

Dignāga, On Perception,

being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's

Pramāṇasamuccaya

from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions

Translated and annotated

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SECTION 1. EXPOSITION OF THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION

- A. k. 1. Saluting Him, who is the personification of the means of cognition, who seeks the benefit of [all] living beings, who is the teacher, the *sugata*, the protector, I shall, for the purpose of establishing the means of valid cognition, compose the [*Pramāṇa*]-*samuccaya*, uniting here under one head my theories scattered [in many treatises].¹

At² the beginning of the treatise, here [in this verse], I express praise in honor of the Worshipful [Buddha] in order to produce in [the hearts of] men faith in Him who, because of His perfection in cause (*hetu*) and effect (*phala*), is to be regarded as the personification of the means of cognition (*pramāṇa-bhūta*).³ There [in the above statement], “cause” means perfection in intention (*āśaya*) and perfection in practice (*prayoga*). Perfection in intention means the [Buddha’s] taking as His purpose the benefit of [all] living beings (*jagad-dhītaiṣitā*). Perfection in practice means [His] being the [true] teacher (*śāstrīva*) because He teaches all people. “Effect” means the attainment of His own objectives (*svārtha*) as well as those of others (*parārtha*). Attainment of His own objectives is [evidenced] by [His] being *sugata* in the following three senses:⁴ (i) that of being praiseworthy (*praśastatva*), as is a handsome person (*surūpa*),⁵ (ii) the sense of being beyond a return [to *samsāra*] (*apunar-āvṛtṭy-artha*), as one who is fully cured of a fever (*sunāṣṭa-jvara*), and (iii) the sense of being complete (*niḥśeṣārtha*), as is a jar wholly filled (*supūrṇa-ghaṭa*). These three senses [of His title “*sugata*”] distinguish the Buddha’s attainment of His own objectives from that of non-Buddhists of subdued passions (*vīta-rāga*), from the attainment of those who are undergoing religious training (*śaikṣa*), and from that of those who are no longer in need of religious training (*aśaikṣa*).⁶ Attainment of the objectives of others is [seen from His] being a protector (*tāyīva*) in the sense of [His] saving the world.

Saluting the teacher who is endowed with such merits, the author will compose the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* or the Collected Writings on the Means of Cognition by gathering [passages] from the *Nyāyamukha* and other of his treatises⁷ in order to establish the means of valid cognition. The purpose [of the work] is to reject the theories concerning the means of cognition maintained by others and to

elucidate the virtues in his own theories concerning the means of cognition,⁸ since there are divergent opinions with regard to [the nature, number, object, and result of] the means of cognition,⁹ on which depends the clear understanding of the object to be cognized.¹⁰

B. Now,

k. $2a-b_1$. the means of cognition are [immediate and mediate, namely,] perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).¹¹

They are only two,¹² because

k. $2b_2-c_1$. the object to be cognized has [only] two aspects.¹³

Apart from the particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) there is no other object to be cognized, and we shall prove that perception has only the particular for its object and inference only the universal.¹⁴

What¹⁵, then, of those [cognitions] which cognize a thing of color, etc., in such an aspect as evanescent, etc.,¹⁶ or which repeatedly (*asakṛt*) cognize one and the same object?¹⁷

Certainly there are such cognitions, but

k. $2c_2-d_1$. there is no [need for admitting an] other separate means of cognition for [cognizing] the combination of the [two] above-mentioned [aspects of the object];¹⁸

[In the case of the cognition which cognizes a thing of color, etc., as noneternal, firstly,] one cognizes the inexpressible particularity (*avyapadeśya* = *svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), color-ness (*varṇatva*). Then, by means of the operation of the mind (*manas*), one relates [the color-ness] to [the universal,] noneternity (*anityatā*), and expresses [the resulting cognition in the judgment] "the thing of color, or the like, is noneternal."¹⁹ Hence [for this kind of cognition] there is no need of any other means of cognition.

k. $2d_2-3a$. nor [is there any need for a separate means of cognition] in the case of recognizing (*abhijñāna*) [an object] again and again;²⁰

Although there are cognitions which repeatedly cognize one and the same object, [cognitions of that sort require] no [postulate of a] separate means of cognition.²¹ Why?

k. $3b_1$. because [if a separate means of cognition were to be accepted as necessary, then] there would occur the fallacy of infinity (*aniṣṭhā*).²²

If every sort of cognizing were [to involve] a [different] means of valid cognition, the means of valid cognition would have to be infinite in number.

k. 3b₂. for instance, [such mental faculties as] recollection (*smṛta*) and the like [would have to be recognized as separate means of valid cognition].²²

The word “*smṛta*” [in the verse] has the same meaning as “*smṛti*” (recollection).²³ Such mental faculties as recollection, desire (*icchā*), anger (*dveṣa*), etc., since they operate on an object once cognized, are not independent means of valid cognition. So, here [recognition should not be considered as a separate means of valid cognition].²⁴

Q. Among these [two means of cognition]

k. 3c. perception (*pratyakṣa*) is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanā*);²⁵

The cognition in which there is no conceptual construction is perception. What, then, is this conceptual construction?

k. 3d. the association of name (*nāman*), genus (*jāti*), etc. [with a thing perceived, which results in verbal designation of the thing].²⁶

In the case of arbitrary words (*yadṛcchā-śabda*, proper nouns), a thing (*artha*) distinguished by a name (*nāman*) is expressed by a word [such as] “*ḍiṭṭha*.” In the case of genus-words (*jāti-śabda*, common nouns), a thing distinguished by a genus is expressed by a word [such as] “*go*” (cow). In the case of quality-words (*guṇa-śabda*, adjectives), a thing distinguished by a quality is expressed by a word [such as] “*śukla*” (white). In the case of action-words (*kriyā-śabda*, verbal nouns), a thing distinguished by an action is expressed by a word [such as] “*pācaka*” (a cook, to cook). In the case of substance-words (*dravya-śabda*), a thing distinguished by a substance is expressed by a word [such as] “*daṇḍin*” (a staff-bearer) or “*viṣāṇin*” (horned, a horn-bearer).²⁷

Here, [with regard to action-words and substance-words,] some maintain that what is expressed [by the words “*pācaka*,” “*daṇḍin*,” etc.] is [a thing] distinguished by a relationship [such as that of an action to its agent, that of a substance to its possessor, and the like].²⁸

On the other hand, some others hold that what is expressed [in all these cases] is a thing qualified only by words which denote no real entity (*arthasūnya-śabda*).²⁹

[In any case,] that which is devoid of such conceptual construction is perception.³⁰

Daa-1. For what reason, then, is it [viz., perception] called “*pratyakṣa*”

[literally, belonging to each sense-organ (*akṣa*)] and not “*pratiṣaya*” [literally, belonging to each object], despite the fact that it is dependent on both [the sense-organ and the object]?³¹

k. 4ab. it is named after the sense-organs because they are its specific cause (*asādhāraṇa-hetu*).³²

[It is] not [named] after the object such as color, etc. The reason is that the object is common (*sādhāraṇa*) [to many cases], for it is a cause of mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) and perceptions in other persons (*anya-saṁtānika-vijñāna*) [as well as of one's own perception]. We find that a designation is generally by means of a specific [cause]; for example, [we use expressions like] “the sound of a drum” or “a sprout of barley” [to indicate a certain sound or a certain sprout, instead of calling it “the sound of a stick” or “a sprout of the earth,” although the stick or the earth is also a cause].³³

Thus, it is established that perception is free from conceptual construction.³⁴

Daa-2. In an Abhidharma treatise, too, the following is stated:³⁵ “One who has the ability to perceive perceives something blue (*nīlam vijānāti*), but does not conceive that ‘this is blue’ (*nīlam iti vijānāti*).”³⁶ “In respect to an object, he has the sense of the object itself (*artha-saṁjñin*), but does not possess any notion of its name (*dharma-saṁjñin*).”³⁷

Dab. If perception is absolutely devoid of conceptual construction, then why is it [stated in the Abhidharma treatise] that “the five kinds of sense-cognition take aggregates [of atoms] as their object”?³⁸ [An aggregate (*saṁcita*) of atoms is cognizable only by the conceptual construction which binds together the perceptions of several individual atoms. It seems, therefore, incongruous to hold that perception is free from conceptual construction and yet cognizes an aggregate of atoms.] Again, it is mentioned [in the Abhidharma treatise] that “these [sense-cognitions] take a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) as their object insofar as it is the particular in the form of a [cognizable] sphere (*āyatana-svalakṣaṇa*) and not in the form of a [component] substance [viz., an atom] (*dravya-svalakṣaṇa*).”³⁹ How is this to be understood?

k. 4cd. there [in the above-cited Abhidharma passages], that [perception], being caused by [the sense-organ through its contact with] many objects [in aggregation], takes the whole (*sāmānya*) as its sphere of operation in respect to its own object.⁴⁰

Since it [viz., perception] is caused by [the sense-organ through its contact with] many substances [viz., atoms in aggregation], it is said, in respect to its sphere of operation, that it takes the whole as its object; but [the sense is] not [that it operates] by conceptually constructing a unity within that which is many and

separate.⁴¹ [Therefore, the definition that perception is free from conceptual construction is not inconsistent with the statements in the Abhidharma treatises.]

Dac. Further, we hold:⁴²

k. 5. a thing possessing many properties cannot be cognized in all its aspects by the sense. The object of the sense is the form which is to be cognized [simply] as it is and which is inexpressible.⁴³

Thus, in any case, perception caused by the five kinds of sense-organs is devoid of conceptual construction (*avikalpaka*).

Here our distinguishing [various kinds of perception] is in response to the view of others. However, all [kinds of perception] are indeed free from conceptual construction.⁴⁴

Db. k. 6ab. there is also mental [perception, which is of two kinds:] awareness of an [external] object and self-awareness of [such subordinate mental activities as] desire and the like, [both of which are] free from conceptual construction.⁴⁵

The mental [perception] which, taking a thing of color, etc., for its object, occurs in the form of immediate experience (*anubhava*) is also free from conceptual construction.⁴⁶ The self-awareness (*sva-samvedana*) of desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain, etc., is [also recognized as] mental perception because it is not dependent on any sense-organ.⁴⁷

Dc. Likewise,

k. 6cd. the yogin's intuition of a thing in itself unassociated (*avyatibhinna*) with the teacher's instruction [is also a type of perception].⁴⁸

The yogin's intuition which is not associated (*avyavakīṛṇa*) with any conceptual construction of the *āgama* (the authoritative words of the teachers) and which apprehends only a thing in itself is also perception.⁴⁹

Dd. If the self-awareness of desire, etc., is perception, then even the awareness of conceptual construction (*kalpanā-jñāna*) should be considered as perception.⁵⁰ Indeed it is so.

k. 7ab. even conceptual construction, when it is brought to internal awareness, is admitted [as a type of perception]. However, with regard to the [external] object, [the conceptual construction is] not [admissible as perception], because it conceptualizes [the object].⁵¹

When it [viz., conceptual construction] is directed toward an object, it is not perception, any more than desire or the like.⁵² However, the internal awareness [of conceptual construction] is not [itself a conceptual construction], and hence there is no harm [in admitting it as a type of perception].

E. k. 7cd-8ab. erroneous cognition, cognition of empirical reality, inference, its result, recollection, and desire are not true perceptions and are accompanied by obscurity (*sataimira*).⁵³

Erroneous cognition (*bhrānti-jñāna*) is not a true perception because it arises conceptually constructing, for example, water, etc., out of such things as vapor floating over sand. Cognition of empirical reality (*saṃvṛti-saj-jñāna*) is not a true perception because it superimposes something extraneous upon things which are only empirically true (*saṃvṛti-sat*), and thus functions through the conceptualization of forms of these [extraneous things]. Inference and [the cognition which is] its result, etc., are not perceptions because they arise through the conceptualization of what formerly has been perceived.⁵⁴

F. And

k. 8cd. [we call the cognition itself] "*pramāṇa*" [literally, a means of cognizing], because it is [usually] conceived to include the act [of cognizing], although primarily it is a result.⁵⁵

Here we do not admit, as the realists do, that the resulting cognition (*pramāṇa-phala*) differs from the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).⁵⁶ The resulting cognition arises bearing in itself the form of the cognized object and [thus] is understood to include the act [of cognizing] (*saṃvṛtī*). For this reason, it is metaphorically called *pramāṇa*, the means of cognition,⁵⁷ although it is [ultimately speaking] devoid of activity (*vyāpāra*).⁵⁸ For instance, an effect is said to assume the form of its cause when it arises in conformity with its cause, although [in fact] it is devoid of the act [of assuming the form of its cause].⁵⁹ Similar is the case with this [resulting cognition].

G. k. 9a. or [it can be maintained that] the self-cognition or the cognition cognizing itself (*svasaṃvṛtti*) is here the result [of the act of cognizing]—⁶⁰

Every cognition is produced with a twofold appearance, namely, that of itself [as subject] (*svābhāsa*) and that of the object (*viśayābhāsa*). The cognizing of itself as [possessing] these two appearances or the self-cognition (*svasaṃvṛtti*) is the result [of the cognitive act].⁶¹ Why?

k. 9b. because the determination of the object (*artha-niścaya*) conforms with it [viz., with the self-cognition].⁶²

When a cognition possessing [the form of] an object (*saviṣayam jñānam*) is itself the object to be cognized, then, in accordance with the nature of the self-cognition, one conceives that [secondary] object (*artha*) as something either desirable or undesirable.⁶³

When, on the other hand, only an external thing is [considered to be] the object, then

k. 9c-d₁. the means of cognizing it is simply [the cognition's] having the form of the object;

For, in this case, we overlook the true nature of the cognition as that which is to be cognized by itself, and [claim that] its having the form of a thing is our means of knowing that [thing]. Why? Because [we may say of] the thing [that]

k. 9d₂. it is known only through this [viz., through the cognition's having the form of it].

Whatever form of a thing appears in the cognition, as, for example, something white or non-white, it is an object in that form which is cognized.⁶⁴

Thus, [it should be understood that] the roles of the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and of the object to be cognized (*prameya*), corresponding to differences of [aspect of] the cognition, are [only] metaphorically attributed (*upacaryate*) to the respective [distinctive] factor in each case,⁶⁵ because [in their ultimate nature] all elements of existence, [being instantaneous,] are devoid of function (*nirvyāpāra*).⁶⁶

The same idea is stated [in the following verse].

k. 10. whatever the form in which it [viz., a cognition] appears, that [form] is [recognized as] the object of cognition (*prameya*). The means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and [the cognition which is] its result (*phala*) are respectively the form of subject [in the cognition] and the cognition cognizing itself. Therefore, these three [factors of cognition] are not separate from one another.⁶⁷

Ha. How, then, is it understood that cognition has two forms?⁶⁸

k. 11ab. that cognition has two forms is [known] from the difference between the cognition of the object and the cognition of that [cognition];⁶⁹

The cognition which cognizes the object, a thing of color, etc., has [a twofold appearance, namely,] the appearance of the object and the appearance of itself [as subject]. But the cognition which cognizes this cognition of the object has [on the one hand] the appearance of that cognition which is in conformity with

the object and [on the other hand] the appearance of itself. Otherwise, if the cognition of the object had only the form of the object, or if it had only the form of itself, then the cognition of cognition would be indistinguishable from the cognition of the object.⁷⁰

Hb. Further, [if the cognition had only one form, either that of the object or of itself,] then the object which was cognized by a preceding cognition could not appear in a succeeding cognition. Why? Because that [object of the preceding cognition does not exist when the succeeding cognition arises and] could not be the object of the latter.⁷¹ Hence it is proved that cognition has two forms.

Hc-1. [That cognition has two forms follows]

k. 11c. later also from [the fact of] recollection—⁷²

This [expression] “later also from [the fact of] recollection” (in *k. 11c*) refers back to “cognition has two forms” (in *k. 11ab*). Some time after [we have perceived a certain object], there occurs [to our mind] the recollection of our cognition as well as the recollection of the object. So it stands that cognition is of two forms.⁷³ Self-cognition is also [thus established].⁷⁴ Why?

k. 11d. because it [viz., recollection] is never of that which has not been [previously] experienced.⁷⁵

It is unheard of to have a recollection of something without having experienced [it before]. For instance, the recollection of a thing of color, etc. [does not arise unless the thing of color or the like has been experienced].

Hc.2. Some may hold that cognition also, like a thing of color, etc., is cognized by means of a separate cognition.⁷⁶ This is not true because

k. 12a-b₁. if a cognition were cognized by a separate cognition, there would be an infinite regression—⁷⁷

An infinite regression would result if a cognition were to be cognized by a separate cognition.⁷⁸ Why?


k. 12b₂. because there is a recollection of this [separate cognition] too.⁷⁹

It must be admitted that this cognition by which the [previous] cognition is cognized is [also] later recollected. [The later recollection of this separate cognition does not arise unless it is experienced.] So, if it should be that this [separate] cognition is experienced by the third cognition [so that it may be recollected], there would be an infinite regression.

Hc-3. *k. 12cd.* [further,] in such a case, there could be no motion [of cognition] from one object to another. But actually such [a movement of cognition] is accepted.⁸⁰

Therefore, self-cognition must be admitted. It itself is a result [of the act of cognizing].

In this way it is established that perception is free from conceptual construction.



NOTES

Section 1. Exposition of the Theory of Perception

1.1. *Vibhūti*, p. 518.26–27 (cf. p. 108¹):

*pramāṇa-bhūtāya jagad-dhitaṣiṇe
praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine
pramāṇa-siddhyai sva-matāt samuccayah
kariṣyate viprasrtād ihaikataḥ.*

PVBh, p. 3.6 and *AKV*, p. 7.5–6 quote the first half of this verse.


Dignāga and his successors are generally called the *Vijñānavādins* of the logical tradition (*nyāyānusāriṇo vijñānavādinah*), as distinguished from the *Vijñānavādins* of the Scriptural tradition (*āgamānusāriṇo vijñānavādinah*), by which appellation the older teachers of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school are called; see Obermiller, *The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation*, p. 99. Unlike his predecessors, Dignāga does not accept the unconditional authority of Scripture. According to him, the words of the Buddha must be subjected to critical test before they are accepted as valid. This critical attitude he inherited from the Buddha, who used to exhort His disciples not to accept any of His words merely out of reverence but to examine them carefully, just as people examine the purity of gold by burning it in fire, cutting it, and testing it on a touchstone; see *TSP*, p. 12.19–20:

*tāpāc chedāc ca nikaṣāt suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ
parīkṣya bhikṣavo grāhyam mad-vaco na tu gauravāt.*

See also Stcherbatsky, *Bud. Log.*, I, 77; Mookerjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, pp. xl ff. Dignāga is convinced that he is following the teaching of the Buddha in expounding the theory of knowledge. He begins his treatise with a salutation to the Buddha who “is to be recognized as the personification of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa-bhūta*)”; see below, n. 1.3. It is reported by Bu-ston that Dignāga inscribed this verse on a rock in a cavern. As he recorded his praise of the Buddha and his determination to establish the true theory of knowledge, various omens are said to have appeared; see Obermiller, *History of Buddhism (Chos-hbyun)* by Bu-ston, part II, p. 150. No inscription, however, has so far been discovered to attest to the authenticity of this report. Dharmakīrti attaches great importance to this verse, by which, he thinks, the essential standpoint of the Bauddha Logicians is made clear. In *PV*, he gives a detailed explanation of each epithet of the Buddha mentioned in Dignāga’s verse (see n. 1.2). In consequence, the verses discussing the *pramāṇa-siddhi* (establishment of the means of valid cognition) form a separate chapter independent of the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* in *PV*.

1.2. For this passage of the *Vṛtti*, see *PVBh*, p. 3.12–18: *atra bhagavato hetu-phala-sampattyā pramāṇa-bhūtatvena stotrābhīdhanām śāstrādaḥ . . . tatra hetu-āśaya-prayoga-sampat. . . āśayo jagad-dhītaiṣitā. prayogo jagac chāsanāt śāstrītvam. phalaṁ sva-parārtha-sampat. svārtha-sampat sugatatvena trividham artham upādāya, praśastatvaṁ surūpavat [text: svarūpavat], apunarāvṛtṭy-artham sunaṣṭa-jvaravat, niḥśeṣārtham supūrṇa-ghaṭavat. parārtha-sampat jagat-tāraṇāt tāyītvam. . . evaṁ-bhūtaṁ bhagavantaṁ praṇamya . . . pramāṇādhiṇo hi pramēyādhiḡamo . . .* See also *ibid.*, pp. 115.31–32, 116.5–6.

The following table sums up Dignāga's praise of the Buddha as expressed in *k. 1* and its *Vṛtti*. The figures in parentheses indicate the verses of *PV*, *II*, dealing with the same topic.



See M. Nagatomi, "The Framework of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Book I," *JAOS*, 79, 266; E. Frauwallner, "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti's," *Asiatica: Festschrift Friedrich Weller*, Leipzig, 1954, p. 143.

1.3. The term "*pramāṇa-bhūta*" is used in a double sense. First, it means "authoritative" or "standard," and in this sense the Buddha (*Bodhisattva Siddhārtha*) is called "*pramāṇa-bhūta*" in the *Lalitavistara*, ed. Lefmann, pp. 319.3 ff.: *atha khalu . . . sthāvarā-nāma mahā-prihivī-devatā . . . bodhisattva etad avocat . . . tvam eva sadevakasya lokasya parama-sākṣi-bhūtaḥ pramāṇa-bhūtaś cēti*. Dignāga characterizes the authoritativeness of the Buddha as *hetu-phala-sampad*. Second, it has the more technical meaning, "to have come into existence" (*bhūta*) as a "means of valid cognition" (*pramāṇa*). According to Jinendrabuddhi, the Buddha has a similarity (*sādharmya*) to *pramāṇa*, since he is *avisarṇvāda* and has made known the truth of *catur-ārya-satya* which was not known, just as *pramāṇas* are *avisarṇvāda* and make known an unknown object (*anadhigatārtha-gaṇṭh*). He further remarks that "*-bhūta*" affixed to "*pramāṇa*" is meant to reject *īśvara* and other *pramāṇas* which are maintained by others to be eternal (*abhūta = nitya*); see *PST*, 2a.3 ff. (2b.4 ff.). See also *PVV*, p. 9.11 ff.: "*tadvat pramāṇaṁ bhagavān*" (*PV*, *II*, 9a). *tadvat bhagavān pramāṇam, yathābhīhitasya satya-catustayasyāvisarṇvādanāt tasyaiva parair ajñātasya prakāśanāc ca. yady evaṁ namaskāra-śloke pramāṇāyēty evāstu "pramāṇa-bhūtāya" iti kim artham ity āha, "abhūta-vinivṛttaye bhūtōktiḥ"* (*PV*, *II*, 9b–c). *bhūta-śabda-nirdeśo 'bhūtasya nityasya nivṛtṭy-artham nityam pramāṇaṁ nāstīty arthaḥ;*

Vibhūti, p. 102: *nityam īśvaram Naiyāyikāḥ āhuḥ, āsaṃsāram ekam pratisattvaṃ buddhiṃ pramāṇam āhuḥ Sāṃkhyāḥ*.

1.4. *Sugata* (lit., well-gone) is counted among the ten titles of the Buddha in the sense that He has well attained the enlightenment; see *Mvy.*, 1–10. This title of the Buddha is explained here as implying His three merits—*praśastatā*, *apunarāvṛtṭitva*, and *niḥśeṣatā*—which are, respectively, the attributes of *surūpa*, *sunāṣṭa-jvara*, and *supūrṇa-ghaṭa*, each of which contains the prefix “*su-*” as in “*su-gata*.” See *PVV*, p. 59.7–8: *su-śābdasya trividho ’rthaḥ, praśastatā surūpavat, apunarāvṛtṭiḥ sunāṣṭa-jvaravat* [text: *anaṣṭa-°*], *niḥśeṣatā cā supūrṇa-ghaṭavat* [text: *apūrṇa-°*]; *DhP*, p. 3.11 ff. See also *PV*, II, 141cd–147ab. Manorathanandin explains that *praśastatā* distinguishes the Buddha from *bāhya-vīta-rāgas*, *apunarāvṛtṭitva* from *śaikṣas*, and *niḥśeṣatā* from *āśaikṣas*; see *PVV*, p. 107.5–8: *ye laukika-bhāvanā-mārgena vīta-rāgā bāhyā atattva-darśinas tebhyaḥ tattva-darśitvād adhikāḥ. ye śaikṣā abāhyāḥ parihāṇi-dharmāṇas tebhyaḥ ’punarāvṛtṭiyā. ye cāśaikṣāḥ śrāvakā aprahīṇa-kleśa-vāsanā asākṣāt-kṛta-sarvākāra-vastavas tebhyaḥ niḥśeṣa-pratītyā*.

1.5. *Mahāvastu*, I, 92, 13, and *Avadānaśataka*, I, 188, 1 ff., relate the story of Surūpa, a legendary king, who, in exchange for religious instruction, gave up his son, his wife, and himself to be eaten by an ogre. His religious ardor is praiseworthy. However, here “*surūpa*” is to be taken as a common noun according to Durvekamiśra, who states, in explaining “*praśastatā*,” that those who make a living by their beauty of form are called *surūpa*; see *DhP*, p. 3.15: *surūpā rūpā-jivāḥ*. Dharmakīrti explains the meaning of “*praśasta*” (< *pra-√śas*ms, to praise) by the word “*śasta*” (< *√śas*, to destroy) in *PV*, II, 142ab:

duḥkhasya śastam nairātmya-dṛṣṭeś ca yuktito ’pi vā.

1.6. There are eight classes of “sage” (*ārya-puṅgava*) among the Buddhist disciples (*śrāvaka*), namely, *srotāpatti-pratipannaka*, °*-phalaka*, *sakṛdāgami-pratipannaka*, °*-phalaka*, *anāgami-pratipannaka*, °*-phalaka*, *arhat-pratipannaka*, and *arhat*. Of these, *arhat* is called *āśaikṣa*, because he has extinguished the influence of passions (*āsrava-kṣaya*) and no longer needs religious training. The other seven, who are to study further in order to attain *arhathood*, are called *śaikṣa*; *AK(Bh)*, ch. VI.

1.7. Among Dignāga’s works now available (see my Introduction), the same theories expounded in *PS(V)* are found in *Abhidharmakośa-Marmadīpa* (see below, nn. 1.31–33, 39, passim), *Ālambanap.* (see below, nn. 1.61, 2.17), *Hetucakraḍamaru* (see *PS(V)*, III, K 131a.5–132a.2, V 45b.5–46a.7=48b.5–49b.1), and *NMukh*. As will be noted, many verses and passages of *NMukh* are found rearranged in *PS(V)*; see Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*.

1.8. In each chapter of this treatise, Dignāga, after elucidating his own theory, refutes the views of the *Vādaividhi* and those of the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṃkhyas, and Mīmāṃsakas.

1.9. The theories maintained by other schools contradict one another in their discussion of the number (*sāṃkhyā*), the nature (*svarūpa*), the object (*viśaya*, *go-cara*), and the result (*phala*) of the means of cognition; see *PST*, 11b.1 (13a.4–5):

“hgal baḥi rtogs pa (= *viruddha-pratipatti*) ni log par rtogs pa (= *vipratipatti*) rnam te, phan tshun hgal baḥi mtshan ṇid byed paḥi phyr ro”; *ibid.*, 11b.7 (13b.4): “de la ḥbras bu daṇ raṇ gi ṇo bo daṇ yul daṇ graṇs la log par rtogs pa bṣi rnam te.” See also *TSP*, p. 366.14: *tatra pramāṇe svarūpa-phala-gocara-samkhyāsu pareṣāṃ vipratipattis catur-vidhā*; *PVV*, p. 110.6; *NBT*, p. 35.1 ff. Dignāga’s theory is unique on each of these four points: (1) He recognizes perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) as the only two means of cognition, and does not admit verbal testimony (*śabda*), identification (*upamāna*), etc. as independent means of cognition; see below, n. 1.11. (2) He characterizes perception as “being free from conceptual construction” (*kalpanāpoḍha*), and does not recognize determinate perception (*savikalpa-pratyakṣa*) as a kind of perception; see below, n. 1.25. (3) He sharply distinguishes the particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), which are respectively the objects of perception and inference. He denies the reality either of the universal as an independent entity or of the particular as qualified by the universal; see below, n. 1.14. (4) Rejecting the realist’s distinction between the means and the result of cognition, he establishes the theory of nondistinction between the two; see below, n. 1.55.

1.10. Dignāga’s statement that a clear understanding of *prameya* (= *artha*) depends upon *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇādhīnaḥ prameyādhigamaḥ*) has an affinity with the opening statement of *NBh*: *pramāṇato ’rtha-pratipattau pravṛtti-sāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam*. However, Dignāga differs radically from the Naiyāyikas in his understanding of the nature of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. While the Naiyāyikas hold the view that *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are real entities (*padārtha*), Dignāga shares the Vijñānavāda view that they are of ideated character; see below, n. 1.61. The possibility of apprehending *prameya* by means of *pramāṇa* is denied by Nāgārjuna on the ground that both, being mutually conditioned, lack independent substantiality; see *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, kk. 31–33; *Vaidalya-prakarāṇa*, Peking ed., 114b.4–6. Nāgārjuna’s argument is intended to reveal the transcendental truth of universal emptiness (*śūnyatā*). The Vijñānavādins, however, stress that the intuition of transcendental truth (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*, *lokōt-tara*°) is reflected in empirical knowledge which apprehends wordly phenomena (*savikalpa-jñāna*, *laukika*°). In such knowledge concerning wordly phenomena, *pramāṇa* and *prameya* must be postulated. On the basis of this Vijñānavāda doctrine, Dignāga establishes his theory of knowledge which asserts that both *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are factors immanent in knowledge itself; see below, n. 1.61. Accordingly, his theory does not conflict with Nāgārjuna’s argument against the substantiality of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. A later extreme transcendentalist, Candrakīrti, makes an attack on Dignāga’s proposition “*pramāṇādhīnaḥ prameyādhigamaḥ*,” asserting that there is nothing to be apprehended in the ultimate sense; see *Prasannap.*, p. 58.14 ff., but this criticism does not fundamentally affect Dignāga’s standpoint.

1.11. *PVBh*, p. 169.3; *Vibhūti*, p. 140²; *NC(V)*, p. 88.3 (18):

pratyakṣam anumānam ca pramāṇe

Dignāga gives the etymological explanation of *pratyakṣa* in *NMukh* as follows:

akṣam akṣam praiti vartata iti pratyakṣam (*pratyakṣa* is so named because it occurs in close connection with [*prati*] each sense faculty [*akṣa*]); cf. *NMukh*, p. 3b.17: 現現則轉故名現量, cited in *TSP*, p. 373.26; *DhP*, p. 38.26; *Prasannap.*, p. 72.1 ff. This etymology is repudiated by Candrakīrti on the ground that it could yield the absurd conclusion that cognition which has a sense-organ (*akṣa*) for its object (*prati*) is *pratyakṣa*; see *Prasannap.*, p. 72.1–3: *yas tv akṣam akṣam prati vartata iti pratyakṣa-śabdam vyutpādayati tasya jñānasyēndriyā- viṣayatvād viṣaya-viṣayatvāc ca na yuktā vyutpattiḥ*. (Stcherbatsky wrongly attributes Candrakīrti's citation to Praśastapāda, in *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, p. 159, n. 4. His definition of *pratyakṣa* differs slightly from that above; see *PBh*, p. 552.28: *akṣam akṣam pratītyōtpadyata iti pratyakṣam*.) The following Nyāya etymology might meet Candrakīrti's criticism: *akṣasyākṣasya prati-viṣayaṁ vrttiḥ pratyakṣam* (*pratyakṣa* is the function of each sense-organ [*akṣa*] toward [*prati*] its object). Actually Dignāga bases his etymological explanation upon the Abhidharmic doctrine that perception, although caused by sense and object, is named after the sense, which is its specific cause (*asādhāraṇa-hetu*), but not after the object. The above-cited etymology in *NMukh* is preceded by “*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇatvāt*” (*TSP*, p. 373.26); and Dignāga expresses the same thought in *PS(V)*; see below, Section 1, nn. 1.32, 1.33, and Section 6, *Db*. Besides *asādhāraṇa-kāraṇatva* of the sense, another reason for naming perception after the sense, viz., *āśrayatva* of the sense, is mentioned by Vasubandhu in *AK*, I, 45:

*tad-vikāra-vikāritvād āśrayāś cakṣur-ādayaḥ
ato 'sādhāraṇatvāc ca vijñānam tair nirucyate.*

The idea that the sense is the basis (*āśraya*) of perception is noticed in Dharmottara's etymology of *pratyakṣa*; see *NBT*, p. 38.1; *pratyakṣam iti pratigatam āśritam akṣam* (*pratyakṣa* means that [cognition] which belongs to or rests on a sense). However, the etymologies given by Dignāga and Dharmottara cannot include such cases as *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, *yogi-pratyakṣa*, and *svasamvedana*, which are independent of the sense. Hence Dharmottara distinguishes between the etymological origin and the actual meaning. After offering his etymology of the term “*pratyakṣa*,” he states that all sorts of direct awareness (*sākṣātkāri-jñāna*) are actually implied by the word “*pratyakṣa*”; see *NBT*, p. 38.3–6: *akṣāśritatvaṁ ca vyutpatti-nimittam śabdasya, na tu pravṛtti-nimittam. anena tv akṣāśritatven- aikārtha-samavetam artha-sākṣātkāritvaṁ lakṣyate. tad eva śabdasya pravṛtti-nimittam. tataś ca yat kimcid arthasya sākṣātkāri-jñānam tat pratyakṣam ucyate*; and *DhP*, p. 39.7–8: *atha pratigatam āśritam akṣam ity asyām api vyutpattau mānasa-svasamvedana-yogi-pratyakṣāṇām na syāt pratyakṣa-śabda-vācyatēty āha “akṣāśritatvaṁ . . .”*

Anumāna (*anu-√mā + ana*) literally means a means of cognition which is preceded by some other cognition. According to the Naiyāyikas, that which precedes *anumāna* is perception of a mark (*liṅga*) and of the invariable connection between this mark and its possessor (*liṅgin*); see *NBh*, ad I, i, 5: *liṅga-liṅginoh sambandha-darśanam liṅga-darśanam ca*. Thus, the prefix “*anu-*” is taken by the Naiyāyikas to mean “*paścāt*” (afterwards) or “*pūrvaka*” (preceded by); see *NS*, I, i, 5: *tat-pūrvakam trividham anumānam*; and *NBh*, ad I, i, 3: *mitena*

liṅgenârthasya paścân mānam anumānam. Dignāga, however, interprets differently the meaning of “*anu-*.” His definition of *anumāna* for one’s own self (*svârthānumāna*) is: “tshul gsum paḥi rtags las rjes su dpag par bya baḥi don (K: rjes su dpag paḥi don) mthoñ ba gañ yin pa de ni rañ gi don gyi rjes su dpag paḥo” (That apprehension of an object which is based upon the triple-conditioned inferential mark is *svârthānumāna*); *PSV*, II, K 109a.2–3, V 27a.5 (27b.7); see *NB*, II, 3: *tatra svârtham (anumānam) tri-rūpāl liṅgād yad anumeye jñānam tad anumānam*. The prefix “*anu-*” is thus replaced by the ablative case-ending and is taken as implying a logical ground.

Since Dignāga regards determinate perception (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*), which perceives a thing as associated with a universal (*jāti-viśiṣṭa-vyakṛti*), as a kind of *anumāna*, the terms “*pratyakṣa*” and “*anumāna*” in this treatise are to be understood as standing respectively for direct, unmediated cognition or immediate awareness and indirect, mediated cognition. In translating, for the sake of convenience, I employ the term “perception” as an equivalent for *pratyakṣa*, and “inference” for *anumāna*.

1.12. The number and kinds of means of cognition recognized by different schools of Indian philosophy are as follows: the Cārvākas, one means: perception (*pratyakṣa*); the Vaiśeṣikas, two means: perception and inference (*anumāna*); the Sāṃkhya and a branch of the Naiyāyikas, three means: verbal testimony (*śabda*), in addition to the above two; the Naiyāyikas, four means: identification (*upamāna*), together with the above three; the Prabhākara-Mīmāṃsakas, five means: implication (*arthāpatti*), in addition to the above four; the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins, six means: negation (*abhāva*), together with the above five; the Paurāṇikas, eight means; possibility (*sambhava*) and tradition (*aitihya*), together with the above six; see Randle, *Ind. Log.*, p. 305. The doctrines recognizing *aitihya*, *arthāpatti*, *sambhava*, and *abhāva* as independent means of cognition had been criticized in *NS*, II, ii, 1 ff., and in Dignāga’s day, the Nyāya theory of four means of cognition was the most authoritative. Among the Bauddhas, the author of the *Fang pien hsin lun* (T. 1632, *Upāyahrdaya* or *Prayogasāra*), a Hinayānist preceding Nāgārjuna, admits four means as maintained by the Naiyāyikas, and the older school of the Yogācāras excludes *upamāna* therefrom, without mentioning any reason.

Dignāga does not recognize *śabda* as an independent means of cognition. According to him, the cognition derived from *śabda* indicates its own object through the “exclusion of other objects” (*anyāpoha*). This process of excluding other objects is the function of *anumāna*; see *PS*, V, k. 1 (cited in *TSP*, p. 441.6–7, trans. in *Bud. Log.*, I, 459):

*na pramāṇāntaraṃ śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat
kṛtakatvādivat svârtham anyāpohena bhāṣate.*

As regards *upamāna*, Dignāga gives the following arguments: If the cognition identifying an object with its name is derived from hearsay, as, for example, from hearing the words “a *gavaya* is similar to a cow,” then the process of cognizing is just the same as in the case of *śabda*. If, on the other hand, the identification of the object with its name is made by the cognizant himself, then it must be admitted that he relates two things separately perceived through the operation

of the mind. This process of cognizing through the operation of the mind is *anumāna*. Hence *upamāna* cannot be recognized as an independent means of valid cognition; see *PSV*, V, K 169b.4–5, V 78a.5–6 (84a.2–3): “re ṣig ñe bar ḥjal ba ni ba lañ dañ ba min dag ḥdra bar rtogs pañi don can yin na, de la gšan las thos nas rtogs na sgra las byuñ ba yin la, rañ ñid kyis yin na ni don gñis tshad ma gšan gyis rtogs na, yid kyis ḥdra bar rtog par byed pa yin la, de yañ tshad ma gšan ma yin no.” In this way, Dignāga includes *śabda* and *upamāna* in *anumāna*, and admits *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* as the only two means of valid cognition; see *NMukh*, p. 3b.10–11: 唯有現量及與比量。彼聲喻等攝在此中。故唯二量。

In respect to the number of *pramāṇas*, the Vaiśeṣikas are in accord with Dignāga. However, it should be noted that there is an inconsistency in the Vaiśeṣika theory of two *pramāṇas*. The Vaiśeṣikas claim that determinate perception (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* in later terminology), which results from the association of a determinant with an immediate sense-datum, is a kind of *pratyakṣa* (*VS*, VIII, 6–7). On the other hand, they regard *śabda*, the apprehension of an object by means of words, as a kind of *anumāna* (*VS*, IX, 18–19). Dignāga bases his theory of two *pramāṇas* on a radical distinction between two *prameyas* (see below, n. 1.14). His theory which is consistently logical may be clearly distinguished from the Vaiśeṣika theory.

1.13. *Vibhūti*, p. 140²; *PVBh*, p. 213.6; *NC(V)*, p. 88.3 (20):
lakṣaṇa-dvayam

prameyam . . .

See also *PV*, III, la–b₁: *mānañ divividhañ viśaya-dvaividhyāt* and *PV*, III, 63:
na pratyakṣa-parokṣābhyāñ meyasānyasya sambhavaḥ
tasmāt prameya-dvītvena pramāṇa-dvītvam iṣyate.

1.14. *PVV*, p. 132.7–8; *PVBh*, p. 169.9: *na hi sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇābhyām anyat [aparam in PVBh] prameyam asti. PVBh*, p. 169.9–10: *sva-lakṣaṇa-viśayañ hi pratyakṣañ sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-viśayam anumānam iti pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ*. I have inserted the particle “*hi*” on the authority of *PST*, 14b.2–3 (16b.6–7): “*rañ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can ni ṣes pa la sogs pas te, niñi sgra ni ñes par gzuñ bañi don can no. rañ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can mñon sum kho na dañ spyiñi mtshan ñid kyi yul can rjes su dpag pa kho na ste.*” Cf. *NC(V)*, p. 88.3–89.1 (p. 88.18–24): *na hi sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇābhyām anyat prameyam asti. sva-lakṣaṇa-viśaya-niyatam pratyakṣam, sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-viśaya-niyatam anumānam*. By the expression “*pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ*,” Dignāga means that he will deal with the distinction between *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* at the beginning of *PS(V)*, ch. II; cf. K 109a.4–109b.5, V 27a.7–27b.7 (27b.8–28b.2).

According to the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas, every existing thing, with the exception of the extreme universal (*para-sāmānya*) and the extreme individual (*antya-viśeṣa*), possesses both generality (*jāti* = *sāmānya*) and individuality (*vyakti*). In perceiving a thing, one perceives it, at the first moment, vaguely, without differentiating *jāti* and *vyakti* [*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*], but later on, determinately, conjoining differentiated *jāti* and *vyakti* [*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*]. Dignāga does not assent to this view. He makes an essential distinction between

sva-lakṣaṇa and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, the former being the particular individuality which can never be generalized or conceptualized and the latter being the universal which is conceptually constructed by the mind through generalizing from many individuals without regard for their particularity. The former is real, while the latter lacks reality. As each is incompatible with the other, there cannot be anything which possesses both *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* at the same time. Corresponding to this essential distinction between two kinds of *prameya*, there is a radical distinction between the two means of cognition (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā*): *pratyakṣa* which grasps *sva-lakṣaṇa* exclusively and *anumāna* which grasps *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* exclusively. This theory is evidently set up in opposition to the Nyāya view of the coalescence of different means of cognition (*pramāṇa-samlava*), i.e., the view that the same object can be cognized by any of the four kinds of *pramāṇa*; see *NBh*, ad I, i, 3. The elaborate arguments made by Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra on this point are precisely traced by Stcherbatsky, and no further remark is necessary here; see *Bud. Log.*, II, 301 ff.

Dharmakīrti sets up the following criteria to distinguish *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*: *sva-lakṣaṇa* (a) has a power to produce effects (*artha-kriyā-śakti*), (b) is specific (*asadrśa*), (c) is not denotable by a word (*śabdasyāviśayaḥ*), and (d) is apprehensible without depending upon other factors such as verbal conventions, while *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* (a) has no power to produce effects, (b) is common to many things, (c) is denotable by a word, and (d) is not apprehensible without depending upon other factors such as verbal conventions; see *PV*, III, 1-2. The concept of *artha-kriyā* is unfamiliar to Dignāga. Dharmakīrti adds further detailed discussions to prove the unreality of *sāmānya*, and states that *sva-lakṣaṇa* alone is the object to be cognized in the ultimate sense; see *ibid.*, III, 53d: *meyam tv ekaṁ sva-lakṣaṇam*. That there are two sorts of *prameya* implies that *sva-lakṣaṇa* is apprehended in two ways, as it is (*sva-rūpeṇa*) and as something other than itself (*para-rūpeṇa*), but not that there is real *sāmānya* apart from *sva-lakṣaṇa*. Thus, the distinction between *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is the result of a changed perspective; see *ibid.*, III, 54cd:

tasya sva-para-rūpābhyāṁ gater meya-dvayaṁ matam.

1.15. For this passage of the *Vṛtti*, see *PVBh*, p. 227.8: *yat tarhīdam anityā-dibhir ākārair varṇādi grhyetaitat katham*; *Vibhūti*, p. 140²: *yat tarhīdam . . . grhyate 'sakṛd vā*; *ibid.*, p. 139³: *asakṛd vā*. On the basis of these fragments, the original may be reconstructed as: *yat tarhīdam . . . grhyate 'sakṛd vā tat katham*.

1.16. The meaning of the question raised here is as follows: In seeing a patch of color which exists momentarily and then disappears, one has a cognition of the noneternity of color (*varṇasyānityatā*). Similarly, in hearing a fading sound, one has a cognition of the noneternity of sound (*śabdasyānityatā*). Cognitions of this sort cannot be *pratyakṣa*, because *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, i.e., noneternity, is cognized. Nor can they be *anumāna*, because there is no inferential mark (*liṅga*) from which the noneternity of color, sound, etc. is to be inferred. Hence the need for admitting the third *prameya*, in which *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* are combined. Cf. *PV*, III, 76:

*prameya-niyame varṇānityatā na pratīyate
pramāṇam anyat tad-buddhir vinā liṅgena sambhavāt.*

1.17. This question refers to the case in which a man who has perceived a fire before, upon perceiving its smoke, has re-cognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) of the same fire. This process of re-cognizing the same fire is not *pratyakṣa*, since the re-cognition is produced by perceiving the mark (*liṅga*), smoke. But it is not *anumāna* either, because what is re-cognized is the particular fire, and not fire in general, as inferable from the mark, smoke. In this regard, the Sāṃkhya set forth the theory of *viśeṣa-dr̥ṣṭam anumānam*, and say that the particular is inferable from its likeness (*sāmya*) to the particular (*viśeṣa*) perceived before (*dr̥ṣṭa*); cf. *PST*, 17a.3 (19b.6): “gaṇ gi phyir graṇis can pas khyad par mthoñ ba rjes su dpag pañi mtshan ñid du brjod de”; *ibid.*, Peking ed., 141b.7–8: “rjes su dpag pa rñams pa gñis šes pa ste, de la khyad par mthoñ ba ni, gaṇ gi tshe me dañ du ba ħbrel pa mthoñ nas, du ba de kho nas me de kho nañi yañ dañ yañ du me de kho na ħdiho šes yod pa ñid du rtogs par byed paño”; Frauwallner, “Klass. Sāṃkh.,” p. 90. This type of *anumāna* is called by Śabara-svāmin *pratyakṣato dr̥ṣṭa-sambandham anumānam* as distinguished from *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭa-sambandham anumānam* (see *ŚBh*, p. 10.11–15), and, according to Kumātila, it was expounded by Vindhyavāsin (*ŚV*, *Anumāna*, 141–143, quoted in *TSP*, ad *TS*, 1443–1445). Dignāga’s theory of a sharp distinction between the objects of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* is hardly applicable to the case of re-cognition. Cf. *PST*, 15a.1–3 (17a.6–17b.1); *PV*, III, 77a–c:

*viśeṣa-dr̥ṣṭe liṅgasya sambandhasyāpratītiḥ
tat pramāṇāntaram . . .*

1.18. *Vibhūti*, p. 140²:

... tasya saṃdhāne na [text: saṃdhānena] pramāṇāntaram . . .

1.19. *PVBh*, p. 236.13–14: *sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇābhyām hy avyapadeśya-varṇatvābhyām varṇādi gr̥hitvānityatayā cānityaṃ varṇādīti manasā saṃdhatte*. Cf. *PVV*, p. 140.9–12: “*yojanād varṇa-sāmānye nāyaṃ doṣaḥ prasajyate*” (*PV*, III, 79cd). *vikalpakena jñānenānityatayā “varṇa-sāmānye yojanād ayaṃ” sāmānya-viśeṣātmaka-prameya-grāhaka-pramāṇāntarābhyupagama-lakṣaṇo “doṣo na prasajyate.” na hi viśeṣo ’nityatayā yojyate . . .*

1.20. *Vibhūti*, p. 140²; *PVBh*, p. 242.29:

... na ca

punaḥ punar abhijñāne.

See *TAV*, p. 56.9: *... punaḥ punar abhijñānaṃ [text: abhidhānaṃ jñānaṃ] na pramāṇam*.

1.21. Dharmakīrti denies the possibility of re-cognizing the particular *viśeṣa* on the ground that it is in a state of flux. Further, he points out that the object of *viśeṣa-dr̥ṣṭam anumānam* is not *viśeṣa*, inasmuch as it is grasped through *dr̥ṣṭa-sāmya*; see *PV*, III, 118:

*viśeṣa-pratyabhijñānaṃ na pratikṣaṇa-bhedataḥ
na vā viśeṣa-viśayaṃ dr̥ṣṭa-sāmyena tad-grahāt*.

and III, 119–122; *PST*, 17b.1 ff. (20a.5 ff.). The Naiyāyikas do not admit re-cognition as valid knowledge, since, like recollection (*smṛti*), it is produced only

by an impression (*saṁskāra*) of past experience, and is not dependent upon any *pramāṇa*.

- 1.22. *Vibhūti*, p. 140²; *PVBh*, p. 242.29:
aniṣṭhāsakteḥ smṛtādivat.

1.23. *PST*, 17a.7 (20a.3): “*dran pa kho na dran paḥo* ṣes pa dños po la kta byas paḥi phyir ro.” According to a rule of Pāṇini, participles in “-ta,” when used in the neuter gender, are admitted as nouns of action; *Pāṇ.*, III, iii 114: *napuṁsake bhāve ktaḥ* (ex., *hasitam*, *jalpitam*). Metri causa, “*smṛta*” is used instead of “*smṛti*” in the verse.

1.24. See *TAV*, p. 56.8–9: *yad uktam “smṛticchā-dveṣādivat pūrvādhigata-viṣayatvāt punaḥ punar abhijñānam* [text: *abhidhānam jñānam*] *na pramāṇam*” iti . . .

The Bauddhas are in concert with the Mīmāṃsakas in defining *pramāṇa* as *anadhigatārtha-gaṇṭṛ pramāṇam* [*pramāṇa* is the agent of apprehension of an object which is not yet apprehended]; see *PST*, 17a.5 (20a.1): “*ma rtogs paḥi don rtogs par byed pa po tshad maḥo*”; *NBT*, p. 19.2: *ata eva cānadhigata-viṣayaṁ pramāṇam*. This definition is criticized by Akalaṅka as follows: A lamp at the moment of being lit possesses the same capacity to illuminate objects as the lamp at a later moment. Likewise, the capacity of a cognition to apprehend an object is the same, whether it be the first moment of the cognition or a later moment. Just as the lamps at different moments are equally called “lamp,” so the cognitions apprehending the same object at different moments should be equally recognized as “*pramāṇa*.” Had the Bauddhas’ statement that the object, being in a state of flux, is renewed in each moment successfully vindicated their definition of *pramāṇa* as “*anadhigatārtha-gaṇṭṛ pramāṇam*,” Dignāga’s statement that the re-cognition of the same object is not *pramāṇa* would have proved improper; see *TAV*, p. 56.1–9. Vācaspatimiśra also rejects the above definition of *pramāṇa* for the reason that it cannot include a case in which a stable object is cognized by a series of perceptions (*dhārāvāhika-vijñāna*); see *NVTT*, p. 21.6 ff.

- 1.25. *Vibhūti*, p. 174¹; *TAV*, p. 53.29:
pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍham.

Cf. *NMukh*, p. 3b.14: 現量除分別 ; *NV*, p. 41.19: *apare tu manyante “pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍham” iti*; *NVTT*, p. 153.20: *samprati Dignāgasya lakṣaṇam upanyasyati—apara iti*; *NC(V)*, p. 59.2 (15–16): *ghaṭṭādi-kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣam*; *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 39.19.

Dignāga is not the first to describe *pratyakṣa* as free from *kalpanā* = *vikalpa*. Vindhyavāsin, an elder contemporary of Vasubandhu, for example, defines *pratyakṣa* as *śrotrādi-vṛttir avikalpikā*; see *Saṁmatitarkap.*, p. 533.2; *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, p. 24.13; Chakravarti, *Origin and Development of Sāṁkhya System of Thought*, pp. 145, 149, and his definition is regarded by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa as virtually identical with the Bauddha definition, cf. *NMañj*, p. 93.10–11. Dignāga, however, provides a logical basis for this definition by sharply distinguishing *sva-lakṣaṇa* from *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*; see above, n. 1.14. He does not approve of

adding any superfluous terms to *kalpanâpoḍha* in defining *pratyakṣa*; see below, Section 3, B.

The characteristic feature of *kalpanā*, as will be noted below (n. 1.27), consists in the association of an immediate awareness with a word. *Pratyakṣa* which is free from *kalpanā* is inexpressible by a word. Uddyotakara objects to the defining of *pratyakṣa*, which should be inexpressible, by the words “*pratyakṣam kalpanâpoḍham*.” He points out that neither the words “*pratyakṣa*” and “*kalpanâpoḍha*” nor the sentence “*pratyakṣam kalpanâpoḍham*” can denote *pratyakṣa*: if *pratyakṣa* could be denoted by either of these words or by the sentence, it could not be free from *kalpanā*. He further observes that, if the word “*kalpanâpoḍha*” were held to mean “inexpressible in its specific feature” (*svarūpato na vyapadeśyam*), then everything would be regarded as *pratyakṣa*, because a word expresses only the general feature (*sāmānyākāra*) of a thing and not its specific feature (*viśeṣākāra* = *svarūpa*). However, it would not be proper to say that a thing is “inexpressible” because its specific feature is inexpressible. A brāhmaṇa may be spoken of by the word “man,” although this word does not express his specific feature. On the other hand, it would be self-contradictory to assert that the specific feature of *pratyakṣa* is expressed by the word “*kalpanâpoḍha*,” since “*kalpanâpoḍha*” signifies that the specific feature of *pratyakṣa* is inexpressible. Lastly, if the word “*kalpanâpoḍha*” were understood to express nothing, the definition would have to be regarded as utterly useless; see *NV*, pp. 41.22–43.5. To this objection Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla give the answer: by defining *pratyakṣa* as “*kalpanâpoḍha*” it is implied that *pratyakṣa* is *avikalpaka*, but not that it is *anabhidheya*; therefore, there is no fault in describing *pratyakṣa* by the word “*kalpanâpoḍha*”; cf. *TS(P)*, 1239–1242.

Dharmakīrti follows Dignāga in defining *pratyakṣa* as *kalpanâpoḍha* in *PV*, III, 123a, but he adds the term “*abhrānta*” to this definition in *NB*, I, 4, and *PV*in, 252b.3.

1.26. *TSP*, p. 368.23; *NV*, p. 41.19; *TAV*, p. 53.29:

... *nāma-jāty-ādi-yojanā*.

Cf. *NC*, p. 59.2–60.1: *atha kā kalpanā. nāma-jāti-guṇa-kriyā-dravya-svarūpā-panna-vastu-antara-nirūpanānusmaraṇa-vikalpanā*.

1.27. *TSP*, p. 369.23–25; *NVTT*, p. 153.22–154.3: *yadṛcchā-śabdeṣu hi nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyaṭe dīthhēti, jāti-śabdeṣu jātyā gaur iti, guṇa-śabdeṣu guṇena śukla iti, kriyā-śabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka iti, dravya-śabdeṣu dravyeṇa daṇḍi viṣṇīti*.

According to Dignāga, a thing, which in itself is essentially inexpressible, comes to be expressed by a word only when it is associated with a name (*nāman*) and other factors. Conceptual construction (*kalpanā*) means nothing other than this process of associating a name, etc., with a thing. Dignāga classifies the factors to be associated with a thing for the sake of verbal designation into five categories: *nāman*, *jāti*, *guṇa*, *kriyā*, and *dravya*, which respectively function in producing *yadṛcchā-śabda*, *jāti-ś.*, *guṇa-ś.*, *kriyā-ś.*, and *dravya-ś.* His classification of *śabda* seems to have been adopted from the Vaiyākaraṇas, who classify *śabda* into four categories; cf. *MBh*, p. 19.20–21 (ad *Pāṇ*, I, i, 2, *Vārt*. 1):

catuṣṭayi śabdānām pravṛttiḥ, jāti-śabdā guṇa-śabdāḥ kriyā-śabdā yadr̥cchā-śabdāś caturthāḥ. As regards “*dravya-śabda*,” we do not find the term in *MBh*, but Dignāga’s identifying *viśāṇin* as a *dravya* shows that he bases his explanation upon *MBh*, p. 1.6 ff., where Patañjali asks the question “*atha gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ?*” and then rejects a *pūrvapakṣa* as follows: *kiṁ yat tat sāsna-lāṅgūla-kakuda-khura-viśāṇy-artha-rūpaṁ sa śabdaḥ? nēty āha, dravyaṁ nāma tat*. Patañjali proceeds to reject some other views: *yat tarhi tad ṅgitaṁ ceṣṭitaṁ nimiṣitaṁ sa śabdaḥ? nēty āha, kriyā nāma sā. yat tarhi tac chuklo nilaḥ kṣṇaḥ kapilaḥ kapota iti sa śabdaḥ? nēty āha, guṇo nāma saḥ. yat tarhi tad bhinneṣv abhinnaṁ chinneṣv acchinnaṁ sāmānya-bhūtaṁ sa śabdaḥ? nēty āha, ākṛtir nāma sā*. Here Dignāga follows the pattern of *MBh* in his use of the terms “*kriyā*,” “*guṇa*,” and “*jati*” (= *ākṛti*). As a *kriyā-śabda*, “*pācaka*” is used in a verbal sense, as an infinitive, through application of *Pāṇ*, III, iii, 10: *tumun-ṇvulau kriyāyām kriyārthāyām* [ex. *bhoktuṁ vrajati = bhojako vrajati*].

Śāntarakṣita argues that from the viewpoint of the Bauddhas, who deny the reality of such categories as *dravya*, all words are to be regarded either as arbitrary words inasmuch as they are simply products of the desire to communicate (*vivakṣā*), or as genus-words inasmuch as they stand for what is common to many individual moments or entities: even in the case of applying the name “*Ḍittha*” to an object, the object itself is associated with the genus “*ḍitthatva*,” which is a generalization of the innumerable moments that constitute the series of the individual *Ḍittha*; see *TSP*, ad 1226. Thus Śāntarakṣita says that Dignāga is only following the general usage of words in classifying *śabda* into five categories; see *TS*, 1227–1228. Praśastapāda also classifies the qualifiers or distinguishers (*viśeṣaṇa*) of *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* into five categories, but his categories differ from those employed by Dignāga, inasmuch as they are based upon Vaiśeṣika doctrine; see *PBh*, p. 553.2–5; Randle, *Ind. Log.*, pp. 107ff.

Dignāga is close to the Vaiyākaraṇas in maintaining that conceptual construction is inseparable from verbal expression. The Vaiyākaraṇa theory of the inseparable relation between conception and word is clearly set forth in *Vākyap.*, I, 124:

*na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād rte
anuviddham iva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena gamyate.*

Kamalaśīla, in explaining Śāntarakṣita’s definition of *kalpanā* as “*abhilāpiṇi pratītiḥ*” (*TS*, 1214), quotes *Vākyap.*, I, 122:

*itikartavyatā loke sarvā śabda-vyapāśrayā
yām pūrvāhita-saṁskāro bālo 'pi pratipadyate.*

This shows the affinity between the Vaiyākaraṇas and Dignāga’s school in regard to the theory concerning the relation of *kalpanā* and verbal expression. In this respect, Dignāga differs from Vātsyāyana who distinguishes knowledge itself from the verbal designation of the object; see Randle, *Ind. Log.*, pp. 119–120.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla lay importance on the expression “*ucyate*” [(a thing . . .) is expressed (by a word)] in the above passage of *PSV*, and consider it as evidence for Dignāga’s understanding of *kalpanā* as being inseparably related to word (*nāman = śabda*), and not to genus, etc. (*jāty-ādi*); see *TS(P)*, 1233.

According to their interpretation, “*nāman*” in Dignāga’s definition of *kalpanā* must be distinguished from “*jāty-ādi*.” They say that *jāty-ādi-yojanā* is a heretical theory which should be discarded, because *jāti*, etc., were not recognized by Dignāga as real entities. Thus they consider that Dignāga’s own interpretation of *kalpanā* is *nāma-yojanā*; *ibid.*, 1219–1221. Or, even if *jāti*, etc., were admitted provisionally as entities, it must be noted that these are related to a thing only through the medium of *nāman*; *ibid.*, 1224–1225. After elaborating these arguments, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla conclude that the association with word (*nāman*) is the distinctive feature of Dignāga’s definition of *kalpanā*. These arguments, however, even if they are not actually false in their conclusion, seem not to be faithful to the original thought of the above passage.

Dharmakīrti is more cautious than Dignāga in defining *kalpanā* as “a cognition of representation which is *capable of* being associated with a verbal designation”—which definition also includes the conceptual construction of infants and dumb persons who have the potentiality of verbal expression although they do not utter an actual word; cf. *NB*, I, 5: “*abhihāpa-saṃsarga-yogyā-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ kalpanā*”; *PVin*, 252b.4: “rtog pa ni brjod pa dañ ḥdrer ruñ ba snañ bañi šes pa ste.” Jinendrabuddhi, taking Dharmakīrti’s definition into consideration, explains as follows: “ḥdir yañ sbyor bar byas zin pa kho nañi šes pa rtog pa brjod par ḥdod pa ma yin gyi, ḥo na ci še na, gañ yañ sbyor bar byas zin pa ma yin pa de la yañ ruñ bar snañ ba de yañ yin no”; *PST*, 18a.8–18b.1 (21a.6).

1.28. When the *kriyā-śabda* “*pācaka*” or the *dravya-śabda* “*dañḍin*” is applied to a certain thing, the thing is distinguished by the relationship as indicated by the suffix *ñvul* (-aka) or *ini* (-in). Jinendrabuddhi seems to push the analysis further by introducing the concept of “*śabda-pravṛtti-nimitta*” (efficient cause of verbal expression). His explanation may be summarized as follows: (1) The *bhāva-pratyaya* suffixed to *saṃāsa*, *kṛt*, and *taddhita* implies *kriyā-kāraka-sambandha* (the relation of action to a factor of action), and other relations. Cf. *Tattvabodhinī* ad *Siddhāntakaumudī* 1781 (= *MBh*, V, i, 119): ... *Hari-ṭikāyām yad uktam* “*saṃāsa-kṛt-taddhiteṣu sambandhābhīdhānam bhāva-pratyayena*” *iti*. (2) *pācaka* = *pac* + *ñvul* is *kṛt*, and *dañḍin* = *dañḍa* + *ini* is *taddhita*. (3) The *bhāva-pratyaya*, when suffixed to any word, expresses the efficient cause of the application of that word to a certain thing. In support of (3), Jinendrabuddhi quotes *MBh*, V, i, 199: *yasya guṇasya bhāvād dravye śabda-niveśaḥ tad-abhidhāne tva-talau*. Thus, his contention is that the *bhāva-pratyaya* “-*iva*” suffixed to *pācaka* or *dañḍin* expresses the above-mentioned relation and at the same time is deemed to be the efficient cause of the application of the word “*pācaka*” or “*dañḍin*” to a thing distinguished by that relation; cf. *PST*, 18b.5–19a.1 (21b.4–7).

1.29. *TSP*, p. 371.11–12: “*anye tv artha-sūnyaiḥ śabdair eva viśiṣṭo ’rtha ucyate*.”

Although the text begins with “*anye tu*,” it is evident that Dignāga introduced this sentence here with the intention of making his own point clear. The Naiyāyikas and other realists are of the opinion that genus, quality, etc., which, in the preceding passage (see n. 1.27), are considered to be the factors of verbal designation, are *padārthas* or real entities. But, according to Dignāga,

they are simply conceptual constructions denoting no real entities: what is denoted by the genus-word “cow” is not any real entity “cowness,” but really the “exclusion of non-cows” (*anya-vyāvṛtti*). This point is discussed in detail in *PS(V)*, ch. V. Cf. *TS(P)*, 1229:

*te tu jāty-ādayo nēha lokavad vyatirekiṇaḥ
ity etat pratipatty-artham “anye tv” ity-ādi varṇitam.*

... *anya iti bauddhāḥ. artha-śūnyair iti jāty-ādi-nirapekṣair apoha-mātra-gocaraiḥ śabdaiḥ.* Cf. also *PST*, 19a.1 (21b.7–8): “*gṣan rnam s ni don gyis ston pa rnam kyis ṣes pa raṇ gi lugs bzaṇ po ston te, don de rigs la sogs paḥi khyad par daṇ bral ba rnam kyis ṣes paḥi don to.*”

1.30. *TSP*, p. 373.26: *yatraiśā kalpanā nāsti tat pratyakṣam.* Cf. *Vibhūti*, p. 174¹.

1.31. *Vibhūti*, p. 175⁵; *PVBh*, p. 277.24: *atha kasmād dvayādhināyām utpattau pratyakṣam ucyate na pratiṣṭayam.* (The reading given in the text of *PVBh*: (*vi*)*śayādhināyām* is incorrect.)

It is generally accepted by the Bauddhas that *viññāna* (consciousness, cognition) is dependent for its production upon the sense-organ (*indriya*) and the object (*viśaya*); cf. *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, II, 72 ff.; *ibid.*, IV, 33, 67, 86, *passim*: *cakkhum ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhu-viññānam*, quoted in *Ālambanap.*, ad k. 7cd; *NC*, p. 82.2–5; *Prasannap.*, pp. 6.3, 567.7–8, *passim*. In *AKBh*, Vasubandhu asks why *viññāna* is called *cakṣur-viññāna*, etc., in accordance with the name of the sense and not with that of the object—cf. *AKBh*, p. 12b.18 ff: 何因識起俱託二緣。得所依名在根非境。—and gives the following answers: (1) According as the sense is strong or weak, *viññāna* becomes clear or dim. Therefore the sense should be regarded as the basis (*āśraya*) of *viññāna*. (2) The sense is the specific cause (*asādhāraṇa-hetu*) of *viññāna*. For example, when a man experiences a visual perception (*cakṣur-viññāna*), its specific cause must be his own visual sense (*cakṣur-indriya*), since the object, *rūpa*, etc., is the cause of visual perception in other persons too, as well as of mental perceptions (*mano-viññāna*) in himself and others. For these two reasons, *viññāna* is named after the sense and not after the object; cf. *AK*, I, 45:

*tad-vikāra-vikāritvād āśrayāś cakṣur-ādayaḥ
ato 'sādhāraṇatvāc ca viññānam tair nirucyate.*

The question raised in the above passage is concerned with the name given to perception in general, and not with that of individual *viññāna*. However, from *k. 4ab* and its *Vṛtti*, it is obvious that Dignāga here makes reference to *AK(Bh)*.

Cf. *PV*, III, 191:

*sākṣād viññāna-janane samartho viśayo 'kṣavat
atha kasmād dvayādhina-janma tat tena nōcyate.*

PVV, p. 176.4–6 (ad *PV*, III, 191cd): “*atha dvayādhina-janma*” *viśayēndriyōtpatti* “*tad*” *indriya-jñānam indriyenōcyate vyapadiśyate pratyakṣam iti. pratigatam akṣaṇ pratyakṣam indriyāśritam ity arthah.* “*kasmāt*” *punar viśayeṇa* “*nōcyate*” *pratiṣṭayam iti.* See also Section 6, *Db*.

1.32. *Vibhūti*, p. 177¹⁰; *TAV*, p. 53.30:

asādhāraṇa-hetutvād akṣais tad vyapadiśyate.

Of the two reasons given by Vasubandhu for naming *viññāna* after the sense, the second one, *asādhāraṇa-hetutva*, is mentioned by Dignāga in the above verse. In *NMukh*, too, Dignāga says: *asādhāraṇa-kāraṇatvād akṣam akṣam prati varīta itī pratyakṣam*; cf. n. 1.11.

Dharmakīrti states that the name of a thing should be taken from its indicator (*gamaka*). For example, if a sprout is named “a sprout of barley” (*yavāṅkura*), no one would mistake it for a sprout of rice. If, on the other hand, it were named “a sprout of earth” (*prthivy-aṅkura*), then this name could be just as easily understood to refer to a sprout of rice as to a sprout of barley. Thus, it is the *asādhāraṇa-hetu*, that is to be regarded as the “indicator.” Following Dignāga, Dharmakīrti considers that the sense (*akṣa*) is the “indicator” of a perception; cf. *PV*, III, 192:

*samīkṣya gamakatvaṃ hi vyapadeśo niyujyate
tac cākṣa-vyapadeśe 'sti tad-dharmaś ca niyogyatām.*

1.33. *PVBh*, p. 278.18: *viśayo hi mano-viññānānya-sarītānika-viññāna-hetutvāt sādharāṇam*; *ibid.*, p. 278.12: *asādhāraṇena* [text: *sādharāṇena*] *vyapadeśo dṛṣṭo bherī-śābdo yavāṅkura itī*. Cf. *AKBh*, p. 12b.26–12c.2 (*AKV*, p. 87.20 ff.): 彼及不共因 故隨根說識 (*AK*, I, 45cd, cf. n. 31) ... 及不共者謂眼唯自眼識所依。色亦通爲他身眼識 (*anya-cakṣur-viññānasyāpi*) 及通自他意識所取... 識得名隨根非境。如鼓聲及麥芽等 (*yathā bherī-śābdo yavāṅkuraḥ*) .

Candrakīrti, directly after quoting Dignāga's etymology of *pratyakṣa* (see above n. 1.11), refers to the following argument: *atha syāt, yathōbhayādhināyām api viññāna-pravṛttāv āśrayasya paṭu-mandatānuvidhānād viññānānām tad-vikāra-vikāritvād āśrayenaiva vyapadeśo bhavati, cakṣur-viññānam itī. evaṃ yady apy artham artham prati vartate tathāpy akṣam akṣam āśritya vartamānaṃ viññānam āśrayeṇa vyapadeśāt pratyakṣam itī bhaviṣyati. dṛṣṭo hy asādhāraṇena vyapadeśo bherī-śābdo yavāṅkura itī*; *Prasannap.*, p. 72.4–7. In the last sentence (“*dṛṣṭo hi ...*”) Candrakīrti is following Dignāga's words very closely, like him citing “*bherī-śābda*” and “*yavāṅkura*” as examples of “*asādhāraṇena vyapadeśaḥ*.” However, in the preceding lines he does not explain that the sense is *asādhāraṇa-hetu* of perception. He only makes reference to *AK(Bh)*, I, 45ab, where Vasubandhu states that *viññāna*, which changes (*vikāra*) as the sense grows stronger or weaker (*paṭu-mandatānuvidhāt*), is named after the sense as *cakṣur-viññāna*, etc. Of the two reasons mentioned by Vasubandhu for naming *viññāna* after the sense (cf. n. 1.31), Dignāga bases his argument on the second one, whereas Candrakīrti, in criticizing Dignāga's theory, quotes the first one. Thus, Candrakīrti's use of the examples is inappropriate. Uddyotakara also uses the example of “*yavāṅkura*” in his explanation of the contact of sense and object (*indriyārtha-sarīnikarṣa*, *NS*, I, i, 4) as *asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa* of perception; see *NV*, p. 32.22: *rtv-ādi-kāraṇa-sarīnidhānāt prādurbhāvann aṅkuro na rtv-ādibhir vyapadiśyate 'pi tv asādhāraṇena bijena vyapadiśyate yavāṅkura itī*. See also *AKV*, p. 87.23–28; *Nyāyapraveśavṛtti* (G.O.S. No. 38), p. 35.19 ff.

1.34. That *pratyakṣa* is free from conceptual construction is proved by *pratyakṣa* itself, that is to say, by *svasamivedana*. See *PV*, III, 123ab:

pratyakṣam kalpanāpōdham pratyakṣeṇaiva sīdhyati.

Dharmakīrti gives the following illustration: A man may have perception of a thing of color even when his mind is drawn from all external objects and remains inactive; from this fact it is self-evident that *pratyakṣa* is free from conceptual construction by the mind; *ibid.*, III, 124:

saṃhṛīya sarvataś cintām stimitenāntarātmanā

sthito'pi cakṣuṣā rūpam iṣate sākṣajā matiḥ.

See also *PST*, 19b.6 ff. (22b.7 ff.); *TS(P)*, 1243; *Bud. Log.*, I, 151–152.

1.35. Jinendrabuddhi says here that *kalpanāpōdhatva* of *pratyakṣa* can be established not only by *pratyakṣa* itself but also by *āgama*; *PST*, 21a.1 (24a.3). This, however, does not mean that *āgama* is an independent means of cognition.

1.36. *AKV*, p. 64.22–23; *Prasannap.*, p. 74.7–8; *NC*, pp. 60.3–61.1; *NCV*, p. 81.20: *cakṣur-vijñāna-samaṅgī nilam vijānāti no tu nilam iti* [nohati instead of *no tu* in *AKV*, Wogihara ed., but *AKV*, N. N. Law ed. (Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 31) p. 74.23 reads *no tu*].

The expression “*nilam vijānāti*” implies that one has an immediate awareness of the object itself. On the other hand, “*nilam iti vijānāti*” implies that one forms a perceptual judgement by associating a name with the object perceived. Thus, the above Abhidharma passage expresses the thought that perception is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanāpōdha*). Kamalaśīla claims that the expressions “*nilam vijānāti*” and “*no tu nilam iti (vijānāti)*” imply respectively that perception is nonerroneous (*abhrānta*) and that it is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanāpōdha*); see *TSP*, p. 12.21–24: *tatra pratyakṣasya lakṣaṇam bhrānti-kalpanābhyām rahitatvam, tac ca bhagavatōktam eva. yad āha—“cakṣur-vijñāna-samaṅgī* [text: “-saṅgī”] ...” *tathā hi nilam vijānāntīty anenāvīparīta-viṣayatva-khyāpanād abhrāntatvam uktam, no tu nilam ity anena nāmānuvidhārtha-grahaṇa-pratikṣepāt kalpanā-rahitatvam*. It is obvious that he hopes by this interpretation to find support in the Abhidharma passage for the definition of *pratyakṣa* given in *NB*, I, 4: *pratyakṣam kalpanāpōdham abhrāntam*, which he adopts, following Śāntarakṣita, cf. *TS(P)*, 1214. The same interpretation is given in *NB-Pūrvapakṣasamkṣepa*; see La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannap.*, p. 74, n. 6.

1.37. *NC(V)*, p. 61.4 (19–20): *arthe 'rtha-saṃjñī, na tv arthe dharma-saṃjñī*.

The term “*dharma*” implies particular *citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra-dharmas*, namely, *nāman*, *pada*, and *vyañjana*; *NC(V)*, p. 62.3 (18–25): *evam abhidharme uktam “dharma nāmōcyate nāma-kāyaḥ pada-kāyo vyañjana-kāyaḥ”*; *PST*, 21a.2–4 (24a.4–6). To have *dharma-saṃjñā* in respect to an object means to apprehend the object by its name. On the other hand, *artha-saṃjñā* means *artha-svarūpa-saṃjñā*. Thus, the distinction between *artha-saṃjñā* and *dharma-saṃjñā* corresponds to the distinction between “*nilam jānāti*” and “*nilam iti jānāti*.”

1.38. *NCV*, p. 79.15–16: *yat tarhīdam “saṃcītāmbanāḥ pañca vijñāna-kāyā” iti tat katham yadi tad ekato na vikalpayati*. Cf. *PVV*, p. 176.20: *nanu “saṃcītā-*

lambanāḥ pañca vijñāna-kāyā” iti *siddhāntaḥ*; *NC(V)*, p. 64.1 (13–14): *uktaṁ vo ’bhidharma eva “saṁcitālambanāḥ pañca vijñāna-kāyāḥ.”* Cf. also *NCV*, pp. 65.18, 80.27, 102.5.

In *Ālambanap.*, kk. 1–5, as well as in *Viśś*, k. 11 and *Vṛtti*, and *TriśśBh*, ad k. 1, realists are divided into three groups according to their theories concerning the object of cognition (*ālambanā*). The first group maintains that the object of cognition is a *dravya* (substance), viz., an individual atom (*paramāṇu*) or an *avayavin* (a substance possessing parts), the second that it is the aggregate (*saṁcita*) of atoms, and the third that it is the gathering (*saṁghāta*) of atoms. It is obvious that the theory here referred to is that of the second group, which is reported by Kuei-chi to be the *Vaibhāṣikas*; see *Wei shih erh shih lun shu chi*, T. 1834, p. 992c.8–10. In explaining the theory of the second group, *Sthiramati* (*TriśśBh*, p. 16.20–21) and *Vinitadeva* (*Tikā* on *Viśś*, Peking ed., *Tib. Trip.*, no. 5566, 219b.1) quote the sentence “*saṁcitālambanāḥ . . .*” The same *siddhānta* is referred to as follows in *AKBh* p. 12a.26–28: 傳說...五識決定積集多微方成所依所緣性故 (*saṁcitāśrayālambanatvāt*, *AKV*, p. 86.9–10).

1.39. *AKBh*, ad I, 10 (quoted in *NC*, p. 78, n. 5 from a yet unpublished manuscript, which is being deciphered by P. Pradhan. Chinese version, p. 3a.9–11); *AKV*, p. 28.10–16; *PVBh*, p. 280.7–8; *NC*, pp. 86.2, 93.3; *NCV*, p. 79.18: *āyatana-svalakṣaṇam praty ete svalakṣaṇa-viśayā na dravya-svalakṣaṇam prati*.

In this sentence, *āyatana* stands for *bāhyāyatana*, i.e., a gross form which is perceivable by the sense-organ, while *dravya* stands for an individual atomic element. See *PST*, 21a.7–21b.1 (24b.2–3); *Vibhūti*, p. 176⁴: *yac ca Vasubandh-unōktam āyatana-svalakṣaṇam cakṣur-grāhyatvādi tat prati jñānāni svalakṣaṇa-viśayāni, na dravya-svalakṣaṇam* [text: *dravyam sva*^o] *praty eka-paramāṇu(m)*.

In *AKBh*, after enumerating the varieties of *rūpa*, *Vasubandhu* says that eye-perception is caused sometimes by a single *dravya* (here *dravya* does not mean an atom, since a single atom is invisible), as in the case of perceiving something blue, and sometimes by many *dravyas*, as in the cases of perceiving from a distance a military array, a collection of jewels, etc.; see *AKBh*, ad I, 10 (Chinese version, p. 3a.3–6): *yad etad bahu-vidham rūpam uktaṁ tatra kadācid ekena dravyeṇa cakṣur-vijñānam utpadyate yadā tat-prakāra-vyavacchedo bhavati, kadācid bahubhir yadā na vyavacchedaḥ tadyathā senā-vyūham aneka-varṇa-saṁsthānaṁ maṇi-vyūham vā dūrāt paśyataḥ*. It may be argued that, inasmuch as sense-cognitions are caused by many objects, they could be considered to take *sāmānya* for their object and not *svalakṣaṇa*; *ibid.* (Chinese version, p. 3a.9–10): *nanu caivaṁ samastālambanatvāt sāmānya-viśayāḥ pañca vijñāna-kāyāḥ prāpnuvanti, na svalakṣaṇa-viśayāḥ*. Thus, *Vasubandhu* claims in the above-cited passage that the object of sense-cognition is to be regarded as *svalakṣaṇa*, even when it is formed by many elements.

1.40. *PVBh*, p. 279.10; *PVV*, p. 176.20–21; *NC*, p. 93.5; *NCV* (p. 86.9), 89.27 (p. 94.12), pp. 97.26–27, 99.26–27, 102.24–25:

tatrānekārtha-janyatvāt svārthe sāmānya-gocaram.

In this verse, “*anekārtha*” means the atoms in aggregation or the things forming a group, which are called *saṁcita* or *āyatana-svalakṣaṇa* in the

preceding Abhidharma passages. The sense-organ does not take a single atom nor a single member of the group for its object, but grasps many atoms or things simultaneously. Thus, the object of the sense is the totality of individual atoms or things. The word "*sāmānya*" in this verse implies this totality, but not the *sāmānya* which is assumed by the Naiyāyikas and others to exist over and beyond the individuals.

This idea of Dignāga's is fully elaborated by Dharmakīrti in *PV*, III, 194-230, on the basis of the Sautrāntika theory that individual atoms, which are imperceptible, come to possess, when they gather together, a pre-eminent quality (*atiśaya*), which enables them to present a certain form in a cognition. See also *AbhD*, k. 317.

1.41. *NC*, pp. 86.10, 93.6; *NCV*, p. 91.9-10: *aneka-dravyōtpadyatvāt tat svāyatane sāmānya-gocaram ity ucyate, na tu bhinneṣv abheda-kalpanāt*.

Mallavādin vehemently attacks the thought that the sense-cognition is caused by "*anekārtha*" or that it takes "*sāmānya*" for its object; see *NC*, p. 86.6 ff. The main points of his arguments are as follows: (1) The cognition which takes *sāmānya* for its object is not *pratyakṣa*. If it were admitted as *pratyakṣa*, then it would follow that *anumāna* also would be a type of *pratyakṣa*, since it has *sāmānya* for its object. (2) The expression "*svārthe sāmānya-gocaram*" incurs a self-contradiction, like the expression "my father is a pure celibate," because "*svārtha*" of the sense-organ is *svalakṣaṇa* which is perceived immediately, whereas "*sāmānya*" is to be cognized only through an inferential mark. (3) If "*sāmānya*" were held as the object of *pratyakṣa*, then there would be no *svalakṣaṇa*. Thus the theory of the radical distinction between the two *pramāṇas* would become baseless. Two *pramāṇas* would apprehend the same *prameya*, or *pratyakṣa* would be regarded as a kind of *anumāna*. (4) When we perceive "*anekārtha*," for example, many leaves on a tree, they are perceived as individuals, each possessing its own color and shape, but not as a "*sāmānya*" different from individual leaves. There is no such "*sāmānya*" that is distinct from individuals (*svalakṣaṇa*) and might be called "*saṃghāta*," "*avayavin*," etc. Therefore, it is unreasonable to say that "*sāmānya*" becomes the object of *pratyakṣa*. (5) "*Sāmānya*" as the aggregate (*saṃcaya*) of atoms is unable to produce a cognition, since the aggregate of atoms, according to Dignāga, is an empirical reality (*saṃvṛti-sat*) distinct from a real entity (*dravya*=*paramārtha-sat*), which alone has the faculty of producing a cognition. (6) Granted that a cognition takes the aggregate of atoms for its object, that cognition cannot be recognized as *pratyakṣa*, because a cognition of an empirical reality (*saṃvṛti-saj-jñāna*) is a kind of *pratyakṣābhāsa*; see below n. 1.53. (7) If *pratyakṣa* were caused by "*anekārtha*," then it would be indistinguishable from *anumāna*, since the latter is also produced from "*anekārtha*," that is to say, from an inferential mark, etc. After raising these objections to *k. 4cd*, Mallavādin proceeds to criticize Dignāga's examinations of the theories concerning the object of cognition. In Section 2 as well as in *Ālambanap.*, Dignāga repudiates the theories (1) that the object of cognition is the aggregate (*saṃcita*) of atoms, (2) that it is the gathering (*saṃghāta*) of atoms, and (3) that it is a single atom; see Section 2, *D-De* and n. 2.17. Mallavādin points out the inconsistency of Dignāga's views

set forth here in *k. 4cd* and in Section 2. The thought expressed in *k. 4cd* is that many atoms in aggregation or things forming a group are perceived at once as a variegated whole, but not as a single entity distinct from individuals. This thought is close to the theory (2) repudiated in Section 2 and in *Ālambanap.*, which is called “*anekākārārtha-vāda*” by Jinendrabuddhi; see Section 2, n. 2.20.

1.42. I have emended K to conform to *PST*, 22b.2 (25b.6–7): “*smras pañāṇ (āha ca) ṣeṣ pa . . .*” K is close to V, which may be reconstructed as “*tam evārtham āha.*” But *k. 5* does not express exactly the same thought as that of the preceding passages. Jinendrabuddhi states: setting aside the wrong views in respect to the object [of perception], [the author] concludes that [perception is] *avikalpa* [in the following verse], *PST*, 22a.2–3 (25b.7): “*spyod yul las log par rtogs pa bsel ṣin nram par rtog pa med pa ṇid de kho na gsuñ ḥdsugs te.*”

1.43. *PVBh*, p. 298.1:

*dharmiṇo 'neka-rūpasya nēndriyāt sarvathā gatih
svasamvedyam anirdeśyam rūpam indriya-gocarah.*

Vibhūti, p. 189¹: *naika-rūpasya* instead of *aneka-rūpasya*, inserts *tu* after *svasamvedyam*. The latter half is quoted in *TSP*, p. 293.1–2, and also in *NCV*, p. 669.23, where the reading is *svalakṣaṇam* instead of *svasamvedyam*. This verse is identical with *NMukh*, p. 3b.18–19: 有法非一相 根非一切行 唯內證離言 是色根境界, and *Dignāga* repeats the latter half in Section 6, *Dc*.

When one cognizes a pot possessing blue color (*varṇa*), round shape (*saṁsthāna*), and other properties (*dharma*), this cognition is not produced directly by his sense-organ. The properties of an object are to be admitted as the products of conceptual construction. An object comes to be recognized as being of blue color only when it is excluded (*vyāvṛtta*) from non-blue things, and this process of the exclusion from other things is nothing other than conceptual construction. ✓ In the same manner, that object comes to be recognized as being of round shape, or as possessing the properties P, Q, etc., according to whether it is excluded from non-round-shaped things, or non-Ps, non-Qs, etc. Thus, many different properties of the object are mentally constructed through these exclusions from other things, and consequently the object comes to be conceived as the possessor of many properties. By the sense-organ, however, one perceives the object in itself (*svasamvedya*) and not in all its aspects (*na sarvathā*), i.e., as a possessor of such and such properties.

Dharmakīrti sets forth the same idea in *PV*, III, 231:

*sarvato vinivṛttasya vinivṛttir yato yataḥ
tad-bhedōnnīta-bhedo sā dharmiṇo 'neka-rūpatā.*

and III, 232–238. See also *ibid.*, III, 108:

*vyāvṛtteḥ sarvatas tasmin vyāvṛtti-vinibandhanāḥ
buddhayo 'rthe pravartante 'bhinne bhinnāśrayā iva.*

1.44. See *PVBh*, pp. 252.24, 335.15: “*viśeṣaṇam lakṣaṇe para-matāpekṣam, sarve tv avikalpakā eva.*” K, V, and *PST*, 24a.3 (27b.1) have no equivalent for *lakṣaṇe*, but all have “*ḥdir*” (= *ātra*) instead. Thus, originally this passage must have been: “*ātra viśeṣaṇam para-° . . .*” Perhaps *lakṣaṇe* is, as will be seen below, Prajñākara-gupta’s or his predecessor’s interpretation of “*ātra.*”

Jinendrabuddhi takes the term “*viśeṣaṇa*” as synonymous with *viśeṣa* (distinction) or *bheda* (division) (khyad par dan bye brag dan bye ba ṣes pa ni rnam graṅs so) and gives the following explanation: Since *pratyakṣa* has been defined above in *k. 3c* as being free from conceptual construction, it is not strictly necessary to state anew the natures of each particular sort of *pratyakṣa*. However, since wrong views are held respecting each, Dignāga has deliberately made separate mention of each with the intention of removing these wrong views; see *PST*, 24a.1–6 (27a.7–27b.5). Jinendrabuddhi also alludes to another interpretation, according to which “*viśeṣaṇa*” refers to the qualifier of *pañcēndriya-pratyakṣa*, i.e., *avikalpaka*, “being devoid of conceptual construction.” There are some who maintain that *indriya-pratyakṣa* in certain cases is *savikalpaka*. It was with the view to setting aside this mistaken theory that Dignāga stated that *pañcēndriya-pratyakṣa* is *avikalpaka*. However, Jinendrabuddhi does not accept this interpretation. He says that if the qualifier “*avikalpaka*” were understood to refer to *para-mata*, then the definition of *pratyakṣa* in *k. 3c* would also be understood to refer to *para-mata* [*kalpanāpoḍha* = *avikalpaka*], and the statement of *sva-mata* could be found nowhere; *ibid.*, 24a.6–24b.2 (27b.5–28a.1).

Prajñākaragupta understands that *atra* refers to the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of *pratyakṣa* (see the above-cited passage in *PVBh*), and that *viśeṣaṇa* refers to the qualifier “*abhrānta*.” Thus, his construction of this passage is as follows: the qualifier [“*abhrānta*” (nonerroneous)] in the definition [of *pratyakṣa*] is [employed] in response to the views of others, but all nonerroneous cognitions (*sarve bhrāntāḥ pratyayāḥ*) are, indeed, free from conceptual construction. He alternatively construes the latter half as: all cognitions which operate in the form of immediate awareness (*sarve sākṣātkarāṇākāra-pravṛttāḥ pratyayāḥ*) are . . . , or, all cognitions caused by the senses (*sarve kṣa-jāḥ pratyayāḥ*) are . . . , *PVBh*, p. 252.21–28. As errors (*bhrānti*) occur only in conceptually constructed (*savikalpaka*) cognitions, “being free from conceptual construction” (*kalpanāpoḍha*) is enough to define *pratyakṣa*, from the viewpoint of *sva-mata*. But, the term “*abhrānta*” is also adopted in the definition in order to remove the prevailing wrong view that considers some *savikalpaka* cognitions as *pratyakṣa*. This interpretation by Prajñākaragupta, however, is irrelevant, since Dignāga defined *pratyakṣa* simply as *kalpanāpoḍha* and did not recognize the necessity for adding any other qualifier to it; see above, n. 1.21, and below, Section 3, *B* ff. Prajñākaragupta seems to have regarded Dharmakīrti’s definition in *NB*, I, 4 (*PVin*, 252b.3)—*pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam*—as the standard definition of *pratyakṣa*; see *PVBh*, p. 245.13.

1.45. *PVBh*, p. 303.23; *Vibhūti*, p. 191³:

mānasam cārtha-rāgādi-sva-saṁvittir akalpikā.

According to Jinendrabuddhi, the compound *artha-rāgādi-sva-saṁvitti* should be analyzed into *artha-saṁvitti* and *rāgādi-sva-saṁvitti*; see *PST*, 24b.4–5 (28a.3–4): “*don gyi sgra ḥdi ni ṣes byaḥi rnam graṅs so. ḥdod chags la sogs pa rnam kyī raṅ ni chags la sogs raṅ ṅo. . . don dan chags la sogs raṅ ṅo de rig pa ni don dan chags la sogs raṅ rig pa ste.*” On the other hand, Prajñākaragupta takes “*sva-*” as meaning “*svarūpa-*,” and writes as follows: *mānasam apy artha-rāgādi-svarūpa-saṁvedanam akalpakatvāt pratyakṣam, anubhavākāra-pravṛtteḥ*;

PVBh, p. 303.24. Cf. NMukh, p. 3b.20–21: 意地亦有離諸分別唯證行轉。又於貪等諸自證分...皆是現量。 Dharmakīrti distinguishes *svasaṃvedana* of *rāga*, etc., from *mānasa-pratyakṣa* in his classification of *pratyakṣa*; see NB, I, 7–11: *tat* (= *pratyakṣaṃ*) *caturvidham: indriya-jñānam: ... mano-vijñānam: sarva-citta-caittānām ātma-saṃvedanam: ... yogi-jñānam cēti*.

1.46. *Vibhūti*, p. 191³: *mānasam api rūpādi-viśayāḥ lambanam* [text: °-*viśayam*] *avikalpakam anubhavākāra-pravṛttam*. The presence of “*ālambana*” is evidenced by K, V, and PST. According to Jinendrabuddhi, the compound *rūpādi-viśayāḥ lambanam* is a bahuvrīhi of which the prior portion (*rūpādi-viśaya*) is a genitive of material (*vikāra-śaṣṭhī*); see MBh, II, ii, 24 (ex., *suvarṇa-vikāro 'lambkāro yasya suvarṇāḥ lambkārah*). Thus, he analyzes it as: *yasyāḥ lambkārah rūpādi-viśaya-vikārah* (*rūpādi-viśaya-jñānam vikārah*); see PST, 25a.2–4 (28b.2–3). Following this interpretation, we may translate the above passage as follows: The mental perception whose object is a derivative from the object [of the immediately preceding sense-perception, viz.,] a thing of color, etc., and which operates in the form of immediate experience is also free from conceptual construction.

It is obvious that, in giving the above explanation, Jinendrabuddhi is influenced by Dharmakīrti's treatment of the problems of mental perception. Two problems respecting mental perception of objects are: (1) If the mind perceives the same object that had been perceived by the immediately preceding sense, this mental perception could not be recognized as *pramāṇa*, because *pramāṇa* is defined as *anadhigatārtha-gaṇṭh*; see above, n. 1.20. (2) If, on the other hand, the object of the mental perception were absolutely different from that of the sense-perception, then even blind and deaf persons would be able to perceive color and sound, for their minds are not defective like their senses. It is not clear whether Dignāga was aware of these two problems, but they are mentioned in Dharmapāla's commentary on *Ālambanap.*; see *Kuan so yüan yüan lun shih*, T. 1625, p. 889b.4–8. Dharmakīrti solves these difficulties in the following way: (1) What is perceived by means of mental perception is the object in the moment that immediately follows the moment of sense-perception. Therefore mental perception is held to be *anadhigatārtha-gaṇṭh*. (2) Mental perception is conditioned by the immediately preceding sense-perception as its *samanantara-pratyaya*. Accordingly, blind and deaf persons who have no sense-perception are unable to have mental perception; see PV, III, 243–244; NB, I, 9; PVin, 256a.8–256b.2. See also PV, III, 239–248; *Bud. Log.*, II, 311 ff.

The reason for postulating mental perception of external objects is variously discussed by post-Dharmakīrti scholars. (1) Some accept it only because it is canonically established. The following *āgama* is quoted in justification of mental perception: *dvābhyām bhikṣavo rūpam grhyate, kadācit cakṣuṣā tad-ākṛṣṭena manasā ca*; see NBT-Ṭippanī (Bibliotheca Buddhica, XI), p. 26.10–11; *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 9.17–18. Dharmottara clearly states that there is no means to prove mental perception. He accepts it simply because he sees no harm in admitting it, insofar as it is of such nature as is explained by Dharmakīrti; see NBT, p. 63.1–2: *etac ca siddhānta-prasiddham mānasam pratyakṣam, na tv asya prasādhakam asti pramāṇam. evaṃ-jātiyakam tad yadi syāt na kaścid doṣaḥ syād iti vaktum*

lakṣaṇam ākhyātam asyēti. Jitāri omits mental perception in his classification of perception; see *Hetutattvanirdeśa*, p. 273. (2) Some maintain that mental perception is a process intermediate between sense-perception and conceptual construction. According to the *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* theory (see above n. 1.14), sense-perception and mental construction are two radically different means of cognition. However, if mental perception, which is perceptual on the one hand and mental on the other, were not postulated, sense-data could never have been combined with mental construction, with the consequence that human activities based upon verbal expressions in respect to objects could never have taken place; see *DhP*, p. 62.29–31: *iha pūrvaiḥ—bāhyārthālambanam evam-vidhaṁ mano-vijñānam astīti kuto 'vaseyam ity āśaṅkya, tad-abhāve tad-balōtpannānāṁ vikalpānāṁ abhāvād rūpādaṁ viṣaye vyavahārābhāva-prasaṅgaḥ syād ity uktam*. This view was held by Jñānagarbha, etc.; *ibid.*, p. 266 (notes on p. 62): “*iha pūrvaiḥ*”—*tad astīti kuto 'dhigatam ity āśaṅkya vikalpōdayād iti sādhanam Jñānagarbheṇōktam; . . . ācārya-Jñānagarbha-prabhīrtināṁ mānasa-siddhaye yat pramāṇam upanyastam vikalpōdayād iti . . .* (3) Some consider that mental perception is the intellectual intuition of persons who, by repeated practice of meditation upon the true state of all things (*samasta-vastu-sambaddha-tatvābhīyāsa*), have attained omniscience (*sarva-jñatva*); *TS(P)*, 3381–3389. Such mental perception may be regarded as identical with *yogi-jñāna*; see *TSP*, p. 396.1. However, according to Dharmottara, there is a difference between mental perception and the yogin's perception. The former is conditioned by the preceding sense-perception whereas the latter is unconditioned. Sense-perception is the *samanantara-pratyaya* in the case of mental perception, but it is the *ālambana-pratyaya* in the case of yogin's perception, for a yogin has insight into what other persons perceive. See *NBT*, p. 59.2–3: *idr̥śenēndriya-vijñānenālambana-bhūtenāpi yogi-jñānam janyate. tan nīrāsārthaṁ samanantara-pratyaya-grahaṇam kṛtam*. It is hard to determine which of the above three interpretations is most faithful to Dignāga's thought.

1.47. *PVBh*, p. 305.17–18: *rāga-dveṣa-moha-sukha-duḥkhādiṣu ca* [text omits *ca*] *sva-saṁvedanam indriyānapekṣatvān mānasam pratyakṣam*. See *PST*, 25b.3 (29a.3): “*ḥdod chags la sogs pa rnam la yaṅ raṅ rig paḥo*”; *Vibhūti*, p. 229¹: *rāgādiṣu ca . . .*; *ibid.*, p. 194¹: *rāgādi-sukhādiṣu . . .*

See also *PV*, III, 249–280.

1.48. *Vibhūti*, p. 191³; *TAV*, p. 54.14–15:

yoginām guru-nirdeśavyatibhinnārtha-mātra-dṛk.

Cf. *NMukh*, p. 3b.21: 諸修定者離教分別...是現量.

1.49. *Vibhūti*, p. 203¹: *yoginām apy āgama-vikalpāvyavakīrṇam artha-mātra-darśanam pratyakṣam*.

The cognition derived from the *āgama* (= *śabda*) is a kind of *anumāna*; see above n. 1.12. Akalaṅka points out that Dignāga, who states that *pratyakṣa* functions in close connection with the senses (*akṣam akṣam prati vartate*) (see n. 1.11), has no right to regard the yogin's intuition as a kind of *pratyakṣa*, since it has nothing to do with the senses, *TAV*, p. 54.13–14: *syān matam—yogino*

'*indriya-pratyakṣam jñānam asty āgama-vikalpātītam, tenāsau sarvārthān pratyakṣam vetti. uktam ca "yoginām . . ." (PS, I, 6cd) iti. tan na. kiṃ kāraṇam. arthābhāvat. "akṣam akṣam prati vartate" iti pratyakṣam, na cāyam artho yogini vidyate akṣābhāvāt.* To meet this objection, Dharmottara distinguishes the actual meaning of *pratyakṣa* from its etymological meaning; see above n. 1.11. See also *PV*, III, 281–287.

1.50. In introspection, one becomes aware of one's own cognition. This internal awareness of cognition is similar in nature to the internal awareness of desire, etc.

1.51. *PVV*, p. 204.15; *PVBh*, p. 331.19; *ŚVK*, pt. I, p. 258.11; *NR*, p. 131.18: *kalpanāpi svasamvittāu iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāt.*

Dignāga expounds the theory that each cognition has a twofold appearance: the appearance of an object (*arthābhāsa*) and that of itself as subject (*svābhāsa*). As such, cognition cognizes itself while cognizing an object; see below n. 1.61. *Kalpanā* means the association of a word with a thing perceived; see above n. 1.26. The cognizing of an object through *kalpanā* is *anumāna*, and not *pratyakṣa*. But, whether it is *anumāna* or *pratyakṣa*, the essential nature of the cognition is the same, that is, it is self-cognized; see *PS*, ch. II, k. 1c (cited in *Vibhūti*, p. 524.2): *pūrvavat (= pratyakṣavat) phalam.* In this process of self-cognition, there is no *kalpanā*. Cf. *NMukh*, p. 3b.23–26.

Dharmakīrti expounds the same thought in *PV*, III, 287:

*śabdārtha-grāhi yad yatra taj jñānam tatra kalpanā
svarūpaṃ ca na śabdārthas tatrādhyakṣam ato 'kḥilam.*

1.52. Desire for an object which was formerly experienced as pleasurable is not perception, whereas our internal awareness of desire is perception; see n. 1.47.

1.53. *PVBh*, p. 332.20; *NCV*, p. 64.9–10:

*bhrānti-samvṛti-saj-jñānam anumānānumānikam
smārtābhilāṣikam cēti pratyakṣābhāṃ sataimiram.*

Vibhūti, p. 205¹: *ābhilāpikam* instead of *ābhilāṣikam*; *Sammatitarkap.*; p. 527.1–2: *samvṛti-saj-jñānam* instead of °*saj-jñānam*. Cf. *TSP*, p. 394.20–21: “*bhrānti(h) samvṛti(h)saj-jñānam anumāna-*” ity ādinā *pratyakṣābhāsa-nirdeśād . . .* (This reading must be corrected to conform to the above-cited verse.)

Jinendrabuddhi explains that four kinds of *pratyakṣābhāsa* are mentioned in this verse: (1) *bhrānti*, (2) *samvṛti-saj-jñāna*, (3) *anumāna*, *anumānika*, *smārta*, *ābhilāṣika*, and (4) *sataimira*; see *PST*, 27b.2–285.2 (31a.5–32a.8). The word “*sataimira*” is interpreted by him as meaning cognitions caused by the defect of sense-organ, such as *timira* (eye-disease); *ibid.*, 28b.2 (32a.7–8): “*rab rib bcas (sataimira) ṣes pa ḥdis dbaṅ po la ñe bar gnod pa las skeyes pa rab rib la sogs paḥi ṣes pa (indriyōpaghāta-jam timirādi-jñānam) mñon sum ltar snaṅ ba bṣi pa gsuṅs so.*” However, in the *Vṛtti* on this verse, Dignāga does not mention “*sataimira*” as a kind of *pratyakṣābhāsa*. He explains only (1), (2), and (3), all of which are produced by *kalpanā*. Dignāga defines *pratyakṣa* as *kalpanāpoḍha* and in the preceding passages he has mentioned various types of *pratyakṣa*. In enumerating here three kinds of *pratyakṣābhāsa*, he seems to have followed the *Vādaividhi*, in

which it is stated that the definition of *pratyakṣa* given therein effectively rules out *bhrānti-jñāna*, *saṃvṛti-jñāna*, and *anumāna-jñāna*; see Section 2, n. 2.8. Thus, I take the word “*sataimiraṃ*” as an adjective modifying “*pratyakṣābhāṃ*,” but not as mentioning a separate kind of *pratyakṣābhāsa*.

The above explanation of Jinendrabuddhi is based upon Dharmakīrti's interpretation of this verse as developed in *PV*, III, 288–300. Dharmakīrti clearly states that there are four kinds of *pratyakṣābhāsa*, three produced by *kalpanā* and one produced by the defect of sense-organ; see *PV*, III, 288:

tri-vidhaṃ kalpanā-jñānaṃ āśrayōpaplavōdbhavam
avikalpanaṃ ekaṃ ca pratyakṣābhāṃ catur-vidhaṃ.

According to him, the word “*sataimira*” is mentioned by Dignāga in order to make an exception (*apavāda*) to his definition of *pratyakṣa* as *kalpanāpoḍha*, since cognitions produced by the defect of sense-organ are *kalpanāpoḍha* and yet are not true *pratyakṣa*. Thus, “*sataimira*” is taken as meaning “*indriyōpaghāta-jam jñānaṃ*”; *ibid.*, 293:

apavādaś caturtho 'tra tenōktam upaghāta-jam
kevalaṃ tatra timiraṃ upaghātōpalakṣaṇam.

When examining the Nyāya definition of *pratyakṣa* “*indriyārtha-saṃnikarṣōtpannam jñānaṃ . . . avyabhicāri . . .*,” Dignāga states that the qualifier “*avyabhicārin*” is unnecessary for the reason that the cognition produced by *indriyārtha-saṃnikarṣa* is free of *vyabhicāra* which is caused by taking the illusion produced by *manas* for the object; see Section 3, *Bb*. This statement of Dignāga's inclines us to believe that Dignāga attributed errors only to *manas* and that he admitted *indriya-jñāna* as absolutely free from error. However, Dharmakīrti argues that Dignāga was aware of the *pratyakṣābhāsa* caused by the defect of sense-organ, referring to a passage (see Section 2, *Dd*) wherein Dignāga states that *indriya* is the cause of cognitions of *nila*, *dvi-candra*, etc.; see *PV*, III, 294:

mānasam tad apīty eke teṣāṃ grantho virudhyate
nila-dvi-candrādi-dhiyāṃ hetur akṣāny apīty ayam.

He further proceeds to disprove the notion that an error is caused only by *manas*, in the following manner: If the erroneous perception of *dvi-candra* were held to be caused by *manas*, this would involve the following absurd conclusions: (1) It would be removed even when the defect of the *indriya* is not cured, as the erroneous mental cognition of a snake for what is really a rope is removed simply by the close examination of the object; (2) It would not be removed even when the defect of the *indriya* is cured; (3) A man whose *indriya* is sound would also perceive a *dvi-candra* if he were to hear about it from a man who had a defective *indriya*; (4) It would not be immediate to *indriya* but would be mediated by remembrance; (5) The image of *dvi-candra* would not be clear; cf. *ibid.*, 297–298:

sarpādi-bhrāntivac cāsyāḥ syād akṣa-vikṛtāv api
nivṛttir na nivartteta nivṛtte 'py akṣa-viplave
kadācid anya-saṃtāne tathaihvārpyeta vācakaiḥ
drṣṭa-smṛtiṃ apekṣeta na bhāseta parisphuṭam.

In defining *pratyakṣa* in *NB* as well as in *PVin*, Dharmakīrti employs the term “*abhrānta*” besides “*kalpanāpoḍha*” in order to rule out erroneous cogni-

tions caused by *timira*, etc.; see NB, I, 4; *PVIn*, 252b.3–4; *Nyāyakanikā*, p. 192.16–21 (see Stcherbatsky, *Bud. Log.*, II, 17, n. 3, 18, n. 1), and post-Dharmakīrti scholars follow him; see *PVBh*, p. 245.13; *TS*, 1214, 1312, etc. However, as mentioned above, Dignāga defines *pratyakṣa* simply as *kalpanāpodha* and regards the qualifier “*avyabhicārīn*” in the Nyāya definition of *pratyakṣa* as unnecessary. As I see it, Dignāga did not take into consideration errors caused by defective sense-organs when he defined *pratyakṣa* and when he mentioned *pratyakṣābhāsa* in the above verse. Perhaps later on Dignāga’s definition was subjected to criticism which recognized that *manas* is not the only cause of erroneous cognitions, and this criticism propelled Dharmakīrti into making an extended interpretation of Dignāga’s thought. This may be clear from the fact that some commentators did not follow Dharmakīrti and put a different interpretation on Dignāga’s thought. As to why Dignāga did not use the term “*abhrānta*” in his definition of *pratyakṣa*, they urged the following explanation: Even erroneous cognitions, such as the cognition of a yellow conch-shell for what is really a white conch-shell, are to be recognized as *pratyakṣa* inasmuch as they are not inconsistent in producing effects (*artha-kriyāvisamvāda*). Thus, they take the word “*sataimira*” in the above verse of Dignāga’s as derived from *timira* in the sense of “*ajñāna*,” but not as meaning “*indriyōpaghāta-jam jñānam*”; see *TS* and *TSP*, 1324:

*piṭa-śaṅkhādi-buddhīnām vibhrame ’pi pramāṇatām
artha-kriyāvisamvādād apare sampracakṣate.*

kecit tu sva-yūthyā evābhrānta-graṇaṇam nēcchanti, bhrāntasyāpi piṭa-śaṅkhādi-jñānasya pratyakṣatvāt. atā evācārya-Dignāgena lakṣaṇe na kṛtam abhrānta-graṇaṇam. “bhrānti- . . .” ity-ādinā pratyakṣābhāsa-nirdeśād aṣamvādi-kalpanāpodham ity evamvidham iṣṭam ācāryasya lakṣaṇam. “sataimiram” iti tu timira-śabdo ’yam ajñāna-paryāyah. . . timire bhavaṁ taimiram visamvādakam ity arthaḥ. See also *PVBh*, pp. 252.29–253.2; Stcherbatsky, *Bud. Log.*, I, 153–161.

1.54. *PVBh*, p. 332.25–27: *tatra bhrānti-jñānam mrga-trṣṇādiṣu toyādi-kalpanā-pravṛttatvāt pratyakṣābhāsam. samvṛti-saj-jñānam¹ samvṛti-satsv arthāntarāropāt tad-rūpa-kalpanā-pravṛttatvāt pratyakṣābhāsam.² anumāna-tat-phalādi-jñānam pūrvānubhūta-kalpanayēti na pratyakṣam.* [I have inserted ¹ and ². K and V have ², but not ¹. Without these, the passage is liable to be construed as: *bhrānti-jñāna* is *pratyakṣābhāsa*, because (1) *mrga-trṣṇādiṣu . . . pravṛttatvāt*, (2) *samvṛti-satsu . . . pravṛttatvāt*. This construction is not appropriate.]

Jinendrabuddhi explains the distinction between *bhrānti-jñāna* and *samvṛti-saj-jñāna* as follows: the former is produced by the superimposition upon the object of a thing which one has seen before, whereas the latter is produced by the superimposition of what is unreal upon the object; see *PST*, 28a.4–6 (31b.8–32a.3). For “*samvṛti-sat*,” see below, n. 2.17. See also *NMukh*, p. 3b.26–3c.1.

1.55. *Vibhūti*, p. 221¹; *PVBh*, p. 349.5; *NMañj*, p. 66.20; *ŚVV*, p. 138.17; *Sammatitarkap.*, p. 529.12:

savyāpāra-pratītatvāt pramāṇam phalam eva sat.

Cf. *NMukh*, p. 3b.21–23: 又於此中無別量果。以即此體似義生故似有用故假設爲量。

In asserting the identity of *pramāṇa-phala* and *pramāṇa* in this verse, Dignāga is basing his thought upon *sākāra-jñāna-vāda*, the theory that the cognition possesses the form (*ākāra*) of the object within itself. The cognition as *pramāṇa-phala* is the apprehension of an object (*viśayādhigati*). If, as maintained by the *anākāra* (or *nirākāra*)-*jñāna-vādins*, the cognition were formless (*nirākāra*) while the object had form (*ākāra*), then the cognition itself (*anubhava-mātra*), as distinguished from the object, would remain the same whether it cognized something blue or something yellow or any other object. Accordingly, the cognition as the apprehension of an object must be admitted to be *sākāra*: it has assumed the form of an object (*viśayākārāpanna*). The *sākāra* cognition is thus understood to possess the function (*vyāpāra*) of assuming the form of an object. For this reason Dignāga considers it as *pramāṇa*, although primarily it is *phala* in its aspect as the "apprehension" (*adhigati*) of an object. See TSP, p. 399.13–16: *jñānam hi viśayākāram utpadyamānam viśayam paricchinad iva savyāpāram ivābhāti. ayam evārtha-prāṇa-vyāpāro jñānasya . . . tasmāt sākāram eva jñānam pramāṇam na nirākāram iti . . .*

Dharmakīrti, in a detailed commentary on the above verse (PV, III, 301–319), disproves the theories which hold that the sense-organ, the contact of sense and object, or the simple reflection of an object (*ālocana*) is *pramāṇa*. The suffix "-ana" of the word "*pramāṇa*" signifies "*karana*," the instrument or, according to Pāṇini, the predominant cause; see Pāṇ., I, iv, 42: *sādhakatamaṁ karaṇam*. (The Bauddhas follow this definition; see PV, III, 311; PVBh, p. 344.29; NBT, p. 84.6–7.) Dharmakīrti states that, among the various causes which contribute to a result, the latest one is the predominant cause. The sense-organ, etc. is related to the resulting cognition only mediately (*vyavadhānena*). Thus, Dharmakīrti, in support of Dignāga's theory, concludes that the latest and the predominant cause of the resulting apprehension of an object is nothing other than the fact that the cognition possesses the form of an object (*meya-rūpatā*). He also criticizes the view which holds *viśeṣaṇa-jñāna* to be the *pramāṇa* of the resulting *viśeṣya-jñāna*. This same view is attacked by Dignāga himself in Section 3, Eb-1.

The theory that the cognition is *sākāra* is held by the Sautrāntikas and some Yogācāras. (The Yogācāras are divided into *sākāra-vijñāna-vādins* and *nirākāra-vijñāna-vādins*.) Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla distinguish the views of the two schools concerning *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala*. The Sautrāntikas admit the existence of an external object (*bāhyārtha*). Thus, the similarity (*sārūpya*) of the form represented in a cognition to that of the object is held to be *pramāṇa* of the resulting *viśayādhigati*. The Yogācāras, on the other hand, maintain that the object is merely the appearance of an object (*viśayābhāsa*) in the cognition. Accordingly, *viśayādhigati* is nothing other than the cognition of the cognition itself, i.e., self-cognition (*svasamvitti*). This ability (*yogyatā*) of the cognition to cognize itself is considered as *pramāṇa* of the resulting self-cognition, because it is the predominant cause of the latter; see TS(P), 1344. The difference between the views of the two schools is discussed by Dignāga in the following passages of the text. However, the theory set forth here that the *sākāra* cognition is both *pramāṇa-phala* and *pramāṇa* is amenable to both schools (*ubhaya-naya*). See also NB, I, 18–19; *Yuktidīpikā*, p. 40.12–15.

1.56. Dignāga criticizes the view recognizing *pramāṇa* as distinct from *pramāṇa-phala* in Section 3, *Ea-Ee*, and in Section 6, *Da*. In *NBh*, introd. to I, i, 1, Vātsyāyana distinguishes the four factors of cognition, namely, *pramātr*, *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, and *pramiti* (*pramāṇa-phala*). Further, in *NBh*, ad I, i, 3, after explaining that *pratyakṣa*-(*pramāṇa*) is the operation (*vṛtti*) of each sense-organ upon its own object, he states that, according as the operation is in the form of contact (*sannikarṣa*) or of cognition (*jñāna*), the result (*pramiti*) is cognition or the mental attitude to discard or accept or disregard the object (*hānôpādānôpekṣā-buddhi*). Thus, it is clear that Vātsyāyana considered *pramāṇa-phala* to be distinct from *pramāṇa*. But, in view of the fact that Uddyotakara gives no answer to Dignāga's criticism while Kumārila makes a counter attack, it is supposed that the distinction between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala* was originally discussed by the Mimāṃsakas. Vācaspatimiśra does not make any particular remark on this problem in *NVTT*, but he takes it up in his *Nyāyakanikā*, a commentary on the *Vidhiviveka* of the Mimāṃsakas; see below, n. 1.57.

1.57. Kumārila objects to this theory of nondistinction between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala*. He cites the instance of cutting down a tree with an axe. The instrument, axe, is distinct from the resulting cutting down (*chidā*) of the tree. The distinction between instrument and result is thus universally accepted. Likewise, Kumārila observes, *pramāṇa*, the instrument of cognition, must be distinguished from the cognition produced by means of it; see *ŚV*, IV, 74, 75 (*TSP*, p. 399.4-6):

*viśayaikatvam icchāms tu yaḥ pramāṇaṁ phalaṁ vadet
sādhyā-sādhanayor bhedo laukikas tena bādhitāḥ.
chedane khadira-prāpte palāśe na chidā yathā
tathaiva paraśor loke chidayā saha naikatā.*

The same objection is made by Akalaṅka in *TAV*, p. 56.12-14: *loke pramāṇāt phalaṁ arthāntara-bhūtam upalabhyate. tadyathā chetṛ-chettavya-chedana-sannidhāne dvaidhī-bhāvaḥ phalaṁ. na ca tathā svasamvedanam arthāntara-bhūtam asti. tasmād asya phalatvaṁ nōpapadyate*. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also reproaches Dignāga as follows, for his confusion of the instrument and the result: When we say that Caitra mows rice with a scythe or that a man perceives a pot with his eyes, the subject, the object, and the instrument are presented to our consciousness as distinct from the action itself. Actually the word "*pramāṇa*" is sometimes used in the sense of "*pramā*," and "*karāṇa*" in the sense of "*kṛti*." However, it is not admissible to regard "*pramāṇa*" and "*pramā*" or "*karāṇa*" and "*kṛti*" as one and the same thing: the instrument and the result reside always in different loci (*adhikarāṇa*); see *NMañj*, p. 66.20 ff. References to the theory in question made by Vācaspatimiśra in *Nyāyakanikā*, pp. 254.12-260.22, and by Udayana in *NVT-Parīśuddhi*, pp. 152-155, are studied by Stcherbatsky, *Bud. Log.*, II, app. IV, 352 ff. The Bauddhas are ready to answer the above objections as follows: Since all entities are, absolutely speaking, instantaneous, the relation of the producer and the produced (*utpādyôtpādaka-bhāva*) cannot be established between two entities. It, therefore, is not proper to consider the instrument of cognition as an entity distinct from and producing the resulting cognition. The relation of *pramāṇa* and *phala* is to be understood as that of the

determiner and the determined (*vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka-bhāva*). When we have a distinct cognition of something blue, this cognition is recognized as being determined—the cognition of something blue and not of something yellow (*nīlayyēdaṁ saṁvedanaṁ na pītasyēti*)—and this determination is made by the appearance (*ākāra*) of something blue in the cognition itself; see *TS(P)*, 1346; *PV*, III, 315; *NBT*, ad I, 18–19.

1.58. Both K and V read “bya ba med paḥaṇ ma yin no” (*na tu vyāpārābhāve* ‘pi: but not when it is devoid of activity). However, we read in *PV*, III, 307cd, 308, as follows:

*dadhānaṁ tac ca tām (= meya-rūpatām) ātmany arthād dhigamanātmanā
savyāpāraṁ ivābhāti vyāpāreṇa sva-karmaṇi
tad-vaśāt tad vyavasthānād akāraḥ kam api svayam.*

According to the Bauddhas, all entities (*dharma*) are ultimately devoid of function (*vyāpāra*), since they are in a state of flux. Thus, the cognition is *akāraka*-or *nirvyāpāra* in its essential nature. But, inasmuch as the cognition arises in the form of an object, the function of *taking* (*upā-√dā*) that form and *discarding* (*pari-√tyaj*) another form can be secondarily attributed to the cognition. It is through this function that a cognition is determined as the cognition of something blue and not of something yellow; see above, nn. 1.55, 57. In the light of Dharmakīrti’s interpretation, we understand Dignāga’s statement as meaning that the resulting cognition is metaphorically called the means of cognition, because it appears as if it had a function, *although it is devoid of function in its ultimate nature*. Thus, the Tibetan text had better be corrected to read “bya ba med par yaṇ yin no” (*vyāpārābhāve* ‘pi). This emendation may be supported by *PST*, 31b.4–5 (35b.7): “ji lta baḥi bya ba med kyaṇ de daṅ ldan pa ṇid du snaṇ bar ḥgyur ba ci ltaṇ se na . . .,” and also by Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on *PS*, III, 309; cf. n. 59.

Two seven-syllable sentences—“tshad ma ṇid du ḥdogs pa ste” and “bya ba med paḥaṇ ma yin no”—are included in both Kk and Vk. It seems likely that they have been wrongly regarded as forming part of the Kārikās, since they simply express in different wording the same idea as that stated in *k. 8cd*.

1.59. Here again the reading given by both K and V is “bya ba med pa(r) yaṇ ma yin pa.” Dharmakīrti expresses the same thought in *PV*, III, 309, as follows:

*yathā phalasya hetūnāṁ sadṛśātmata yôdbhavād
hetu-rūpa-graho loke ’kriyāvattve* ‘pi kathyate.

Prajñākaragupta makes clear the meaning of this verse by the example of the newborn child, who, showing similarity to his father (*pitṛ-sadṛśa*), is said to *have taken* the form of his father (*pitṛ-rūpaṁ grhṇāti*), although, in fact, he has no such function as *taking* (his father’s form) (*vināpi grahaṇa-vyāpāreṇa*); *PVBh*, p. 344.11–12. The same illustration is given by Manorathanandin too; *PVV*, p. 211.10: “*hetu-rūpa-graho kathyate*” *pitū rūpaṁ grhītaṁ sutenētyādi*. Thus, the Tibetan text must be corrected to read “bya ba med par yaṇ yin pa . . . (*vyāpārābhāve* ‘pi).”

1.60. *Vibhūti*, p. 221¹:

sva-saṁvittih phalaṁ vātra.

PVBh, p. 349.7; *Vibhūti*, p. 215¹; *ŚVK*, pt. I, p. 237.22: *ca* instead of *vā*. *NR*, p.

158.17: *cāśya* instead of *vātra*. It is worth noting that both ŚVK and NR reverse the order of *k. 9ab* and *k. 9cd*. PVV, p. 228.12–13: *śva-saṁvittiḥ phalaṁ vēti sūtre . . .* In *k. 8cd* and the *Vṛtti* thereon, the cognition possessing the form of an object, i.e., the apprehension of an object (*viśayādhigati*), has been regarded as *phala*. Since an alternative view recognizing *śva-saṁvitti* as *phala* is put forward here, the reading “*vā*” is preferable to “*ca*.” Although the Tibetan “*yaṁ*” is used as an equivalent for both “*vā*” and “*ca*,” the following statement of Jinendrabuddhi seems to support the reading “*vā*”: “*sṇa mar yul rig pa ḥbras bur gsuṇs te, deḥi phyir yaṁ naḥi sgra ni rnam par brtag paḥi don can no*”; PST, 32a.5 (36a.8).

The word “*śva-saṁvitti*” (self-cognition: *śva-saṁvid*, °*saṁvedana*, *ātma*-°) is expressive of the thought that a cognition is cognized by itself and does not need another cognition to cognize itself. When a man has the cognition of something blue (*nīla*), he has at the same time the awareness of the cognition of something blue (*nīla-dhī*). This awareness is caused by nothing other than the cognition itself. Thus, the cognition, while cognizing an object, cognizes itself, as a lamp illuminates itself (*śva-prakāśa*) while illuminating an object. The definition of *śva-saṁvitti* is given in TS, 2012:

*svarūpa-vedanāyānyad vedakaṁ na vyapekṣate
na cāviditām astīdam ity artho 'yaṁ śva-saṁvidah.*

There are divergent views regarding how a cognition is cognized; see Stcherbatsky, *Bud. Log.*, I, 164–166; Sinha, *Indian Psychology, Cognition*, pp. 199–221. The Sāṁkhya maintain that the cognition is a function of *buddhi*, which, evolving from *prakṛti* (primordial matter), is of material nature. As such the cognition is unconscious in itself. It is illumined by *puruṣa*, which alone is self-conscious. The Naiyāyikas put forward the theory of *anuvyavasāya*. When the external sense-organ comes into contact with an object, there arises the apprehension (*vyavasāya*) of the object. This apprehension is unconscious of itself. The awareness of this apprehension is produced as the “subsequent apprehension” (*anuvyavasāya*) through the medium of the internal sense-organ or the mind (*manas*) which takes the first apprehension for its object; see NBh, ad I, i, 4: *sarvatra pratyakṣa-viśaye jñātur indriyeṇa vyavasāyaḥ, paścān manasānuvyavasāyaḥ*. Thus, according to the Naiyāyikas, a cognition is cognized by another cognition. Kumārila expounds a different view. According to him, a cognition is known not directly, but through inference. When an object is cognized, a peculiar property, namely, “cognizedness” (*jñātatā*), is produced in the object as a result of cognition. As the cognition is an action (*kriyā*), it is not known directly. Thus, Kumārila holds, the cognition is inferred from “cognizedness.” The theory of *śva-saṁvitti* is maintained by the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras. It is also shared by the Jainas, the Prabhākara-Mīmāṃsakas, and the Advaita-Vedāntins, although it is modified by each.

1.61. TAV, p. 56.10–11: *dvy-ābhāsaṁ hi jñānam utpadyate, svābhāsaṁ viśayābhāsaṁ ca. tasyābhayābhāsasya yat śva-saṁvedanaṁ* [text: *saṁvedanam*] *tat phalam*. Cf. PVV, p. 228.13–14: *svābhāsaṁ viśayābhāsaṁ ca jñānam utpadyate, tatra yat śva-saṁvedanaṁ tat phalam*; PVBh, p. 349.7: *ubhayābhāsasya vijñānasya śva-saṁvedanam eva phalam*.

That the consciousness (*viññāna*) itself appears (*ābhāti, pratibhāti, avabhāti, khyāti*) as subject (*svābhāsa* = *grāhakāśa*, °-*ākāra*) and object (*arthābhāsa*, *viśayā*° = *grāhyāśa*, °-*ākāra*) is a principal doctrine of the Yogācāras; see *Madhyāntav.*, I, k. 3; *Mahāy. Sūtrālam.*, ad XI, k. 32, etc. The above passage shows that, in considering *sva-saṃvitti* as *pramāṇa-phala*, Dignāga takes the Yogācāra doctrine for his theoretical basis. See *Vibhūti*, p. 215¹: *Sautrāntika-pramāṇaṃ sārūpyaṃ bāhyo 'rthaḥ prameyo 'dhigatiḥ phalaṃ vyavasthāpyādhunā viññaptau pramāṇa-phala-vyavasthāṃ nirdidikṣuḥ* "sva-saṃvittih . . ." iti . . .

In *Ālambanap.*, Dignāga examines the theories concerning the object of cognition (*ālambana*), and proves that nothing existing in the external world, whether it be a single atom (*aṇu*) or the aggregate (*saṃcita*) of atoms or the gathering (*saṃghāta*) of atoms, can satisfy the necessary conditions that the object of cognition must fulfill; see below, n. 2.17. In conclusion, he supports the Yogācāra doctrine that the object of cognition is nothing other than the appearance of an object in the cognition itself; *Ālambanap.*, k. 6a-c (cited in *TSP*, p. 582.11-12):

*yad antar-jñeya-rūpaṃ tu bahirvad avabhāsatē
so 'rthaḥ.*

He further remarks that what is called the sense (*indriya*) in relation to the object is not the physical organ, but the ability (*śakti*) to produce a cognition (*ibid.*, 7cd) or the ability to cognize the appearance of the object. This ability is considered to be cognition's appearance as itself (*svābhāsa*) in contrast with its appearance as an object (*viśayābhāsa*). When *sva-saṃvitti* is regarded as *pramāṇa-phala*, the role of *pramāṇa*, which takes the cognition for its *prameya*, must be attributed to the *svābhāsa* of the cognition itself.

Although Dignāga bases the theory of *sva-saṃvitti* on the Yogācāra doctrine, he believes that even the Sautrāntikas will accept the theory that *sva-saṃvitti* is the *pramāṇa-phala*. In his own commentary on *k. 9b*, which follows the above passage, he refers to two different theories: the one recognizing the object as *saṃvīṣaya-jñāna*, and the other as *bāhyārtha*. Evidently, they are respectively the theories of the Yogācāras and the Sautrāntikas. The Sautrāntikas admit that when an external object (*bāhyārtha*) is brought to the cognition (*buddhy-ārūḍha*) and the cognition comes to possess similarity (*sārūpya*) to the form of the object, there arises the awareness of this cognition, viz., *sva-saṃvitti*. Inasmuch as this awareness is held to be *pramāṇa-phala*, the Sautrāntikas should admit that the *prameya* in this case is the cognition itself, and not the external object. However, Dignāga justifies the Sautrāntika view by regarding *sārūpya* (= *viśayākārata*) as the *pramāṇa* by means of which an external object is cognized. The difference between the views of the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras is described in *ŚVV* as follows: *ye 'pi Sautrāntika-pakṣam evaṃ vyācakṣate—bāhyo 'rthaḥ prameyam, viññānasya viśayākārataḥ pramāṇaṃ sva-saṃvittih phalaṃ iti* [p. 139.11-12], *idānīm Yogācāra-pakṣe 'pi . . . teṣāṃ caitatad darśanam—bāhyārtho nāsti, viññānasya viśayākārataḥ prameyā, svākārataḥ pramāṇam, sva-saṃvittih phalaṃ iti* [p. 139.19-21]. See also *ŚVK*, part I, pp. 237.18-22, 238.10-14; *NR*, pp. 158.13-17, 159.7-11. The ability to cognize itself or *svābhāsa* (= *grāhakākāra*) of the cognition is disregarded by the Sautrāntikas, and *svābhāsa* and *sva-saṃvitti* are under-

stood by them as bearing the same meaning. Therefore the Sautrāntika view is referred to in *ŚVK*, part I, p. 237.18–20 as follows: *yadi tūcyate . . . dvi-rūpam ekam eva jñānam sva-saṁvittiyā viṣayākāreṇa ca. tad atra sva-saṁvittih phalam viṣayākāraḥ pramāṇam . . .* Both *ŚVK* and *NR* regard *k. 9* as expressing the Sautrāntika thought and *k. 10* the Yogācāra view. (As noted above, they reverse the order of *k. 9ab* and *k. 9cd*.) This interpretation, it seems to me, is irrelevant, since in the above passage Dignāga mentions “*svābhāsa*,” “*viṣayābhāsa*,” and “*ubhayābhāsasya sva-saṁvedanam*.”

Dharmakīrti criticizes the Sautrāntika theory of *artha-saṁvedana* in *PV*, III, 320–337, and concludes his arguments with the following verse:

tasmād dvi-rūpam asty ekam yad evam anubhūyate

smariyate cōbhayasyāsyā saṁvedanam phalam.

The word “*dvi-rūpa*” means “*bodha-rūpa*” and “*nīlādi-rūpa*”; see *PVBh*, p. 391.29; *PVV*, p. 220.24–25, i.e., *svābhāsa* and *viṣayābhāsa*.

Kumārila objects to the theory of “*sva-saṁvitti*” as follows: The cognition, while functioning to illumine an object, cannot also function to illumine itself, as one thing cannot possess two functions (*vyāpāra*) at the same time; see *ŚV*, Śūnyavāda, 184–187; *TS(P)*, 2013–2016. However, this objection does not damage the position of the Yogācāras, since they do not admit the object independent of the cognition itself.

1.62. *Vibhūti*, pp. 215¹, 221¹; *TS*, 1328d; *ŚVK*, part I, p. 237.22:

tad-rūpo hy artha-niścayaḥ.

NR, p. 158.17: *tad-dvaye* instead of *tad-rūpa*.

It is evident from the *Vṛtti* on this *pāda* that “*tad-rūpa*” means “*svasaṁvitti-rūpa*.” Quoting this *pāda*, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla construe “*tad-rūpa*” as meaning “*viṣayākāra*” in the cognition; see *TS*, 1328, 1329ab:

yady ākāraṁ anādrtya prāmāṇyaṁ ca prakalpyate

artha-kriyāvisaṁvādāt “tad-rūpo hy artha-niścayaḥ”

ityādi gaditam sarvaṁ katham na vyāhataṁ bhavet.

on which *TSP* explains “*tad-rūpa*” as “*jñāna-sthābhāsa-rūpaḥ*.” This interpretation shows the Sautrāntika tendency. In fact, Kamalaśīla quotes from the *Vṛtti* the passage explaining the Sautrāntika thought, without referring to Dignāga’s explanation of the Yogācāra view; *TSP*, ad 1329: “*ādi-śabdena ‘yathā yathā hy arthasyākāraḥ śubhrādītvena . . .’ ityādikam ācāryīyaṁ vacanaṁ virudhyata iti darśayati*”; cf. n. 1.64.

The term “*niścaya*” is often used in the sense of “*adhyavasāya*” (judgment), which involves conceptual construction (*vikalpa*, *kalpanā*); see *Bud. Log.*, vol. II, indices. However, here *artha-niścaya* means not *arthādhyavasāya* but *artha-vyavasthāpana*, the determination or the establishment of the object. The realist view is that a cognition is determined as the cognition of *x* or that of *y* according as the object is *x* or *y*, whereas Dignāga holds the view that an object is determined as *x* or *y* according as *sva-saṁvitti* is *x* or *y*.

1.63. The reading of both *K* and *V*: “*de dañ rjes su mthun pañi rañ rig pa . . . (tad-anurūpa-svasaṁvittih . . . = saviṣaya-jñānānurūpa-svasaṁvittih . . .)*” is not acceptable, because *k. 9b* is intended to show that the object conforms to *sva-saṁvitti*, but not that *sva-saṁvitti* conforms to the object. The translation is

based upon the reading given in *PST*, 32b.4 (36b.7), 33a.2 (37a.5–6), 33a.3 (37a.7–8), 33a.6 (37b.2): “rañ rig pa dañ rjes su mthun par (pañi) ḥdod paḥam mi ḥdod pañi don rtogs par byed do (*svasamvittiy-anurūpa iṣṭo 'niṣṭo vārthaḥ pratiyate*).”

This passage is understood as proving that *sva-samvitti* is *phala* from the Yogācāra viewpoint. The Yogācāras do not admit the existence of the external object. They note that the object of the cognition in a dream has no corresponding reality, that one and the same object is variously cognized by different persons, etc., and they assert that the object is essentially immanent in the cognition. Here Dignāga observes that when a man is aware that something blue appears in his cognition, this thing of blue in the cognition is conceived as the object. As there is no object, for the Yogācāras, apart from this appearance of something blue in the cognition, it is established that the awareness of the cognition of something blue, i.e., *sva-samvitti*, is the result of the act of cognizing the object.

The same argument is set forth by Dharmakīrti in *PV*, III, 339–340:

*yadā saviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ jñānāmśe 'rtha-vyavasthiteḥ
tadā ya ātmānubhavaḥ sa evārtha-viniścayaḥ
yadīṣṭākāra ātmā syād anyathā vānubhūyate
iṣṭo 'niṣṭo 'pi vā tena bhavaty arthaḥ praveditaḥ.*

It is evident, from comparison with Dignāga's explanation, that these two verses refer to the Yogācāra view. Both Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin state that k. 340 would be acceptable to the Sautrāntikas, who diverge from the Yogācāras in not admitting the *saviṣayatā* of *jñāna* as mentioned in k. 339; see *PVBh*, p. 392.13 ff.: *api ca bāhyam ārtham abhyupagacchatām api sva-samvedanam eva phalam. yataḥ “yadīṣṭākāra . . . praveditaḥ” . . .*; *PVV*, p. 222.1 ff.: *bahir-arthanaye 'pi buddhi-vedanasyaivārtha-vedanatvāt tathā “yadīṣṭākāra . . .”*

1.64. *PVBh*, p. 393.27–30: *yadā tu bāhya evārthaḥ prameyas tadā*

viṣayākārataivāśya pramāṇam

tadā hi jñānaṃ svasamvedyam api svarūpam anapekṣyārthābhāsataivāśya pramāṇam. yasmāt so 'rthaḥ

tena miyate

yathā yathā hy arthasyākāraḥ śubhāditvena jñāne pratibhāti (niviśate) tat-tad-rūpaḥ sa viṣayaḥ pratiyate.

[*viṣayākārataivāśya pramāṇam tena miyate*: quoted in *ŚVK*, I, 237.21; *NR*, p. 158.16. *tadā*: text, *tathā*; *PVBhT* (Tibetan version of *PVBh*, Peking ed., Tib. Trip. No. 5719, 70b.5), ḥdi ltar; K, V, *PST*, 33b.2 (37b.7): deḥi tshe. *yathā yathā*: text, *yathā*; *PVBhT*, ji ltar; K, V, *PST*, 33b.5 (38a.2), ji lta ji ltar. *jñāne*: text, *PVBhT*, omit; K, V, *PST*, 33b.7 (38a.4), śes pa la. *niviśate*: K, V, omit; *PST*, 33b.7 (38a.4), nes par gnas pa; *PVBhT*, gnas pa. *tat-tad-rūpaḥ*: text, *tad-rūpaḥ*; *PVBhT*, deḥi rañ bñin du; K, V, de dañ deḥi ño boḥi. *sa viṣayaḥ*: K, V, yul dañ bcas pa (= *saviṣayaḥ*).]

Cf. *Vibhūti*, p. 224², 236¹: *yadā tu bāhya evārthaḥ prameyaḥ . . .*; *TSP*, p. 395.18–19: *yathā yathā hy arthasyākāraḥ śubhrāditvena samniviśate tad-rūpaḥ sa viṣayaḥ pramiyate.*

In the above passage Dignāga refers to the views of the Sautrāntikas, who hold that the object of cognition exists in the external world. Inasmuch as the cognition is held to take an external thing for its object, it is improper to say that *sva-saṃvitti* is the result of the cognitive process, since *sva-saṃvitti* signifies that the cognition itself is the object of cognition. But Dignāga believes that the cognition is self-cognized even in that case. Jinendrabuddhi explains Dignāga's position as follows: Even if there is an external object, it is thought to exist only in conformity to the cognition, and not by its own nature. It is not that the cognition conforms to the object which exists by itself prior to the cognition; *PST*, 33a.2 (37a.5): "phyi rol gyi phyogs la yañ myoñ ba ji lta ba bñin kho nar don rtogs kyī don ji lta ba bñin myoñ ba ni ma yin no ñes sñar [cf. 32a.2] kho nar bśad zin to." This observation is very close to the Yogācāra theory in denying the independence of the object from the cognition. Similarity to the Yogācāra theory is even more notable in *PV*, III, 341:

*vidyamāne 'pi bāhye 'rthe yathānubhava eva saḥ
niścītātmā svarūpeṇa nānekātmatva-doṣataḥ.*

The meaning of "*svarūpeṇa na . . .*" is understood as follows: If the object exists by itself, the absurdity would be implied that a single object has various natures (*anekātmatva-doṣa*), since it is cognized variously by different persons. This is exactly the reasoning advanced by the Yogācāras in proof of their theory of the non-existence of the external object (*anartha*); see *Mahāy. Saṃgr.*, p. 148.1–2 (Lamotte, *La Somme*, II, 250–251), quoted in *Upādāyap.*, p. 887b.4, but it is here adopted to prove that *sva-saṃvitti* is *pramāṇa-phala* from the Sautrāntika viewpoint. To conclude, when a man is aware of a pot in his cognition, it is the cognition of a pot that is cognized, and not a pot as an external object; but, insofar as there is such awareness, a pot is thought to exist in the external world. That *artha-niścaya* is in accordance with *sva-saṃvitti* (*k. 9b*) is thus established even when *prameya* is considered to be *bāhyārtha*; see *PV*, III, 346:

*tasmāt prameye bāhye 'pi yuktam svānubhavaḥ phalam
yataḥ svabhāvo 'sya yathā tathāivārtha-viniścayaḥ.*

If it is the case that the cognition of a pot is cognized, then there must be, immanent in the cognition, the self-cognizing faculty, which functions as *pramāṇa*, taking the pot-formed cognition for *prameya* and producing *sva-saṃvedana* as *phala*. This is how the Yogācāras explain the theory of *sva-saṃvitti*. However, the Sautrāntikas have a limitation: they uphold the doctrine that *prameya* is an external thing. If the Sautrāntikas, in concert with the Yogācāras, had recognized the self-cognizing faculty, i.e., *svābhāsa* = *grāhakākāra*, as *pramāṇa*, their doctrine would have been violated, because *grāhakākāra* does not take the external thing for *prameya*. Accordingly, within the doctrinal limitation of the Sautrāntikas, Dignāga considers that the cognition's taking the form of an object (*viśayākāratā*) should be regarded as *pramāṇa*, the external object being cognized by means of it and it being self-cognized. However, Dignāga remarks that the essential nature of the self-cognizing cognition is disregarded in the justification of the Sautrāntika doctrine.

Dharmakīrti sets forth the same argument in *PV*, III, 347:

*tadārthābhāsataivāsya pramāṇam na tu sann api
grāhakātmāparārthatvād bāhyeṣv artheṣv apekṣate.*

He further argues that, since we have awareness of the external object only when its form appears in the cognition, there is no apprehension of the external object (*artha-saṁvedana*) apart from the cognition of the cognition itself (*sva-saṁvedana*); *ibid.*, III, 348–350. Touching on the same topic, Kamalaśīla states that *viṣayādhigama* = *artha-saṁvedana* is *pramāṇa-phala* from the Sautrāntika view-point; see *TSP*, p. 398.19–20: *bāhye 'rthe prameye viṣayādhigamaḥ pramāṇa-phalam, sārūpyam tu pramāṇam. sva-saṁvittān api satyām yathākāram asya prathanāt.*

The above justification of the Sautrāntika theory has a weakness which is pointed out by Kumārila in *ŚV*, IV, 79ab:

pramāṇe viṣayākāre bhinnārthatvān na yujyate.

If it is held that *pramāṇa* is *viṣayākāra* while *phala* is *sva-saṁvitti*, then it would follow that *pramāṇa* and *phala* take different things for their respective objects (*bhinnārtha*): the former would take an external thing for its object, whereas the latter would take the cognition. In Section 3, Dignāga himself criticizes the Naiyāyika view that *pramāṇa* and *phala* are *bhinnārtha*, saying that the axe aimed at a *khadira* tree does not produce the cutting down of a *palāśa* tree as a result. Kumārila employs the same criticism against Dignāga's justification of the Sautrāntika theory.

• 1.65. See *PVBh*, p. 393.30–31: ...-ākāra-bhedena *pramāṇa-prameyatvam upacaryate.*

For Dignāga, there is only the one fact of *sva-saṁvitti*: this cognitive phenomenon itself is not differentiated into subject and object nor into act and result. His belief is based upon the *viññapti-mātra* theory of the Yogācāras, according to whom, such expressions as *ātman*, *dharma*, and the like, which are supposed to denote the subject and the object, are mere metaphors (*upacāra*) applied to the transformation of the consciousness (*viññāna-pariṇāma*); cf. *Trīmś*, k. 1a-c:

*ātma-dharmôpacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate
viññāna-pariṇāme 'sau.*

In reality, they maintain, there is neither subject nor object: these are products of the imagination (*parikalpita*, *utprekṣita*). By attaining (*pariniṣpanna*) detachment from the imaginary subject and object (*grāhya-grāhaka-rahita*), a man comes to realize the state of pure consciousness (*viññapti-mātra*), in which there is no differentiation between subject and object; see *Trīmś*, k. 20 ff., etc. The state of pure consciousness has no duration, as it is not an entity existing by its own nature. One state exists under certain conditions (*paratantra*) and in the next moment is replaced by another; see n. 1.66. With this theory of *viññapti-mātra* as background, Dignāga considers that the undifferentiated fact of *sva-saṁvitti* is metaphorically differentiated into *pramāṇa* and *prameya*.

Kamalaśīla ascribes the following statement to "ācārya," i.e., Dignāga: "*tatrāpi hi pratyakṣôpacāro 'viruddhaś cakṣur-ādiṣu tat-kāraṇeṣu.*" Neither K nor V has the corresponding passage. According to Kamalaśīla, this statement expresses the thought that, after one has understood the relation between *pramāṇa* and *phala* as that of the determiner and the determined (*vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka-bhāva*); see above, n. 1.56, he may metaphorically call the sense-organ a *pramāṇa*, although it is generally known as the cause (*kāraṇa*) or the producer (*utpādaka*) of the resulting cognition; cf. *TSP*, ad k. 1349.

1.66. *PVBh*, p. 366.7: *nirvyāpārāḥ sarva-dharmāḥ*.

The fundamental teaching of the Buddha that all existent things are non-eternal (*aniccā sabbe saṅkhārā*, *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, IX, 6, 6, etc.) is developed by the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras into the theory of universal momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), the theory that everything is liable to destruction at the very moment of its origination; see *Mahāy. Sūtrālam.*, XVIII, 82–91, etc. Being in a state of flux, a thing cannot possess any function (*vyāpāra*). Cf. *TSP*, p. 399.12–13: *yasmān na pāramārthikāḥ karīṭ-karaṇādi-bhāvo 'sti, kṣaṇikatvena nirvyāpāratvāt sarva-dharmāṇām*. Similar expressions are often found in *TSP*; *naiva tu kaścit kamcid yojayati, nirvyāpāratvāt sarva-dharmāṇām* (p. 369.11–12); *nirvyāpāratvāt sarva-dharmāṇām na paramārthataḥ kasyacit kenacid grahaṇam* (p. 570.15).

1.67. *NMañj*, p. 67.30–31; *ŚVK*, part I, p. 238.13–14:

*yad-ābhāsam prameyam tat pramāṇa-phalate punaḥ
grāhakākāra-saṃvittiḥ trayam nātaḥ prthak-kṛtam.*

Vibhūti, p. 221¹: *grāhya-grāhaka-saṃ*° instead of *grāhyākāra-saṃ*° (cf. *ibid.*, p. 229¹). *ŚVV*, p. 139.22–23; *NR*, p. 159.9–10: °-*saṃvittiyos* instead of °-*saṃvitti*.

In this verse the Yogācāra view is clearly expounded. “*Yad-ābhāsam*” means that a cognition has “*viśayābhāsa = grāhyākāra*,” and “*saṃvitti*” implies “*sva-saṃvitti*.” In his commentary on *Trīṃś*, Dharmapāla cites this verse as evidence of Dignāga’s theory of the triple division of *viññāna*, viz., *grāhyākāra*, *grāhakā*°, and *sva-saṃvitti*, which Dharmapāla criticizes while presenting his own fourfold division theory (證自證分 *svasaṃvit-saṃvedana*° besides the above three); cf. *Cheng wei shih lun*, p. 10b.13–16: 如集量論伽他中說 似境相所量 能取相自證 即能量及果 此三體無別 ; La Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, La Siddhi de Hsüan-tsang*, I, 131. This fourfold division theory is not referred to in later Sanskrit sources. Dharmakīrti treats the problem of the distinction between *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, and *phala* from the Yogācāra viewpoint in *PV*, III, 354–367. The following verse in which the triple division of *viññāna* is clearly established, is cited with particular frequency:

*avibhāgo 'pi buddhy-ātmā viparyāsita-darśanaiḥ
grāhya-grāhaka-saṃvitti-bhedavān iva lakṣyate.* (354)

Cf. *PVin*, 263a.5–6; *ŚVV*, pp. 243.21–22, 269.18–19; *NR*, p. 272.14–15; *ŚVK*, part II, p. 98.18–19; *Yogabhāṣyaṭīkā* (*Tattvavaiśārādī*), ad IV, 23 (*Ānandāśrama* Skt. Ser., p. 198.23–24); *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, ad I, 20 (H. O. S. 2, p. 15.16–17); *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (Govt. Oriental Ser., Poona), II, 206–207, etc.

Kumārila attacks the above verse of Dignāga. One cannot assume that there is *svākāra* without ascertaining it, he says. However, in order to ascertain *svākāra*, it would be necessary to postulate another *svākāra* and so forth *ad infinitum*. His conclusion is that there is no *svākāra* apart from *sva-saṃvitti*; *ŚV*, IV, 80–82. Akalaṅka also gives a criticism of the same verse. According to him, the theory that one thing has many appearances (*ākāra*) is maintainable only by the Jains who hold the *anekānta-vāda*; see *TAV*, p. 56.19–21: *syād etat—grāhaka-viśayābhāsa-saṃvitti-śakti-trayākāra-bhedāt pramāṇa-prameya-phala-kalpanā-bheda iti. tan na. kiṃ kāraṇam. ekānta-vāda-tyāgāt. “ekam anekākāram” ity etaj jainendram darśanam, tat katham ekānta-vāde yujyate.*

1.68. *PVBh*, p. 425.13; *katham punar jñāyate* [text: *jāyate*] *dvi-rūpaṃ vijñānam* iti. [*jñāyate*: *PVBhT*, 105a.4: śes; K, V: rtogs par bya.]

The term “*dvi-rūpa*” means *svābhāsa* and *viśayābhāsa* mentioned in the *Vṛtti* on *k. 9a*. The Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaibhāṣikas are unanimous in holding that the cognition simply represents the form (*ākāra*) of an external object but does not in itself possess any form (*nirākāra*). The cognition, as such, has only *svābhāsa*, which remains the same regardless of the variety of the objects to be cognized. Or, the cognition, in which an object is represented, has only *arthākāra*, for it has no *ākāra* of its own. Thus, for those *nirākāra-jñāna-vādins*, the cognition is “*eka-rūpa*,” of one form. In the following passages Dignāga advances some reasonings to prove that the cognition is “*dvi-rūpa*” and thus to establish the theory of *sva-samvitti*. Cf. *PV*, III, 368-425.

1.69. *PVBh*, pp. 403.17, 425.12; *Vibhūti*, p. 234² (cf. p. 244⁶):

viśaya-jñāna-taj-jñāna-viśeṣāt tu dvi-rūpatā.

ŚVV, p. 267.14; *NR*, p. 299.11: *ghaṭa-jñāna-°* instead of *viśaya-jñāna-°*. Cf. *Vāk-yap.*, III, i, 105.

1.70 *PVBh*, p. 403.18-20: *viśaye rūpādaṃ yaj jñānam tad artha-svābhāsam. viśaya-jñāne tu yaj jñānam tad arthānurūpa-jñānābhāsam svābhāsam ca. anyathā yadi viśaya-jñānam arthākāram eva syāt svākāram eva vā viśaya-jñāna-jñānam* [text: *viśaya-jñānam*; *PVBhT*, 80b.8: yul śes paḥi śes pa; K, V: śes pa śes pa; *PST*, 36b.2 (41a.4): śes paḥi śes pa] *api tad-aviśiṣṭam syāt.*

To make clear the meaning of this passage, I use the following symbols:

viśaya-jñāna = C_1

svābhāsa in C_1 = S_1

arthābhāsa in C_1 = O_1

viśaya-jñāna-jñāna = C_2

svābhāsa in C_2 = S_2

arthābhāsa in C_2 = O_2

According to Dignāga, $C_1 = (S_1 - O_1)$, $C_2 = (S_2 - O_2)$. [— indicates relation] Since C_2 takes C_1 for its object, $O_2 = (S_1 - O_1)$. Therefore, $C_2 = (S_2 - (S_1 - O_1))$. Thus, C_2 is distinguishable from C_1 .

Now, in case the cognition had only *arthākāra* (=°*ābhāsa*), then $C_1 = O_1$, and $C_2 = O_2$. Since C_2 takes C_1 for its object, $O_2 = O_1$. Therefore, $C_2 = C_1$. Thus, *viśaya-jñāna-jñāna* would be indistinguishable from *viśaya-jñāna*. If, on the other hand, the cognition had only *svākāra* (=°*ābhāsa*), then $C_1 = S_1$, and $C_2 = S_2$. However, since the cognition which does not possess the form of an object within itself remains the same at all time, $S_2 = S_1$. Therefore, $C_2 = C_1$. See *PV*, III, 385-386:

*ādyānubhava-rūpatve hy eka-rūpaṃ vyavasthitam
dvitīyaṃ vyatiricyeta na parāmarśa-cetasā
artha-samkalanāśleṣā dhīr dvitīyāvalambate
nilādi-rūpeṇa dhīyaṃ bhāsamānam puras tataḥ.*

See also *ŚV*, *Śūnyavāda*, 111, 112ab:

*ekākāraṃ kila jñānam prathamam yadi kalpyate
tatas tad-viśayāpy anyā tad-rūpaiva matir bhavet
ghaṭa-vijñāna-taj-jñāna-viśeṣo °to na sidhyati.*

In the same manner, the third and the succeeding cognitions $C_3, C_4 \dots C_n$ are distinguishable from the preceding ones only when they are acknowledged to possess "*dvi-rūpa*." The formulas are as follows:

$$C_3 = (S_3 - O_3) = (S_3 - (S_2 - O_2))$$

.....

$$C_n = (S_n - O_n) = (S_n - (S_{n-1} - O_{n-1}))$$

($S_3 \dots S_n$ and $O_3 \dots O_n$ respectively stand for *svābhāsa* and *arthābhāsa* in $C_3 \dots C_n$.) $C_2, C_3 \dots C_n$ are constituted by adding another *ākāra* to the preceding $C_1, C_2 \dots C_{n-1}$. This is clearly expressed by Dharmakīrti in *PV*, III, 379-380:

*tac cānubhava-vijñānenōbhayāmsāvalambinā
ekākāra-viśeṣeṇa taj-jñānenānubadhyate
anyathā hy atathā-rūpaṁ katham jñāne 'dhirohati
ekākārōttaraṁ jñānaṁ tathā hy uttaram uttaram.*

Cf. *PVBh*, p. 407.7-9 (ad *PV*, III, 380): *tathā hy uttaram uttaram ekaikenā-kāreṇādhikam adhikam bhavati nānyathā. tathā hi pūrvakeṇa nilaṁ grhītaṁ tad-uttareṇa nila-jñānaṁ tad-uttareṇa nila-jñāna-jñānaṁ tad-uttareṇāpi tad-adhikam iti niścinoti. tad etad anyathā na syāt.*

This theory of the "accumulation of *ākāra*" (*ākāra-pracaya*) is referred to by Kumāṛila in *ŚV*, *Sūnyavāda*, 112cd-114ab:

*grāhakākāra-saṁvittau tv ākāra-pracayo bhavet
jāyate pūrva-vijñānaṁ dvy-ākāraṁ yatra tat punaḥ
tasyātmīyaś ca pūrvau ca viśaya-sthāv upaplutau
pareṣv ākāra-vṛddhyaivam pūrvēbhyo bhinnatā (tathā).*

Kumāṛila, who holds that the difference between cognitions is due to the difference between objects (*grāhya-bheda-nibandhanaḥ saṁvitti-bhedaḥ*), does not recognize the necessity for admitting the accumulation of *ākāra*; *ibid.*, 115-117.

1.71. *PVBh*, p. 409.1-2: *na cōttarōttarāṇi jñānāni pūrva-pūrva-jñāna-viśayā-bhāsāni* [K, V: *sṅar rin du ḥdas paḥi yul snaḥ ba (= pūrva-viprakṛṣṭa-viśayā°)*; *PST*, 37a.4-5 (41b.8): *sṅa ma ... rin ba yin*] *syus tasyāviśayatvāt.*"

According to the Bauddhas, nothing has stability or duration. A thing cognized by a cognition ceases to exist before the succeeding cognition arises. Hence, on the assumption that an external object is represented in the *nirākāra* cognition, the form of the object in the preceding cognition would never appear in the succeeding cognition. This, however, is contrary to our experience. When it is admitted that the cognition is "*dvi-rūpa*," the structures of the succeeding cognitions can be shown by the following formulas. (The symbols are the same as those used in n. 1.70.)

$$C_2 = (S_2 - O_2) = (S_2 - (S_1 - O_1))$$

$$C_3 = (S_3 - O_3) = (S_3 - (S_2 - (S_1 - O_1)))$$

.....

$$C_n = (S_n - O_n) = (S_n - (S_{n-1} - (S_{n-2} - \dots (S_1 - O_1))))$$

It is thus clear that O_1 , the appearance of an object in C_1 , appears in $C_2, C_3, \dots C_n$.

1.72. *PVBh*, p. 425.5; *ŚV*, *Śūnyavāda*, 118a; *ŚVV*, p. 267.15; *ŚVK*, part II, p. 144.18; *NR*, pp. 209.12, 301.13–14:
smṛter uttara-kālaṁ ca.

1.73. *Vibhūti*, p. 244⁴: *yasmāc cānubhavôttara-kālaṁ viṣaya iva jñāne smṛtir utpadyate tasmād asti dvi-rūpatā jñānasya.*

The argument advanced in *Hb* was primarily intended to prove that the cognition has *arthākāra* within itself. Here, by the fact of the recollection of a past cognition, Dignāga proves that the cognition has *svākāra* along with *arthākāra*. The recollection is caused by the impression (*saṁskāra*) of previous experience. The *nirākāra-jñāna-vādins*, who hold that an external object is experienced by the cognition which is in itself unconscious of itself, must find it difficult to explain the fact of recollection of a past cognition in the form “I remember that I cognized this object.” As the cognition, according to them, has not been experienced before, it cannot have left an impression able to give rise to recollection. The recollection of a past cognition is explainable only by admitting that the cognition is cognized by itself. From this it necessarily follows that the cognition has *svākāra*.

This reasoning is referred to by Kumārila in *ŚV*, *Śūnyavāda*, 114cd, and refuted, *ibid.*, 118:

*smṛter uttara-kālaṁ cēty etan mithyaiva giyate
 tadaiva hy asya saṁvittir arthāpattyōpajyate.*

For Kumārila, the recollection is of the object only and not of the cognition. The past cognition is merely inferred from the recollection of the object by means of *arthāpatti* (hypothetical inference); see below, n. 1.79.

1.74. *PVBh*, p. 425.20, 426.18: *svasaṁvedyatā ca.*

That the cognition has *svākāra* along with *arthākāra* implies that the cognition is cognized by itself. Thus the fact of recollection of a previous cognition is proof also of self-cognition; see *PST*, 38b.3 (43a.8): “*dus physis dran pa las ṣes paḥi tshul gñis pa ṇid grub pa ḥbaḥ ṣig tu mzad kyi, ḥon kyaṁ raṁ rig pa yaṁ ste . . .*”; *PV*, III, 426:

*dvairūpya-sādhanenāpi prāyaḥ siddham svavedanarṁ
 svarūpa-bhūtābhāsasya tadā saṁvedanēkṣaṇāt;*

ibid., III, 485a–b: *smṛter apy ātma-vit siddhā jñānasya.* See also *Madhyamakāvātāra* (ed. by De la Vallée Poussin, Bib. Bud., IX), pp. 167–168.

1.75. *PVBh*, p. 425.5; *ŚVV*, p. 267.15; *NR*, p. 299.12:
na hy asāv avibhāvite.

ŚVK, part II, p. 144.18: *avibhāvitaḥ* instead of *avibhāvite*.

This statement may also be put thus: Whatsoever is recollected has been experienced before. The recollection is an effect (*kārya*) of the previous experience

(*anubhava*). Thus the reason “*smṛteḥ*” (k. 11c) is *kārya-hetu* (cf. NB, II, 15; Bud. Log., II, 67), and effectively proves that the cognition itself has been experienced or self-cognized before; PST, 38b.4–5 (43b.2).

In *Vimś*, ad k. 17, the Sautrāntikas criticize the *viññapti-mātra* doctrine which denies the existence of external objects, arguing that the fact of recollection of an object proves the existence of the external object, which one has experienced before. In reply to this criticism, Vasubandhu states that the *viññapti* which has the appearance of the object within itself is later recollected by *mano-viññāna*; see *Vimś*, p. 9.1–8.

1.76. The Naiyāyikas hold that a cognition is not self-luminous but illuminated by another cognition; see n. 1.60. The example of the lamp, which the Bauddhas cite to illustrate the self-luminous nature of cognition, is used by them to explain their theory that a cognition is cognized by another cognition; see NBh, II, i, 18: *yathā pradīpa-prakāśaḥ pratyakṣāṅgatvād dṛśya-darśane pramāṇam, sa ca pratyakṣāntareṇa cakṣuṣaḥ samnikarṣeṇa grhyate, pradīpa-bhāvābhāvayor darśanasya tathā-bhāvād darśana-hetur anumīyate, tamasi pradīpam upādadhīti ity āptōpadeśenāpi pratipadyate, evaṁ pratyakṣādīnāṁ yathā-darśanaṁ pratyakṣā-dibhir evōpalabdhiḥ*. The use of the lamp metaphor as an illustration of the *sva-prakāśa* theory (cf. NS and NBh, II, i, 20) is not authorized in the Nyāya school; see NVTT, p. 371.5–7: *ye tu—pradīpa-prakāśo yathā na prakāśāntaram apekṣate evaṁ pramāṇāny api pramāṇāntaram anapekṣamāṇāny api santi bhaviṣyanti yācārya-deśiyā manyante*.

1.77. *Vibhūti*, p. 271⁵; ŚVV, p. 247.23, 284.20:

jñānāntareṇānubhave 'niṣṭhā.

ŚVK, part II, p. 103.18–19; NR, p. 277.15: *hīṣṭā* instead of *aniṣṭhā*. NR, p. 321.9: *anubhāvo* instead of *anubhave*; *aniṣṭas* instead of *aniṣṭhā*.

Inasmuch as there is a later recollection of C_1 (C stands for cognition), it must be admitted that C_1 is cognized in some way. If it is held that C_1 is cognized by C_2 , then it necessarily follows that C_2 is cognized by C_3 , and C_3 by C_4 , and so forth. Because C_2, C_3, \dots are also later recollected (k. 12b₂). Thus the Naiyāyikas are inevitably led to the absurd conclusion that an endless series of cognitions follow from a single cognition of an object. See PV, III, 513, 514ab:

jñānāntareṇānubhave bhavet tatrāpi ca smṛtiḥ

dṛṣṭā tad-vedanam kena tasyāpy anyena cet imām

mālām jñāna-vidām ko 'yaṁ janayaty anubandhinim.

TSP, p. 565.13–17: *kim ca yadi jñānāntareṇānubhavo 'ṅgikriyate tadā tatrāpi jñānāntare smṛtir utpadyata eva jñāna-jñānaṁ mamōtpannam iti, tasyāpy apareṇānubhavo vaktavyaḥ, na hy ananubhūte smṛtir yuktā, tataś cē mā jñāna-mālāḥ ko 'nanya-karmā janayatīti vaktavyam. na tāvad arthas tasya mūla-jñāna-viṣayatvāt. nāpindriyālokaḥ tayoś cakṣur-jñāna evōpayogāt. nāpi nirnimittā, sadā sattvādi-prasaṅgāt; ŚV, Sūnyavāda, 187cd, 188 (see also *ibid.*, 27):*

anyena vānubhave [texts: anubhāve] 'sāv anavasthā prasajyate

tatra tatra smṛtiṁ dṛṣṭvā sarvānubhava-kalpanā

ekena tv anubhūtatve sarvaṁ tatraiva sambhavet.

1.78. The Naiyāyikas are often charged with this absurdity; see *Yogabhāṣya*, ad IV, 21: “*cittāntara-dṛśye buddhi-buddher atiprasaṅgaḥ . . .*” (Sūtra). *atha cittam cec cittāntareṇa grhyeta buddhi-buddhiḥ kena grhyate, sāpy anyayā sāpy anyayēty atiprasaṅgaḥ*. The same criticism of the Nyāya theory offered in *Prameyakamalamārtanda* and *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* is explained in Sinha, *Indian Psychology, Cognition*, pp. 214–220.

1.79. *Vibhūti*, pp. 261⁵, 271⁵; *ŚVV*, pp. 247.23, 284.20, 286.11; *NR*, pp. 277.15, 321.17:

tatrāpi hi smṛtiḥ.

ŚVK, part II, p. 103.22: *ca* instead of *hi*; *ibid.*, p. 168.16 omits *hi*.

Kumārila vehemently attacks this argument in *ŚV*, *Śūnyavāda*, 189–196. He observes that it is contrary to the experience of an ordinary person to argue that an endless series of cognitions, *C*₁, *C*₂, *C*₃, . . . are recollected. He explains the cause of the recollection of the cognition by his theory that a cognition is inferred from its result, i.e., *jñātātā* (cognizedness); see above, n. 1.60. Immediately after an object has been cognized, the cognition is inferred from *jñātātā* by means of *arthāpatti* (hypothetical inference): if there had been no cognition, there could not be *jñātātā*. *C*₁ is thus cognized by *C*₂, that is to say, *jñātātā* is produced on *C*₁. Again from this *jñātātā*, *C*₂ is inferred by means of *arthāpatti*. In this way there arise a certain number of cognitions, each cognizing the preceding one, so long as the cognizer attempts to apprehend the cognition. As many cognitions as are thus cognized may be recollected later, but not an endless series; see *ŚVK*, part II, p. 168.11–13 (ad k. 191): *yadi tv artha-jñātātānyathānupapattyā jñānam avagamyā punas taj-jñātātā-vaśena tad-ṣṣayam jñānāntaram kalpayati, punas cānenaiva krameṇa yāvac-chramam jñānāni jñātāni, tato yāvaj-jñāta-smaraṇād nānavasthā*. Kumārila also disagrees with the view that there is a recollection of the cognition itself similar to the recollection of the object. According to him, what is recollected is always the object and never the cognition. From the recollection of the object, the previous cognition is inferred by means of *arthāpatti*: if this object had not been cognized before, there could be no recollection of it. It is through this process that the past cognition comes to be recollected; see *ibid.*, p. 168.17–18 (ad k. 192) *artha hi smaryate. tat-smaraṇānyathānupapattyā ca tasya prāḡ jñātātām eva kalpyate, tato 'pi prācīna-jñāna-kalpanā*.

1.80. *ŚVV*, p. 247.24; *ŚVK*, part II, p. 103.25; *NR*, p. 277.16, 322.20:

viṣayāntara-saṁcāras tathā na syāt sa cēṣyate.

Vibhūti, p. 261⁵: *cēkṣate* instead of *cēṣyate*; *TS*, 206ab: *gocarā°* instead of *viṣayā°*; *ŚVV*, p. 285.20: *tadā* instead of *tathā*. Cf. *Vibhūti*, p. 271⁵.

Cf. *PV*, III, 514cd:

pūrvā dhīḥ saiva cen na syāt saṁcāro viṣayāntare.

TSP, p. 565.17–27: *saiva pūrvā-dhīr uttarottarām buddhiṁ janayatīti ced āha—“gocarāntara-saṁcāras . . .”* (*TS*, 2026ab). *evam hi viṣayāntara-saṁcāro na prāpnoti. tathā hi pūrvā-pūrvā buddhir uttarōttarasya jñānasya viṣaya-bhāvenāvasthitā pratyāśannā cōpādāna-kāraṇatayā tām tādṛśīm antar-aṅgikām tyaktvā katharā ca bahir-aṅgam artham gṛhṇīyāt.*

Dharmakīrti develops the discussion as follows: Inasmuch as we admit the movement of the cognition from one object to another, the series of cognitions must be broken at a certain point. If this is the case, the last in the series of cognitions is not cognized by any other cognition. But this conclusion is untenable. Since all cognitions are of the same nature, the last one must also be cognized, so that it may be recollected. If the opponents insist that the last one is not cognized, then they must admit that no cognition is ever cognized by another cognition and, in consequence, deny the fact of the recollection of the cognition. If, on the other hand, they state that the last cognition is cognized by itself, then they have to accept the theory of self-cognition; see *PV*, III, 539–540:

*viśayāntara-saṁcāre yady antyaṁ nānubhūyate
parānubhūtavat sarvānanubhūtiḥ prasajyate
ātmānubhūtaṁ pratyakṣaṁ nānubhūtaṁ paraiḥ yadi
ātmānubhūtiḥ sā siddhā kuto yenaivam ucyate.*

See also *TS*, 2026cd–2028:

*gocarāntara-saṁcāre yad antyaṁ tat svato 'nyataḥ
na siddhyet tasya cāsiddhau sarveṣāṁ apy asiddhatā
ataś cāndhyam aśeṣasya jagataḥ samprasajyate
antyasya tu svataḥ siddhāv anyeṣāṁ api sā dhruvam
jñānatvād anyathā naiṣāṁ jñānatvaṁ syād ghaṭādivat.*

TSP, p. 566.17–22: *athāpi syād ekam antyaṁ jñānam ananubhūtaṁ asmṛtaṁ
cāstāṁ ko doṣaḥ syād ity āha—“gocarāntara- . . .” (TS, 2026cd–2028) iti.
svasaṁvitter anabhyupagamān na svataḥ siddhatā, nāpi parataḥ, anavasthā-doṣāt,
tasyāntasyāśiddhau satyāṁ pūrvakasyāpy asiddhiḥ, apratyakṣōpalambhakatvāt.
tataś cārthasyāpy asiddhir iti na kadācit kimcid upalabhyeta. tataś cāndhyam
āyātam aśeṣasya jagataḥ. athāntasya yathōkta-doṣa-bhayāt svasaṁvittiyā svata eva
siddhir abhyupagamyate tadā tadvad eva sarvasya jñānatvāviśeṣāt svasaṁvid astu.*

As noted above (n. 1.79), Kumārila considers that the series of cognitions is finite. The successive cognitions arise not spontaneously but by man's exertion, and hence the series may be broken. As one ceases to see an object when one's eyes tire of looking at it or when they turn to another object, so one ceases to apprehend the cognition when one tires of this exertion or when one cognizes another object. Hence the cognition surely moves from one object to another; *ŚV*, Śūnyavāda, 193:

*yāvach-chramaṁ ca tad-buddhis tat-prabandhe mahaty api
śramād rucyānya-samparkād vicchedo viśayeṣu iva.*