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By the very same reasoning “being a linguistic expression” should also be considered to be refuted. For no awareness shines forth that finds in the phonemes *k* and *g* a single recurrent representational content. And as for the linguistic expression “linguistic expression” itself, that comes to be used only under the condition (*upādhi*) of being audible; in no way can it allow us to postulate a natural kind. What has been said, namely that “being a linguistic expression,” which comes to have a content through various characterizations insofar as it is based on a sound that manifests the specific properties of particular linguistic expressions, suits the understanding of their associated meanings” — that is also refuted.¹

By the very same maneuver we have countered natural kinds such as “being a brāhmaṇa.” For it is not the case that a cognition appears which establishes a single representational content for itself that is something besides “being a human” which exists in various individual men and women. For even upon reflection apply themselves, they will not cognize a single representational content that recurs in every brāhmaṇa that is absent from Kṣatriyas and so on. Now as for what has been said, namely, that although one cannot determine whether someone is a brāhmaṇa on [101]

1. Source unknown to me.

the basis of a momentary consideration, nevertheless that determination simply appears when one has a cognition resulting from reflection on the person's connection to a mother and father who are themselves brāhmaṇas:² that, too, contradicts what we actually experience to be the case (*svamānasavisamvādi*). Even even upon reflection, who indeed is able to cognize this connection with a mother and father as a single representational content?

As for what was mentioned earlier, namely, that ghee, once it is melted, though it is not separated from oil, can nevertheless be understood as distinct from it by the visual faculty operating together with one's sense of smell—that is not very bright. For it is not the case that, at that time, our visual consciousness exceeds the objects of sensation. Rather, our cognition of ghee is simply an inference. If, however, a person with excellent sight is capable of examining the form, however subtle it may be, he can perceive the natural class of ghee visually, without having to rely on smell.

One might object that we have given up too much. For in that case, on what basis can we determine who is eligible to perform rituals that require the *āhavanīya* fire and so on?³ And on what basis do we apply the word “brāhmaṇa” to some people and not to others?

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Here is our answer. In *saṃsāra*, which has no beginning, there are just certain lineages of men and women that are set apart by their relationships of who begets whom (*janya-janaka-bhāvāna vyavasthitāḥ*), and the individual men and women who are born by mutual intercourse between those lineages are called by the name “brāhmaṇas.” And because a given generation could never be said to be the first in a lineage,⁴ all of them came to be called by the name “brāhmaṇas” on the grounds

2. This is Kumāṛila's position, sketched in the *Arthavāda* section (1.1.2) of the *Explanation of the System*.
3. I.e., rituals which only Brāhmaṇas, who are instructed to install the *āhavanīya* fire, can perform.
4. *anidamprathamatayā ca santatēḥ*.

that he was the forefather of the lineage.⁵ Therefore being born in a particular lineage is the condition (*upādhi*) for the use of the linguistic expression “brāhmaṇa.” And there is nothing wrong with saying that only those who are born in such lineages are eligible to perform sacrifices.

Now what are these particular lineages? They cannot actually be enumerated, but those that are well-known on the basis of worldly life can be accepted (*lōkata ēva prasiddhāḥ pratyētavyāḥ*). But how are we to understand that someone was in fact born in such a lineage, given the possibility that women are unfaithful? For there are in fact some women who run after men and act unfaithfully toward their husbands. Here is our answer: it’s said that absence is just when you don’t observe something that can be observed. In worldly life we take it to be justified that, when the total assemblage of apperception is present, and still the deviant behavior of women cannot be observed, such deviant behavior does not in fact exist. Moreover, there is really no scope for imagining deviant behavior on the part of women who are to be guarded with great care. But if there is, then of course we will not determine their children to have been born within that lineage. Nor is it right to say, merely on this basis, that no such determination is possible even in those cases where it is possible.

And as for what some people maintain, namely that among many different flames, which exist as individuals, there is a class category called “being a flame” which belongs to the domain of recognition (*pratyabhijñāgōcaraḥ*), our *guru* would not stand for this, either. He has analyzed the matter as follows. The seed of our imagination of a class category is a cognition that is not otherwise established. This cognition, however, is only possible when one does not grasp differences, just as [103] when we understand silver with reference to mother-of-pearl, and hence it is not capable of establishing a universal. Therefore there is nothing wrong with saying that our recourse, in a provisional way, to natural

5. “he”: i.e., Brahma. Although Śālikanātha does not accept the creation of the world, least of all by a creator god, he explains the name by popular etymology.

kinds among different individuals happens when we first apprehend differences but then do not cognize those differences.

This is the essay that Śālikanātha
made up his mind to make, called
The Ascertainment of Natural Kinds,
refuting various contrary views
with careful attention.

Here ends the fourth essay, called *The Ascertainment of Natural Kinds*,
in the *Commentarial Essays* composed by Mahā-
mahōpadhyāya Śālikanātha Mīśra.