VICTORINE TEXTS IN TRANSLATION
Exegesis, Theology and Spirituality from the Abbey of St Victor

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Trinity and Creation

A Selection of Works of Hugh, Richard and Adam of St Victor

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BREPOLS

an intentional generosity and hospitality that wills the well-being and flourishing of Itself and all else, and in the service of which the other divine attributes—especially power and wisdom—function.[110] For the Victorines, such divine goodness "explains" both the nature of divine being itself, specifically its tri-unity,[111] as well as the existence and nature of all non-divine being, and, finally, the relationship between the two.[112] So, in Victorine thought, manifest in various ways in the works contained below, Trinity and creation are linked according to this overriding intuition regarding divine goodness.

[110] Similarly, Aquinas, *ST* III.1.1, ad 3: "Every mode of being wherein any creature whatsoever differs from the Creator has been established by God's wisdom, and is ordained to God's goodness. For God, Who is uncreated, immutable, and incorporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures for His own goodness."

[111] Similarly, Bonaventure, *Itinerarium in Deum* 6.1: "the good itself is the principal foundation for contemplating the [Trinitarian] emanations."

[112] So David Bentley Hart (*Beauty of the Infinite*, 185): "God graciously makes a place for others in the divine interval of love's superabundance."

HUGH OF ST VICTOR

ON THE THREE DAYS

INTRODUCTION AND TRANSLATION
BY HUGH FEISS OSB

INTRODUCTION

Work

Hugh came to St Victor in Paris from northern Germany sometime around 1115–1118, after the departure of the monastery's founder, William of Champeaux to be bishop of Chalons-sur-Marne in 1113. Hugh died in 1141. His career as a teacher and writer at St Victor spanned less than twenty-five years, during which he wrote an impressive number of works, some of them very influential.

Among these works of Hugh of St Victor is the *On the Three Days* (*De tribus diebus*), of which its editor, Dominique Poirel identified 132 manuscripts.[1] *On the Three Days* exists in two slightly different versions, the second one containing Hugh's touching up of the first.[2] It seems likely that the plan of the work also evolved between the time Hugh began the work and when he finished the first version. It is at once a sermon, a collection of wonders, a theological-philosophical treatise on creation, the existence of God and the mystery of the Trinity, allegorical exegesis, and an account of the mind's journey to God, written in a captivating Latin style.[3] More exactly, the work—especially the first of its three parts—is a meditation on the divine works, so that "through the things which God has made, a man will learn to seek out and understand him who has made them all."[4]

1 On the influence of *On the Three Days*, see Dominique Poirel, *Livre de la nature et débat trinitaire au XIIe siècle, Le* De tribus diebus *de Hugues de Saint-Victor*, Bibliotheca Victorina XIV (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 169–98. As the notes will make clear, this introduction is for the most part merely a summary of this magisterial study by the editor of the *On the Three Days*.

2 Poirel, *Livre*, 213–33.

3 Poirel, *Livre*, 6, 236–40. On Hugh's style, which itself suggests the variety (immensity), beauty and utility of God's creation, see Poirel, *Livre*, 199–213.

4 *Didasc.* 3.10 (Taylor, 93; Buttimer, 59–60). I owe this reference to Jan W. M. van Zwieten, "Scientific and Spiritual Culture in Hugh of St Victor," in *Centres of Learning: Learning and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East*, ed. Jan Willem Drijvers and Alasdair A. MacDonald (New York: Brill, 1995) 183.

Date

Poirel has confirmed and refined the opinion that *On the Three Days* is among Hugh's earliest works. In Hugh's *Booklet on the Formation of the Ark*, there is a list of popes which ends with Innocent II, who died February 13, 1130. In the *Booklet*, Hugh refers the reader to a treatise he had written entitled *On the Three Days*.[5] The *Booklet* is appended to the *On the Ark of Noah* (1125/1126); it is likely that Hugh finished the *On the Three Days* before the *On the Ark of Noah*. Abelard discusses the triad, power, wisdom and kindness in his *Theology "Of the Supreme Good,"* which its editors assign to 1120/1121.[6] As we shall see, Poirel thinks Abelard derived the triad from the *On the Three Days*, which suggests that Hugh wrote it before 1120/1121.[7] Hugh probably made corrections and issued the second version before 1130.[8] The second, corrected version was included in the official collection of Hugh's works made at St Victor by Abbot Gilduin (d. 1155).

Argument

The work is divided into three distinct sections, which are marked in the translation by bracketed roman numerals. The first section is a lyrical and well organized praise of the wonders of the things that God has made. In it Hugh, the enthusiastic twelfth-century scholar, marvels in a systematic way at the immensity, beauty and utility of the natural world. His wonder at the various dimensions of creation reminds one of the carefully constructed blessings of God and the spheres of creation in the *Benedicite*, the prayer of the three young men included in the Latin Vulgate version of the book of Daniel, a text incorporated

5 *Libellus*, IV (Sicard, 143.115–16; PL 176.693D).

6 Poirel, *Livre*, 284, refers to E. M. Buytaert and C. J. Mews, *Petri Abaelardi opera theologia, III: Theologia "Summi boni"; Theologia "Scholarium,"* CCCM 13 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1987) 20–21; C. J. Mews, "On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, t. 52 (1985) 73–92, 131.

7 Poirel, *Livre*, 131–54, 458–60, and *De tribus diebus*, 218[a]-20[a] offer further evidence. Hugh's treatise *On the Virginity of the Blessed Mary* exists in two recensions, the second containing and appendix answering objections to the first. The manuscripts, which contain the earlier version of the Marian work, also contain the first recension of *On the Three Days*, and the later versions of both works appear in a different body of manuscripts. In addition, because of many parallels in the two works, Poirel thinks it likely that the first two books of Hugh *Explanation of Ecclesiastes* were written at the same time as *On the Three Days*.

8 Poirel, *Livre*, 118–21.

into the liturgy. Hugh's knowledge of the physical world draws on the encyclopedic tradition (e.g., Pliny's *Natural History* and Isidore of Seville's *Etymologies*), but his wonder seems to have been elicited by direct experience, not just descriptions in books. In the *Didascalicon*, in a rare autobiographical reference, he tells about going out at night to gaze at the stars.[9] He is particularly impressed by how creatures of very different sizes and shapes mesh together in ordered harmony, an ecosystem, and how each biological need is fulfilled (4.8; 18.2, 4–5; 20.6). The world he describes is the world of ordinary experience. He lived long before microscopes and telescopes brought knowledge of dazzling worlds beyond the reach of the senses and before the data of the senses were doubted by Enlightenment philosophers.[10]

Hugh divides the wonders of the physical world into three, because he sees in the immensity, beauty and utility of the world a reflection of the power, wisdom and kindness of God (1.3). In the first part of his treatise, he presents these as essential attributes of God, identical with the divine substance and evident in creation (1.2). His leitmotiv is Rom 1:20: "From the creation of the world the invisible realities of God are beheld through what is understood of the things which are made." He lays down a careful outline, which supplies the subdivisions of the first part of the treatise, but makes no reference to the second and third parts. Surprisingly, even in the first section, Hugh does not follow his outline exactly.

In the second part of the treatise, Hugh turns to the invisible things that have been made known through the wonders of the visible. Whereas the first part was based on experience, and the third part will be based on the authority of Scripture, this second part is based on reason.[11] Here, Hugh focuses on the link between visible beauty and invisible Wisdom. The warrant for this choice, on the one hand, is that

9 *Didasc.* 6.3 (Taylor, 136–37; Buttimer, 114.19–115.1).

10 Wanda Cizewski, "Beauty and the Beasts," 297–98, notes Hugh's "great delight in cataloguing the variety of qualities and species to be found on earth . . . Hugh concentrates on animal beauty . . . The category of animal beauty includes not only shapeliness or grace, but also the curious, the exotic, and the grotesque." Hugh's dictum, "Learn everything, and you will see that nothing is superfluous" (*Didasc.* 6.3 [Taylor, 137; Buttimer, 115]) is vindicated in the *On the Three Days*. In *Didascalicon* 6.3, Hugh describes how as a school boy he delighted in observing the natural world; Hugh's theory and practice directed all learning toward the *lectio divina* of the Bible. On Hugh's use of all knowledge for reading the Bible and his keen sense of observation, see Dominique Poirel, "Voir l'invisible: la spiritualité visionnaire de Hugues de Saint-Victor," in *Spiritualität im Europa des Mittelalters: L'Europe spirituelle au Moyen Age: 900 Jahre Hildegard von Bingen, 900 ans l'abbaye de Cîteaux*, ed. Jean Ferrari and Stephan Grätzel, Philosophie im Kontext 4 (St. Augustin: Gardez! Verlag, 1998) 29–30, 33.

11 Poirel, *Livre*, 249.

beauty has definite form (which power does not), and it is a habitual quality (which utility is not). On the other hand, as the image of the Father, Wisdom (or the Word) is manifested in both creation and in redemption (16.1–3; 24.3). Then, from the discussion of beauty in part one, Hugh privileges the movement proper to rational creatures, which is the highest representation of uncreated Wisdom. Because the rational creature spans the visible and invisible, it is a both a door or first access and a path to contemplation of God.

The spiritual essence of a human being had a beginning and so did not give existence to itself. For anything at all to exist, there must be an eternal Creator. The order in nature shows that this eternal Creator exerts an all-encompassing Providence (18.2–5). The Creator is "completely one and simple" (19.3), and so is unchanging (19.5) in his omnipresence (19.8), his being (20.1–4) and knowledge (20.5–10). Hugh mentions that divine knowledge is called vision, wisdom, foreknowledge and providence (he does not mention predestination at all), but says that he does not want to deal with them in this compendium (20.10; cf. 8.5)

Having discovered in the rational mind a path to the one, eternal, immutable Creator, Hugh turns to the Trinity. The rational mind generates understanding and sometimes loves and delights in what it understands. In God the generation of Wisdom is eternal, as is the Love between them (21). The Father loves his Wisdom in itself and loves Wisdom's works because of the likeness of Wisdom that he sees in them (22; 24.2).

At this point Hugh turns from meditative and devout analysis to exhortation. One might say that the first part of his treatise read the literal meaning of the book of nature (4.3), the second part to this point explored its allegorical and anagogic meaning, and from this point Hugh will urge its tropological meaning. Using as his springboard the gospel account of the Transfiguration of Christ, Hugh has the Father address the reader: "Listen to Him," and keep or return to his likeness within you (24.2–3). Then Hugh adds his own exhortation, urging his readers to turn to their Redeemer, through whom they and the beautiful world were created good (1.1) and who wishes to redeem them. If they do not wish to have him as their Redeemer, they will have him as their Judge.

The first two parts describe the way of cognition, which leads from knowledge of creation to knowledge of Wisdom, the second person of the Trinity. In contemplation of the Triune God, the rational creature is turned (converted) toward the Wisdom of God, as befits its nature. However, contemplation can last only for a little while. We (Hugh changes to the first person plural) now must reverse our path and return to the world

following the way of creation, from Wisdom, to rational creation, to corporeal creation (25). However, we should bring back with us the Light that we saw there, the divine Power, Wisdom, and Kindness to which we should respond with the light of fear, the light of truth, and the light of love (26.1). These are three interior "days," which logically follow each other, without the later ones eliminating the earlier ones (26.2–3, 6).

Then Hugh relates the three days to the history of salvation. In the ark treatises, he will distinguish three eras: before the law, under the law, under grace. Here, looking at the three days from the standpoint of Christ, rather than of humanity, he distinguishes the first day, when humanity was under sin, and, under the prompting of the law, feared God the Judge;[12] the second day, when Christ brought the truth which takes away evil; the third day, when good is restored until finally charity will be perfect and fear of punishment will pass over into reverent fear (27.1–2).

What occurred in Christ was not just a remedy, but also an example and sacrament; what was external in his days we are to seek internally:

> First day: death, fear, Power, the Father
> Second day: burial, truth, Wisdom, The Son
> Third day: resurrection, charity, Kindness, the Holy Spirit.

These three days are one in the brightness and in the operation of God, but in this way "the distinction of persons can be understood in the distribution of works" (27.3). The omnipotence of God arouses our hearts to wonder and we die through fear; that is the day of the Father. The Wisdom of God enlightens our hearts to the recognition of truth and we are buried away from the clamor of this world by the contemplation of truth; that is the day of the Son. On the day of the Holy Spirit's kindness, we rise through love and desire for eternal goods (27.4).

Trinity: Power, Wisdom, Kindness

The triad power-wisdom-kindness is a connecting thread in Hugh's treatise. He saw them as divine attributes reflected in the immensity, beauty, and utility of nature. His most original contribution was to appropriate these three attributes respectively to the three persons of the Trinity.[13]

[12] Here Hugh adds "fear" to the dyad truth-love (*veritas-dilectio*), which he usually favored. See Poirel, *Livre*, 254–55.

[13] Poirel, *Livre*, 345–68.

Strikingly, already in 1121, Abelard was condemned at Soissons for doing something similar in his *Theology "Of the Supreme Good"* (1119–1121). Abelard aimed to describe the Trinity in terms that were more accessible to non-believers and less anthropomorphic than the Scriptural terms "Father," "Son," and "Spirit." Because it was established teaching that the divine persons are distinguished by their relations of origin, Abelard tried to show that wisdom derives from power, and goodness from the love of them both, for without power and wisdom, goodness would be without effect. This risked implying subordination in the Trinity. Reversing the traditional order, which saw attributes like power, wisdom and goodness as properly pertaining to the divine substance, but appropriated to one of the divine persons by reason of some fittingness, Abelard saw power, wisdom, and goodness as proper respectively to Father, Son and Spirit, but able, under certain conditions, to be assigned to the divine Substance. Thus, the "Father is powerful in-himself," but it can be said, with a meaning determined by the context, that "God is powerful" or "The Son is powerful." This was rejected by the church council at Soissons and again at Sens in 1141.[14] It seems very unlikely Hugh would have taken over a suspect idea from Abelard or that they would have come up with the same idea independently, so Abelard probably derived the idea from Hugh.[15]

The triad appears five times in *On the Three Days* (1.1–3; 15.2–16.1; 24.4; 26.1; 27:3–4). Only in the fourth and fifth of these passages does Hugh speak of appropriations of power, wisdom and kindness to the Trinity, and the fourth is only a brief mention. In the fifth reference, at the very end of *On the Three Days*, Hugh writes that the three days are ultimately one in God and in the divine action, but they are distinct in the works which God creates and in the stages of the spiritual life. Hugh does not identify the three attributes with the individual persons, but

[14] Poirel, *Livre*, 283–314.

[15] Poirel, *Livre*, 368–82. The precise chronology and source of the introduction of this triad in twelfth-century theology is still debated: Poirel (*Livre*, 372–379) opts for Hugh of St Victor, basing his argument of a dating of *On the Three Days* earlier than Abelard's *Theology "of the Supreme Good,"* whereas Matthias Perkams ("The Origins of the Trinitarian Attributes: *potentia, sapientia, benignitas*," *Archa Verbi*, 2004: 25–41) argues in favor of an "Abelardian" origin. Constant Mews (*Abelard and Heloise* [New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005], 38–41; 103–4; 115f), underlines the importance of oral discussions in the school of William of Champeaux in Paris; because of this, both Abelard and Hugh started using the ternary nearly at the same time (as is acknowledged by Perkams, *ibid.* 37). What is both certain and important is that Abelard's use proved immensely controversial. This particular triad would continue to draw the attention of theologians after Hugh and Abelard. Gilbert of Poitiers alludes to it (Gemeinhardt, "Logic, Tradition, and Ecumenics," 42) as does Richard (see below).

says only that they pertain to the different persons. Even then, the Trinitarian appropriations are not the primary focus of the discussion of power, wisdom and kindness in *On the Three Days*. Hugh's finesse in this regard is evident in a homily of Hugh's preserved as *Misc.* 1.99.[16] There, commenting on Mic 6: 5–8, Hugh writes that you should make an offering of discernment, piety and care, but in such a way that "you do not divide the one Trinity in distinguishing the gifts, nor confuse the Trinity of the unity in participating in the gifts, but present to each what is his and present all together to the one."[17]

The triad was discussed by theologians between 1140 and 1160. During that time, in part because of the influence of Hugh's *On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith*, the third member of the triad became fixed as "goodness" (*bonitas*).[18] Between 1160 and 1200, theologians considered the way in which essential attributes like these could be more specifically attributed to one divine person. Richard of St Victor was an important contributor; he or the anonymous author of the *Sentences on Divinity* seems to have been the first to use the term "appropriation" in this regard.[19] In *On the Spirit of Blasphemy*, he discusses the sin against the Holy Spirit, which he says is sheer malice against goodness, which is especially attributed to the Holy Spirit. "Certain [names] common to all the persons are appropriated to specific persons, not without a great mystery."[20] In *On the Trinity* 6.10,[21] he explains why the word "spirit" is applied or appropriated to the Holy Spirit as a proper name, even though it pertains to all three. In *On the Trinity* 6.15, Richard says he is going to repeat what he wrote earlier about why by a special manner of speaking, power is attributed to the Unbegotten, wisdom to the Begotten, and goodness to the Holy Spirit. The work he is referring to is a letter to an unknown Bernard, responding to his question why Augustine attributed unity to the Father, equality to the Son, and their mutual harmony to the Holy Spirit, and why the Scriptures attribute power specifically to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and charity or goodness to the Holy Spirit.[22] Richard's answer to Bernard's second question is included verbatim in *On the Trinity* 6.15. The gist of his

[16] PL 177.529A-532B.

[17] See Poirel, *Livre*, 334–43.

[18] *Sacr.* 1.3.26 (PL 176.227CD; Deferrari, 53–54). See Poirel, *Livre*, 383–89.

[19] *Sent. divinit.* (Geyer, 61–62).

[20] PL 196.1192BC.

[21] Ribaillier, TPMA 6.238–39, translated below.

[22] *De tribus personis appropriatis in Trinitate*, Ribaillier TPMA 15.167–87 (= PL 196.991–94).

argument is that the mystery of the Trinity exceeds the capacity of the human mind, but what we do know from daily experience—power, wisdom, charity—teaches us something about them, in a "provisory, indirect, and so to speak, mirror-like way."[23] There is no goodness without wisdom and power, no wisdom without power. In this created trinity, only power is not from the others; goodness is from both the others. In this trinity are expressed the properties of that highest and eternal Trinity. Richard does not say, as Abelard was accused of doing, that the power of the Son and Spirit is any less than that of the Father. For example, when wisdom is appropriated to the Son, an attribute common to the three persons is signified, but attention is directed toward the particular way in which this attribute is realized in that person. Or as St Thomas Aquinas put it, appropriation is "the manifestation of the persons through essential attributes,"[24] because there is some resemblance between that attribute and the unique property of that person, e.g., the relationship between unbegottenness and power.

The triad entered into the common patrimony of Western theology. Thomas Aquinas and the other thirteenth-century theologians incorporated it into their theologies of the Trinity. Among countless examples, here is one. In 1639, the Superior General of the canons regular of the Order of the Holy Cross (Crosiers) had ordered published a manuscript on the spiritual life written in the fourteenth century by his predecessor, Peter Pincharius (d. 1382). In his discussion of contemplative prayer, Pincharius lists seven reasons why such prayer is accompanied by spiritual joy. The seventh is that the contemplative is stunned by the magnitude of the divine power, and the profundity of the divine wisdom, and is in awe at the gentleness of the divine kindness.[25] The words—and the sentiments—are Hugh's.

Sources

Hugh's primary source is the Bible. He explicitly cites the Scriptures thirty-three times, most often the Psalms and the Gospel of Matthew. Beyond that, he alludes to the thought and language of the Bible constantly. Platonic thought, transmitted to the early Middle Ages through

[23] Poirel, *Livre*, 397. What follows draws upon his commentary (397–420) and Ribaillier's introduction in *Opuscules théologiques*.

[24] *ST* 1.39, aa. 7–8.

[25] Petrus Pincharius, *Vestis nuptialis* (Cologne: Henricus Krafft, 1639) 392.

Calcidius' *Commentary on the Timaeus*, Macrobius' *Dream of Cicero*, the writings of the fathers of the Church and of Boethius, is evident; e.g., the contrast between the intelligible and the physical world, the different kinds of movement, the triad reason, anger, and desire, and the pre-eminence of the sense of sight. Hugh is directly influenced by book 2 of Cicero's *On the Nature of the Gods*, which seeks to establish the existence, nature, and providence of the gods. The Carolingian theologian Paschasius Radbertus' *On Faith, Hope and Charity* anticipated and probably influenced Hugh's central ideas: the invisible creator is known from the visible things he has made, and in the creator, power, wisdom and will are co-extensive. The opening sentence of *On the Three Days* Hugh seems to have derived from a commentary on the Pauline Epistles composed by Florus of Lyons from extracts of Augustine's writings. This statement may have reached Hugh and Abelard, who also cites it, through William of Champeaux.[26]

Message

What can *On the Three Days* convey at the beginning of the twenty-first century? It provides anyone interested in the medieval world with a door into the way in which one educated, devout, and enthusiastic twelfth-century scholar, a native of Germany who chose exile in Paris, looked upon the natural world and loved it ardently (4.2). "Green, the most beautiful of all—how it enraptures the minds of those who see it" (12.2). He saw visible creation as an intricate, interconnected whole, an ecosystem, immense and beautiful. Nature was made to supply humanity's necessities, but in no sense does Hugh suggest it is humankind's plaything or possession (5). For Hugh science and theology complement each other.

For the theologian, Hugh is a charming colleague, optimistic about both the range of reason and the truth of faith. He respects the ultimate mystery of God, but reasons boldly about what faith teaches. He explores the paradox of attributes of the divine substance shared by three persons, yet somehow proper to each, which remains puzzling still to anyone who takes seriously the evidence of the Christian Scriptures. Hugh loves the beauty of the world, but knows that he must leave it behind to reach eternal beauty. He insists that the Incarnate Wisdom

[26] Poirel, *Livre*, 155–68.

is also the creative Wisdom, and that may be the secret of his wonder at the world. Hugh's is a sacramental world (27.3), in which nature manifests, and to spiritual person signifies, Truth itself. (4.3). The hedgehog, the human mind, and the Trinity are interconnected, and ultimately as in the Hugh's treatise *On the Ark of Noah*, Christ is the center around which all else revolves.

On the Three Days leads from visible creation to invisible creation, to contemplation of God—the order of cognition; then it leads from God to the rational creature who lives amid created realities—the order of creation. The pattern could be repeated endlessly, and deepened each time. Perhaps, that was what Hugh intended *On the Three Days* to be: an object of meditation, tracing a path that readers retrace each time they take up the book.[27]

A Note on Editions

There are translations of *On the Three Days* into modern languages, of which I have been able to consult the first:

Ugo di S. Vittore, I tre giorni dell'invisibile luce; L'unione del corpo e dello spirito. Ed. Vicenzo Liccaro. Florence: Sansoni, 1974.

Hugo van St Victor, *De drie dagen van het onzichtbare licht*. Ed. Jan Van Zwieten. Kampen: KoK, 1996.

In Poirel's critical edition, the numbers are lined, but there are no numbered divisions.[28] However, in the margins of his text he puts the section numbers into which the text is divided in Migne's *Patrologia Latina*. These section numbers are added in this translation, in order to provide a convenient way to refer to sections of the text both here and in the Latin versions. Moreover, I have divided each section into numbered paragraphs. So the third paragraph of section IX in the *Patrologia* (and Poirel) here becomes 9.3.

[27] Poirel, *Livre*, 258.

[28] Hugonis de Sancto Victore, *De tribus diebus*, ed. Dominique Poirel, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis 177 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 3–70.

Here begins *On the Three Days*.

[I]

1.1 The good Word and wise Life that made the world is perceived when the world is contemplated. The Word itself cannot be seen, but the Word both made what can be seen and is seen through what He made.[1]

1.2 "From the creation of the world the invisible realities of God are beheld through what is understood of the things which are made."[2] The invisible things of God are three: power, wisdom and kindness (*benignitas*).[3] From these three proceed all things. In these three all things subsist. By these three all things are governed. Power creates; wisdom governs; and kindness conserves.[4] Just as these three are ineffably one in God, so also they cannot be separated in any way in their operation.[5] Power creates wisely through kindness; wisdom governs kindly through power; and kindness conserves mightily through wisdom.[6]

1.3 The immensity of creatures manifests power; their beauty manifests wisdom;[7] their utility manifests kindness. The immensity of creatures lies in their number (*multitudo*) and size (*magnitudo*).[8] Number is found in the similar, the diverse, and the mixed. Size is found in bulk and extension. Bulk is found in mass and weight; extension, in length and breadth, depth and height. The beauty of creatures is found in their structure and movement, in their appearance and their quality. Structure is found in composition and order. Order lies in place, time and property. Motion is fourfold: local, natural, biological,[9] and rational. Local motion is back and forth, right and left, up and down, and around. Natural motion consists in increase and decrease; biological motion in the senses and appetites; rational motion in actions and decisions. Appearance is the visible form that the eye discerns, such as the colors and shapes of physical things. Quality is the internal property that is perceived by the other senses, such as tone when a sound is heard by the ears, sweetness in what the mouth tastes, fragrance smelled through the nose, and softness of material objects under the hand's touch. The usefulness of things consists in what makes them attractive,

apt, beneficial, and necessary. The attractive is that which pleases; the apt is what is suitable; the beneficial is that which is advantageous; and what is necessary is that without which something cannot be.[10]

1.4 Now let us go through these proposed distinctions again from the beginning. For each kind in the division let us examine how from the immensity of creatures the power of the Creator is manifest, His wisdom from their beauty, and His kindness from their usefulness. Because immensity was the first division, it needs to come first in the development.

2.1 IMMENSITY

Diligently hear and consider the things that I am going to say. What kind of power (*potentia*) was it that made something to be when there was nothing? What understanding (*sensus*) could comprehend what power (*virtus*) is involved in making something from nothing, even to make anything, even to make one thing, however tiny?

2.2 MULTIPLICITY

If, then, it involves incomprehensible power to make one thing, however small, out of nothing, how can one gauge the power that makes so many things? And how many! How numerous they are! Count the stars of the heaven, the sands of the sea, the dust of the earth, the drops of rain, the feathers of birds, the scales of fish, the hair of animals, the blades of grass in the field, the leaves and fruits of trees, and countless numbers of innumerable other things.

2.3 Countless in similar things, innumerable both in diverse things and in mixed things. What are similar things? They are things in the same genus, like one man and another, one lion and another, one eagle and another, one flatfish and another.[11] Each of these and others like them are similar in their genera. What are diverse things? Those that are informed by dissimilar differences like man and lion, lion and eagle, eagle and flatfish. These are different from each other. What are mixed things? All considered together.

2.4 So, in what way are there infinite similar things? In what way are there infinite diverse things? In what way are there infinite mixed things? Listen. "Man" is one genus, but one man is not. Who can count them? "Lion" is a genus, but one lion is not. Who can count them? "Eagle" is a genus, but one eagle is not. Who can count them? Whale is a genus, but one whale is not. Who can count them? And so on in countless genera of countless things, infinite genera of things. And in each genus infinite similar things. Thus at the same time, all the infinite, innumerable things.

3. MAGNITUDE

However, perhaps he who made so many things made small things, but could not make many and great things at the same time. On the contrary, what great things there are! Measure the masses of the mountains, the channels of the rivers, the expanses of the fields, the height of the heaven, the depth of the abyss. You are amazed for you fall short, but your amazement is better because you fall short. For those meditating on the immensity of creatures we have, as it were, laid out a seed plot. Now we move on to contemplate the beauty of these things.

4.1 BEAUTY

In extremely many and varied ways,[12] the beauty (*pulchritudo*) of creatures is perfect, but there are four in which all their beauty (*decor*) principally consists; that is, in structure, motion, appearance (*species*), and quality. If anyone were up to investigating these, he would discover the wondrous light of God's wisdom in them.

4.2 Would that I could examine these as subtly, and tell of their beauty as ably as I am able to love them ardently! I find it delightful that it is so very pleasant (*dulce*)[13] and agreeable to treat frequently of these matters where simultaneously sensation is instructed by reason and the mind (*animus*) delighted with sweetness, and feeling aroused to affection so that stunned and admiring we shout with the psalmist: "*How magnificent are your works, O Lord! You have made everything in wisdom. You have delighted me, Lord, in what you have made. I will exult over the works of your hands. How magnificent are your works, O Lord! Your thoughts have become too deep for me! A fool will not comprehend these things, a stupid man will not understand them.*"[14]

4.3 For this whole sensible world[15] is a kind of book[16] written by the finger of God,[17] that is, created by divine power (*virtus*), and each creature is a kind of figure, not invented by human determination, but established by the divine will to manifest and in some way signify the invisible wisdom of God.[18] However, just as when an unlettered person sees an open book and notices the shapes but does not recognize the letters, so stupid and carnal people, who are not aware of the things of God, see on the outside the beauty in these visible creatures, but they

do not understand its meaning. On the other hand, a spiritual person can discern all things.[19] When he considers externally the beauty of the work, he understands internally how wondrous is the wisdom of the Creator. Therefore, there is no one who does not find God's works wonderful, but the foolish person admires only their appearance,[20] whereas the wise person, through what he sees externally, explores the deeper intent of the divine wisdom, just as in one and the same writing, one person notices the color or shape of the figures, whereas another praises their meaning and signification.

4.4 Therefore, it is good carefully to contemplate and wonder at the divine works, but this applies to the one who knows how to turn the beauty of physical things to spiritual use. For this reason, Scripture very strongly urges us to ponder God's wonders, so that through the things we see externally, we may come to recognize the truth within. Hence, the psalmist recalls, as though it were something important, that he had done this already, and promises that he is going to do it still: "*I was mindful of earlier days. I meditated on all your works, and I will occupy myself with all your inventions.*"[21] Hence, also, what Isaiah says about certain people who know not the Creator and give to idols the worship due to God: "*Who has measured the waters in his fist or weighed the heavens with his palm? Who grasped the bulk of the earth with three fingers, and measured out on scales the weight of the mountains and hills? The one who sits above the circular course of the earth, and to whom all its inhabitants are like locusts. The one who extends the heavens as though they were nothing and expands them like a tent.*"[22] And again in a certain place, where the psalmist was denouncing idol worshippers, he said: "*All the gods of the nations are demons, but the Lord made the heavens.*"[23] Why do you suppose that in his assertion of the true divinity, the works of God are brought to the center in this way, and he says: "*The Lord made the Heavens*," if not because when what is created is rightly considered it shows to a human being its Creator?

4.5 So let us also consider how great are the wonderful things of God. Let us seek through the beauty of created things that beauty that is the most beautiful of all that is beautiful. It is so wonderful and ineffable that there can be no comparison between it and all transitory beauty even though the latter is a way to it.[24] We said above that all the beauty of visible things consists of four things. So, now let us run through them in order one by one and see how from them the invisible wisdom of God shines forth. Of course, I know that whatever we say will be lacking, but still it is not fitting that we be completely silent

especially there where, if it were possible, we ought especially to speak in a suitable sway. We said four: structure, motion, appearance and quality. So, let us begin by discussing the first of these.

4.6 STRUCTURE

Structure consists in composition and order, that is, in composition and disposition. Composition involves two things: aptness and solidity, that is, that the things to be composed go together aptly and properly and are connected to each other solidly. Such composition is praiseworthy. Aptness is to be sought in quantity and quality; in quantity, lest the very weak and thin be with the thick and hefty; in quality, lest the very wet be connected with the dry, the very hot with the cold, the very light with the heavy. If there are such, they are conjoined in a disorderly way.

4.7 See if any of these are lacking in the beauty of the divine works. If you see nothing is lacking, then in this regard you already have something to arouse your wonder. First of all, if you gaze at the structure of this universe, you will find that the composition of all things is perfect because of wonderful thought and wisdom. How apt, fitting, seemly, how complete in all its parts! In it not only do similar things protect concord, but also diverse and incompatible things, which have come into existence by the Creator's power at the command of wisdom, come together in some way in one friendship and federation. What could be more incompatible than water and fire? Yet, the foresight of God has so mixed them in the natural world that not only do they not dissolve the common bond of association between them, but they are also able to provide vital nourishment to all growing things so that they can subsist.[25] What shall I say of the joining of the human body where the junctures of all the members preserve such a great concord with each other that we cannot find a single member whose function does not seem to provide support to another. Thus does all nature love itself and in the same wondrous way a concord of many dissimilar things joined together in unity fashions one harmonious whole in all of them.[26]

4.8 Therefore, the composition of all things is apt and suitable. But how is it firm? Who does not see it? Who is not amazed? Behold the heavens, which include all things in their ambit, how solid they are. They seem to be molded out of air and spread out above in every direction. The earth held down by its weight remains ever immobile in the middle, so that the solidity of the heavens on the one side and the stability of the earth on the other force and constrain into one the other

fluctuating things in between, lest these, spreading out beyond legitimate limits disrupt the concord of the universe. Notice how within the bowels of the earth channels of water spread out.[27] These lead outward through hollow places into diverse locations, and within they compact together what is weakening so that it does not dissolve, while on the outside they water the ground lest it crumble.

4.9 Notice how in the structure of the human body the connecting sinews bind the joints of the bones. By means of the marrow dispersed within the hollow places of the leg bones, channels conduct the vital blood of the veins throughout the whole body. Then the covering of skin wraps around the tender flesh so that the stiffness of the bones supports the body interiorly, while the protection of the skin guards it by defending it on the outside. Who can spell out the hardness of rocks, the solidity of metals, the knotting of wood, the tenacity of glues? Who can enumerate the innumerable other things? From this it is clear how firm are the bonds of things, since each created thing defends its nature and being with such effort, yet at the same time all things cannot be completely loosed from the concord of their association.

5. The Disposition of Places

After considering composition, let us consider what is the disposition of things. There will be no small amazement if one diligently examines how divine providence distributes its causes for each and every place, time and thing. The result is that in absolutely nothing is the order of things disturbed. See how the heavens are above and the earth below. She[28] situates the stars and the luminaries in heaven, so that they illumine everything below. She makes a path in the air for the winds and clouds, so that dispersed by their movements they pour down rain from above. In the womb of the earth, She orders reservoirs of water to form so that through their streams they run here and there where the nod of their commander carries them. She suspends birds in the air and immerses fish in the waters. She fills the earth with beasts and serpents and various kinds of other reptiles and worms. She endows some regions with rich produce, some with lush vines, others with fertile olive trees, others with productive livestock, others with powerful herbs, others with precious gems, others with monstrous animals and beasts, others with various colors, others with the study of different arts,[29] others with various kinds of metals or incenses. As a result there is absolutely no region that does not possess something new and special by comparison to other regions. There is also no region that cannot receive something new and special from other regions. The providence of the Creator positions the things that are necessary for human uses in the midst of the common concourse of people.[30] Why is it then that She hides in the hidden hollows of the earth those things which nature does not seek out of necessity, but which cupidity craves[31] for their appearance? It is so that a person whom love of virtue does not restrain from immoderate craving will at least come to rest when overcome by weariness from his labor.

6.1 The Disposition of Times

We have said these things about the disposition of places. What shall we say about the disposition of times? Who can admire sufficiently the wondrous rationale by which divine providence distinguishes the courses of time? Notice that after night comes day so that the movement of working may arouse the drowsy. After day comes night, so that rest may rescue the exhausted to revivify them. It is not always day, nor is it always night. Day and night are not always equal, lest excessive labor break those who are worn down or continual rest spoil nature, or perpetual sameness give rise to mental fatigue.[32]

6.2 Likewise, just as the alternation of days and nights renews living things, so the four seasons of the year, which succeed one another in order, change the face (*speciem*)[33] of the whole world. First, through the gentle warming of spring the earth is reborn with a kind of renewal. Then, through the heat of summer it receives youthful strength. After this, when autumn follows, it reaches maturity. Then, when winter follows, it turns toward decline.[34] However, it always declines so that it can always be renewed after its decline, for unless old things first deteriorated from their condition (as if they were occupying a certain space), new things could not arise.

6.3 One can also discern in this disposition something else which is quite wonderful. The seasons themselves, by the immutable law of their changeableness, keep their places so that they never fail to fulfill their service nor by coinciding mix up the order given at their original founding.

7.1 The Disposition of Parts

Let the things that have been said about the disposition of times suffice as examples. Now let us investigate that order that can be considered

in each thing regarding the fitting disposition of its parts. Here there is an intrinsic order; the others, those according to place and time, are extrinsic. Here also the effectiveness of divine wisdom is no less wonderful. She[35] distributed each thing in a suitable way within the whole, so that never, never would the joining of the parts give rise to a conflict of qualities.

7.2 Here, by way of example, we can adduce a few things from among many. What great wisdom of the Creator shines forth in the composition of the human body! In its upper part, the human body is single, but below it is divided into two, because the principal aspect of the mind (*mentis*), reason (*ratio*),[36] which regards invisible things, is uniform, while the aspect of the soul (*animae*)[37] which turns down toward earthly things is dual, anger and desire. The structure of the human body extends to the side through the arms and is fixed beneath by the legs. This is because the intention to act extends the mind (*animum*) and the affect of desires focuses it. The outreach of the human body is completed in a fivefold way, outward and sideways by the fingers, and downward by the toes, for whether the mind (*animus*) moves outward by the intention of doing something or is focused downward through affect's desire, it goes out through the five senses. A division into three parts characterizes the fingers and toes. They stick out from the palm of the hand and from the sole of the foot, because from the one sensorium the five senses go out. In them, too, one finds a threefold articulation: first, the sense; then, the sensing; finally, the sensible. Next, at the outer end of each digit one finds tips with nails on them like helmets. So, wherever an extended hand or forward-moving foot finds an obstacle, it can remain unharmed, shielded by the protection they provide. In like manner those earthly things, which like nails are attached to the external senses, guard us as if in necessity; but insofar as they do not pertain to necessity, they can be cut off without that being felt for they are external to the flesh.[38]

7.3 Notice in the human face how the organs of sensation are located with such reasonable differences. Vision occupies the highest place in the eyes, then hearing in the ears, then after that smell in the nose, and after that taste in the mouth. However, we know that all the senses come from outside to within; only sight goes to the outside from within.[39] Set in the highest place, with wondrous agility sight perceives before the others do. Therefore, it is well that like a sentinel it occupies a higher place than all the rest, and before danger arises can detect what things are coming toward the other senses. Hearing is second to sight

in location and mobility, then smell. However taste, which can sense only what it touches, rightly resides after the other senses at the bottom. Touch has no special location. It is universal insofar as it cooperates with all the other senses. So also among the fingers, when the others are held together to form a single fist, the thumb, which signifies touch, alone responds to all, for without touch none of the senses can exist.[40]

7.4 See also how in the human body the bones are connected internally, so that their strength supports the body. Next the flesh clothes the bones, so that their brittleness softly receives touch. Finally, the skin covers the flesh so that by its adhering it guards the body from unsuitable things coming at it from the outside. Note also how what is soft and weak is placed in the middle in a safer place, lest lacking an intrinsic support it be destroyed, or not having any external protection it deteriorate.

7.5 What is seen in this one example can be found in all kinds of things. Thus, bark protects trees; their feathers and beaks, birds; and scales, fish. The providence of the Creator has arranged defenses for every single thing according to what suits its nature. Thus far we have spoken of structure. Now let us turn to movement.

8.1 MOVEMENT

Movement is fourfold: local, natural, biological and rational. Since we cannot say many things about these, let us briefly touch lightly on each of them.

8.2 See how the wisdom of the Creator is apparent in local motion. Think about from what cause a never-failing watercourse is always served by down-flowing waters; from what cause the motion of the wind is sustained; who regulates the unfailing course of the stars; who commands the sun to descend through the winter constellations and then makes it ascend again through those of summer; who leads it from the east to the west and again conveys it back from the west to the east. All these are wonders, and only for God are they possible!

8.3 Moreover, what shall I say about natural motion? Who do you suppose grants growth to all growing things, and as from some hidden bosom of nature brings germinating things into the open, and when those same things are withering makes them return again to the place from which they came? These things will seem amazing (*mirabilia*) enough to whoever looks at them carefully.

8.4 Next comes biological movement, which occurs in the senses and the appetites. Think what He must be like who makes the senses of all living beings, creates their appetites, and for each and every animal ordains what and how much it should desire.
8.5 Next, rational movement, which occurs in deeds and deliberations, will cause you wonder enough, if you wish to examine how indescribable is the wisdom which so educes all the deeds of human beings, all their volitions, and all the thoughts of their hearts according to the judgment of Her will and so tempers and moderates them, that nothing can happen in the universe which wisdom does not wish to happen either by commanding or permitting it for the adornment of Her works.

9.1 Appearance (*de specie*)

For the sake of brevity, those things just said will suffice regarding motion. There follows appearance. Appearance is the visible form that contains two things: shapes and colors. The shapes of things appear marvelous in many ways: sometimes because of their great size, sometimes because of their smallness, sometimes because they are rare, sometimes because they are beautiful, sometimes because, so to speak, they are in some fashion suitably inept, sometimes because there is one in many, sometimes because there are diverse things in one. Let us pursue these one by one in order.
9.2 Shape draws attention to its large size when something exceeds in quantity the usual measure of its kind. Thus we are astonished by a giant among human beings, the whale among fish, the griffin among birds, the elephant among quadrupeds, the dragon among serpents.
9.3 One gives thought to smallness in shape when something cannot equal in quantity other individuals of its kind. Such are a louse and a moth, a termite and a stinging insect, and other such things that live among other living things but are different from all the rest because of their small bodies. Notice, therefore, which you should admire more: the teeth of a wild boar or of a moth, the wings of a griffin or of a stinging insect, the head of a horse or of a locust, the legs of the elephant or of a gnat, the snout of a pig or of a tick; the eagle or the ant, the lion or the flea, the tiger or the tortoise.[41] In one instance you are amazed at their great size, in the other at their smallness, a small body created with great wisdom, great wisdom which no negligence negates. She gave eyes to those that the eye can scarcely grasp. In every instance, in

bodies so tiny She distributed the features befitting their natures, so that you see that, in the least of them all, there is lacking nothing that nature formed in the largest.

10 It remains to speak about the things that are rare, and from this more wonderful things are seen. Among created things there are certain ones which are more wonderful because they rarely come to human notice either because few individuals of that kind of thing have been created, or because they are concealed in remote places or hidden in nature's hollows. The providence of the Creator wished to set these apart so that human society may not be damaged by intermingling with those which are harmful, human greed may be tested by the appearance of those that are precious, and human dullness of heart may learn to wonder when aroused by their rare novelty.[42] Finally, providence aimed that these, both good and bad, when placed at a distance, would speak to humanity in such a way that its members would attend to what great zeal they should show in fleeing eternal evils and seeking eternal goods, if they undergo such great labors to acquire these temporal goods and to avoid these temporal evils.

11.1 Next, about those things which are wonderful because of their beauty (*pulchritudinem*). We wonder at the shape of certain things, because they are seemly in a certain special way and suitably fit together so that the very disposition of the work seems somehow to suggest the special diligence that its Creator devoted to them.[43]
11.2 Again we are amazed at other things because they are in some way monstrous or ridiculous. The more their shape is alien to human reason, the more readily it can compel the human mind to amazement. Why does the crocodile not move its lower jaw when it is eating? And how does the salamander stay unharmed in a fire? Who gave the hedgehog spines and instructed it to wrap itself with fruits scattered by a storm with the result that freighted with them it goes along sounding like a wagon? And the ant that knows winter is approaching and so fills her granary with grains? The spider, too, fashioning its webs from its own innards to capture prey? These are witnesses to the wisdom of God.
11.3 There is still another true and clear proof of divine wisdom, namely that every kind of thing procreates offspring like itself, so that in so many the one propagated likeness does not alter the form of the first beginning. A sheep does not give birth to a calf, or a cow to a lamb, or a doe to a rabbit, or a lion to a fox. Rather, every existing thing extends its line in progeny like itself.

11.4 Even nature devoid of sensation keeps to this. The linden is one kind of tree, the beech another, and the oak another. Every one has its own appearance, and every one keeps the likeness of its kind. Look at a leaf, how around the edge it is differentiated by serrated teeth, how the ribs produced inside it are woven in this direction and that. Count one, count another, you will find that all of one kind have the same likeness: as many teeth in one as in another; as many ribs in one as in another; the same form in one as in the other; the same color in one as in another. Notice how the blackberry, how the strawberry are divided into grains pressed together all around. Such is one, such is another, and all nature, as though it has received the command of one ruling from within, never presumes to exceed its limits.

11.5 This, too, is wonderful, that in a single body are formed so many members, so many forms of members, so many locations, so many tasks. Look at how many members are in one human body! The ear is one thing, the eye another, the tongue another, the nose another, the foot another, the hand another, each with its own form, location, tasks. Although each of them is so different from the rest, all still cooperate with each other.

12.1 After shape comes color. There is no need to discourse at length about the color of things, for sight itself declares how much beauty is added to nature when it adorns different things with such varied colors. What is more beautiful than light, which, although it does not have color in itself, in some ways gives colors to all the things that it illumines?[44] What is more delightful to behold than a clear sky; resplendent like a sapphire, it draws one's gaze by the extremely pleasing mildness of its glow and softens the view? The sun shines like gold; the moon is pale like electrum. Certain stars radiate a flaming appearance; others sparkle with a rosy light; others alternately display a rosy glow, then green, then white.

12.2 What can I say about gems and precious stones, which not only have practical uses but also a wonderful appearance. Behold the earth wreathed with flowers! What a pleasing show it puts on, how it delights the eyes; how it arouses feeling! We see blushing roses, white lilies, purple violets. Not only do they look wonderful, but their origin is also wonderful—how God's wisdom produces such beauty from the dust of the earth. Finally, there is green, the most beautiful of all.[45] How it enraptures the minds of those who see it, when in a truly new way shoots come forth with new life and standing up in their stalks, which

seemed to have been trodden down by death, bud forth together into the light in a symbol of the future resurrection. But what can we say about the works of God, when we admire even their imitations produced by human industry that so deceive the eyes with their artificial (*adulterina*) beauty.[46]

13.1 QUALITY

After appearance we need to discuss the quality of things. The Creator's providence endowed things with such diverse qualities that every human sense may find its delights. Sight perceives one thing, hearing another, smell another, taste another, touch another. The beauty of colors nurtures sight; the sweetness of song soothes hearing; the fragrance of scent, smell; the sweetness of savor, taste; bodily feel, touch. Who could list all the delights of the senses? Those delights are so manifold in each, that if anyone looks for himself at any one thing, he will think to himself how singularly endowed that thing is.

13.2 We find as many delights for the ear in the variety of sounds, as we have shown there are delights for the eyes in the variety of colors. First among these are the sweet exchanges of speech[47] by which people communicate their wishes to each other, tell of past events, point to present-day things, announce future things, disclose secrets. So true is this that if human life lacked these things, it would seem comparable to that of brute animals. But what shall I call to mind of the melody of birds, the pleasant sound of the human voice, or the sweet modes of all sounds. There are so many kinds of harmony, that thought cannot traverse them all nor can speech easily display them. Yet all of them are at the service of hearing and have been created for its pleasure.

13.3 It is thus with smell. Incenses have their odors, ointments their aromas, roses their scent. Thickets have their smell, and meadows have theirs. Wastelands have their odors; wood, flower and fruits have theirs. All things that emit a sweet fragrance and breathe out sweet smells serve the olfactory sense and were created for its pleasure. In the same way taste and touch have various delights that can be adequately pondered on the basis of the foregoing.

14.1 UTILITY

We have spoken of the immensity of created things and of their beauty insofar as we could, though not as we should have done. It remains for us to consider the usefulness of these same things. The utility of things

includes four elements: the necessary, the beneficial, the fitting, and the pleasing.[48] What is necessary to each thing is that without which it could not exist;[49] for example, for human nourishment, bread and water; in clothing, wool or skins or some kind of clothes. The beneficial is that which, although sometimes it gives more delight, is not required for life; for example, for nourishment a glass of wine or the eating of meat, in clothes, cotton and silk, or some other softer cloth. The apt or fitting is what, although it does not benefit the users, nonetheless is fittingly used. Such are colored dyes, precious stones, and other things of this kind. The pleasing is what is not suitable for use, but is still delightful to look at. Such are certain kinds of plants, animals, birds and fish, and the like.

14.2 It is worthwhile to inquire why God wished to create these things that He foresaw would not be necessary for the use of humankind, for whom He created all things. But this will be quickly understood if one examines the cause and manner of the creation of humankind. God made humankind for Himself; God created all other things for human beings. He made humankind for Himself, not because He needed humankind, but so that humankind could enjoy Him,[50] for He could give nothing better. The rest of creation was so made that it would both be subject to humankind from its creation and would serve the use of humankind. Therefore, humankind, as though situated in a kind of middle place, has God above itself and the world below. By the body humankind is connected to the world below, and by the spirit it is lifted up toward God above. It was necessary that the creation of visible things be so arranged that human beings would recognize in them exteriorly what the invisible good they were to seek within was like; that is, that human beings would see beneath them what they were to desire above them.[51]

14.3 Hence, it was not fitting that in any aspect the array of visible things suffer a defect,[52] because it was instituted above all to announce the inconceivable profuseness of eternal goods. This is what we have said about why God also wished to create those things that He foresaw would not be necessary for human uses. If He created only what was necessary that would be goodness but not richness. So when God also joined the beneficial to the necessary He showed the riches of His goodness. When, however, the beneficial are augmented by the fitting, that manifests the abundance of the riches of His goodness. Then, when to the fitting the pleasing are also added, what does that tell other than how superabundant are the riches of his goodness.

15.1 Let these things briefly recounted about the usefulness of created things suffice. But it is pleasant to pay a bit more attention to the totality of divine praise—how wondrously God has kept these three together in His work. We probably understand this more easily—what great wonder it deserves—if first we have reflected on how these things cannot exist simultaneously in a human work. Certainly, when a human being wants to make many things, he cannot make great things, because he can accomplish less, in regard to each, the more numerous are the things toward which the focus of his attention is divided. Again, when he strives for size, he is kept back from multiplicity. This is because he is not able to devote his strength to many things when he expends it particularly on a single result. In the same way, when the mind is occupied with achieving multiplicity alone or size, less diligence is given to the beauty of a work. We see that a scribe forms more quickly those shapes that are thin; he labors more when forming large shapes. The faster he pushes the pen, the more deformed are the letters it executes. It is the same in making clothes: those who like great beauty often lose utility; those who want to maintain utility cannot have beauty. However, in God's work multiplicity does not diminish size, nor does size limit multiplicity. Nor, at the same time, is multiplicity or size detrimental to beauty, nor does beauty take away utility. All things are done as though each were done singly, so that when you look at the whole of them, you are in awe of each.[53]

15.2 Perhaps to someone it will seem that we have spoken much about visible things, in view of the constraints of our treatment.[54] However, he should realize that such difficult material cannot be explained easily with a few words. Since the Apostle says that through visible things in the world the invisible things in God are manifested, it is necessary that whoever desires to attain knowledge of invisible things through visible ones must first be familiar with those visible things. For this reason when I proposed to investigate these things as far as I was able, after the three invisible things had been listed in the beginning, and the three visible things had been arranged over against them, I decided this was the most suitable order for the discussion. First, I would bring to the fore some knowledge of those visible things and then, after an entry for contemplation had been opened, I would proceed through an investigation of invisible things. Therefore, now that we have finished with the things that needed to be said about visible things, we must consider how and by what order we ascend through these to invisible things.

[II]

16.1 We said that there are three invisible things: power, wisdom and kindness. One needs to ask which of these first occurs to those who are contemplating. I believe that the first invisible thing to be grasped in contemplation is what is more explicitly and obviously shown in its visible representation (*simulacrum*). Visible things are said to be representations of the invisible; namely, the immensity of creatures is the representation of invisible power; the beauty of created things is the representation of invisible wisdom; and the usefulness of creatures is the representation of invisible kindness. However, every creature more closely declares its Creator the more closely it approaches its Creator's likeness. Hence, that visible representation that contains expressed more perfectly within itself the image of the divine likeness (*similitudinis*) ought to be the first to show its invisible exemplar.

16.2 The immensity of creatures pertains more to the essence, the beauty of creatures more to the form. The essence considered without the form is formlessness. What lacks form is like God in as much it exists, but in as much as it lacks form, it is unlike God.[55] What has form is more like God than what does not have form. Hence the beauty of creatures, which pertains to form, is a more evident representation than the immensity of creatures, which concerns only the essence.

16.3 Likewise the beauty of creatures deriving from their natural form pertains to something habitual, whereas utility pertains to act because creatures are useful inasmuch as they are subjected to humankind and render service and obedience. But what pertains to habit is more proper and more certain than what pertains to act, because nature is connected to habit, but resolve is connected to act. The representation of beauty precedes both immensity and utility in cognition. It is first in cognition because it is more evident in its manifestation. Therefore in this representation we must situate the first step of contemplation, so that when we have properly undertaken the first step of inquiry, with it as the guide we seek, we may with sure step advance to the rest. In the search for wisdom, the representation of wisdom makes a beautiful starting point, because through His wisdom the Father is manifested not only when He sent His wisdom into the flesh, but also when He created the world through His wisdom.[56]

16.4 The beauty of created things, which we have said is the representation of God's wisdom, includes four things: structure, movement, appearance and quality. There is no doubt that, among these four, movement has pride of place. For things that can move are more akin to life than things that cannot move. Movement is fourfold: local, natural, biological, rational. Natural motion is more excellent than local motion, because in natural movement not only is the image of life expressed, but also life itself is in some way begun. Likewise, biological movement ranks above natural movement insofar as what has sensation ranks above that which is incapable of sensation. Finally, rational movement is situated above all the rest, because in it not only does sensation move to animate life, but reason also moves to understanding. No representation in creatures can be more evident than this one, because that which knows (*sapit*)[57] shows forth invisible wisdom (*sapientia*) more clearly than does anything else.

17.1 Therefore, the first and principal representation of uncreated wisdom is created wisdom, that is, the rational creature, which because in one aspect it is visible and in another invisible, becomes a door and path of contemplation.[58] It is a door insofar as it is visible; it is a path insofar as it is invisible. It is a door because for the one entering into contemplation it offers a first access. It is a path because it leads the mind that is hastening along in contemplation to its goal. It is a door because in some fashion it shows invisible things visibly. It is a path because it leads those going from the visible through the invisible to see the one who is Creator equally of the visible and the invisible.

17.2 One can recognize this in oneself. No one is wise at all who does not see that he exists. Nevertheless, if one begins to pay attention to what one truly is, one will understand that he is none of all the things that are or can be in him. For truly that in us that is capable of reason, although it is, so to speak, infused into and mixed with the flesh, can distinguish itself by its own reason from the substance of the flesh and understand that the latter is foreign to it. Why then does anyone have any doubt at all about the existence of invisible things, when he sees that what is truly human, whose existence no one can doubt, is itself invisible? Therefore, the door to contemplation opens for one who, under the guidance of his reason, enters to know himself.

17.3 It remains for the one who has entered to run the path to the end, so that whoever it is may arrive at knowledge of the Creator from a consideration of himself. For that in us that does not have the essence of the flesh cannot have matter from the flesh. But just as it is different from the flesh so it is aware of itself as alien from the flesh's origin. However, it recognizes that it really did have a beginning. The reason

is this: it understands that it is, but it does not remember that it always was. But non-knowing understanding cannot be. If, then, understanding cannot be unless it is actively understanding, the conclusion is that one whom we know has not always been understanding did not always exist, and for this reason we believe that at some time he began to be.

17.4 However, as was already said, what has a spiritual essence cannot have a bodily origin, because whatever is drawn out of pre-existing matter proves to be corporeal. If, therefore, our invisible side had a beginning, it follows that it was made not from pre-existing matter, but from nothing. However, what is not cannot give existence to itself, and for that reason there is no doubt that whatever had a beginning received its being from another. Now, what is not from itself cannot give existence to others. Therefore, whoever he is who gives being to things did not receive being from another. From this it is also clearly proven that if we believe that *whatever is* is a creature, we will find no end in things.

17.5 Therefore our nature tells us that we have an eternal Creator. It is proper to Him to subsist, because if He had received being from another, He could not truly be said to be the first origin of things. If there was a time when He was not, He did not have His beginning from Himself. Neither could He be said to be first if He received being from another. Therefore if there is a Creator, He always was.[59]

17.6 Likewise, what is from itself cannot *not* be. In whatever is from itself, *to be* and *what it is* are identical. It is also clear that no thing can be divided or separated from itself. Therefore, if *whoever there is for whom to be* and *what it is* are the same; then it necessarily always is, because nothing can be separated from itself. Therefore, if in whatever is from itself to be and what it is are the same, for it did not receive being from another, it follows necessarily that it always is, and that what was not given by another cannot be taken away by another.

17.7 It is therefore necessary that we confess that the one whom we believe to be Creator can have neither beginning nor end. What always was can have no beginning; what never ceases can have no end. Therefore, no one is eternal except the Creator alone, and He cannot be the Creator unless He is eternal.[60]

18.1 We have found in rational movement this knowledge, namely, that we have an eternal Creator who lacks a beginning because He always was, and who will meet with no end because He always will be. However, the other kinds of motion, biological, natural and local, also attest to this form of knowledge.

18.2 Now, in *biological movement* there are sensation and appetite. However, all natural appetite in things finds what satisfies it. Nor is there any ordered affective impulse (*affectus*) that cannot achieve its goal (*effectus*). For example, animals are hungry; they find what they may eat. They are thirsty; they find what they may drink. They are cold; they find what will warm them. It is clear, therefore, that providence has preceded. By its counsel, providence then provided that the support required for those in need of things is not now lacking. The one who establishes desires provides the objects of those desires. If outcomes were fortuitous, there is no way that it could come about that, among all things, objects corresponded to all their effects.[61]

18.3 *Natural motion* proves the same thing. Just as it is impossible that something comes to be from nothing on its own, so it is utterly impossible that on its own something receives increase; that is, something which cannot give itself its beginning cannot give itself its increase. Whatever increase occurs in a growing thing proves to be different from what it was in itself, because previously on its own it was without the increase. If, therefore, nothing can increase unless there is added to it what it previously did not have, it is clear that no growing thing achieves increase through itself. Therefore, the one who gives increase to growing things is He who gave a beginning to existing things.

18.4 *Local motion* proves the same thing. We notice that some things are stirred by perpetual motion. We see that some things move from time to time, some things in one way, others in another. Although things thus move in dissimilar ways, the order of things is never upset. Hence, there is no doubt whether there is an internal arrangement by a provident being who moderates all things with a certain law.[62]

18.5 By what argument can we deny providence, if all natural appetite finds the sustenance that it seeks naturally prepared for it, and never does it happen that what nature seeks in one thing nature does not have in another? Similarly, since movement and growth running externally in various and dissimilar ways still never cause disorder, how can we deny that there is some intrinsic ordering? Therefore, one cannot doubt that there presides from within some ruler who precedes the outcomes of all things by His providence and arranges them with His wisdom.

19.1 I say "one." For nature herself teaches this also, namely, that there is one maker of all things and one ruler.[63] For if the counsels of those presiding differed internally, the courses of things externally would

sometimes be at odds with each other. Now, however, when all things hasten harmoniously toward one goal, they surely show that there is one fount and origin from which they proceed.

19.2 But because "one" can be taken in different ways, it is necessary to consider in what way the Creator of things is said to be one.[64] For there is oneness in a collection, and oneness in composition, and oneness in likeness, and oneness in essence, and oneness in identity. Oneness in a collection resembles somewhat the way in which we say a flock of many animals is one. There is oneness in composition, as for instance when we say that a body in which there are many members is one. There is oneness in likeness when, for example, we say one word that is uttered by many.

19.3 But none of all these is truly one. They are said to be one in some respect, because they approach unity in some way. It is not right that we think that the Creator of things is one either by a collection of different things, or a composition of parts, or a likeness among many. What is rational in us can discover nothing at all of these in itself. Our reason itself establishes that what in us is observed to be composed of a multitude of parts is not the rational, but rather that which is joined with the rational. If therefore the rational in us is truly one, how much more ought we to believe that its Creator is truly one? That is truly one which is essentially one, which as a whole has one existence and which is a simple being. Whatever, therefore, is truly one is simple and cannot in any way be separated into other parts. Therefore, it admits no cutting up into parts, because it admits no composition of parts. Therefore, in the Creator of things what He is truly, is to be, because the being which he is is completely one and simple.

19.4 But we still need to consider that certain things are found which truly are one, and nevertheless are not supremely one. Thus souls are essentially one, but they are not one without any variation. What is truly and supremely one is one essentially and invariably. It remains for us, therefore, if we believe that God is truly one, to inquire whether God can be said also to be supremely one. We will truly show this if and when we prove Him to be completely invariable. But we cannot know how God is invariable unless we first recognize in how many ways something can vary. First, then, we need to describe all the modes of mutability, and then show how each is removed from God.

19.5 All mutability occurs in three ways: in place, form, and time.[65] Something changes with reference to place when it passes from one place to another, that is, when it ceases to be where it was and begins

to be where it was not. This change is extrinsic, and nothing varies regarding the essence of the thing. This is because if it ceases to be where it was, it does not cease to be what it was. If it begins to be where it was not, it does not begin to be what it was not.

19.6 Something changes formally when it stays in the same place in regard to its essence, but either receives through increase something which it did not previously have or loses through decrease something that it previously had, or, by alteration, begins to have in a different way something that it previously had.

19.7 Change in regard to time arises from the two previous modes of change, because nothing can change temporally which is not changed either formally or in location. From this it can be concluded convincingly that something is wholly immutable if it can change neither in form nor in place. If, therefore, it is established that God can change neither in form nor in place, there will be no doubt that God is wholly immutable.

19.8 We can easily eliminate change in place from Him if we show that He is everywhere.[66] For what is everywhere is in every place. What is in every place cannot change from place to place. Now there are multiple proofs that God is everywhere. First, there is our soul itself, which reason does not doubt is a single essence, and sensation proves to be diffused throughout the entire body that it vivifies. No matter what part of the ensouled body is injured, there is one awareness (*unus*) to which every sensation of pain returns. This would not occur at all unless one (*unus*) and the same awareness were diffused throughout.[67] If therefore the rational spirit of a human being, although it is simple, is spread throughout the whole body in which it presides, it is not right to believe that the Creator Spirit who rules and possesses all things is confined in some one place rather than filling all things. For the very movements of things, which everywhere run with such certain and so rational governance, show that there is a moving life within.

19.9 Not that one is to believe in any way that as the human spirit is personally joined with the body to which it gives sensation, so the Creator Spirit is also joined personally with the body of this sensible world. For God fills the world in one way, and the soul fills the body in another. The soul fills the body and is contained because it is circumscribable. God fills the world but is not enclosed by the world, because being present everywhere He can nowhere be enclosed.

19.10 Besides, since we see that the effects of the divine power are nowhere lacking, why do we doubt that the same power of God is in

all things? Now if the power of God is everywhere, since God's power is not other than God, it follows that God is not absent from any place. For God does not need an outside power in order to act, as a human being does, because a human being often finishes by means of another's assistance what he is not able to do by his own strength. According to a usual way of speaking, a human being is sometimes said to be working in a place where he himself is absent. For example, it is said that a king residing in his city attacks, conquers or overcomes his enemies at a distance, because his soldiers, at his will and command, attack, conquer or overcome. Such is the case when someone extends a pole toward something set on a high place or throws a rock at it and is said to touch whatever the rock or pole touched. There are many such instances, but in none of these is the action properly attributed, because what one does is attributed to another. However, it is necessary that God, who does all things Himself by His own power, is present by His Godhead everywhere where He is present by His working.

19.11 But if someone asks how the divine essence, which is simple, can be everywhere, he should know that a spirit is said to be simple in one way, a body in another. A body is said to be simple because of its insignificance, but when a spirit is called simple that signifies not its insignificance but its unity. Therefore, the Creator is simple because He is one, and He is everywhere because He is God. Existing in every place, He is nowhere enclosed because, filling all things, He contains but is not contained. Therefore, because He is in every place, He cannot change locally, and because He is enclosed by no place, He is not in a place.

20.1 Neither can mutability in form occur in Him. Whatever changes in regard to form changes either through increase or decrease or alteration. But the divine nature admits none of these, which can easily be seen in regard to each of them.

20.2 The divine nature is not augmented. Whatever increases by augmentation receives something more to itself. Whatever accepts something other than what it has in itself necessarily receives from another, because no thing can give itself what it does not have. But from what will the Creator of things receive something that it does not have, since everything that exists proceeds from it? Therefore, He who can receive nothing more into Himself cannot increase.

20.3 Nor can the divine nature be diminished. For whatever can become less than itself is not really one, because what divides itself by separation was not identical in its conjoining. Therefore God, for whom

to be what He *is* is completely one, can in no way become less than Himself. Therefore, neither can His perfection be augmented, nor can His unity be diminished, nor can His immensity be enclosed, nor can He who is present everywhere change location.

20.4 Now all that remains for us is to show why alteration does not befit the divine nature. The alteration of bodies is one thing and that of spirits is another. It is clear from what was said above that God is not a body but a spirit. Since, then, we are talking about God, it is not necessary to say many things about change in bodies. However, let us touch upon it briefly, so that we may arrive more suitably at alteration in spiritual beings.

20.5 Change in bodies occurs through rearrangement of parts and alteration of qualities. Change in spirits occurs through knowledge and affect. Spirits change according to affect as at one time they are sad and at another joyful. They change according to knowledge when they know now less, now more.

20.6 There are two things that are usually the principal causes of change in the affect of an agent; that is, either because something causes him to repent what he did in the past, or because he proposes something disordered for the future. But the unvarying course of all things, which by a perpetual law never forsakes the measure of its original arrangement, shows with sufficient clarity that God does not, in fact, repent. That He never proposes anything disordered is proven by the reasonable outcome, which nowhere in the whole body of nature is at odds with itself. Therefore, God's will is always unchanging, because He never changes His decision regarding the past nor His plan for the future.[68]

20.7 Likewise, He ought to be believed to be immutable in knowledge. Human cognition is subject to change in three ways: through increase, through decrease, through alteration. Through increase, when we learn what we do not know; through decrease, when we forget what we know. Alteration is fourfold: in essence, form, place, and time. Human cognition suffers alteration in essence when we think now of this, and then of that, because we cannot comprehend everything in our consciousness at one time. In form, when we pay attention now to one sort of thing and then to another, because we cannot focus on both at once. In place, when we turn our thought now here, now there, because we are not capable of turning our thought everywhere at once. Human cognition alters in time when now we consider things past, now present things, and now future things, because we cannot be aware of all at the

same time. Cognition also varies in time when we interrupt what we are thinking, and then resume what we have interrupted, because we are not able to keep at it without interruption.

20.8 Divine knowledge (*cognitio*) admits none of these changes. It does not increase, because it is full. Nor can the one who creates, governs, penetrates, and supports all things be ignorant of any of them. The one who is present to all things by His divinity cannot be absent from them in His seeing. He cannot decrease who is not anything that He is from another; rather His very self, whatever it is, is from itself, from one and wholly one in what it is. What shall I say of alteration? How can the Wisdom (*sapientia*), which in one glance of vision comprehends everything simultaneously and once-and-for-all (*simul et semel*)[69], undergo alteration? Simultaneously, because She embraces every essence, form, place, and time; once-and-for all, because She admits no interrupted vision, nor does She interrupt a vision once begun, because what She is all at once She is always, and what She always is She is totally. She sees all things, she sees all things about all things, She sees always and She sees everywhere. Nothing is new to Her. Nothing alien happens to Her. Nothing of Hers recedes. When it is future, She foresees it; when it is present She sees it; when it is past She retains it. Nothing in Her is other. She foresees; She sees; She retains. What happens in time was in Her vision and what went before in time remains in Her sight.

20.9 For example, if your whole body were an eye, then your being would not be one thing and your seeing another. In whatever direction a thing turned it could not *not* be present to you. While remaining immobile you would, with one glance of your sight, comprehend whatever thing you had in your sight in any direction. In fact, you would see whatever was around you as though it were in front of you. A thing might pass by, but your vision would remain stationary. In whichever direction its movement took it, it would still be present to you because you remained stationary. Now, however, because you see in part, you see changeably. When a thing passes by someone who is looking at it, it either ceases to be seen or draws the onlooker's sight after it and so brings about change. But if you were wholly eye, you would not see thus in a changeable way.[70] Therefore, whatever is partial is mutable, and whatever is not partial is immutable. For God, to *be*, to *live*, and to *understand* are identical. Since He is not in His essence partially, neither could *He* be partial in *His* wisdom. Just as He is immutable in His essence, so also is He immutable in His wisdom.

20.10 Let what has been said about divine knowledge suffice. But it should be known that this is called knowledge and vision, and wisdom, foreknowledge and providence. Vision, because it sees; wisdom, because it understands; foreknowledge, because it anticipates; providence, because it arranges. Regarding these,[71] many difficult and puzzling questions arise, which we are afraid to put into this compendium. So let us pass on to the remaining topics.

21.1 From where we first advanced with the eye of contemplation from visible things to invisible things we have traversed the path of inquiry to the point that now we have no doubt that the Creator of things is one, without a beginning, without an end, and without change. We found this not outside ourselves, but within ourselves. We might therefore consider whether that same nature of ours may still teach us something further about our Creator. Perhaps it may show us that He is not only one, but three.

21.2 Certainly, the rational mind is one and generates from its one self one understanding. Sometimes when it sees how fine, true, suitable and pleasant something is, it immediately loves it and takes pleasure in it. Simultaneously it sees and is awestruck and is amazed that it could have found something like that. It would be very glad to gaze upon that thing always, to have it always, to enjoy it always, to delight in it always. That something pleases the mind through, and because of, itself. There is nothing beyond that something that the mind seeks, because in it the whole is loved. In it, contemplation of truth is delightful to see, pleasant to have, sweet to enjoy. With it, the mind is at peace with itself and never affected with tedium regarding its secret, as it rejoices in its only, but not solitary, companion.

21.3 Consider these three: the mind, understanding, love. From the mind is born understanding; from the mind and understanding together, love arises. Understanding arises from the mind alone, because the mind generates understanding from itself. But love arises neither from the mind alone nor from understanding alone, for it proceeds from both. First there is mind, then mind and understanding, and afterwards mind, understanding and love.[72]

21.4 This is the way it is in us. Reason truthfully suggests that it is far different in the Creator. Because we believe that He always was, we must confess that He always had wisdom also. For if He is said to have been at some time without wisdom, there is no way someone could be found who would later make Him wise or from whom He would re-

ceive wisdom. It would be totally absurd and foreign to all reason to believe that He who is the fount and origin of all wisdom existed at some time without wisdom. Therefore, wisdom was always in Him, always from Him, and always with Him. Wisdom was always in him, because He who always was wise always had wisdom. Wisdom was always from Him, because He gave birth to the Wisdom that He had.[73] Wisdom was always with Him, because once born He did not separate Himself from the one who bore Him. He is always born and is always being born, neither beginning to be when He is born, nor ceasing to be born after He has been born. He is always being born because He is eternal; He is always born because He is perfect. Hence, there is one who gives birth and one who is born. The one who gives birth is the Father; the one who is born is the Son. Because the one who has given birth has always given birth, He is the eternal Father. Because the one who has been born has always been born, He is the coeternal Son of the Father. The one who always has had Wisdom, always has loved Wisdom. He who always has loved has always had Love. Therefore, Love is coeternal with the eternal Father and Son. Moreover, the Father is from no one, the Son is from the Father alone, but Love is simultaneously from the Father and from the Son.

21.5 However, because we asserted above that it is necessary that the Creator of all things is supremely and truly one, let us confess that these three[74] in God are substantially one. For just as the one who has been born cannot be He from whom He has been born, likewise neither can the one, who proceeds from the one giving birth and from the one born, be the one who gives birth or the one born. So we are forced by unassailable, true reasoning to acknowledge in the Godhead both a trinity of persons and a unity of substance. Therefore, for the three in the Godhead there is one common and equal eternity and eternal equality, because what the one Godhead does in common for all cannot be dissimilar in each. Therefore, the three are one (*unum*), because in the three persons is one substance, but the three are not one (*unus*), for just as the distinction of persons does not divide the unity of the Godhead, so also the unity of the Godhead does not confuse the distinction of persons.[75]

22.1 But it is desirable to consider a little more closely how it may be said that the Father loves His wisdom. It is often customary for people to love a science for the work to which it leads, not the work for the science. Such are the sciences of agriculture, weaving and milling,[76] and

others like them, where to be sure expertise is judged useless unless it results in some work that yields a useful product.[77] But if one is speaking of the Wisdom of God, then doubtless the work yields precedence to the worker. Moreover, one must say that Wisdom is always more precious than Her work, and Wisdom is always to be loved on Her own account. If sometimes Wisdom's work is preferred to Wisdom, this results not from a true judgment, but from human error. For Wisdom is life, and the love of Wisdom is life's happiness. For this reason, when it is said that the Father of Wisdom takes delight in that Wisdom (*illa*), let it be far from our minds to believe that God loves His Wisdom on account of the works which He did through Her, when, on the contrary, He loves all His works only on account of Wisdom.

22.2 Therefore, He said: "This is my beloved Son in whom I am pleased."[78] He did not say He was pleased with the earth or the heaven, or with the sun and moon and stars, or even with the angels and what things are the most excellent in creatures, because even these things, though in their way are pleasing, nevertheless cannot please except in Him and through Him. They are the more worthy of my love, the more closely they approach His likeness. Therefore, God does not love Wisdom on account of Her works, but Her works on account of Wisdom. In Wisdom is all beauty and truth. She is totally desire, invisible light and immortal life. Her appearance is so desirable that She can delight the eyes of God. She is simple and perfect, full but not excessive, alone but not solitary,[79] one and containing all.

23.1 But because we believe in three persons in the Godhead, it remains to inquire whether what is said of each of these can also be said of the others. It has been said that the Father loves the Son. It remains for us to consider if it can be said equally that the Love-of-Father-and-Son loves the Son, and that the Son loves Himself. Likewise, that the Father loves Himself, that the Son loves the Father, that the Love-of-Father-and-Son loves the Father; likewise, that the Love-of-the-Father-and-Son loves Himself, that the Father loves the Love-of-the-Son-and-Himself, that the Son loves the Love-of-the-Father-and-Himself. Finally, whether it is one and the same Love by which each loves Himself and each of them reciprocally loves the other. But we will easily find out these things, if we recall to memory the things that have already been said.

23.2 In the above line of reasoning we asserted that God is the first cause and origin of all good things. No good can surpass Him who is

the fount and beginning of all. Therefore, God is the supreme good. Blessedness (*beatitudo*) is nowhere more rightly situated than in the supreme good. Therefore, God alone is properly and principally blessed (*beatus*).[80] How could someone be blessed who is not pleased with what he is? Therefore, it is necessary that whoever is blessed loves himself. But how could anyone who hates what he is love himself? Therefore, whoever is blessed both loves Himself and loves what he is. If, therefore, the Father and Son and the Love-of-the-Father-and-the-Son are one and are one God, then, since in God alone is true beatitude, it is necessary both that each loves himself and each loves the others reciprocally. For it cannot truly be said to be beatitude; indeed, on the contrary, it would be supreme unhappiness if they were divided by an opposing will, yet on account of the same nature could not be separated from each other.

23.3 Therefore, as Father and Son and the-Love-of-Father-and-Son are one in nature, so also they cannot *not* be one in will and love. They love themselves with one love because they are one. What each loves in the other is not different from what each loves in Himself, for what each *is* is not different from what the other is. What the Father loves in the Son is identical with what the Son loves in Himself, and what the Love-of-the-Father-and-the-Son loves in the Son is what the Son loves in Himself. Similarly, what the Son loves in the Father, that the Father loves in Himself, and what the Love-of-the-Father-and-Son loves in the Father, that the Father loves in Himself. Likewise, what the Father and Son love in their Love is what the Love-of-the-Father-and-Son loves in Himself. Likewise, what the Father loves in Himself is what He loves in the Son and in their Love, and what the Son loves in Himself is what He loves in the Father and in their Love, and what the Love-of-the-Father-and-the-Son loves in Himself is what He loves in the Son and in the Father.

24.1 Listen whether the voice of the Father is in harmony with what we are saying: "*This*," He says, "*is my beloved Son in whom I am pleased.*"[81] He did not say separately, "I am well pleased," nor did He say separately, "He pleased me." Nor, indeed, did He say conjointly: "I am well pleased," and "He pleased me"; but He said: "I am well pleased in Him," that is, "what pleases me regarding myself is in Him, not outside of Him, because what I am He is. For because I am not other than He, I cannot be pleased outside of Him. '*This is my beloved Son in whom I am pleased.*'"[82]

24.2 "Whatever pleases me does so in Him and through Him. For He is the Wisdom through whom I made all things. In Him I have eternally arranged whatever I have made in time. And the more perfectly I see each work of mine to be in harmony with that first arrangement, the more fully I love it. Do not think that He is only the mediator in the reconciliation of humankind, for through Him also the creation of all creatures becomes praiseworthy and pleasing in my sight. In Him I consider all the works I do, and I cannot *not* love what I see is similar to Him whom I love. The only one that offends me is the one who departs from His likeness.

24.3 "Therefore, if you wish to please me, be like Him, 'Listen to Him.'[83] And if by chance you have departed from His likeness by acting badly, return by imitating Him. In Him are given the command and the counsel; the command so that you may remain steadfast, the counsel so that you may return. Would that you had kept the commandment! But because you have transgressed the command, at least listen to the admonition, 'Listen to Him.' An angel of great counsel[84] is sent to you, and the one who was given to created things for their glory is the same one who comes to the lost for their healing. 'Listen to Him.' He is the creator and He is also the redeemer. As God, He created you with me; He alone came to you as a human being with you. 'Listen to Him.' For He is the form; He is the medicine; He is the example; He is the remedy. 'Listen to Him.' It would have been a happier situation to have always maintained His likeness, but now it will be no less glorious to return to imitation of Him. 'Listen to Him.'"

24.4 O humanity! What is the cause of your ignorance? Look, your own nature reproves you; it convicts you. You know what you are like, whence you come, whom you have as your Maker;[85] what Mediator you need; and you still clamor insolently against God by defending yourself! You know that you are wicked and that you have not been made evil by a good Maker. You quit; you do not call to Him who made you to come and restore you, or to the one who created you to redeem you. Have no doubts about His power; see how great are His works. Do not doubt His Wisdom; see how beautiful are His works. Do not doubt His good will; see how His works serve you by their usefulness. Thus, He shows you in His works what a great thing your redemption can be. He shows you also how you can await the fearful Judge, if you do not wish to have a Redeemer. No one can resist Him, because He is almighty. No one can deceive Him, because He is most wise. No one can corrupt Him, because He is most good. No one can turn away from Him, because

he is everywhere. No one can sustain[86] Him, because He is eternal. No one can bend Him, because He is immutable. Therefore, if we do not wish to have experience of the Judge, let us seek the Redeemer.

[III]

25.1 When we long since began to proceed from visible things to the investigation of invisible ones, we passed first from the corporeal creation to the incorporeal, that is, to the rational creation, and then from the rational creation we arrived at the Wisdom of God. Now, on our return, we will proceed first from the Wisdom of God to rational creation, then from consideration of the rational creation to corporeal creation.

25.2 The former is the order of knowledge; the latter, the order of creation (*conditionis*). For corporeal creation, which is visible, first comes into our awareness; then knowledge passes from corporeal creation to incorporeal creation. Finally, the open road of inquiry reaches the Creator of both. In the creation, at the top level,[87] rational creation was made in the image of God, then there is the corporeal creation, so that the rational creature would recognize in what was outside what it had received from the Creator interiorly. In the Wisdom of God is truth; in the rational creation, the image of truth; in the corporeal creature, the shadow of the image. Rational creation has been made for the Wisdom of God; corporeal creation has been made for the rational creature. For this reason, every movement and turning[88] of the corporeal creation is toward the rational creation, and every movement and turning of the rational creature ought to be toward the Wisdom of God. Then, when each thing clings to it superior through conversion, it does not disturb the order of the first creation or the likeness of that first exemplar within itself.

25.3 Therefore, whoever travels by the way of inquiry from visible things to invisible ones must first lead the gaze of his mind from the corporeal creation to the rational creation and then from the rational creation to consideration of his Creator. However, when he returns[89] from the invisible to the visible, he descends first from the Creator to the rational creation, then from the rational creature to the corporeal creation. In the human mind the order of cognition always precedes the order of creation, because it is we who are outside cannot return from the things within, unless we first have penetrated the interior things with the eye of the mind.[90] However, the order of creation always comes again after the order of cognition because, although human weakness is sometimes given tenuous admittance to contemplate interior realities, the ebb and flow of its mutability does not allow it to stay there long.[91]

26.1 Therefore, after we have, to the extent that God deigned to grant us, arrived at knowledge of invisible things from visible things, let our mind now return to itself and pay attention to what use can come to it from this knowledge. For what good is it to us if we know in God the height of his majesty, but glean from it nothing useful to us? But notice, when we come back from that interior, secret place of divine contemplation, what will we be able to bring with us? Coming from the region of light, what else except light? For it is fitting and necessary that if we come from the region of light, we carry with us light to put to flight our darkness. And who will be able to know what we were there, if we do not return enlightened? Therefore let what we were there appear; let what we saw there appear. If there we saw power, let us bring back the light of the fear of God. If we saw wisdom there, let us bring back the light of truth. If we saw kindness there, let us bring the light of love. Power rouses the sluggish to fear; wisdom illumines those who were blind from the darkness of ignorance; kindness enflames the cold with the warmth of charity.

26.2 Look, please! What is light if not the day, and what is darkness if not the night? And just as the eye of the body has its day and its night, so also does the eye of the heart[92] have its day and its night. Therefore, there are three days[93] of invisible light by which the course of the spiritual life within is divided. The first day is fear; the second day is truth; the third day is love.[94] The first day has power as its sun. The second day has wisdom as its sun. The third day has kindness as its sun. Power pertains to the Father, wisdom to the Son, kindness to the Holy Spirit.

26.3 Our days that we have exteriorly are one thing; those that we have interiorly are another. Our exterior days pass by, even if we do not want them to. Our interior days can, if we want them to, remain for eternity, for it is said of the fear of the Lord that it "*remains forever and ever.*"[95] There is no doubt that truth remains forever. Even if truth begins in this life, it will be full and perfect in us then, when He who is truth will appear clearly after the end of this life. It is also said of charity that "*charity never fails.*"[96]

26.4 Good are the days that never fail! For those days are bad which not only do not last forever, but which cannot stand even for a little while. The prophet says of these days: "*Man, his days are like straw.*"[97] The latter are the days that our guilt deserves; the former are the days that grace gives. The prophet spoke about these days: "*In my days I will call out.*"[98] For if he spoke of those other days, why would he not call out also at night, for elsewhere he said: "*I rose in the middle of the night to praise you*"?[99] But he calls these days his own, because he does not love those other days, as Jeremiah says: "*Lord you know that I have not desired the day of man.*"[100] Job was full of this sort of days. Of him it was written: "*He died an old man full of days.*"[101] He could not have been full of that other kind of days, which he had not yet passed through. The only days that the wicked have known are those external days. But the good, who have already deserved to see interior days, not only do not love those that are outside, but they also curse them. Blessed Job says: "*Let the day on which I was born perish, and the night in which it was said, 'A human being has been conceived.' Let this day be turned into darkness, and let God not look at it from above, and let it not be illumined by the light.*"[102] Instead, we should love those days that are within, where darkness does not follow light, where the interior eyes of the clean of heart are illumined by the splendor of the eternal sun.

26.5 Of these days the psalmist sang: "*Announce from one day to the next His salvation.*"[103] What is "His salvation" if not His Jesus? For that is how "Jesus" is translated, that is, "salvation." He is spoken of as salvation because through Him humanity is reformed for salvation. John spoke of Him, saying: "*The law was given through Moses; grace and truth have come to be through Jesus Christ.*"[104] Likewise, the Apostle Paul calls Christ Jesus "*the power of God and the wisdom of God.*"[105] Therefore, if the wisdom of God is Jesus Christ, and truth came to be through Jesus Christ, it follows that truth came to be through the wisdom of God. The day of wisdom is the truth. Concerning this His day, Wisdom himself speaks to the Jews, saying: "*Abraham, your father, rejoiced that he saw my day; he saw and was glad.*"[106] The truth of God is the redemption of the human race. He had first promised it; when later He showed it, surely what else did He show than His own truthful self? Rightly this truth was fulfilled through Wisdom, from whom all truth is. The one who was sent to fulfill the truth was nothing else than He in whom all the fullness of truth resides. Rightly, then, does Abraham exult at the day of truth, because he wanted the truth to be fulfilled. How surely then did he, through the Spirit, see the day, when he recognized the Son of God coming in the flesh for the redemption of the human race.

26.6 Therefore let it be said: "*Tell from one day unto the next his salvation.*"[107] The second day, from the first day unto the third day; the day of truth, from the day of fear unto the day of charity. First, there was one day, the day of fear. A second day came, the day of truth. It arrived, but did not replace, because the first day did not cease. Behold, two days! There was movement toward the third day, the day of charity. But when it came, it did not expel the former days. Blessed are those days! Human beings can be fulfilled by these days, when future things supervene but the present things do not pass away, when their number will increase and their brightness will multiply.

27.1 First, human beings, placed under sin, were rebuked by the law and began to fear God, the Judge, because they knew their wickedness. Now, to fear Him was already to recognize Him, because surely they could not fear Him at all, if they had no inkling of Him. Already this recognition was some measure of light. It was already day, but not yet bright, because it was still shadowed by the darkness of sin. Therefore, there came the day of truth, the day of salvation, which destroyed sin and illumined the brightness of the previous day. It did not take away fear, but turned it into something better. But there was not yet full brightness, until charity was added to truth. For Truth himself says: "*I have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. However, when that Spirit of truth comes, he will teach you all truth*;"[108] "all truth," in order both to take away evils and to reform good things. Notice, there are three days: the day of fear, which makes evil manifest; the day of truth, which takes away evil; the day of charity, which restores good. The day of truth brings light to the day of fear; the day of charity brings light to the day of fear and to the day of truth, until charity is perfect and all truth completely manifest, and fear of punishment will pass over into reverent fear. "*So announce from day unto day his salvation.*"[109]

27.2 Hosea the prophet spoke of these days, when he said: "*He will bring us to life after two days, and on the third day he will raise us up.*"[110] For we have heard and rejoiced about how our Lord Jesus Christ rising from the dead on the third day enlivened us in Himself and raised us up. But it was very fitting that we reimburse Him for his favor, and, just as we have risen in Him as He rose on the third day, so, too, let us, rising on the third day for Him and through Him, make Him rise in us. We

should not believe that He wishes to be paid by us what He first wished to grant us. As He wished to have three days in order to work out our salvation in Himself and through Himself, so he gave three days to us in order that we might work out our salvation in ourselves through Him. But because what was done in Him was not only a remedy, but also an example and a sacrament, it was necessary that it happen visibly and outwardly, so that it might signify what needed to happen in us invisibly.[111] Therefore, His days are external; our days are to be sought internally.

27.3 We have three days internally by which our soul is illumined. To the first day pertains death; to the second, burial; to the third, resurrection. The first day is fear; the second is truth; the third is charity. The day of fear is the day of power, the day of the Father. The day of truth is the day of wisdom, the day of the Son. The day of charity is the day of kindness, the day of the Holy Spirit. In fact, the day of the Father and the day of the Son and the day of the Holy Spirit are one day in the brightness of the Godhead, but in the enlightening of our minds it is as if the Father had one day, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit another. Not that it is to be believed in any way that the Trinity, which is inseparable in its nature, can be separated in its operation, but so that the distinction of persons can be understood in the distribution of works.

27.4 When, therefore, the omnipotence of God is considered and arouses our heart to wonder, it is the day of the Father; when the wisdom of God is examined and enlightens our heart with recognition of the truth, it is the day of the Son; when the kindness of God is observed and enflames our hearts to love, it is the day of the Holy Spirit. Power arouses fear; wisdom enlightens; kindness brings joy. On the day of power, we die through fear. On the day of wisdom, we are buried away from the clamor of this world by contemplation of the truth. On the day of kindness, we rise through love and desire of eternal goods.[112] Therefore, Christ died on the sixth day, lay buried in the tomb on the seventh, and rose on the eighth day, so that in a similar way through fear the power of God on its day may first cut us away from carnal desires outside, and then wisdom on his day may bury us within in the hidden place of contemplation; and finally, kindness on its day may cause us to rise revivified through desire of divine love.[113] For the sixth day is for work; the seventh, for rest; the eighth, for resurrection.

Here ends *On the Three Days*.

NOTES

1 See John 1:1–4; Sir 1:5; Heb 4:12.

2 Rom 1:20. The Latin text of the Vulgate is not transparent: "*invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur*." The Douai-Rheims (ca. 1750) translation reads "For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." Ronald Knox (1945) translated: "From the foundation of the world men have caught sight of his invisible nature [as] known through his creatures." Achard of St Victor, "On the Unity of God and the Plurality of Creatures," 1.37, 2.4 (tr. Hugh Feiss in *Achard of St Victor, Works*, Cistercian Studies Series 165 [Kalamazoo: Cistercian, 2001], 407, 441), refers to Rom 1:20, when he states that he does not develop his theology of the Trinity on the basis of what God has made. In *On the Trinity* Richard of St Victor cites Rom 1:20 more than any other biblical passage: *Trin.* 1.8; 1.10; 5.6; 6.1; 6.15; 6.17.

3 Throughout *On the Three Days*, Hugh designates *benignitas* as the third of the three divine attributes he discusses. The Latin term means having a kind or affable bearing towards others, kindness, benevolence, mercy. For the *benignitas* of God see Rom 2:4; Titus 3:4. Hugh uses the same triad with *benignitas* in a number of places: *Libellus* 4 (Sicard, 143.111–14; PL 176.693D); *Sent. div.* "Appendix" (Piazzoni, 953–54.1–32, 63–68; *Sacr.* 1.2.7 (PL 176.209B-10A; Deferrari 32); *Misc.* 1.63 (PL 177.505A).
Elsewhere, in discussing this triad, Hugh substitutes other similar words for *benignitas*: for example,
bonitas: *Misc.* 1.83 (PL 177.518BC);
bonitas and benignitas: *Sacr.* 1.3.26–28 (PL 176.227C-231A; Deferrari, 53–57);
gratia: *Didasc.* 3.11 (Taylor, 93; Buttimer, 60.6–8);
voluntas: *Sent. div.* 2 (Piazzoni, 938.74–91); *Sent. div.* 3 (Piazzoni, 948.3–5);
libertas: *Sacr.* 1.5.12 (PL 176.251D; Deferrari, 80);
amor: *Sent. div.* 3 (Piazzoni, 953.177–86); *Sacr.* 1.2.6–13 (PL 176.208B-13C; Deferrari, 31–35);
caritas: *Eulogium* (PL 176.988C-989A); *Misc.* 1.99 (PL 177.531A-532A).
On *Misc.* 1.83, see Poirel, *Livre*, 140–44, 338–39; he concludes that it is probably earlier than the *On the Three Days*. It does not mention the Trinity. On the other texts in which Hugh mentions the triad, see Poirel, *Livre*, 327–43.

4 See *In Eccl.* 10 (PL 175.180A).

5 *Sacr.* 2.1.3 (PL 176.373A, 373D; Deferrari, 207); 2.1.4 (PL 176.376C-D; Deferarri, 211).

6 Hugh does not follow exactly the division of the first part (of three) that he sketches in 1.3. On this initial outline, see Poirel, *Livre*, 240–60, who suggests that in 1.3 Hugh is not so much giving the plan of his treatise as he is inculcating a (di-)vision of the world.

7 Richard of St Victor, *Exterm.* 3.16 (PL 196.1112BC): "Happy are those for whom the beauty of temporal things is an incitement toward eternity." Achard of St Victor, *Serm.* 9.4 (tr. Feiss, 67–68), writes that each created thing mirrors the Trinity by its existence, beauty and useful goodness. Regarding his preoccupation with beauty see Feiss's comments in *Sermons*, 58. However, in "On the Unity of God," where he deals with the Trinity apart from creation, Achard focuses on unity, duality and equality as the relational attributes of the divine persons.

8 Hugh uses these same two terms in a discussion of the quadrivium in *Didasc.* 2.6 (Taylor, 67; Buttimer, 30.1–5). There he says that quantity is the visible form in its measured dimensions as impressed on the mind's imagination; it has two parts, one continuous, such as a tree or stone which is called magnitude, the other discrete, like a flock or a people, which is called multitude.

9 "*animalis*" from *anima* (soul). Literally the adjective means "soul-bearing," "ensouled," or "animate," and at times, "animalistic." Generally when it is used in a neutral sense I have translated it as "biological." When it is used pejoratively, I have translated it as "carnal."

10 *gratus, aptus, commodus, necessarius*. Later, Hugh will substitute *congruus* for *aptus*. The four qualities form a continuum from what is pleasant to what is necessary. In the translation I try to be consistent: *gratus*: attractive or pleasing; *aptus*: apt, for which sometimes Hugh

substitutes *congruus* = fitting; *commodus*: beneficial, for which Hugh sometimes substitutes *conveniens* = suitable; *necessarius*: necessary.

11 *honoruscopa*: see Pliny, *Historia Naturalis* (Thayer, 32.24.69), available online at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/L/Roman/Texts/Pliny_the_Elder; Isidore of Seville, *Etym.* (Thayer, 12.6.35), available online at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Isidore. The name is a corruption of "uranoscopus" ("sky-gazer"). The fish was so named because its eyes are both on the top of its head. The *Oxford English Dictionary* has a helpful entry for "uranoscopus."

12 Cf. Heb 1:1.

13 *Dulcedo* (*dulce*) and *suavitas* (*suave*) seem to be synonyms. They refer to sweetness in taste, something much rarer in the Middle Ages than now, when the prime sweetener was honey rather than sugar. Most often the terms mean charm, delightfulness, agreeableness.

14 Ps 91:5–7 (Vulg.). Cf. *In Eccl.* 2 (PL 175.138C).

15 On *mundus sensilis*, see *Sacr.* 1.1.29 (PL 176.204C; Deferrari, 27): "The works of creation, that is, this world perceptible to the senses (*sensilis*) with all its elements, were made in matter before any day together in time and with time . . .").

16 On the *book* of nature, see *Archa Noe.* 2.10 (Sicard, 48.1–6; PL 176.643D-644A): There are three books: one made by human beings from something, the second created by God from nothing, the third to whom God gives birth, God from very God. The second book is the work of God, which will never cease to be; in this visible work the invisible wisdom of the Creator is visibly written. See Wanda Cizewski, "Reading the World as Scripture: Hugh of St Victor's *De tribus diebus*," *Florilegium* 9 (1987): 65–88; Alan of Lille, *Rhytmus* (PL 210.579AB); *Anticlaudianus* (PL 210.491).

17 On nature as revelatory, see *Didasc.* 6.5 (Taylor, 145; Buttimer, 123.4–6): "all nature bespeaks God; all nature teaches humanity; all nature produces knowledge, and nothing in the universe is sterile"; *In Eccl.* 2 (PL 175.142B). Dominque Poirel, "Voir l'invisible: la spiritualité visionnaire de Hugues de Saint Victor," in *Spiritualität im Europa des Mittelalters: L'Europe spirituelle au Moyen Age: 900 Jahre Hildegard von Bingen, 900 ans l'abbaye de Citeaux*, eds. Jean Ferrari and Stephan Grätzel, Philosophie im Kontext 4 (St. Augustin: Gardez! Verlag, 1998), 34–36, points out how Hugh's theology and spirituality "can be interpreted as an effort to get beyond the contradiction between the visible and the invisible." God must be known and loved by way of his visible creation, which is a pledge of His love.

18 On God's invisible Wisdom and Word made visible, see *Sacr.* 1.3.20 (PL 176.225B; Deferrari, 50) and *Sacr.* 1.6.5 (PL 176.266D-267A; Deferrari, 97–98): Divine Wisdom is the intrinsic, invisible Word of God; this invisible Word is made known through a visible, extrinsic word, which is God's work. Cf. Augustine, *En. Ps.* 26.2.12 (Dekkers and Fraipont, 161.10–21).

19 On "*spiritalis . . . omnia diiudicare potest*" (1 Cor 2:15), see *Didasc.* 6.4 (Taylor, 144; Buttimer, 122.4–5); *Sacr.* 1.1.13 (PL 176.198A; Deferrari, 20); *Sacr.* 2.2.4 (PL 176.418C; Deferrari 256). *Misc.* 1.1 (PL 177.469B-477C) is an extended commentary on this verse of St Paul, summarizing some central themes of Hugh's theology: (1) The Holy Spirit makes people spiritual. The Spirit's anointing instructs them about everything, because it contains all. There is one Wisdom, in which are all things. Thus the universe is one, and greatness (*magnitudo*) and simplicity coalesce. God is the Light by which we see and the Beauty (*species*) which we see. God is the one delight of all the spiritual senses. (2) The eye of the flesh sees the world and what is in the world; the eye of reason sees the rational soul (*animus*) and all that is in it; the eye of contemplation sees God and all else in God. (3) Hence, spiritual persons judge all things. They judge truth through wisdom and goodness through experience. (4) Like corporeal light, spiritual light both illumines to knowledge of the truth and warms to love of goodness. (5) True judgment is made according to a right rule; the supreme rule is the supreme truth and goodness, that is, God. (6) God is the supreme spiritual good; human beings are the supreme good among bodily beings, and for them all other bodily beings were made for their use and instruction. Spiritual goods are from God; bodily goods are for humankind. Hugh reiterates this conviction that God created physical things for human beings at: *Misc.* 1.35 (PL 177.494D); *Archa Noe.* 4, 5 (Sicard, 100.51–52; PL 176.671D); *Sac. dial.* (PL 176.211D); *Sent. div.* 3 (Piazzoni, 928.23–24); *Sacr.* 1.Prol.3 (PL 176.184B; Deferrari, 4); *Sacr.* 1.1.3 (PL 176.188C-189B; Deferrari,

8–9), where Hugh says that if someone does not like this explanation, they should find a better one; *Sacr.* 1.1.29 (PL 176.204D; Deferrari, 27), *Sacr.* 1.2.1 (PL 176.205B-206C; Deferrari, 28–29). He believed there was a hierarchy in creation, in which each level is subject to the one above: God, spirit, body, and world. This does not imply that human beings had unlimited scope to exploit nature; they are subject to God, and were to use God's creation to meet their needs and learn from it about its maker. Some things were made solely for the latter purpose. Moreover, Hugh had a very strong sense of the interconnectedness of the whole material universe; everything is interconnected (*Sacr.* 1.2.1 [PL 176.206 D; Deferrari 29]). See 14.2 below. (7) That is good which participates in and leads to the Supreme Good. (8) All the forms, figures, colors and beauties of things are said to be good insofar as they delight the human senses. (9) Properly speaking, evil is what people do, not what happens to them. By God's grace, the bad things that happen to people can be turned to good.

20 On this contrast between the wise and foolish person, see *In Eccl.* 10 (PL 175.182A), 17 (PL 175.241B); *Archa Noe* 3.5 (Sicard 59.12–19; PL 176.649BC).

21 Ps 142:5.

22 Isa 40:12, 22.

23 Ps 95:5.

24 *In hier. cael.* 2 (PL 175.949BC); *Assumpt.*(*Oeuvre* 2, 118.89–94; PL 177.1211D; 148.501–150.507; PL 177.1220AB); *Laude car.* 6 (*Oeuvre* 1, 188.97–99; (PL 176.972D); *Arrha* (*Oeuvre* 1, 232.101–5; PL 176.954B).

25 Van Zwieten, "Scientific and Spiritual Culture," 184, traces this idea back to Macrobius, *In somnium Scipionis* 2.10.10–22 (Eyssenhardt [Leipzig, 1893] 618–19; available at http://la.wikisource.org/wiki/Commentariorum_in_Somnium_Scipionis), where the discussion of fire and water occurs in section VI.

26 *Inst. nov.* 12 (*Oeuvre* 1, 72.926–27; PL 176.943A).

27 *Adnot. in Pent.* (PL 175.35B); *In Eccl.* 2 (PL 175.137D-138A); *Sent. div.* 1 (Piazzoni, 932.157–61; *Sac. dial.* (PL 176.20A); *Sacr.* 1.1.6 (PL 176.190C; Deferrari, 11); *Sacr.* 1.1.22 (PL 176.201D-202A; Deferrari, 24). Hugh will return to this idea of the harmonious interconnection of disparate parts a number of times in *On the Three Days*. Achard of St Victor also emphasizes this congruence: "On the Unity of God," 1.5–9, 1.48 (tr. Feiss, 381–84, 425–26).

28 The subject of the verbs in this paragraph is divine providence ("*divina providentia . . . creatoris providentia*"). One could refer to "divine providence" as "he," (referring to God in the masculine and recognizing that divine providence is only a personification of one aspect of the simple fullness of God), "she," ("*providentia*" is feminine in Latin) or "it" ("*providentia*" as a neuter power of foresight). When in Latin the pronoun was the subject of a verb, Hugh did not have to make this choice, since the pronouns are not expressed in Latin. I have chosen to use the feminine pronoun, both because the grammatical subject is the feminine word "providentia" and as a counterweight to my use of "he" for God elsewhere in the translation. Hugh will use feminine pronouns when referring to divine Wisdom and Knowledge (both feminine words in Latin), except in a few instances where he is speaking directly of Christ; in those instances he uses masculine pronouns. I will follow his usage.

29 The inclusion of the study of the arts in a list of natural resources is striking. Perhaps Hugh thought that the special contribution to human society of places like Paris or St Victor was scholarship rather than some sort of material resource.

30 The idea that Providence arrange that one region supplies what is lacking in another occurs in Walahfrid Strabo, *Hortulus*, ed. and tr. Raef Payne, comm. Wilfrid Blunt (Pittsburgh, PA: Hunt Botanical Library, 1966) 52–53: ". . . Oh, how wise, / How good is God! Let us praise Him as we ought. / From no land He withholds His bounty; what is rare / Beneath this sky, under another lies / In such abundance as the cheapest trash / We have among us here: some things we scorn / Rich kingdoms pay great prices for. And so / One land helps another; so the whole world, / Through all its parts, makes one family." ("... O magni laudanda Tonantis / Virtus et ratio, nullis quae munera terris / Larga suae non pandit opis: quae rara sub isto / Axe videre soles, aliis in partibus horum / Copia tanta jacet, quantam vilissima tecum / Efficiunt; rursus quaedam quae spreta videntur / Forte tibi, magno mercantur ditia regna, / Altera ut alterius potiatur foenore tellus / Orbis et in toto per partes una domus sit.")

31 Cf. *Misc.* 1.174 (PL 177.573C), which says that it is not a fault (*vitium*) to drink the waters of the lower cistern (Is 22:9), but it is a fault to hoard them, because although we may use temporal goods for our needs, we may not love them to the point of superfluity.

32 Cf. *Didasc.* 2.12 (Taylor, 69; Buttimer, 32.14–17); *Inst. nov.* 4 (*Oeuvre* 1, 24.107–12; PL 176.927D-28A).

33 "*Species*" is difficult to translate. It means a seeing or sight, shape, beauty, appearance, apparition, reputation, quality.

34 Cf. *Archa Noe* 2.3 (Sicard, 37.6–8; PL 176.638A).

35 Like "*providentia*," "*sapientia*" is a feminine noun personifying a divine attribute.

36 The notion that the soul has a higher part (Hugh here speaks of the *ratio* of the *mens*) directed toward the world of the invisible above humans and a lower part, directed toward knowledge of physical things, is part of the diffuse Platonism of medieval thought. The distinction between *sapientia* and *scientia*, stemming from Augustine, corresponds to this division. Here, however, when Hugh speaks of this latter dimension of human existence, he does not think of reason knowing physical things, but of instincts and feelings. Following again the Platonic tradition, he divides these into the irascible and the concupiscible, that is, we might say, adrenalin and desire. On these, cf. *Didasc.* 2.4 (Taylor, 65; Buttimer, 27.30–28.10; PL 176.754AB); *Didasc.* 2.12 (Taylor, 69; Buttimer, 33.6); and for desire, see *In Eccl.* 12 (PL 176.192B).

37 *Anima*, soul, is the basis for the adjective *animalis*. The word means "ensouled," "soul-bearing," "animate," or even "animalistic." It is misleading to translate it the same way in each context. Generally, when it is used neutrally, I have translated it as "biological" or "animal," and when it is used pejoratively, I have translated it "carnal."

38 Prompted by his mention of the nails on fingers and toes, Hugh draws a moral regarding earthly things. Some are almost necessary for us to live; others are not and can be trimmed painlessly. The first are needs (*necessitates*), the second superfluous wants. Cf. *Eulogium* (PL 176.990D); *Unione* (Piazzoni, 887.130–32; PL 177.288BC).

39 Rather as we understand radar, medieval thinkers thought that seeing occurred when the eyes sent out a ray which was then reflected back to the eye. Cf. *Unione* (PL 177.287B).

40 *In Eccl.* 2 (PL 175.141A); *Sacr.* 2.16.3 (PL 176.585B; Deferrari, 438–39); *Misc.* 2.11 (PL 177.595A).

41 The Latin names of some of the creatures Hugh lists here are not easy to identify. In her translation of this passage, Wanda Zemler-Cizewski ("Beauty and Beasts," 298) opts for alternate translations for the following animals: moth = bookworm, stinging insect = gnat, gnat = fly, tick = mosquito. Professor Zemler-Cizewski elsewhere ("Animal and Plant Lore in Hugh of St Victor's *De tribus diebus*," unpublished paper delivered at the 43rd International Congress on Medieval Studies, Western Michigan University, May 9, 2008) made the interesting suggestion that one of Hugh's pedagogical goals may have been to increase his readers' (or students') Latin vocabulary.

42 *In Eccl.* 2 (PL 175.140B); *Sacr.* 1.6.8 (PL 176.268D-269A; Deferrari, 100).

43 The inclusion of "beauty" here does not perfectly fit the logic of his outline. Since par. 4, Hugh has been writing about beauty as a manifestation of divine wisdom. He subdivided it into four categories: structure, motion, appearance, and quality. In 9.1, he divided appearance into shape and color. He then listed a number of ways in which shapes can be marvelous: great size, smaller, rarity, beauty, oddity, one in many, many in one. In this paragraph he mentions that the appearance of some things is strikingly beautiful, and in the next he mentions things that are particularly odd-looking.

44 *In hier. cael.* 7 (175.1063D); *Misc.* 1.122 (PL 177.546D).

45 Hugh's high estimate of the color green recurs in *Assumpt.* (*Oeuvre* 2, 148.501–2; PL 177.1220A); *Libellus* 1 (Sicard, 122.38; PL 176.682A; 122.44; PL 176.682B), *Misc.* 1.183 (PL 175.567C; PL 175.568D). This love of the color green seems to reflect his own sensibility, but it may also have derived from Sir 40:22: "*gratiam et speciem desiderabit oculus tuus et super hoc viride sationis*" ("Thy eye desireth favour and beauty, but more than these green sown fields" [Douai-Rheims]; "Grace and beauty charm the eye; best of all, the green wheat" [Knox]); cf. Sir 40:16. One thinks of Hildegard of Bingen's notion of *viriditas* ("greenness"), the God-given life force of the biological and spiritual worlds.

46 In *Didasc.* 1.9 (Taylor, 56; Buttimer, 16.17), *Didasc.* 2.1 (Taylor, 62; Buttimer, 24.24), and *Didasc.* 2.20 (Taylor, 75; Buttimer, 39.16–17), Hugh speaks of mechanical arts which imitate nature. These are "artificial" (*adulterinae*) because they are the work of an artisan in which the form is not from nature. The Latin word "*adulterina*" was usually pejorative, and Hugh may have chosen it for its negative connotations. However, his treatment of these "mechanical" arts (such as cloth-making and navigation), which aim to meet human needs, is positive and original.

47 "*dulcia sermonum commercia*." In *Inst. nov.* 13–17 (*Oeuvre* 1, 82–90.965–1113; PL 176.943D-949A), Hugh treats in detail of what, to whom, where, when, and how to speak.

48 The four categories are *necessarius*, *commodus*, *congruus*, and *gratus*. They are on a continuum from necessary to unnecessary. It is not easy to capture the nuances of the middle two, which I have translated as beneficial and suitable, the latter being less necessary than the former. In *Sacr.* 1.9.7 (PL 176.327AB; Deferrari, 164), Hugh divides "sacraments" into three kinds: Those which are necessary to salvation (Baptism, Eucharist); those helpful toward salvation (ashes, holy water); and those preparatory to the other sacraments (e.g., relating to Holy Orders).

49 In his edition, Poirel has corrected the reading in the manuscripts from "*Necessarium unicuique rei est quominus ipsa subsistere commode non potest*" to "*Necessarium unicuique rei est, quo minus ipsa subsistere omnimodo non potest*." See Poirel, *De tribus diebus*, *243–*245.

50 Cf. 1 Tim 6:17.

51 See note 15 above.

52 "*Non igitur decebat, ut rerum visibilium copia aliqua in parte defectum sentiret*." The subject of *sentiret* could also be understood to be "*homo*": "it was not fitting that humanity perceive a defect in some aspect with respect to the array of visible things . . ."

53 Cf. Richard of St Victor, *Serm. cent.* 69 (PL 177.1114BC).

54 *compendium tractandi*: As Poirel notes (*Livre* 235–40), here and in 20.10 Hugh refers to *On the Three Days* as a *compendium*. This is not one of the genres he lists in *Didasc.* 3.6. Hugh refers to many of his works as *compendia* or *compendiosa*. In doing so, he seems to indicate a pedagogical concern for brevity. *Tractactus* is also a flexible term, but implies a monograph treating of a unified theme.

55 In *Sacr.* 1.1.3–6 (PL 176.188C–192D; Deferrari, 8–13), Hugh draws a parallel between the formation of material creation and humankind. God first created unformed matter, and then gave it form, and so showed that it first received from God existence, which was the prerequisite for receiving ordering and form. Newly created matter was not totally without form, but it lacked the beautiful and apt disposition and form that it now has. So human beings are first created, then turn in thanks and love to their Creator to be formed. They first receive being (existence), then beautiful being (sanctification), then blessed being (eternal consummation). Newly created matter was not totally without form, but it lacked the beautiful and apt disposition and form that it now has.

56 *Misc.* 1.184 (PL 177.580D-581A) says that the Wisdom of God, without departing from where it was (in the Trinity), came out to us in three ways: in the creation of things, when it appeared to us clothed in the beauty of created things; when it assumed the vesture of the flesh and appeared to us visibly; when, clothed under the sacred veil of words, it presented itself to our understanding. Cf. *Decalogum* 1 (PL 176.11BC); *Sacr.* 1.12.6 (PL 176.354AB; Deferrari, 194).

57 *Sapere*, from which the noun *sapientia* is derived, means to taste, have good taste, be discreet or wise. This connection was often noted by medieval authors; see, for example, the citations in Henri de Lubac, *Medieval Exegesis*, vol. 2: *The Four Senses of Scripture*, tr. E. M. Macierowski (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 397–98.

58 In *Sacr.* 1.2.12–13 (PL 176.211AB; Deferrari, 34–35), having just said that the immensity of created things bears the form of power, their beauty the form of wisdom, and their utility the form of goodness, Hugh adds that the rational creature has a more perfect likeness of these three in its knowing, choosing and power. The primary and principle mirror of the invisible God is his image and likeness, which is near and kin to God (*Sacr.* 1.3.6 [PL 176.219A; Deferrari, 43]). Humans, therefore recognize their invisible God, when they understand that they are made in his image (*Sacr.* 1.3.21 [PL 176.225BC; Deferrari, 50–51]).

59 In 17.4–5, Hugh may be drawing on the argument of St Anselm's *Monologion* 4–6, ed. Schmidt, *Obras completas de San Anelmo* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1952) 1:201–9.

60 Cf. *Didasc.* 1.6 (Taylor, 52–54; Buttimer, 12.4–13.4).

61 Hugh often plays on the words *affectus* and *effectus*; e.g., *Adnot. in Pent.* 7 (PL 175.47B) *Orat. dom.* 10 (PL 175.782B), *Arrha* (*Oeuvre* 1, 248.350; PL 176.959C), *Potestate*, where he adds *re spectus* (PL 176.789C), *Sacr.* 1.3.11 (PL 176.291D-292A; Deferrari, 45), where he distinguishes in human beings *appetitus justi* and *appetitus commodi* and their respective *effectus* that, unlike those in the natural world, are not always attained, because their attainment depends on human choice. *Misc.* 1.64 (PL 177.504D-505A) tersely distinguishes *affectus*, *defectus* and *effectus*. These three would not exist apart from the providence of God. Hugh immediately goes on to say that another triad —magnitude, beauty and utility— in creation testify to the power, wisdom and kindness of God.

62 Boethius, *Con. phil.* 3, prosa 12 (Loeb 74.286.15–288.24).

63 On the oneness of God, see *Adnot. in Pent.* 4 (PL 175.33B); *Sacr.* 1.1.1 (PL 176.187AB; Deferrari 7–8); *Sacr.* 1.3.9 (PL 176.220A; Deferrari, 44); *Sacr.* 1.10.4 (PL 176.333B; Deferrari, 171); *Misc.* 1.185 (PL 177.581BC).

64 For the kinds of unity discussed in this and the next paragraph, see *In Eccl.* 16 (PL 175.233B); *In hier. cael.* 7 (PL 175.1070C); *Sent. div.* 1 (Piazzoni, 930.81–88); *Sent. div.* (Piazzoni 951.119–952.140); *Sacr.* 1.3.12 (PL 176.220BD; Deferrari, 45); *Sacr.* 1.6.37 (PL 176.285D-286B; Deferrari, 119); *Sacr.* 2.1.3 (PL 176.375AB; Deferrari, 209); *Sacr.* 2.1.11 (PL 176.408C-409A; Deferrari, 245–46); Achard of St Victor, "On the Unity of God," 1.1–4 (ed. Martineau, 71–72; tr. Feiss, 379–81).

65 Cf. *Sacr.* 1.3.15 (PL 176.221C; Deferrari, 46).

66 *Sacr.* 1.3.17 (PL 176.223D-224A; Deferrari, 49); *Sacr.* 2.1.13 (PL 176.413A-416A; Deferrari, 250–53): Christ's risen humanity is in heaven; by his divinity he is everywhere; *Misc.* 1.118 (PL 177.543D-544C).

67 *unus*: As Poirel points out, *De tribus diebus*, 247–48, the antecedent of these two occurrences of the masculine "one" is not clear. He notes that Licarro, translates "one (same) reality" and Van Zwieten has "one (same) faculty." Poirel himself suggests that one supply *animus* or *spiritus* or interpet *unus* as "*one person*," the spiritual dimension of a human being.

68 Cf. Ps 32:11.

69 Hugh uses this expression in a number of contexts: *Sacr.* 1.1.2 (PL 176.187C; Deferrari, 8): regarding the creation of the matter of physical things; *Sacr.* 1.6.12 (PL 176.270D; Deferrari, 102): regarding the knowledge infused into Adam at his creation; *Sacr.* 2.1.6 (PL 176.384A; Deferrari, 219): regarding the divine knowledge the soul of Christ received at the Incarnation; *Didasc.* 2.1 (Buttimer, 23.12): thus divine knowledge embraces past, present, and future.

70 Elsewhere, Hugh discusses the limitations of the bodily eye, contrasting it with the spiritual eye. See *Vanitate* 1 (PL 176.704BC).

71 See *Potestate* (PL 176.840CD); *Sent. div.* (Piazzoni, 938.94–7); *Sacr.* 1.1.9 (PL 176.210B; Deferrari, 33); Achard of St Victor, "On the Unity of God," 2.3 (tr. Feiss, 440).

72 *Sent. div.* 3 (Piazzoni, 952.151–62): *mens, intelligentia, gaudium* (mind, understanding and joy).

73 Here for the first time Hugh appropriates an essential attribute, wisdom, to one person of the Trinity, the Son.

74 Here Hugh uses *tria* (neuter plural); it would have been more consistent with his own practice and argument to have used *tres* (masculine plural).

75 *unum* is neuter; *unus* is masculine.

76 *pinsendi*: This rather unusual verb means to beat, pound, crush. As Poirel points out, *De tribus diebus*, *248–*249, earlier editors, including Licarro, have corrected it to *pingendi* ("of painting"), a reading found in some manuscripts. *Didasc.*1.9 (see reference in next note) encourages this when it lists "texendi, sculpendi, fundendi" among the arts which imitate nature. However, in *Didasc.* 3.2 (Taylor, 85; Buttimer, 51.6) Hugh uses "*molendi et pinsendi*" in relation to the culinary activities connected with hunting, and so Poirel chose to retain this reading.

77 On these useful skills (*artes mechanicae*), see *Didasc.* 1.9 (Taylor, 56; Buttimer, 17.16–17), *Didasc.* 2.20–27 (Taylor, 74–79; Buttimer, 39–44), and note 34 above.

78 Matt 3:17 = 2 Pet 1:17; cf. Mark 1:11; Luke 9:35; Matt 17:5.

79 *sola non tamen solitaria*: The same two adjectives are paired in *Sacr.* 1.3.31 (PL 176.232B; Deferrari, 59); cf. *Sacr.* 2.1.4 (PL 176.381B; Deferrari, 216); *Arrha* (Feiss and Sicard, 248.337–38; PL 176.959B).

80 "*Beatitudo*" means the condition of being happy, felicity. The word seems to have been coined by Cicero from the adjective "*beatus*," which means happy, fortunate, or blissful. In Christian Latin the terms came to have connotations of final bliss (e.g., "the blessed in heaven"). The adjective "*benedictus*," from *benedico*, to bless, is also rendered into English by "blessed."

81 Matt 3:17; cf. 2 Pet 1:17; Mark 1:11; Luke 9:35; Matt 17:5. This text is cited with reference to the Trinity in *Sacr.* 2.1.4 (PL 176.376C; Deferrari, 211).

82 Matt 3:17.

83 Matt 17:6.

84 Isa 9:5.

85 A very similar passage occurs in *Epitome* 1 (Baron, 190.92–98), where it is called the triple way of self-knowledge that the search for wisdom follows.

86 *Tolerare* means to sustain, bear or endure. I think that here it probably means to "outlast."

87 "*primo gradu*": This could be translated "at the first step," but that could suggest temporal succession, or, "the bottom rung of a ladder", which would not fit with the argument.

88 "*conversio*": Conversion or turning is an important idea of Neoplatonic thought. In Christian Platonism, beings go out from God through creation and return by conversion, that is, by contemplation. Here, then, the turning or conversion is intellectual contemplation, not moral change.

89 Most manuscripts have the plural "*revertientes*" which Poirel corrects to the singular "*revertens*."

90 *Verbo* 4, 4 (Baron, 72.180–82; PL 177.292C). Hugh's argument is that we have to reach God by traveling the way of cognition, from external things to rational creation, then to the Creator. But inevitably we will then follow the order of creation back to created realities, because we cannot remain long in the contemplation of God.

91 Human mutability and the limits it puts on contemplation are frequent themes in Hugh's writings; e.g. *Didasc.* 5.9 (Taylor, 133; Buttimer, 110.19–23); *In Eccl.* 12 (PL 175.104C); *Archa Noe* 2.11 (CCCM, 35.3–5; PL 176.636C); *Misc.* 1.8 (PL 177.483A); *Misc.* 1.81 (PL 177.517A); *Misc.* 2.19 (PL 177.599A).

92 The image of "eyes" is prominent in Hugh's writings: *Didasc.* 6.14 (Taylor, 154; Buttimer, 131–32.32); *Meditatione* (Baron, 56.158–59; PL 176.996); *In Eccl.* 7 (PL 175.163C); 10 (PL 175.173A, 182C); *Archa Noe* 2.14 (CCCM, 52.22–23; PL 176.545C); *Archa Noe* 4.9 (CCCM, 116.159–60); *Vanitate* 1 (PL 176.703C, 704 BC); *Sent. div.* 3 (Piazzoni, 949.38–39, 950.67–68); *Verbo* 4, 2 (Baron, 72.177–80; PL 176.292CD). Sometimes, as in *Misc.* 1.1 (PL 177.471BC; see note 19 above) and *Sacr.* 1.10.2 (PL 176.329C; Deferrari, 167), Hugh distinguishes the eye of the flesh, the eye of reason, and the eye of contemplation. The eye of reason was blurred by sin, and the eye of contemplation was blinded. *Doctrina* (teaching) and grace are means to restore their sight. In other passages Hugh distinguishes two eyes, usually the eye of the flesh and the eye of the heart (*cordis*) or mind (*mentis*). The eye of the heart is cleansed by training in virtue (*disciplina*) and instructed by teaching (*doctrina*). Stupid people walk in the dark and their eyes do not see what the eyes of the wise see.

93 This is the first mention of "the three days" which gave this work its title. Christ's humanity corresponds to the eye of the body, whereas his divinity refreshes the eye of the heart (*Misc.* 1.87 [PL 177.519D-520A]).

94 See 1 John 4:18. In *Septem donis* (Baron, 124.63–66), Hugh speaks of God coming first to arouse fear and finally to make one loving. In this passage, Hugh also refers to the divine Light. See *Libellus* 4 (CCCM, 140.53–143.98; PL 176 692C-693B); *Misc.* 1.75 (PL 177.510CD).

95 Ps 18:10.

96 1 Cor 13:8.

97 Ps 102:15.

98 Ps 114:2.

99 Ps 118:62; cf. Ps 53:8.

100 Jer 17:16.

101 Job 42:16.
102 Job 3:3–4.
103 Ps 95:2.
104 John 1:17.
105 1 Cor 1:24.
106 John 8:56.
107 Ps 95:2.
108 John 16:12–13.
109 Ps 95:2. A schema in the Ark treatise (*Libellus* 3 [CCCM, 132.20–133.22]; PL 176.689A, 136.103–10; PL 176.690B) distinguishes three states/eras of humanity: under the natural law, under the written law, and under grace.
110 Hos 6:3.
111 *Sacr.* 2.3.6–7 (PL 176.466BC; Deferrari, 308–9) explains that Christ's death was a real event and an example, that is, visible appearance (*species*), truly Christ's body (*veritas corporis*), and a power of spiritual grace. *In hier. cael.* 2 (PL 175.951D 952A) explains that Christ's death and resurrection are pattern or appearance (*figuram*), image, likeness, sacrament, and example, just as the Sacrament of the altar is both appearance and truth. Cf. *Misc.* 1.81 (PL 177.546C).
112 *Eulogium* (PL 176.988C): "First, the Spouse (Christ) kills the concupiscence of the flesh through abstinence, then through purity of heart he wipes away the ignorance of the mind, finally, as though on the third day, coming to converse, he fires the soul with desire for him."
113 The second volume of this series, devoted to Victorine discussions of love, will show how Richard of St Victor, *On the Four Degrees of Violent Love*, and Achard of St Victor, *Sermon* 15, speak of the same ascent to contemplation and return. However, where Hugh says only that one comes from contemplation "revivified through the desire of divine love," Richard and Achard say that one leaves contemplation filled with loving compassion for others, and so follows the path traveled by the Son of God who became incarnate out of compassion for fallen humanity.

HUGH OF ST VICTOR

SENTENCES ON DIVINITY

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Fr. Hugh Feiss, OSB, produced the notes and English translations for Lawrence's opening letter and the second part on the primordial causes. Christopher P. Evans produced the rest of the notes and translations. This work was profited by initial drafts produced by Dale Coulter and Boyd Taylor Coolman and editorial help from Frans Van Liere.