of relationship between the sounds emitted by the vocal organs and the sounds received by the listener's ears. The later grammarians have shifted Bhartṛhari's conception of the *sphoṭa* from the feature level of language to the semantic level.

I furnish here another instance to indicate that the chief characteristics of *sphoṭa* are not meaningfulness and indivisibility,—a theory which won the recognition of later grammarians. In fact, the term *varṇasphoṭa* provides evidence for the lateness of such a recognition. This term originally represented the smallest distinctive unit heard by a listener. According to Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, the term *varṇasphoṭa* need not necessarily involve the consideration of meaning. The later grammarians, however, are faced with the difficulty in interpreting the term *varṇasphoṭa*, because a phoneme as a single unit is neither invariably meaningful nor does it necessarily involve the question of divisibility. Therefore, they have assigned a new meaning to the term *varṇasphoṭa*⁷³ to represent the smallest meaningful units like stems, roots and suffixes, which may exactly fit in with their conception of *sphoṭa*. This deliberate attempt to assign a new meaning to the term *varṇasphoṭa* only indicates that the term originally might not have been used in the sense of the significant unit.

Bhartṛhari's statement with regard to *jātisphoṭa*⁷⁴ is also essentially confined to the relation between *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*. Accord-

73. *Laghumañjūṣā*, Kashi Sanskrit Series, 1963, pp. 453-54: तत्र प्रकृतिप्रत्ययनिपातानामेकवर्णानामर्थवत्त्वदर्शनात्—इत्यादिना प्रत्याहारान्तिके भाष्ये उक्तः प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोर्वाचकत्वमित्येवंरूपो वर्णस्फोटः शास्त्रप्रक्रियोपयोग्येव न वास्तवः ।

74. See note 46.

ing to him *sphoṭa* represents a class of universal sounds, whereas *dhvani* represents a particular sound. *Sphoṭa* is a class of sounds related to the individual instances of sounds through a relation of the manifest and the manifested. It seems to me, from Bhartṛhari's statement, that the term *sphoṭa* represents the constant distinctive phonetic features which are sorted and extracted from the gross spoken sound-matter. In the *sphoṭa* perception non-distinctive redundant phonetic features are eliminated. Another important thing, worth to be noted here, is that Bhartṛhari considers *sphoṭa* to be merely a class whose members are not themselves *sphoṭas*⁷⁵. Bhartṛhari mentions three different views regarding the relation between *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*. The first view states that the *sphoṭa* entity perceived by the listener is not different from the sound (*dhvani*) produced by the speaker. To put it differently, the concept of *sphoṭa* cannot be divorced from the concept of sound. The second view states that the relation between sound and *sphoṭa* is that of manifest and manifested. That is to say, the *sphoṭa* is not sound but it represents "the minimum sum"⁷⁶ of a sound-matter revealed to the listener's ears in which the non-distinctive personal element is eliminated. The third view propounded by Bhartṛhari is the generic view. According to this view, *sphoṭa* is opposed to *dhvani* as a class to individual. He makes another statement regarding the function of phonemes from the communicative aspect of language. According to this theory, *varṇāḥ*: 'phonemes' are abstract fictional entities. Phoneme, in this case, is a fiction in the same way as a morpheme or a word is in a sentence. This fictionality of phonemes shows merely a functional aspect of language and it does not affect the distinctive analysis of it.

75. J. BROUGH, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

76. I borrow this terminology from R. JAKOBSON, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

While mentioning the generic view, Bhartṛhari points out that *sphoṭa* is always a generic representation, while *dhvani* represents particular sounds. According to him, the term *vyakti-sphoṭa* does not exist. For him, *vyaktis* are always sounds and *jāti* is the *sphoṭa*. This may serve as an additional proof to point out why *sphoṭa* is not a meaningful sound. If the *dhvani-vyakti* does not stand necessarily for a meaningful unit, how can *jāti-sphoṭa*, which necessarily includes all the *dhvani-vyaktis* in a general form, be a meaningful sound?

The later grammarians,⁷⁷ however, have extended this concept to the words and sentence. According to them, the word *hari* is a universal, it is a class comprising a host of varied individual utterances made by different people. This universality of word corresponds to the semantic universality, as, for instance, the word *gauḥ* denotes the class of cows into which all individuals are grouped. It appears to be strange, however, that this universality of word and sentence does not correspond to the generic nature of *varṇasphoṭa*, not only because a word cannot be divided into phonemes, but also because the word-*sphoṭa* is not revealed by *varṇasphoṭa* but by the *dhvani-vyaktis*. Nāgeśa makes the observation that the individual sounds always reveal the generic nature of *sphoṭa*. The *padajāti-sphoṭa*⁷⁸ of later grammarians does not mean the class of spoken word-events, whose members are individual word-events, but a class whose individual members are sounds rather than individual word-events. Similarly, the *padavyakti-sphoṭa* does not mean individual word-events

77. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, p. 603: इदं हरिपदमित्यनुगतप्रतीत्या हर्युपस्थितित्वाबच्छेदेन हरिपदज्ञानत्वेन हेतुत्वात्तदवच्छेदकतया च जाति-विशेषस्यावश्यकल्प्यत्वात् ।

78. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, op. cit., p. 605: कैश्चिद्व्यक्तयो ध्वनय एव ध्वनिवर्णयोर्भेदाभावादित्यभ्युपेयन्त इति शेषार्थः ।

spoken with varied accents and tones. It, on the other hand, denies the plurality of word-events. The *jāṭisphoṭa* assumes the plurality of individual word-events while *vyākṭisphoṭa* denies this. The latter view maintains that word is only one but it appears to be manifold owing to the variation in the manifesting sounds. The new grammarians (including Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa) hold the *jāṭisphoṭa*⁷⁹ view while the modern school (Nāgeśa and his followers) support the view of *vyākṭisphoṭa*.

Bhartr̥hari's concept of *śabda* is analogous to a certain extent to the modern concept of linguistic sign⁸⁰. A linguistic sign is considered a two-sided entity by modern linguists. According to Bhartr̥hari also, *śabda* is related to the phonetic structure on the one hand, and to the semantic fact on the other. Bhartr̥hari⁸¹ says that the grammarians recognise two kinds of words: sound-word and semantic-word. The latter is not a material word but a psychical entity or mental equivalent of an articulated sound (*buddhistha*)⁸². Bhartr̥hari's philosophy of *śabda* starts on the higher plane of linking a name with a thing signified. The concept of *sphoṭa* emerges, on the other hand, in the context of how language utilizes the sound-matter. To explain the process of revelation of sound-matter to the listener, he examines the distinctive function of language. In this respect, the final view of Bhartr̥hari seems to be that *dhvani* represents the articulate sound

79. *Sphoṭavāda*, p. 99.

80. This has been already pointed out by K. K. RAJA, *op. cit.*, p. 121. See also F. DE SAUSSURE, *Course in general linguistics*, pp. 65-66, London.

81. *VP*. 1.44.

82. This modern terminology, although it does not exactly correspond to Bhartr̥hari's words, is somewhat useful to interpret the *Vākṣyapadīya*, which is otherwise a "closed book" to the modern semantists. Also cf. R. JAKOBSON, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-4.

associated with gross matter, whereas the term *sphoṭa* represents a class sound sorted and extracted by the listener from the gross sound-matter. *Sphoṭa* cannot be pronounced, so, to represent the notion of *sphoṭa*, one may use the term phoneme or phonemic sequence⁸³, much used by the linguists today, because both of them represent the abstract entity extracted from the gross sound-matter.

Like Patañjali⁸⁴, Bhartṛhari also uses the term *śabda* in the *Vākyapadīya* to mean various things, such as: (i) the supreme reality, the *Brahman*⁸⁵. (ii) From the stand-point of communication, *śabda* represents indivisible meaning-bearing unit⁸⁶. At the beginning of the second book of the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari defines the sentence in the words *eko'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ*: 'a single undivided speech-unit.' He maintains that a sentence is indivisible⁸⁷ into constituents, because the process of communication is not concerned with the division of sentence into its constituents. Bhartṛhari's theory of the indivisibility of the sentence maintains that the listener hears the sentence as an undivided linguistic unit, and does not identify the word-elements like stems and suffixes etc. while he understands the meaning of the speech-unit. In other words, the process of understanding the sentence-meaning is indifferent to the constituents and their meanings. In this sense he says that sentence is over and above the phonemes. This should not be taken to mean that word and

83. Cf. J. BROUGH, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

84. See footnotes 5-10.

85. *VP.* 1.1-2.

86. *Ibid.*, II.1:

आख्यातशब्दः संघातो जातिः संघातवर्तिनी ।

एकोऽनवयवः शब्दः क्रमो बुद्ध्यनुसंहतिः ॥

87. *Ibid.*, 1.73.

sentence are over and above the phonemes at the articulatory and auditory levels of language. (iii) With reference to the perception of speech-unit also, the term *śabda* is used by Bhartṛhari⁸⁸. It is in this last aspect, that *śabda* may be *sphoṭa*. When the speech-unit intends to represent the significative value attached to it, it is meaning-bearing speech-unit, but when it intends to represent the differentiating sound-values attached to it, it is the *sphoṭa*. Since *śabda* is a two-sided entity, one side of it is the *sphoṭa* while the other side is *arthavatsvarūpa*. In its former capacity the speech-unit might be auditorily grasped, but not necessarily understood semantically. The word *sphoṭa* reflects the relationship between the words and their constituents at the level of distinctive function of language. The perception of *sphoṭa* enables the listener to grasp the sound-pattern of language even without apprehension of the meaning. The term *sphoṭa* stands for a single phoneme or sound-pattern, subjected to the listener's ear, which may or may not be meaning-bearing. It is in this sense that Bhartṛhari, while describing the nature of *dhvani*, has used the term *śabda*⁸⁹. Similarly, while commenting on Patañjali's definition of *śabda*, he has used the word *sphoṭa* in the sense of signifying word's own phonetic shape⁹⁰. He clearly states there the two-fold function of word: significative and distinctive (self-revealing nature). Only in its latter aspect *śabda* is *sphoṭa*.

88. 1.44, 1.54, 1.59 etc.

89. *VP*. 1.77, 103, 104 etc.

90. *Mahābhāṣyaḍṭipikā*, *ABORI*, Vol. XLIII, p. 3: यो वाज्य-मुच्चार्यते क्रमवान् अवरः कश्चिदन्यः अक्रमः शब्दात्मा बुद्धिस्थो विगाहते तस्मादर्थप्रतिपत्तिः । कुतः । यथैवार्थान्तरनिबन्धनो नार्थान्तरं प्रत्याययति एवं स्वरूपनिबन्धनो नोत्सहते प्रत्याययितुम् । अन्ये तु मन्यन्ते । यथा वर्णेषु वर्णतुरीया भागा वर्णजातिं व्यञ्जयन्ति । एवं वर्णा वाक्यान्तरेषु ये

क्रमजन्मानः अयुगपत्कालास्ते तां पदस्थां वर्णजातिमभिव्यञ्जयन्ति । वृक्षशब्दो वृक्षत्वम् । जातेरर्थस्य प्रतिपत्तिः । एतच्चायं स्वरूपम् । स्फोटोऽयमेव शब्दात्मा नित्यः । ये तु क्रमजन्मानः अयुगपत्काला व्यक्तयो ध्वन्यात्मानस्ते इति । अन्ये मन्यन्ते द्विशक्तिः शब्द आत्मप्रकाशनेऽर्थप्रकाशने च समर्थः । यथा प्रदीपः आत्मानं प्रकाशयन् विध्यर्थान् प्रकाशयति । यस्त्वाध्यात्मिकः इन्द्रियाख्यः प्रकाशः स आत्मानमप्रकाशयन् बाह्यमर्थं प्रकाशयतीति ।

At the distinctive level of language, Bhartṛhari first makes distinction between *dhvani* and *sphoṭa*. *Sphoṭa* is not merely sound-entity, but it is a class of which the varied individual instances are *dhvanis*. *Sphoṭa* is not emitted sound, but it is auditorily perceived. *Sphoṭa* is opposed to *dhvani* as a class to individuals. *Sphoṭa* is not associated with the gross phonetic features of sound. The sound-producing movements reveal the *sphoṭa* in such a way that the listener enables himself to extract only the relevant distinctive class-features of sound by way of eliminating its non-distinctive individual variations. Therefore, *sphoṭa* is the revealed (*vyāṅgya*), whereas *dhvanis* are the revealer (*vyāñjaka*). To explain the distinction between *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* clearly, Bhartṛhari speaks of two aspects of *dhvani*: *prākṛtadhvani*: 'primary sound' and *vaikṛtadhvani*: 'secondary sound'. *Prākṛtadhvani* is a spoken sound produced by vocal organs which manifests the *sphoṭa*. The features of primary sounds are attributed somewhat wrongly to the abstract entity *sphoṭa* which is revealed through the primary sounds. To put it into modern terminology, which, of course, may not exactly correspond to Bhartṛhari's way of understanding, the sound endowed with primary features can be recognised as a part of the phonemic system of language. The *vaikṛtadhvanis* represent the secondary features of language. For their production the articulatory position is not directly responsible, but they are produced by the primary sounds (*śabdajāḥ śabdāḥ*). Helarāja calls them 'reverberation of sounds'. The secondary features, like speed of utterance, do not affect in any way the quality of the primary sound and *sphoṭa*, for they are produced from the primary sounds after the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. Therefore, the secondary features are not even wrongly superimposed on the abstract sound-entity *sphoṭa*. To put it into modern terminology,

the secondary features do not form part of the phonemic system of language.

From the foregoing discussion it will be clear that, according to Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, the term *sphoṭa* may refer to a single phoneme or a sound-pattern, which is revealed by *dhvani*. *Sphoṭa* as the indivisible meaning-bearing eternal word is nowhere suggested in either Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* or Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*. I do not see anything mysterious in the *sphoṭa* doctrine. The great masters Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, while making pronouncements on *sphoṭa*, are not engaged in irrational speculations. However, the later grammarians regard the *sphoṭa* as an indivisible meaningful eternal word from which the whole universe evolves. One may see that their way of describing *sphoṭa* is almost parallel to that of describing the supreme reality. All the elaborate terminology—*Brahman*, *sattā*, *avyakta*, *śakti*, *avidyā* etc.—is employed by later grammarians to describe the nature of *sphoṭa*. All this confusion arises on their part—as I have already explained in great detail—because they identify the metaphysical concept of *śabda* with the doctrine of *sphoṭa*. Another possible reason for misunderstanding Bhartṛhari's text is that he packs his arguments into small pithy verses which deal with metaphysical, linguistic and semantic doctrines side by side. This unusual mixture has resulted in diverse interpretations of his teaching. Accordingly, Bhartṛhari's linguistic doctrine is quite forgotten in the wake of metaphysical and semantic philosophy of language.

To conclude our discussion on Bhartṛhari, if one were allowed to cut across the terminological tangle, which has been involved in Bhartṛhari's thought, one may differentiate the linguistic elements from the non-linguistic semantics on the one hand, and the metaphysics of the *Vākyapadīya* on the other. The later

commentators, in my opinion, might have failed to draw the distinction between the linguistic interpretation and the philosophical thought of Bhartṛhari. Subsequently, the *sphoṭa* doctrine has assumed a new interpretation at the hands of grammarians, logicians and literary critics.

Sphoṭa—the views of later grammarians:

What is the *nimitta* of *śābdabodha* (verbal knowledge)? How does the listener grasp the meaning of a sentence? How is the meaning of a sentence communicated? Does the division of a sentence into words and that of words into their grammatical components concern the listener? When the listener grasps the meaning of a sentence, does he account for the inter-relation of the words in the sentence and of the phonemes constituting the word? Is a sentence to be regarded as the single meaning-bearing symbol? Or is it made up of different sound-units arranged in a particular order? These are the various questions which have puzzled the Indian philosophers since a long time and have been answered differently by Indian thinkers.

The grammarians (*sphoṭavādins*) hold that the sentence-*sphoṭa* conveys the meaning of a sentence which is a single meaning-bearing unit indivisible into smaller grammatical components and into phonemes. The *sphoṭa* has no time-order even if we dissolve it into smaller units at the descriptive level of language. On the authority of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (1.44), the later grammarians maintain the two-fold aspect of a word:⁹¹ *dhvani* and *sphoṭa*, viz. (i) the phonetic aspect of a word which forms the structure of expression and (ii) the semantic aspect of a word which is connected with meaning. In fact,

91. K. K. RAJA, *op. cit.*, p. 117.